

File No. 130585

Committee Item No. 1

Board Item No. 28

COMMITTEE/BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

AGENDA PACKET CONTENTS LIST

Committee: Neighborhood Services & Safety Date October 10, 2013

Board of Supervisors Meeting Date October 29, 2013

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Completed by: Derek Evans Date 10/7/13
Completed by: DEREK EVANS Date 10/15/13

An asterisked item represents the cover sheet to a document that exceeds 25 pages.
The complete document can be found in the file.

1 [Police Code - Large Capacity Magazines; Sales of Firearms and Ammunition; Reporting Lost
2 or Stolen Firearms; Shooting Ranges]

3 Ordinance amending the Police Code to: 1) ban the possession of large capacity
4 magazines for firearm ammunition; 2) require that dealers advise persons purchasing a
5 firearm of local firearms laws; 3) establish a rebuttable presumption that the owner who
6 has not reported the theft or loss of a firearm as required by law remains in possession
7 of the firearm; 4) modify certain requirements for ammunition sales ~~require local~~
8 ~~dealers to report all ammunition sales to the Chief of Police;~~ and, 5) prohibit the
9 operator of a shooting range from allowing minors to enter the premises.

10 NOTE: Unchanged Code text and uncodified text are in plain Arial font.
11 Additions to Codes are in *single-underline italics Times New Roman font*.
12 Deletions to Codes are in *strikethrough italics Times New Roman font*.
13 Board amendment additions are in double-underlined Arial font.
14 Board amendment deletions are in ~~strikethrough Arial font~~.
15 Asterisks (* * * *) indicate the omission of unchanged Code
16 subsections or parts of tables. Do NOT delete this NOTE: area.

17 Be it ordained by the People of the City and County of San Francisco:

18 Section 1. The San Francisco Police Code is hereby amended by adding Section 619
19 ~~618~~, to read as follows:

20 **SEC. 619 618. PROHIBITION AGAINST POSSESSION OF LARGE CAPACITY MAGAZINES**

21 **(a) Findings.**

22 (1) In 2007, 3,231 people died from firearm-related injuries in California, and 4,491
23 other people were treated for non-fatal gunshot wounds.

24 (2) The ability of an automatic or semiautomatic firearm to fire multiple bullets without
25 reloading is directly related to the capacity of the firearm's feeding device or "magazine." Inside the

1 magazine, a spring forces the cartridges into position to be fed into the chamber by operation of the
2 firearm's action.

3 (3) Magazines with a capacity of more than 10 rounds of ammunition are generally
4 considered to be "large capacity" magazines, although the statutory definitions vary. In some cases,
5 large capacity magazines can hold up to 100 rounds of ammunition. Other types of firearms, in
6 contrast, are generally capable of holding far less ammunition; for example, revolvers typically hold
7 six rounds of ammunition in a rotating cylinder.

8 (4) Although detachable large capacity magazines are typically associated with
9 machine guns or semiautomatic assault weapons, such devices are available for any semiautomatic
10 firearm that accepts a detachable magazine, including semiautomatic handguns.

11 (5) The ability of large capacity magazines to hold numerous rounds of ammunition
12 significantly increases the lethality of the automatic and semiautomatic firearms using them.

13 (6) Large capacity magazines were used in a number of recent high-profile shootings,
14 including:

15 The shooting on the campus of Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007, where 32 people were
16 killed and many others wounded.

17 The shooting in a gym in Pittsburgh on August 4, 2009, where three people were killed
18 and nine others injured.

19 The shooting on November 5, 2009 at Fort Hood, Texas, where 13 people were killed
20 and 34 more were wounded.

21 The shooting on January 8, 2011, at Tucson, Arizona, where 6 people were killed and 13
22 people were injured, including a member of the United States House of Representatives, and

23 The shootings on December 14, 2012, at Newtown, Connecticut, where 27 people (not
24 including the shooter) were killed.

1 (7) Large capacity magazines have also been used against San Francisco police
2 officers, including a recent incident at India Basin Shoreline Park, where undercover police officers
3 were targeted with semiautomatic pistols containing 30-round magazines. Prohibiting large capacity
4 magazines serves police safety by requiring perpetrators to pause to reload their firearms more
5 frequently, giving police officers greater opportunity to apprehend them.

6 (8) Large capacity magazine bans reduce the capacity, and thus the potential lethality,
7 of any firearm that can accept a large capacity magazine.

8 (9) Large capacity magazines are not necessary for individuals to vindicate their right
9 to self-defense. Only in an extraordinarily rare circumstance would a person using a firearm in self-
10 defense ever be required to use a large capacity magazine to defend himself or herself effectively. This
11 is particularly true in an urban center like San Francisco, where law enforcement can and does
12 respond quickly to threats and incidents. Conversely, the dangers of large capacity magazines are
13 heightened in dense urban areas like San Francisco.

14 (10) In 1994, in recognition of the dangers posed by these devices, Congress adopted a
15 law prohibiting the transfer and possession of large capacity magazines as part of the federal assault
16 weapon ban. That law was filled with loopholes, however.

17 (11) The federal law was enacted with a sunset clause, providing for its expiration after
18 ten years. Despite overwhelming public support for the law, Congress allowed the federal ban to
19 expire on September 13, 2004.

20 (12) Research commissioned by the U.S. Department of Justice to analyze the effect of
21 the 1994 federal ban on assault weapons and large capacity magazines found that attacks with
22 semiautomatics including assault weapons and other semiautomatics equipped with large capacity
23 magazines result in more shots fired, more persons hit, and more wounds inflicted per victim than do
24 attacks with other firearms.

1 (13) Since January 1, 2000, California Penal Code §§ 32310 et seq., have, with limited
2 exceptions, prohibited the manufacture, importation into the state, keeping for sale, offering or
3 exposing for sale, giving, or lending of large capacity magazines. California law does not, however,
4 prohibit the possession of these magazines, and this gap in the law threatens public safety.

5 (b) Definition. "Large capacity magazine" means any detachable ammunition feeding device
6 with the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds, but shall not be construed to include any of the
7 following:

8 (1) A feeding device that has been permanently altered so that it cannot accommodate
9 more than 10 rounds;

10 (2) A .22 caliber tube ammunition feeding device; or

11 (3) A tubular magazine that is contained in a lever-action firearm.

12 (c) Prohibition on Possession of Large Capacity Magazines.

13 (1) No person, corporation, or other entity in the City may possess a large capacity
14 magazine, whether assembled or disassembled.

15 (2) Any person who, prior to the effective date of this chapter, was legally in possession
16 of a large capacity magazine shall have 90 days from such effective date to do any of the following
17 without being subject to prosecution:

18 (A) Remove the large capacity magazine from the City;

19 (B) Surrender the large capacity magazine to the Police Department for
20 destruction; or

21 (C) Sell or transfer the large capacity magazine lawfully in accordance with
22 Penal Code § 12020.

23 (d) Exceptions. Subsection (c) shall not apply to the following:

1 (1) Any government officer, agent, or employee, member of the armed forces of the
2 United States, or peace officer, to the extent that such person is otherwise authorized to possess a large
3 capacity magazine in connection with his or her official duties;

4 (2) A person licensed pursuant to Penal Code §§ 26700 to 26915, inclusive;

5 (3) A gunsmith for the purposes of maintenance, repair or modification of the large
6 capacity magazine;

7 (4) Any entity that operates an armored vehicle business pursuant to the laws of the
8 state, and an authorized employee of such entity, while in the course and scope of his or her
9 employment for purposes that pertain to the entity's armored vehicle business;

10 (5) Any person, corporation or other entity that manufactures the large capacity
11 magazine for a person mentioned in subsection (a) or for export pursuant to applicable federal
12 regulations;

13 (6) Any person using the large capacity magazine solely as a prop for a motion picture,
14 television, or video production, or entertainment event;

15 (7) Any holder of a special weapons permit issued pursuant to Penal Code § 33300,
16 32650, 32700, 31000, or 18900;

17 (8) Any person issued a permit pursuant to Penal Code § 32315 by the California
18 Department of Justice upon a showing of good cause for the possession, transportation, or sale of large
19 capacity magazines between a person licensed pursuant to Penal Code §§ 26700 to 26915 and an out-
20 of-state client, when those activities are in accordance with the terms and conditions of that permit;

21 (9) Any federal, state or local historical society, museum, or institutional collection
22 which is open to the public, provided that the large capacity magazine is properly housed, secured from
23 unauthorized handling, and unloaded;

24 (10) Any person who finds the large capacity magazine, if the person is not prohibited
25 from possessing firearms or ammunition pursuant to federal or state law, and the person possesses the

1 large capacity magazine no longer than is necessary to deliver or transport the same to a law
2 enforcement agency for that agency's disposition according to law;

3 (11) A forensic laboratory or any authorized agent or employee thereof in the course
4 and scope of his or her authorized activities;

5 (12) Any person in the business of selling or transferring large capacity magazines in
6 accordance with Penal Code § 12020, who is in possession of a large capacity magazine solely for the
7 purpose of doing so; or

8 (13) Any person lawfully in possession of a firearm that the person obtained prior to
9 January 1, 2000 if no magazine that holds 10 or less rounds of ammunition is compatible with that
10 firearm and the person possesses the large capacity magazine solely for use with that firearm.

11 (e) Penalty. Any person violating this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor.

12 (f) Severability. If any subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word of this Section be for any
13 reason declared unconstitutional or invalid or ineffective by any court of competent jurisdiction, such
14 decision shall not affect the validity or the effectiveness of the remaining portions of this Section or any
15 part thereof. The Board of Supervisors hereby declares that it would have adopted this Section
16 notwithstanding the unconstitutionality, invalidity, or ineffectiveness of any one or more of its
17 subsections, sentences, clauses, phrases, or words.

18 (g) No duplication of state law. In the event that the State of California enacts legislation
19 prohibiting possession of large capacity magazines, this Section 618 shall have no force or effect to the
20 extent that it duplicates any such state law.

21
22 Section 2. The San Francisco Police Code is hereby amended by amending
23 Section 613.10, to read as follows:

24 **SEC. 613.10. LICENSE—CONDITIONS.**

25 * * * *

1 (n) At or prior to the time of delivering a firearm, licensees shall provide the person buying,
2 leasing, or receiving the loan of the firearm with a copy of a notice, to be prepared by the Chief of
3 Police, advising the reader of local firearms laws, including safe gun storage requirements and the
4 requirement to report a lost or stolen firearm. The notice may also include summary information on
5 relevant State firearms laws, including the requirement that the sale, loan or other transfer of a firearm
6 to a non-licensed person be completed through a licensed firearms dealer.

7
8 Section 3. The San Francisco Police Code is hereby amended by amending
9 Section 616, to read as follows:

10 **SEC. 616. REPORTING THE LOSS OR THEFT OF FIREARMS.**

11 (a) Any person that owns or is otherwise in possession of a firearm shall report the
12 theft or loss of such firearm to the San Francisco Police Department within 48 hours of
13 becoming aware of the theft or loss whenever

- 14 (1) the owner resides in San Francisco, or
15 (2) the theft or loss of the firearm occurs in San Francisco.

16 (b) The failure of an owner or person in possession of a firearm to report the theft or
17 loss of the firearms within 48 hours of when the owner or person in possession becomes
18 aware or should have become aware of the theft or loss shall be punishable in accordance
19 with Section 613.19.

20 (c) The failure of an owner or person in possession of a firearm to report the theft or loss of the
21 firearms in a timely manner shall create a rebuttable presumption that the owner or person remains in
22 possession of the firearm.

23
24 / / /

25 / / /

1 Section 4. The San Francisco Police Code is hereby amended by amending
2 Section 615, to read as follows:

3 **SEC. 615. RECORDS OF AMMUNITION SALES.**

4 (a) **Definitions.**

5 (1) "Firearm ammunition," as used in this Section, shall include any ammunition
6 for use in any pistol or revolver, or semiautomatic rifle or assault weapon, but shall not include
7 ammunition for shotguns that contains shot that is No. 4 or smaller.

8 (2) "Semiautomatic rifle," as used in this Section, shall mean any repeating rifle
9 which utilizes a portion of the energy of a firing cartridge to extract the fired cartridge case and
10 chamber the next round, and which requires a separate pull of the trigger to fire each
11 cartridge.

12 (3) "Assault weapon," as used in this Section, shall mean any of the weapons
13 designated in California Penal Code Section 12276 or 12276.1.

14 (4) "Vendor," as used in this Section, shall mean any person located in the City
15 and County of San Francisco who is engaged in the sale of firearm ammunition, including any
16 retail firearms dealer.

17 (5) "Remote Vendor," as used in this Section, shall mean any person engaged
18 in the sale of firearm ammunition, including any retail firearms dealer, who is located outside
19 the City and County of San Francisco but delivers or causes to be delivered firearm
20 ammunition to an address within the City and County of San Francisco.

21 (b) No Vendor shall sell or otherwise transfer ownership of any firearm ammunition
22 without at the time of purchase recording the following information on a form to be prescribed
23 by the Chief of Police:

24 (1) the name of the Vendor (including the name of the specific individual)
25 transferring ownership to the transferee;

- 1 (2) the place where the transfer occurred;
- 2 (3) the date and time of the transfer;
- 3 (4) the name, address and date of birth of the transferee;
- 4 (5) the transferee's driver's license number, or other identification number, and
- 5 the state in which it was issued;
- 6 (6) the brand, type and amount of ammunition transferred; and
- 7 (7) the transferee's signature *and thumbprint*.

8 Within 24 hours of the commencement of the transaction, regardless of when the
9 firearm ammunition is delivered, the Vendor shall report the transaction to the Chief of Police
10 by electronic mail at _____ or by such other means specified by the Chief of Police.
11 The report shall contain the same information required above.

12 (c) ~~(1) The records required by this Section shall be maintained on the premises of the~~
13 ~~vendor for a period of not less than two years from the date of the recorded transfer. Said records shall~~
14 ~~be subject to inspection at any time during normal business hours.~~

15 ~~(2) Any vendor or remote vendor~~ Any Vendor or Remote Vendor who sells or
16 otherwise transfers ownership of five hundred (500) or more rounds of any firearm
17 ammunition to a transferee in a single transaction, where the transaction occurs within the
18 City and County of San Francisco or the firearm ammunition is ordered for delivery to an
19 address within the City and County of San Francisco, shall be subject to the reporting
20 requirement of this subsection ~~(c) (e)(2)~~. Within 24 hours of the commencement of the
21 transaction, regardless of when the firearm ammunition is delivered, the Vendor or ~~Vendor or~~
22 Remote Vendor shall report the transaction to the Chief of Police by electronic mail at
23 _____ or by such other means specified by the Chief of Police. The report shall
24 contain the same information required under subsection (b). In determining the number of
25 rounds sold or otherwise transferred for purposes of complying with this subsection ~~(c) (e)(2)~~,

1 the Vendor or Remote Vendor ~~vendor or remote vendor~~ shall include any combination of types,
2 brands or calibers sold or transferred to the transferee.

3 (d) No Vendor shall knowingly make a false entry in, or fail to make a required entry in,
4 ~~or fail to maintain in the required manner~~ records prepared in accordance with subsection (b)
5 ~~subsections (b) and (c)(1). No vendor shall refuse to permit a Police Department employee to examine~~
6 ~~any record prepared in accordance with this Section during any inspection conducted pursuant to this~~
7 ~~Section.~~ No Vendor or Remote Vendor shall fail to submit the report required under
8 subsection (c) ~~subsections (b) or (c) in a timely manner~~ ~~subsection (c)(2)~~, or knowingly include
9 false information in such report. A Vendor must maintain the records required under subsection (b)
10 on the premises for a period of not less than two years from the date of the recorded transfer. Said
11 records shall be subject to inspection by the Police Department at any time during normal business
12 hours.

13 (e) **Penalties.**

14 (1) **First Conviction.** Any person violating any provision of this Section shall
15 be guilty of an infraction. Upon conviction of the infraction, the violator shall be punished by a
16 fine of not less than \$50 nor more than \$100.

17 (2) **Subsequent Convictions.** In any accusatory pleading charging a violation
18 of this Section, if the defendant has been previously convicted of a violation of this Section,
19 each such previous violation and conviction shall be charged in the accusatory pleading. Any
20 person violating any provision of this Section a second time within a 90-day period shall be
21 guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than \$300 and not more
22 than \$400 for each provision violated, or by imprisonment in the County Jail for a period of not
23 more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Any person violating any
24 provision of this Section, a third time, and each subsequent time, within a 30-day period shall
25 be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than \$400 and not

1 more than \$500 for each provision violated, or by imprisonment in the County Jail for a period
2 of not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

3 (f) **Severability.** If any subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word of this Section
4 be for any reason declared unconstitutional or invalid or ineffective by any court of competent
5 jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity or the effectiveness of the remaining
6 portions of this Section or any part thereof. The Board of Supervisors hereby declares that it
7 would have adopted this Section notwithstanding the unconstitutionality, invalidity, or
8 ineffectiveness of any one or more of its subsections, sentences, clauses, phrases, or words.
9

10 Section 5. The San Francisco Police Code is hereby amended by amending
11 Section 1040, to read as follows:

12 **SEC. 1040. FIREARMS REGULATED; MINORS PROHIBITED.**

13 (a) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, club or association,
14 maintaining or conducting any shooting gallery or range to use or permit to be used or
15 discharged therein any firearms of greater than 22 caliber, unless the cartridges used in such
16 firearms be loaded with reduced charges.

17 (b) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, club or association, maintaining or
18 conducting any shooting gallery or range to permit any person under the age of 18 to enter the
19 premises that are the subject of the permit unless accompanied by a parent or guardian.
20

21 Section 6. Effective Date. This ordinance shall become effective 30 days after
22 enactment. Enactment occurs when the Mayor signs the ordinance, the Mayor returns the
23 ordinance unsigned or does not sign the ordinance within ten days of receiving it, or the Board
24 of Supervisors overrides the Mayor's veto of the ordinance.
25

1 Section 7. Scope of Ordinance. In enacting this ordinance, the Board of Supervisors
2 intends to amend only those words, phrases, paragraphs, subsections, sections, articles,
3 numbers, punctuation marks, charts, diagrams, or any other constituent parts of the Municipal
4 Code that are explicitly shown in this ordinance as additions, deletions, Board amendment
5 additions, and Board amendment deletions in accordance with the "Note" that appears under
6 the official title of the ordinance.

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9
10 APPROVED AS TO FORM:
11 DENNIS J. HERRERA, City Attorney

12
13 By:


14 THOMAS J. OWEN
15 Deputy City Attorney

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LEGISLATIVE DIGEST

(Amendment of the Whole, dated 10/10/2013)

[Police Code - Large Capacity Magazines; Sales of Firearms and Ammunition; Reporting Lost or Stolen Firearms; Shooting Ranges]

Ordinance amending the Police Code to: 1) ban the possession of large capacity magazines for firearm ammunition; 2) require that dealers advise persons purchasing a firearm of local firearms laws; 3) establish a rebuttable presumption that the owner who has not reported the theft or loss of a firearm as required by law remains in possession of the firearm; 4) modify certain requirements for ammunition sales; and, 5) prohibit the operator of a shooting range from allowing minors to enter the premises.

Large Capacity Magazines

State law prohibits the sale, manufacture, or importation of large capacity magazines for firearms ammunition (capable of holding more than 10 rounds), with limited exceptions (most notable for law enforcement personnel and licensed firearms dealers). (Cal. Penal Code §§ 32310, 32400 *et seq.*) But State law does not prohibit the simple possession of large capacity magazines and permits individuals who owned a large capacity magazine before the law took effect on January 1, 2000, to keep those magazines. (Cal. Penal Code §§ 32310, 32420.) City law currently does not address large capacity magazines.

The proposal is an ordinance that would amend the Police Code to prohibit the possession of large capacity magazines in San Francisco, including magazines acquired prior to January 1, 2000. Under the proposal, persons already possessing a large capacity magazine would have 90 days to remove the magazine from the City, surrender it to the Police Department, or sell or transfer it lawfully in accordance with the Penal Code. The proposal exempts a number of classes of people from the prohibition, including law enforcement personnel, armored car personnel, and persons holding certain State permits. Violation of the ordinance would be punishable as a misdemeanor.

There currently is a bill pending in the State Legislature (S.B. 396) that would prohibit possession of large capacity magazines statewide, other than by law enforcement personnel, effective July 1, 2014. The proposed ordinance provides that if the State enacts legislation prohibiting possession of large capacity magazines, the local prohibition would have no force or effect to the extent it duplicated such State law.

Notification of Local Firearms Laws

City law requires businesses selling firearms and ammunition to obtain a local license, and imposes various regulations on the conduct of such businesses.

The proposal would add a new requirement to the local regulations for licensed firearms dealers. Under the proposal, when a dealer delivered a firearm to a customer, the dealer would be required to give the customer a copy of a notice, to be prepared by the Chief of Police, summarizing local firearms laws, including safe gun storage requirements and the requirement to report a lost or stolen firearm. The Chief of Police could also include in the notice summary information on relevant State firearms laws, including the requirement that the sale, loan or other transfer of a firearm to a non-licensed person be completed through a licensed firearms dealer.

Reporting the Loss or Theft of Firearms

City law requires that any person who possesses a firearm to report the theft or loss of such firearm to the Police Department within 48 hours of becoming aware of the theft or loss.

The proposal would provide that the failure to report the theft or loss as required by local law would create a rebuttable presumption that the owner still possesses the firearm.

Records of Ammunition Sales

City law requires firearms dealers to keep records of ammunition sales and to report to the Chief of Police within 24 hours of the sale of five hundred (500) or more rounds of firearm ammunition to someone in a single transaction. This requirement applies to persons selling ammunition within the City or selling ammunition for delivery to a San Francisco address.

The proposal would clarify the record-keeping requirements for ammunition sales, including the application of those requirements to dealers located outside of the City who are selling five hundred (500) or more rounds of firearm ammunition in a single transaction to someone within the City. The proposal would also add a requirement that the purchaser supply a thumbprint when buying ammunition in the City.

Minors in Shooting Ranges

City law requires persons operating a shooting gallery or range to obtain a City permit, and regulates their operation.

The proposal would make it unlawful for a person operating a shooting range to allow someone under the age of 18 to be on the premises unless accompanied by a parent or guardian.

* * * * *

The Amendment of the Whole, dated 10/10/2013, differs from the legislation on file, dated 6/4/2013, in one significant respect:

Section 4 of the original legislation included a proposal to require ammunition dealers located in the City to report all sales of ammunition to the Chief of Police. The amendment of the whole would drop that proposal and restore the current requirement that ammunition dealers only report the sale of five hundred (500) or more rounds of firearm ammunition to someone in a single transaction.

File # 130585
Received in Committee
10/10/13
jrw.

Robert Green
2994 Pine Street
San Francisco, CA 94115

Board of Supervisors
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
City Hall, Room 244
San Francisco, Ca. 94102-4689

October 10, 2013

I write today to express my concern for the ordinances proposed in file 130585 (Police Code – Large Capacity Magazines (et.al.)).

SECTION 1: LARGE CAPACITY MAGAZINE POSSESSION BAN – OPPOSE

The primary issue here is not a Second Amendment issue or a Fifth Amendment issue of illegal takings; rather the issue here is whether this is the best method – or even an effective method – of improving neighborhood safety.

While my heart goes out to the victims of gun-violence, I doubt that the people who choose to break the law to shoot at undercover officers or people on MUNI are likely to be the same people who will choose to relinquish their property in order to comply with this law.

Magazine capacity has little impact on suicides and accidents – nearly forty percent of firearm deaths are suicides or result from self-inflicted wounds.¹ And more than one quarter of all gunfire-related ER visits result from accidental discharges.²

¹ Data from California Department of Public Health EpiCenter website

² Ibid

We are not naïve enough to believe that with the stroke of a pen we can prevent people who are intent on doing harm from acquiring these magazines. We will have to rely on people to choose to comply with the law if we hope to see any reduction in violent crimes involving these magazines.

Instead, I would suggest that programs that take a holistic approach to dealing with disadvantaged youth do more to improve neighborhood safety – in some cases reducing by 50% or more the rate of violent crime among those involved in the programs versus their peers who are not – than any amount of legislation could hope to accomplish.^{3,4,5}

SECTION 2: NOTIFICATION TO PURCHASERS OF FIREARMS OF SAN FRANCISCO LAWS RELATED TO FIREARMS – NOT OPPOSED

Providing a copy of San Francisco's laws is a good idea since at least one of San Francisco's laws currently being litigated as Jackson v. San Francisco would, to a casual observer, appear to be in direct conflict with the Heller decision.

SECTION 3: REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION OF FIREARM – OPPOSE

While I believe I understand the situations which prompted this proposed ordinance, it seems to turn the whole idea of “innocent unless proven guilty” on its head.

³ Attachment A: “BAM—Sports Edition”, University of Chicago: reduction of 44% in rates of violent crime committed by youth involved in the program versus their peers who were not

⁴ Attachment B: “Short Term Results of the One Summer Plus 2012 Evaluation”, University of Chicago: reduction of 51% in violent-crime arrests

⁵ Attachment C: “Better options for troubled teens”, American Psychological Association: 50% reduction in overall crime rates for youth involved in diversion programs in Michigan; 65% reduction in re-arrest for youth involved in Ohio program

SECTION 4: RECORDS OF AMMUNITION SALES – OPPOSE UNLESS AMENDED

The current ordinance provides that reports shall be made by electronic mail but fails to provide an email address to which the reports may be sent. The proposed ordinance does not correct that oversight.

Although there is a form on the SFPD website for making reports – presumably this form constitutes “such other means specified by the Chief of Police”⁶, the form is hosted on servers at Google and subject to Google’s terms of service which state in part: “When you upload or otherwise submit content to our Services, you give Google (and those we work with) a worldwide license to ... publicly display and distribute such content.”⁷ [emphasis added]

Since there is no way to attach a file containing an image of the purchaser’s signature when submitting a report using the form, it would seem that anyone submitting a report cannot comply with the requirements outlined in current Section 615 of Article 9 of the Police Code. Section 615(b) requires the collection of the purchaser’s signature for paper records, and Section 615(c)(2) requires that reports submitted electronically “shall contain the same information required under subsection (b).”

Additionally, I question how a vendor in Tennessee is supposed to collect and submit a thumbprint from a resident of San Francisco even if the City’s IT department implemented another mechanism for making the reports which would include the ability to attach a file.

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⁶ <http://sf-police.org/index.aspx?page=4170>

⁷ <http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/> (retrieved September 2, 2013)

SECTION 5: REQUIRING PARENT OR GUARDIAN TO ACCOMPANY MINOR – REQUEST AMENDMENT


There is only one shooting open to the public in San Francisco: the Pacific Rod and Gun Club located on Lake Merced. The club is primarily a shotgun-sports facility – shooting at moving targets in the air outdoors. They do not allow handguns on the premises. They do not rent, loan, or sell firearms – you must bring your own firearm. They require that minors must be accompanied by a parent or an “adult supervisor.”

To the extent that the City wishes to reduce the chance that minors may be sneaking off to the range without the knowledge or consent of their parents or guardians, I would respectfully request an amendment to the proposed language to add “an adult authorized by a parent or guardian” to the list of persons who may accompany a minor to the range.

Under the wording in Section 5, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and family friends would be precluded from bringing children to the range even with the full knowledge and consent of those responsible for the youth. The proposed amendment would remedy that oversight while still ensuring that the parents of those attending the range are aware of the activities taking place.

As a whole, I respectfully urge the Neighborhood Services and Safety Committee to make a recommendation of “Do Not Pass”.

Sincerely,


Robert Green

ATTACHMENT A

“BAM—Sports Edition”
University of Chicago

<http://news.uchicago.edu/sites/all/files/attachments/University%20of%20Chicago%20Crime%20Lab%20Research%20and%20Policy%20Brief.pdf>



EMBARGOED For release 10:30 AM, July 13, 2012

BAM—SPORTS EDITION¹

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CRIME LAB
RESEARCH AND POLICY BRIEF
JULY 2012

ABSTRACT

While non-academic or “social-cognitive” skills are important predictors of student outcomes, schools (particularly secondary schools) devote little explicit attention to such skills after the first few grades – perhaps partly because of uncertainty about whether these types of skills are actually amenable to policy intervention. A randomized field experiment in the Chicago Public Schools assigned 2,740 disadvantaged males in grades 7-10 to one year of social-cognitive skill development through in-school and after-school programming, or to a control group. Participation increased schooling outcomes by 0.14 standard deviations during the program year and 0.19 standard deviations in the subsequent year, effects which may translate to a 10 to 23 percent increase in graduation rates relative to the control group once the youth are old enough to graduate. The intervention also reduced violent-crime arrests during the program year by 8.1 per 100 youth, or 44 percent. Student surveys provide suggestive evidence that social-cognitive skills mediate these impacts. Dollar-valued benefits to society range from 3 to 31 times the \$1,100 per-participant program cost.

¹ This project was made possible by the generous support of the University of Chicago’s Office of the Provost and School of Social Service Administration, NICHD award R21HD061757, and grants from the Joyce, MacArthur, McCormick, Polk, and Spencer Foundations, the Exelon Corporation, and the Chicago Community Trust. We are grateful to the amazing staff of Youth Guidance and World Sport Chicago (the two non-profit organizations that implemented the intervention we study here), the Chicago Public Schools, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, and the Illinois State Police, and to Ellen Alberding, Laura Brinkman, Carol Brown, Philip Cook, Stephen Coussens, Hon. Richard M. Daley, Christine Devitt Westley, Steve Gilmore, Hon. Curtis Heaston, Ron Huberman, Rachel Johnston, Ben Lahey, Tim Laveryrach, Ann Marie Lipinski, Sonya Malunda, Jeanne Marsh, Michael Masters, Michael McCloskey, Al McNally, Ernst Melchior, Douglas Miller, Michelle Morrison, Mark Myrent, Stacy Norris, Amy Nowell, Thomas Rosenbaum, Ashley Van Ness, Nina Vinik, Paula Wolff, and Sabrina Yusuf. We are especially grateful to Wendy Fine of Youth Guidance, who provided coordination of many data and managerial issues throughout the process.

BACKGROUND

Improving the life outcomes of disadvantaged youth is a top policy priority in the United States. The average high school graduation rate in our 50 largest urban school districts is just 53 percent (Swanson, 2009). Over the past 40 years, high school graduation rates in the U.S. have barely changed, with little convergence in the black-white gap (Heckman & LaFontaine, 2010). Nearly 70 percent of black male dropouts spend time in prison by their mid-30s (Western & Pettit, 2010).

Why have we not made more progress in improving the long-term life chances of disadvantaged youth? One candidate answer is that while the U.S. devotes considerable resources to developing academic skills – total annual spending on K-12 public schooling equals \$550 billion (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) – we devote relatively little attention, at least outside the earliest elementary-school grades, to addressing other important determinants of student success such as what Dodge et al. (1986) call “social-cognitive skills.” Examples include self-control, conflict resolution, future orientation, and social information processing, such as the ability to accurately infer the intentions of others (see also Dodge, 2011).

A growing body of research demonstrates that social-cognitive skills predict success in school and the labor market, as well as improved health and reduced criminal involvement. Because they are learned through experience, children growing up in disadvantaged circumstances are at elevated risk of developing deficits in social-cognitive skills.

This brief reports the results of a large-scale randomized controlled trial of a one-year program designed to remediate social-cognitive skill deficits among low-income adolescent male students.

BAM—SPORTS EDITION

In March 2009, the University of Chicago Crime Lab launched the *Chicago Initiative to Reduce Gun Violence among School-Age Youth*, a project to address the sobering reality that homicide claims more lives of black males aged 15-24 in the United States than the next nine causes of death *combined*. This initiative included a design competition to identify promising ideas to reduce youth gun violence. Thirty proposals were submitted by local social service agencies, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations. The winning entry, *Becoming A Man—Sports Edition* (BAM-Sports Edition), was proposed by two collaborating organizations: Youth Guidance (YG) and World Sport Chicago (WSC).

Between March and September 2009, the Crime Lab, YG, and WSC raised approximately \$1 million to develop and field the intervention. Major funders included the University of Chicago Provost’s Office, the School of Social Service Administration, the Center for Health Administration Studies, and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, along with philanthropic support from the Exelon, Joyce, MacArthur, McCormick, Polk Bros., and Spencer Foundations, and the Chicago Community Trust. Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and the Circuit Court of Cook County, Juvenile Justice Division, provided administrative data to identify and recruit students.

BAM-Sports Edition is designed to address the difficult everyday circumstances facing many low-income, minority male youth in Chicago. The intervention focuses on developing skills

related to emotional regulation, control of stress response, improved social-information processing, interpersonal problem solving, goal setting and attainment, and personal integrity. Another goal of this intervention is to impart a realistic, socially responsible view of adult masculinity to youth whose social environments often promote competing, more aggressive norms. The program is based on cognitive behavioral therapy principles – a variety of techniques that help individuals “identify, monitor, challenge, and change their thoughts and behavior” (Walker & Bright, 2009) – which have been proven effective in the treatment of depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and medication adherence.

During the 2009-2010 school year, YG and WSC implemented the intervention within CPS. Youth were offered a mix of in-school and after-school programming to develop social-cognitive skills. The in-school program offered youth the chance to participate in up to 27 one-hour small-group sessions (about 15 youth were assigned to each group, with 8.58 attendees per session on average). Sessions met once per week during the school day over eight months of the school year. Each session, built around an explicitly articulated lesson, was designed to develop a specific skill and included an out-of-class homework assignment to practice and apply that skill.

WSC’s after-school sports activities were designed to reinforce conflict resolution skills and the social and emotional learning objectives of YG’s BAM curriculum, as well as to increase program attendance. Sports varied by school and included wrestling, martial arts, archery, weight-lifting, boxing, and handball. This programming was provided by coaches trained in the overall goals of BAM and in social-emotional learning principles more generally.

BAM-Sports Edition was evaluated in 18 schools: Austin Polytech (High School (“HS”)); Banneker (Elementary School (“ES”)); Bass (ES); Clemente (HS and Achievement Academy (“AA”)); Crane (HS and AA); Douglass (HS); Fenger (HS and AA); Harper (HS); Jordan (ES); Juarez (HS); Orr (HS); Parker (ES); Robeson (HS and AA); and Yale (ES). Each school serves a low-income community facing economic and social challenges, including youth violence.

Using student-level CPS data for the 2008-2009 school year (i.e. the “pre-program year”), we identified a total of 2,740 eligible male youth in grades 7-10 attending 18 CPS elementary and high schools. Given large gender disparities in rates of violence involvement, eligibility was restricted to male youth. Our focus was on students of “medium risk” within their local school environments – those whose prior school records were consistent with the presence of social-cognitive skill deficits, but who were still likely to attend school often enough to benefit from a school-based intervention. Within each school, we randomly assigned students to treatment (in-school only, after-school only, or both) and control conditions from this master list.

As shown below, BAM-Sports Edition served youth who faced significant challenges. The average program youth missed six weeks of school during the pre-program year, with a mean grade-point average of a D plus. The last row shows that the distributions of these baseline characteristics are similar across groups, suggesting that assignment to treatment status was indeed random.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Sample: Baseline 2008-09 School Year

	Treatment (n=1473)	Control (n=1267)
Grade	9.29	9.42
Age	15.51	15.70
Old for Grade	0.51	0.55
Total Days Present	133	130
Ever Arrested	0.35	0.37
Black	0.69	0.72
Hispanic	0.31	0.28
GPA	1.73	1.68
Joint significance test, all baseline variables: $F=1.05$, $p=0.397$		

Note: None of the differences across groups in any of the variables shown is statistically significant.


STUDY FINDINGS

About half of the students assigned to one of the treatment groups actually participated in the program, consistent with participation levels seen in previous large-scale social experiments. On average, participating youth attended about 13 program sessions, with substantial variation across schools. YG and WSC successfully implemented a challenging intervention at scale—in 18 public schools serving some of Chicago’s lowest-income communities—under a tight timeline and budget.

To measure the impact of the intervention, we used student-level administrative records obtained from CPS as well as juvenile and adult justice system arrest records maintained by the Illinois State Police. For statistical reasons, we formed a composite measure from available CPS data to capture engagement with and performance in school, equal to an average (in standard deviation units) of number of days present, grade point average, and school persistence (end-of-year enrollment status). To measure changes in criminal behavior, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority used probabilistic matching to provide us with Illinois arrest histories on study youth. We classify these arrests as violent, property, drug, or other offenses. Note that we are still collecting data on the study youth that will help to refine and extend these results.

Our findings show that program participation **significantly increased school engagement and performance** by 0.14 standard deviations during the program year and by 0.19 standard deviations in the follow-up year, impacts that imply future graduation rate increases of about 10 to 23 percent of the control group’s graduation rate. Program participation also **reduced violent crime arrests by 44 percent** (8 fewer arrests per 100 participants) and arrests in the ‘other’ (miscellaneous) category, which includes vandalism and weapons crime, by 36 percent (11.5 fewer arrests per 100 participants) during the program year. These findings are particularly noteworthy given the challenging settings in which the intervention took place. (In fact, our study is closer to what evaluation researchers would call an effectiveness trial of how a program would operate at scale than it is to the sort of smaller-scale efficacy trials carried out under ideal conditions by program developers and researchers.) The positive program effects provide the most rigorous, large-scale evidence to date that a social-cognitive skill intervention can improve both schooling and delinquency outcomes for disadvantaged youth.

FIGURE 1. INTERVENTION EFFECTS



Notes on Figure 1: The bars show the estimated impact of program participation for the year of the program (school year 2009-2010 for schooling outcomes, September 2009 – August 2010 for arrest outcomes) and the following year (school year 2010-2011 for schooling outcomes, September 2010 – July 2011 for arrest outcomes). The whiskers delineate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Although violent crime impacts are no longer statistically significant in the post-program year, by reducing arrest rates during the program year, the intervention appears to reduce youths' likelihood of future detention in a juvenile justice facility. This effect may arise because prior arrest records influence criminal justice authorities' decisions about whether to detain or release specific youth in response to new arrests. The right-hand side of Figure 1 shows that in the year after the program, participants experienced a 5 percentage point (53 percent) reduction in the likelihood of enrolling in a school within a juvenile justice setting compared to their control group counterparts.

The CPS records we analyzed also include student responses to surveys conducted by the Consortium on Chicago School Research (CCSR), which provide suggestive evidence that improved social-cognitive skills might at least in part explain the behavioral impacts.²

² We found positive but not statistically significant effects as a result of program participation related to perseverance (“grit”) and emotional health (items related to conflict resolution and peer relationships). Unfortunately, the CCSR survey response rates on these measures are not ideal – around 40 percent for the study sample overall, and about 4 percentage points higher for treatment than control students. To examine whether these findings might be artifacts of low response rates, we examined treatment-control differences on survey items

BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS

Are these program impacts large or small? One way to make this judgment is to compare the costs of the intervention (around \$1,100 per participant) with the value to society from the accumulated program impacts – that is, benefit-cost analysis. Our sample was too young to have graduated by the end of our study period. We can, however, forecast implied graduation impacts based on the link between graduation and measures of earlier schooling engagement found in previous longitudinal studies of CPS students. Observed impacts on our school engagement index imply high school graduation impacts that might be as high as 5 to 9.5 percentage points (10 to 23 percent). If these graduation impacts are realized, the resulting social benefits would be on the order of \$49,000 to \$119,000 per participant from increased lifetime earnings, tax payments, and lower public benefit use.

Table 2: Estimated Social Benefits Per Participant

	Low Estimate	High Estimate
	From Realized Crime Reduction	
Savings to Victims	\$2,530	\$32,045
Savings to Government	\$1,076	\$1,217
Subtotal	\$3,606	\$34,479
	From Potential Increase in High School Graduation	
Wage Increase to Participant	\$27,890	\$66,999
Savings to Government	\$21,555	\$51,782
Subtotal	\$49,445	\$118,781
Total	\$53,051	\$153,260

Notes: All estimates in 2010 dollars. Savings to victims are based on cost-of-crime estimates, which include tangible costs of crime (lost productivity, insurance and medical care, etc.) as well as quality of life costs. Government savings from reduced crime include costs of arrest, processing, detention, incarceration, and probation. Government savings from increase in graduation include increases in taxes paid and decreases in public health costs and welfare transfers.

While graduation impacts require forecasting given the age of the study youth, and therefore are subject to some uncertainty, the program impacts on criminal behavior during the program year itself generate benefits to society valued on the order of \$3,600 to \$34,000 per participant (depending on how we monetize the intangible costs of crime). This implies **benefit-cost ratios on the order of 3:1 to 31:1** from just reductions in crime during the program year.

POLICY AND PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS

These results are encouraging given how little is currently known about how to improve the life outcomes of disadvantaged adolescents. For example, the U.S Department of Education's What Works Clearinghouse does not report a single intervention for school dropout prevention that earns their highest evidence rating. The Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy does not list a

unrelated to the intervention. We found no similar impacts on other survey outcomes, such as student reports about course clarity and academic "press."

single program for addressing high school graduation among its "Top Tier" of programs. Similarly, the widely-acclaimed Blueprints for Violence Prevention has reviewed over 900 studies; the number of "model programs" they identify for reducing violent behavior among teens is just four, and three of these work with specialized populations of youth already deeply involved in the justice system.

While the results presented in this research brief are encouraging, the study does have limitations. Because of budget considerations, we were forced to rely on existing longitudinal administrative data to measure intervention impacts. The lack of original in-person data collection means that we have only limited information about how the program improved youth schooling outcomes and reduced violent behavior.

It is difficult to determine from our data why the intervention's impacts persist for schooling engagement but not for violent behavior. Understanding more about program "fade-out" remains an open question for our application and for social policy generally.

Another limitation of our study, as with all randomized clinical trials, is that our results may not generalize to other samples and contexts. The program in principle lends itself to scale-up, as it is a manualized intervention, and given that estimated benefit-cost ratios range from 3:1 to 31:1. Since our study was carried out with large numbers of disadvantaged male youth from distressed areas of Chicago, with nearly 1,500 youth assigned to treatment, it is closer to an "effectiveness trial" (testing a program at scale) than an "efficacy trial" of a model (or "hothouse") program. Nonetheless, replicating these results is an important priority for future research.

What is perhaps most remarkable about these findings, given the size of the gains in schooling outcomes (which could translate into increased graduation rates of 10 to 23 percent) and observed reductions in violent-crime arrests (44 percent), the relatively limited number of contact hours participants had in the program (about 13 sessions), and the low cost of the intervention (\$1,100 per participant), is the apparently considerable elasticity of youth outcomes to relatively modest efforts to remediate social-cognitive skill deficits. Given how little policy attention is currently devoted to improving social-cognitive skills of disadvantaged youth, there may be considerable returns to society from expanding investments in this area.

ATTACHMENT B

“Short Term Results of the One Summer Plus
2012 Evaluation”
University of Chicago

<http://crimelab.uchicago.edu/sites/crimelab.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Plus%20results%20brief%20FINAL%2020130802.pdf>

Short Term Results of the One Summer Plus 2012 Evaluation¹

Executive Summary

In 2012, Chicago's Department of Family and Support Services designed and implemented a youth summer employment program called *One Summer Plus (OSP)*. *OSP* combined a part-time summer job with proven cognitive behavioral therapy-based programming in order to reduce violence involvement and generate lasting improvements in youth outcomes. Importantly, *OSP* was structured like a clinical trial in medicine to generate rigorous evidence on the program's effects – a vital contribution given that there is almost no convincing research on the effects of summer jobs, especially on crime. The program was open to youth in 13 Chicago Public Schools located in high-violence neighborhoods. This brief reports on the early findings from the evaluation study, using administrative data on schooling and crime during a 7-month follow-up period. While participants attended less summer school (4 percentage points lower enrollment) and saw no change in other schooling outcomes, they also showed an enormous proportional drop in violent-crime arrests after 7 post-program months (3.7 fewer arrests per 100 participants, a 51 percent decline). Although it is too early for a full benefit-cost analysis, if these results persist, the program's benefits may eventually outweigh its costs given the extremely high social costs of violent crime. Future work will continue to track study youth, but even these preliminary findings provide convincing evidence that *OSP* was highly successful in reducing violence among adolescents.

Background

In 2010, over 600,000 American youth ages 14 to 21 were victims of violence-related injuries. Homicide killed more young African-American males than the 9 other leading causes of death combined (CDC 2012). Stemming this tide of youth violence has become a pressing policy priority in Chicago; national attention is focused on the city's search for successful strategies.²

An oft-repeated saying in Chicago suggests one approach: "nothing stops a bullet like a job." Jobs could reduce violence and improve other outcomes among disadvantaged adolescents for a number of reasons. Work provides money, connections to employers, job-related training, and information on the value of schooling – and it keeps youth busy when they might otherwise be idle. If so, it is a particularly important time to help youth find jobs: Youth employment over the summer, when teenagers are most likely to work, is at a 60-year low, and the 2010 employment rate for low-income black teens is less than one-fourth the rate for higher-income white teens in Illinois (9 vs. 39 percent) (Center for Labor Market Studies 2012; Fernandes-Alcantara 2011).

On the other hand, there is no guarantee that providing a job is a cost-effective use of violence-prevention funds: Jobs also generate money that could be spent on drugs and alcohol, necessitate additional travel and exposure to new groups of peers, and tend to be limited to weekdays rather

¹ For more information on this research, contact Sara Heller (sbheller@uchicago.edu). For questions about the Crime Lab, contact Roseanna Ander (rander@uchicago.edu). Research funded by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The content is the responsibility of the author and does not represent the official position or policies of the Chicago Police Department or Chicago Public Schools. Many thanks to Kylie Klein, Tim Lavery, Stacy Norris, and Bob Tracy for their assistance with CPS and CPD data.

² See, for example, national media reports from PBS, NPR, and the Washington Post on youth violence in Chicago.



than the evening and weekend hours when crime is most prevalent. Prior research on job training programs also suggests other challenges, such as effects that fade out quickly after the program, the substitution of work for school, and high program costs that fail to outweigh benefits even when crime decreases (Jacobs 2012; Schochet, Burghardt & McConnell 2008).

In 2012, Chicago's Department of Family and Support Services (DFSS) designed an employment program called *One Summer Plus (OSP)* to address these challenges, focusing on summer to reduce the work/school tradeoff and target a peak time for crime, and adding an evidence-based program element (cognitive behavioral therapy-based programming) designed to improve youths' decision-making so program effects would endure. More than that, in partnership with the University of Chicago Crime Lab, DFSS constructed the program so it would produce some of the first rigorous evidence about the effects of summer jobs – which have received billions of dollars in funding over the past half-century but have been subject to almost no rigorous evaluation, especially in terms of crime impacts. This brief presents the early results of *OSP* after seven post-program months.

One Summer Plus 2012

Because *OSP* was designed mainly as a violence-reduction intervention, DFSS targeted 13 Chicago Public High Schools in high-violence neighborhoods. A total of 1,634 youth in 8th – 12th grade during the pre-program year applied. To fairly allocate the limited number of program slots, applicants were entered into a fair lottery. Youth were assigned by lottery into three groups: jobs only (n = 364), jobs plus social-emotional learning (SEL) (n = 366), or a control group (n = 904) who received no additional services but were free to pursue outside opportunities. All youth were offered 5 hours per day, 5 days per week of programming (jobs-only youth worked for all 5 daily hours; jobs + SEL youth worked for 3 and participated in SEL for 2). Youth earned Illinois minimum wage (\$8.25/hour) and received one meal per day, plus bus passes when appropriate.

Three non-profit community organizations (Sinai Community Institute, St. Sabina Employment Resource Center, and Phalanx Family Services) placed youth in part-time jobs for seven weeks (an optional 8th week was added during the program). Jobs were in the non-profit and government sectors, including positions as summer camp counselors, workers in a community garden, YMCA office and activity staff, office assistants for an alderman, etc. Youth were also assigned job mentors – adults who helped youth learn to be successful employees and to navigate barriers to employment (transportation, family responsibilities, conflicts with supervisors, etc.).

Because prior research suggests that the effects of subsidized jobs sometimes fade out quickly after the program, DFSS also offered some youth a social-emotional learning (SEL) opportunity (provided by Youth Guidance and SGA Youth and Family Services) designed to ensure that program effects persist. The motivating idea is that quick, automatic decision-making often drives youth behavior. Relying on initial, unthinking reactions may lead youth to behave poorly in the workplace or decide not to persist in pro-social programming. If so, then providing CBT-based programming – which teaches youth to reflect on their decision-making process and to think before acting – may improve youth engagement and generate lasting changes in the ways youth interact with their environment. Prior research has shown this strategy can reduce violent crime and create lasting improvements in school engagement (Heller, et al. 2013).

Table 1: Pre-Program Characteristics of Study Youth

	Control Mean (N = 904)	Treatment Mean (N = 730)
Demographics		
Age	16.79	16.78
African-American	96%	94%
Grade	10.15	10.12
Male ³	34%	44%
School and Crime		
% Days Absent (AY 2011-12)	18%	18%
GPA (Cumulative as of Fall 2011)	2.30	2.25
Ever Arrested	19%	22%
Neighborhood Characteristics		
Unemployment Rate	19%	19%
Below Poverty Line	33%	35%
Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000)	2,128	2,136

Notes: Data from program applications, Chicago Public Schools records, Chicago Police Department arrest records, and the 2010 American Community Survey. None of the pre-program differences are significant.


As Table 1 shows, the program successfully targeted youth in high-violence, low-income neighborhoods who faced significant challenges. Study youth missed an average of 18 percent of school (about 6 weeks) the year before the program, and about 20 percent had been arrested before the program started. They also lived in neighborhoods where over 30 percent of households are below the poverty line and 19 percent of adults are unemployed.

Short-Term Study Findings

Because the program was set up like a clinical trial in medicine, any post-program differences between the treatment and control groups can be definitively attributed to the effect of the program. We measure these effects using data from the Chicago Public Schools and the Chicago Police Department, both available through mid-March 2013, about 7 months after the end of the program.


Overall, 75 percent of youth offered the program participated, and 90 percent of participants completed the full 7 weeks of the program. **Our initial findings show that participation decreases summer school enrollment, has little effect on other schooling outcomes, and decreases violent-crime arrests by 51 percent.** Because we do not find any significant differences across the two treatment groups (jobs only versus jobs + SEL), we present results for all participants relative to their control counterparts.

³ The lottery was structured to over-select male applicants, because males are disproportionately involved in violence. The treatment-control difference in gender representation is therefore part of the experimental design (gender was a “blocking” variable) and controlled for in all analyses.



As shown on the left, while 10 percent of the control group enrolled in summer school, only about 6 percent of participants did so. It is perhaps not surprising that when offered paid work, youth attend less summer school, although it is not yet clear whether this decrease will have any long-term effects on schooling outcomes. We find no significant differences in grade retention or failure to re-enroll the following school year (nor in fall GPA or attendance, not shown).

On the other hand, we find an enormous proportional decrease in violent-crime arrests. Participants experience 3.7 fewer arrests per 100 youth than their control group counterparts, a decrease of 51 percent. We find no differences in other types of crime.



Because these results are from a relatively short follow-up period, it is too early to complete a full benefit-cost analysis. However, violent crime is clearly hugely socially

costly. If the decrease in violent-crime arrests persists, it is possible that program benefits may eventually outweigh program costs (about \$3,000 per participant) – especially if the decline in summer school enrollment continues to have few measurable impacts on future schooling outcomes.

These results draw an early but optimistic picture about the ability of jobs and SEL to reduce violence, at least after the short follow-up period. If the crime decrease persists, this seven-month snapshot may capture only part of the violence drop. Other key outcomes will take more time to develop and measure – especially future employment, most likely to occur in later summers or after high school. The Crime Lab will continue to track study youths' longer-term schooling and crime outcomes, and pending data availability, their future labor market participation as well.

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ATTACHMENT C

“Better options for troubled teens”
American Psychological Association

<http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/12/troubled-teens.aspx>

FEATURE

Better options for troubled teens

Psychologists are creating and implementing programs that curb problem behaviors among juvenile offenders.

By Tori DeAngelis

December 2011, Vol 42, No. 11

Print version: page 69

More than 1 million American youth end up in juvenile court every year, and about 160,000 of them are referred to residential placements, including detention centers, residential treatment centers, correctional institutions and group homes, according to a 2011 *Social Policy Report* by the Society for Research in Child Development.

However, the report finds that such settings often do more harm than good, causing depression, thoughts of suicide, acting-out behaviors and recidivism among these youth. Recognizing this problem, many states have enacted a variety of community-based "diversion" programs aimed at keeping offending youth out of the court system, particularly those who have committed nonviolent crimes or "status" offenses such as truancy, running away from home or defying parents or other authority figures.

Diversion services, though, are extremely diffuse in their design and in the populations they intend to serve, say psychologists in the area of juvenile justice. What's more, most programs that communities use are not backed by science.

"The literature is pretty consistent that you're better off diverting the less serious offenders out of the juvenile justice system, and if possible, hooking them up with services," says Medical University of South Carolina psychologist Scott Henggeler, PhD. "But you can be diverted to services that make the situation worse. So for me, diverted to *what* is really the question."

The good news is that psychologists and other social scientists are creating diversion programs that address this concern, dramatically improving outcomes such as re-offense rates and family relationships, thus saving the juvenile justice system a great deal of money, says University of Connecticut psychologist Preston A. Britner, PhD, the incoming co-chair of APA's Committee on Children, Youth and Families ([/pi/families/committee/index.aspx](#)), who also helped the state of Connecticut create and implement an evidence-based diversion program for status-offending kids.

In addition, these programs are being studied using advanced research methodology, and they recognize that young people's entire environments — growing up in drug-ridden or violent areas, for example — are part of why they end up in trouble.

"There's a growing awareness that you don't just change the kid or the parent or the schools, but you also need to look at neighborhood and community contexts as well," Britner says.

What these programs have in common, he adds, are a strong research base, a focus on improving family relationships and a bent to foster youngsters' strengths. Here's a look at some of them.

Thirty-five years and counting

William S. Davidson II, PhD, distinguished professor at Michigan State University, never imagined that his graduate dissertation would become a model diversion program that has been running now for 35 years. But that's what has happened with his Adolescent Diversion Project, which pairs undergraduate students and adolescents found guilty of breaking and entering, larceny and other crimes. These relationships have been found to cut the youths' recidivism rate in half, and the program has won a number of national awards, including the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter Award from Campus Compact and the APA Task Force on Prevention's Exemplary Prevention Research designation.

In the model, undergraduate psychology students take a two-semester course that trains them in the program's theory and practice. They then spend eight hours a week for 18 weeks mentoring young offenders and their families on how to communicate and negotiate effectively with each other. In addition, the psychology students connect the kids with positive, community-based activities that tap their interests, such as computer labs, machine shops, dance studios and tae kwon do centers. "It's about finding out what this kid is interested in, what his or her strengths are and how we can build on them," Davidson says.

After launching a successful pilot of the program in 1976, Davidson devoted 15 years to improving and replicating it in several Michigan cities with funds from the National Institute of Mental Health. In Lansing, the model has evolved into a partnership among the university, the county Juvenile Court and community members, including police and judges. The students continue to partner with the young offenders, and the rest of the team works together to help the young people achieve positive goals and steer clear of crime.

The program has strong research backing. A 2006 article by Marisa L. Sturza and Davidson in the *Journal of Prevention & Intervention in the Community* reports that for youth in the program, overall crime rates over a 30-month follow-up were consistently half of those randomly assigned to no treatment or to treatment-as-usual control conditions. And the program costs about a fifth as much as usual court processing, Davidson says.

Undergraduate students also benefit from participating in the program, finds a 2010 study in the *American Journal of Community Psychology*. Compared with matched peers, they're more likely to go on to graduate school, choose human service careers, see themselves positively and have better attitudes toward youth. "It's a very positive educational tool," Davidson says.

A family-centered approach

Psychologist Stephen Gavazzi, PhD, a family therapist and professor at The Ohio State University, has developed a diversion program that addresses what he perceives as key limitations in many such programs: a lack of family involvement in treatment and an over-emphasis on problem behaviors. He's developed versions of the program tailored to status offenders, young people who have committed misdemeanors or lower-level felony offenses, and higher-level felony offenders.

Drawing from a primary prevention program he developed called Growing Up FAST (Families and Adolescents Surviving and Thriving), his program makes parents and caregivers an integral part of treatment; focuses on the strengths of the child and family instead of their weaknesses; and asks families to identify the issues they want to work on.

The intervention also helps juvenile offenders avoid problem behaviors and develop effective life strategies, for example, by asking the youth and adult family members to define what it means to be a successful adult and what steps are needed to get there. Program implementers — who may include psychologists, social workers, family therapists, school guidance counselors, paraprofessionals and parent advocates — coach caretakers in helping the child meet those goals.

Implementers also help the young person face and learn from the problem that got him or her into trouble, and think about alternatives to that action. Meanwhile, parents or caretakers are invited to ask as many questions about the incident as they want. This exercise tends to reveal additional information that the family needs to address, such as a child's clandestine substance use.

Juvenile offenders who participate in the program are 50 percent to 65 percent less likely to be arrested again than matched peers who did not go through the program, according to a 2000 article by Gavazzi and colleagues in *Aggression and Violent Behavior*. Gavazzi has trained approximately 650 mental health professionals, paraprofessionals and others in five states in the model, and more recently, has modified the framework for use in school systems, discussed in his 2010 book "Strong Families, Successful Students."

In Gavazzi's view, part of why the program works is its ability to illuminate what is driving the young person's behavior, whether it is negligent parenting, substance use or emotional difficulties within the family. "Criminal activity is often just a symptom of a much larger set of things that are going on," he says.

Progress in Connecticut

In a similar vein, a program in Connecticut developed by Yale University psychologist Elena Grigorenko, PhD, is helping young people already in the criminal justice system learn from and take responsibility for their actions. Grigorenko used an American Psychological Foundation grant to create a 10-week behavioral intervention that uses writing assignments, role play and guided discussions to help more serious young offenders understand and "own" the behavior that landed them in trouble. Her model is now being used throughout Connecticut in both detention and probation centers, and has led to the creation of an assessment device — the situation-judgment inventory — being used to monitor youth compliance and socially oriented changes in thinking and behavior while they're in detention.

Meanwhile, another statewide effort in Connecticut involving psychologists is helping to dramatically reduce the number of status-offending youth who end up in court. The system takes a tiered approach that individualizes services based on the level of a youth's risks and offenses — for example, providing comprehensive services to kids who have run away from home multiple times but not to those who have skipped school once or twice. Before filing a formal complaint against a youth, families, schools and other community members are urged first to seek other solutions to the young person's problems, including through existing community resources. If that doesn't work and caretakers deem that a child needs it, the young person is sent to one of four regional family support centers in the state.

After an initial screening and assessment, the family and child craft individual, social and community, school and family goals.

Once that plan is in place, center staff initiate a "wraparound" system of services that includes 24/7 crisis intervention and family mediation, educational support and evidence-based treatment programs tailored to the child's situation.

So far, the program has yielded impressive results, finds a 2010 evaluation by Florida's Justice Research Center. Between 2006 and 2009, the number of status-offense complaints dropped 41 percent, suggesting that the tiered system works to keep such problems from escalating. In addition, status offense cases handled by the courts in that same time frame dropped from 50 percent to 4 percent.

Like Davidson's and Gavazzi's models, the Connecticut program looks like it will save the system a lot of money, too, says Britner. As a rough estimate, it costs approximately \$4,000 for youngsters to undergo the family service center intervention, which takes about three months, versus about \$10,000 to detain a young person for the same length of time.

But while the results in Connecticut are impressive, they also highlight remaining issues for researchers, Britner and others say. For instance, research suggests that many status offenders wouldn't reoffend anyway — that their aberrant behavior is the result of a common adolescent tendency to act out that goes away with age, says Henggeler. In fact, research shows that about a third of kids engage in delinquent behavior, then "age out" of it, according to a 2006 report by the Justice Policy Institute.

"Where we are now is that in Connecticut, this model works in a general sense, but there's a lot more work to do to understand specifically what works for whom and why," Britner says.

The good news is that researchers will be able to figure that out in the coming years, he adds. "We now have the systems and the psychologically informed measurements in place to start finding those answers."

Tori DeAngelis is a writer in Syracuse, NY

Find this article at:

<http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/12/troubled-teens.aspx>

BOARD of SUPERVISORS



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MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief Greg Suhr, Police Department
Sheriff Ross Mirkarimi, Sheriff's Department

FROM: Derek Evans, Assistant Committee Clerk

DATE: June 18, 2013

SUBJECT: LEGISLATION INTRODUCED

The Board of Supervisors Neighborhood Services and Safety Committee has received the following legislation, which is being referred to your department.

File No. 130585

Ordinance amending the Police Code to ban the possession of large capacity magazines for firearm ammunition; require that dealers advise persons purchasing a firearm of local firearms laws; establish a rebuttable presumption that the owner who has not reported the theft or loss of a firearm as required by law remains in possession of the firearm; require local dealers to report all ammunition sales to the Chief of Police; and prohibit the operator of a shooting range from allowing minors to enter the premises.

Please submit any comments or reports to the Board of Supervisors, City Hall, Room 244, 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, San Francisco, CA 94102.

cc: Christine Fountain, Police Department
John Monroe, Police Commission

Caldeira, Rick

From: Chiu, David
Sent: Tuesday, June 04, 2013 6:57 PM
To: Caldeira, Rick
Subject: cosponsorship

Can you add me to Malia's gun measure introduced today? Thanks.

David Chiu

Introduction Form

By a Member of the Board of Supervisors or the Mayor

Time stamp
or meeting date

I hereby submit the following item for introduction (select only one):

- 1. For reference to Committee.
An ordinance, resolution, motion, or charter amendment.
- 2. Request for next printed agenda without reference to Committee.
- 3. Request for hearing on a subject matter at Committee.
- 4. Request for letter beginning "Supervisor [] inquires"
- 5. City Attorney request.
- 6. Call File No. [] from Committee.
- 7. Budget Analyst request (attach written motion).
- 8. Substitute Legislation File No. []
- 9. Request for Closed Session (attach written motion).
- 10. Board to Sit as A Committee of the Whole.
- 11. Question(s) submitted for Mayoral Appearance before the BOS on []

Please check the appropriate boxes. The proposed legislation should be forwarded to the following:

- Small Business Commission Youth Commission Ethics Commission
- Planning Commission Building Inspection Commission

Note: For the Imperative Agenda (a resolution not on the printed agenda), use a Imperative

Sponsor(s):


COHEN, CHIU

Subject:

Police code - large capacity magazines

The text is listed below or attached:

Attached

Signature of Sponsoring Supervisor: 

For Clerk's Use Only: