

File No. 200279

Committee Item No. 3

Board Item No. _____

COMMITTEE/BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

AGENDA PACKET CONTENTS LIST

Committee: Government Audit and Oversight

Date: February 4, 2021

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Prepared by: John Carroll

Date: January 29, 2021


Prepared by: John Carroll

Date: _____

Public Integrity Review

Preliminary Assessment:

Ethical Standards for Contract Award Processes of the Airport Commission and Other Commissions and Boards



CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Controller's Office

January 11, 2021

Assessment Summary

This preliminary assessment summarizes ethical standards for contract award and focuses on the:

- Airport Commission (referred to here as *the Commission* and distinct from the Airport as a department; the Commission oversees the department).
- Airport's Commercial Division, Revenue Development and Management (RDM), at San Francisco International Airport. (The department is referred to here as *the Airport*).

This document also summarizes:

- The results of our survey of five city commissions/boards, including the Airport Commission, and the Transbay Joint Powers Authority (TJPA) on ethical standards.
- The role of commissions and boards in the contract award process.

More reviews of other internal control processes will be released as our Public Integrity Review progresses. This assessment is the fourth in the series, is offered for public comment and review, and may be revised in the future as our work continues.

Assessment Summary

Background

In 2018 then-Airport Commissioner Linda Crayton allegedly agreed to meet with and help a potential bidder, Nick Bovis, by leveraging her position and authority and did not report the improper request for preferential assistance. The meeting described in the complaint violated the request for proposal (RFP) instructions, which prohibit any attempt by the proposer to communicate with or solicit any city elected official, Airport commissioner, and/or any other city or Airport personnel during the quiet period, except as instructed in the RFP, with the intent to influence the outcome of the selection process or award of the lease.

Highlights: Preliminary Findings

This assessment was conducted because of the seriousness of the allegations in the federal complaint but, in contrast to our previous public integrity assessments, we found no substantial structural problems that impair the overall control environment regarding commission and boards' involvement in procurement processes. However, we do note changes that could improve these processes.

Assessment Summary

- Although the criminal complaint states that during the meeting Ms. Crayton claimed she could influence the contract award process, the Airport confirmed that commissioners have no direct contact with Revenue Development and Management staff. Also, the identities of evaluation panelists are kept confidential, so a commissioner would not have been able to influence them.
- Of surveyed city commissions/boards and the TJPA, the Airport* and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency's Board of Directors have separate policies prohibiting communications with potential bidders. All of the surveyed organizations' RFPs contain instructions that prohibit potential bidders from contacting any member of the organization. Every city department has a statement of incompatible activities that applies to commissioners or directors and prohibits giving selective assistance to bidders or proposers, but none of these documents prohibits selective assistance to *potential* bidders or proposers, such as Mr. Bovis.

* The Airport implemented its Competitive Selection Process Communications Policy on December 19, 2020.

Background on the Public Integrity Investigation

The City Attorney's Office (City Attorney) is leading the investigation into alleged wrongdoing by city employees outlined in criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's Office against:

- Mohammed Nuru, former director of San Francisco Public Works
- Nick Bovis, owner of Lefty's Grill and Buffet and other restaurants
- Sandra Zuniga, former director of the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services
- Florence Kong, former member of the Immigrant Rights Commission
- Balmore Hernandez, chief executive of engineering firm AzulWorks, Inc., a company with large city contracts
- Wing Lok "Walter" Wong, building permit expediter and owner of several entities that do business with the City
- Alan Varela and Bill Gilmartin, officers of ProVen Management, Inc.
- Paul Giusti, former group government and community relations manager for Recology
- Harlan Kelly, Jr., former general manager of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission

Background on the Public Integrity Investigation *(continued)*

Mr. Bovis and Mr. Wong have pled guilty to schemes to defraud the City using bribery and kickbacks. Mr. Wong admitted to conspiring with Mr. Nuru and other unnamed city officials since 2004. Both are now cooperating with the ongoing federal investigation. Also, Mr. Hernandez has pled guilty and will cooperate, and Ms. Kong has pled guilty to providing bribes to Mr. Nuru.

Beyond involving those facing criminal charges, the investigation led Tom Hui, then the director of the Department of Building Inspection, to resign in March 2020 because of evidence showing he had accepted improper gifts, violated city law by giving preferential treatment to a developer and a permit expediter, and abused his official position to help his son and his son's girlfriend obtain city jobs.

The City Attorney has focused its investigation on misconduct by current and former city employees and any remedies for specific decisions or contracts tainted by conflicts of interest or other legal or policy violations.

The Criminal Complaint Against Mr. Nuru and Mr. Bovis

The FBI affidavit in support of the criminal complaint alleges that Mr. Nuru and Mr. Bovis tried to bribe Airport Commissioner Crayton in exchange for assistance in obtaining a city lease at San Francisco International Airport for a company of Mr. Bovis. The affidavit details recorded conversations between Mr. Nuru, Mr. Bovis, Ms. Crayton, confidential sources, and undercover agents at a dinner meeting discussing the possibility of Ms. Crayton securing the Airport Commission's votes to grant Lease #5 to Mr. Bovis and his investors. The affidavit alludes to the fact that Mr. Nuru and Ms. Crayton had a relationship when Mr. Bovis states she told him "Nuru has never asked her for any favors before so whatever he wants because he does a lot of things for her." According to the affidavit, at the April 2018 meeting Mr. Bovis explained to the undercover agents that Ms. Crayton controls the Airport Commission and knows "the vote before the Commission make the decision on Airport bids." The affidavit states that allegedly **Ms. Crayton said she would check to make sure the lease was not promised to others, would find out who will be on the selection committee, and "do everything I can" to assist Mr. Bovis in securing the lease.**

The complaint also notes that **Mr. Nuru** was the chair of the TJPA and **allegedly used this position to try to secure a desirable lease for Mr. Bovis in the Transbay Transit Center in exchange for benefits provided by Mr. Bovis but was unsuccessful.**

Background on the Airport Commission

The Airport Commission is the policy body that oversees San Francisco International Airport as a city department. The Airport director is the chief executive officer of the department and has full power and authority to administer the Airport's affairs.

The Commission is made up of five members appointed by the mayor to staggered four-year terms. There is no limit on the number of terms that can be served. Mayor Breed has appointed two commissioners who are serving their first term, reappointed two commissioners, and one commissioner's term expires in 2021. Under the San Francisco Charter, Section 3.100(18), the Board of Supervisors may reject mayoral appointments. Of the three long-serving Airport commissioners, each has been on the Commission for at least 14 years. Former Commissioner Crayton served from 1996 until 2020.

The Commission's purpose is to formulate, evaluate, and approve goals, objectives, plans, and programs, and set policies for the Airport. It also awards contracts and leases. The Commission may not—nor may its members—interfere with the Airport director's day-to-day management of the Airport's administrative affairs.

Airport Revenue Development and Management's Contract Award Functions

As a unit of the Airport's Commercial Division, Revenue Development and Management (RDM):

- Manages the use and leasing activities of concessionaires and related businesses on Airport property.
- Develops, implements, and administers proposals for use, bid packages, leases, permits, and other documents related to the Airport's concession property rental.
- Obtains required approvals from the Commission and Board of Supervisors for concession tenant revenue contracts.
- Is the primary contact for concession tenants.

Revenue contracts are agreements between the City and suppliers that generate income for the City. The City's financial system is not yet configured to store revenue contract information but should be. Historically, departments have used their own websites and subsystems for departmental revenue contracts.

RDM Competitive Solicitation Requirements at the Airport

The San Francisco Administrative Code, Section 2A.173, requires that concessionaires at the Airport be chosen through a competitive solicitation and selection process. According to RDM, it complies with this requirement by:

- Issuing RFPs as a standard practice to select tenants for retail and food and beverage concessions.
- Relying on its established concession program and continually seeking new concessions to maximize goods and services available to passengers. These concessions offer goods and services including:
 - Retail (shops selling items to meet travelers' needs)
 - Food and beverage
 - Rental cars
 - Services such as banking, currency exchange, and luggage carts

Also, contracts with anticipated revenue of \$1 million or more are subject to additional review and approval by the Board of Supervisors per the San Francisco Charter, Section 9.118(c).

Summary of Airport Concession Agreements *(continued)*

From July 1, 2015, through August 21, 2020, the Airport Commission awarded 99 concession agreements.


Category	Number of Agreements	Year Awarded					Average Term (Years)	Minimum Annual Guarantee ^b
		2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20		
Retail	41	3	3	12 ^a	17	6	6.9	\$57,190,905
Food and Beverage	45	14	9	4	11	7	8.6	15,015,736
Rental Car	4	0	0	0	4	0	5.0	47,166,392
Service	9	2	0	5	2	0	4.1	3,838,500
Total	99	19	12	21	34	13^c	7.3	\$123,211,533

^a One retail lease was rescinded because the owner retired and sold the business.

^b Minimum Annual Guarantee (MAG) is the minimum rent/fee the tenant is required to remit to the Airport per agreement year. Most agreements have multiyear terms. The Airport's revenue per agreement may exceed the MAG because most agreements also include a percentage rent provision.

^c Since January 1, 2019, city departments have been required to submit Form SFEC-126f2 to the Ethics Commission for any proposal with anticipated revenue of \$1 million or more. For fiscal year 2019-20, the Airport was required to submit this form for 12 of the 13 concession agreements executed and obtain the Board of Supervisors' approval.

The Airport Commission's Involvement in RDM's Contract Award Process



 Airport staff presents before Commission to get contract award approval to proceed.

¹ The RDM director must file Form SFEC-126f2 with the Ethics Commission within 30 days of receipt of the proposal if the RFP has anticipated revenue of \$1 million or more.

² Contracts with anticipated revenue of \$1 million or more also require the Board of Supervisors' approval per the San Francisco Charter, Section 9.118. Within 5 days of contract award approval, city elective officers who approve the contract must file Form SFEC-126f4 with the Ethics Commission.

The Airport Commission's Involvement in RDM's Contract Award Process *(continued)*

The Commission is notified of Airport lease solicitations from the pre-proposal stage to the final stage of lease award. According to RDM, its staff obtains Commission approval at the following decision points:

1. RFP Commencement

RDM submits a leasing opportunity package to the Commission to seek its approval to "Commence Proposal/Bid Process" for proposed terms and qualifications and to allow RDM to hold an informational conference.

2. After Informational Conference/Accept Commission Package

RDM updates the Commission on any comments and recommendations from the informational conference. The Commission then approves the final minimum qualifications and business terms and authorizes RDM to accept proposals/bids for the lease.

3. Lease Award

After evaluating the qualifying proposals/bids, RDM submits the results to the Commission to formally award the lease.

Concession Leases Awarded Based on Solicitation Results

Preliminary Finding:

Despite Ms. Crayton's alleged assurances to Mr. Bovis, the Airport did not award Lease #5 (or any other lease during this solicitation) to him—nor could it have—because Mr. Bovis did not ultimately submit a proposal. **The concession lease (Lease #5) was awarded to a bidder based on the results of the competitive solicitation process.**

Moreover, Ms. Crayton would not have had the opportunity to ensure Mr. Bovis was awarded Lease #5. According to the Airport's director of RDM, Airport commissioners have no direct contact with RDM staff administering solicitations or with solicitation panelists. Also, the identities of evaluation panelists are kept confidential, so Ms. Crayton could not have influenced them because she was not allowed to know who they were.

Concession Leases Awarded Based on Solicitation Results

(continued)

The July 2019 audit report, *The Airport Complied With Solicitation Procedures for Concession Leases but Can Better Track Small and Local Business Participation*, found that Airport's solicitation process complies with city and departmental rules and regulations. The audit:

- Assessed the competitive solicitation process used to select tenants for food and beverage and retail concession leases at the Airport.
- Concluded that the Airport properly administers the solicitation process in accordance with city policy and procedures and grants concession leases in accordance with departmental policies for food and beverage and retail concession leases.

Concession Leases Awarded Based on Solicitation Results

(continued)

Preliminary Finding:

Based on the 2019 audit and this review, Airport concession leases are awarded based on evaluation results from the competitive solicitation process.

Beyond the findings of our 2019 audit, this review found further evidence that the Airport awards concession leases based on its evaluation of proposals as part of the competitive solicitation process, including:

- From July 1, 2015, through August 21, 2020, Airport records show that the Airport Commission awarded 99 concession agreements as recommended by RDM through its competitive solicitation process and evaluation results; the Commission did not reject any of the recommended proposers RDM submitted.
- According to the Airport's former chief business and finance officer and the current RDM director, during their tenures the Commission did not reject a lease award proposed by the evaluation team based on the competitive solicitation process. *(The former chief business and finance officer held the position for 30 years. The RDM director has held that position for 13 years.)*

Evaluation Panels for Solicitations

According to the criminal complaint, confidential sources mentioned they previously had lost bids for restaurants at the Airport. Ms. Crayton allegedly stated she would have to make sure she had “everyone onboard” and would find out who would be on the selection committee.

Preliminary Finding:

Airport commissioners are appropriately excluded from participating in the selection process for evaluation panels.

- Successful proposers are selected based on final scores evaluated by the RFP evaluation panel. The panels are generally made up of other Airport division staff and may include industry professionals or staff from another airport. RDM staff selects the panelists; the Airport Commission is not involved in the selection process. According to the Airport’s former chief business and finance officer, panelists’ identities are confidential. Thus, they are not disclosed to commissioners, and only high-level details are shared about panelists’ experience. According to the commission secretary, she ensures that panelist names do not appear in the commissioners’ package.

Former Commissioner Crayton Did Not Report Improper Communications With the Potential Bidder

According to the criminal complaint, on April 4, 2018, then-Commissioner Crayton had a dinner meeting during which Mr. Nuru and Mr. Bovis sought preferential assistance to obtain a concession lease at the Airport for a business belonging to Mr. Bovis.

Preliminary Finding:

Ms. Crayton allegedly agreed to meet with and help a potential bidder by leveraging her position and authority and did not report the improper request for preferential assistance. According to the complaint, Ms. Crayton met with a proposer during the “quiet period” related to the RFP for the Terminal 1 food and beverage concession lease. This period, in 2018, began on January 29th, the day the RFP was issued, and ended on May 2nd, the due date for proposals. The meeting described in the complaint violated the RFP instructions, which prohibit any attempt by the proposer to communicate with or solicit any city elected official, Airport commissioner, and/or any other city or Airport personnel during the quiet period, except as instructed in the RFP, with the intent to influence the outcome of the selection process or award of the lease.

Former Commissioner Crayton Did Not Report Improper Communications With the Potential Bidder *(continued)*

Preliminary Finding *(continued)*:

According to the Airport, Mr. Bovis ultimately did not submit a proposal for the lease in question. Regardless, Ms. Crayton should have reported the improper request for preferential assistance from a potential bidder and a city official to the City Attorney. She could also have reported it to the Controller's Whistleblower Program and the Ethics Commission. The [Controller's Whistleblower Program](#) website states it will respond to specific allegations of administrative wrongdoing by city employees and those who do business with the City.

The Airport's Statement of Incompatible Activities Does Not Expressly Prohibit Ms. Crayton's Actions

Preliminary Finding:

Ms. Crayton allegedly promised to provide selective assistance to a potential bidder, but the Airport's statement of incompatible activities (SIA) does not prohibit communications with potential bidders and proposers. The SIA prohibits officers, including commissioners, and employees from knowingly providing selective assistance to individuals or entities in a manner that confers a competitive advantage on a bidder or proposer who is competing for a city contract. As Mr. Bovis did not ultimately submit a bid, Ms. Crayton's alleged actions did not violate the SIA. Yet, these alleged actions are unethical, so should be clearly disallowed.

Departmental SIAs do not universally prohibit knowingly providing selective assistance to individuals or entities that confers a competitive advantage on a *potential* or actual bidder or proposer who competes or may compete for a city contract. To remedy this gap and to ensure the universal application of this rule, the City should codify in the San Francisco Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code some of the major SIA rules, such as those around selective assistance to potential or actual bidders or proposers.

New Airport Contracting Policies and Procedures

Preliminary Finding:

The Airport has strengthened its contracting policies and continues to make improvements.

In response to the allegations in the federal criminal complaint and to ensure transparency and further strengthen its competitive solicitation and contracting processes, the Airport reports that it has implemented the following procedural changes:

- Added restrictions on communications by bidders and proposers during the quiet period to all RFPs and Requests for Bid (RFBs). Previously, according to the Airport, RFPs did not specifically designate a quiet period, rather a quiet period has been a longstanding practice.
- On December 19, 2020, implemented a Competitive Selection Process Communications Policy prohibiting communication with potential and actual proposers during the restricted communications period. This policy supplements the Airport's Statement of Incompatible Activities.

New Airport Contracting Policies and Procedures *(continued)*

The following are among the additional implemented processes:

- Updated solicitation documents to incorporate the new Competitive Selection Process Communications Policy.
- Added (as a witness) an employee of the Social Responsibility & Community Sustainability office to the kickoff meeting of each evaluation panel.
- Trained staff involved in all processes described above.
- Updated guidelines to ensure evaluation panelists' names are confidential and do not appear in commission memorandums, which according to the Airport, has also been a longstanding practice within RDM.

New Airport Contracting Policies and Procedures *(continued)*

The following are among the additional processes that are not yet implemented:

- Add language to Commission package memorandums about quiet periods and no contact before any RFP or RFB issuance.
- Improve screening of potential evaluation panelists by requiring panelists to sign certifications about the quiet period and the prohibition of contact with proposers.
- Have the Airport director or Commission president make a public statement about the prohibition against contacting officials or staff and the quiet period. This statement would occur during the Commission's open session when the Commission approves the commencement of an RFP or bid solicitation process.
- Require that an officer of each proposer attest in the proposer's bid or proposal that the proposer has not violated any rule of the City or Commission governing the competitive solicitation process.

Other Organizations Surveyed on Contract Award Process

We conducted a survey to compare the Airport Commission's contract award process with those of four other city commissions/boards—the Port Commission (Port), Recreation and Park Commission (Rec & Park), San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency Board of Directors (SFMTA), and San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (PUC)—and the TJPA.

Preliminary Finding:

Similar to the Airport, other surveyed city commissions and the TJPA are not involved in the solicitation process or evaluation panels' selection process.

Category	Airport	Port	Rec & Park	SFMTA	PUC	TJPA
Commission/board involved in solicitation process or proposal evaluation?	No ¹	No ²	No ³	No	No	No

¹ Approves solicitation commencement, bid acceptance, and contract award, but is not involved in administering solicitation or solicitation process.

² Approves solicitation commencement and contract award.

³ May approve solicitation in advance if it involves new business concepts or may raise community concerns regarding park use and its impact.

Other Organizations' Thresholds and Policies

Surveyed organizations have policies to define thresholds for awarding revenue contract leases* and policies, though not always consistent, regarding prohibitions of communications with potential bidders.

Category	Airport	Rec & Park	Port	SFMTA	PUC	TJPA
Board or commission approves at contract award (and threshold)*	All concession contracts	Leases and concessions that exceed one year	Retail and maritime leases	Over \$1M (Revenue contract award & amendments)	Over \$1M or 10 or more years (Real estate leases)	Over \$1.8M or 10 or more years (Real estate & retail leases)
Written policy prohibits commission/board members from communicating with potential bidders	Yes**	No	No	Yes	No	No
Departmental SIA prohibits selective assistance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not applicable
RFP instructs potential bidders on how they may communicate with the organization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

* Pursuant to San Francisco Charter, Section 9.118, specific contracts may also require Board of Supervisors to approve contract award.

** The Airport implemented its Competitive Selection Process Communications Policy on December 19, 2020.

Other Organizations' Roles in the Contract Award Process

Preliminary Finding:

Surveyed organizations have policies to define thresholds for awards requiring board or commission approval. All have SIAs that apply to commissioners or directors and prohibit selective assistance, but none of the SIAs prohibit communicating with potential proposers or bidders. Only one organization has separate policies on prohibitions of communications with potential bidders. However, all organizations' RFPs prohibit potential bidders from contacting any member of the organization.

From our survey and review, we learned that:

- All surveyed organizations have policies to define thresholds for awards requiring board or commission approval. The thresholds differ but appear reasonable.
- Like the Airport Commission, no other surveyed organization reports having rejected a lease or other contract recommended by department staff for contract award approval.

Other Organizations' Roles in the Contract Award Process

(continued)

- No departmental SIA we reviewed prohibits the organization's officials or employees from communicating with potential bidders. All surveyed city departments' SIAs have the same language on selective assistance. The City should codify some major SIA provisions, including the prohibition of selective assistance to potential and actual bidders or proposers.
- Of the commissions/boards we reviewed, the Airport* and SFMTA's Board of Directors have written policies prohibiting their members from communicating with potential bidders during the RFP process through the date of contract award, but all boards and commissions should have policies that include this.
- All organizations include written communication instructions in their RFPs that prohibit potential bidders from contacting any member of the organization. However, departments' RFPs are inconsistent regarding with whom potential bidders cannot communicate. Although all the RFPs specify a quiet period during which potential bidders and department staff cannot communicate, the Port and TJPA's RFPs also prohibit bidders from contacting members of boards or commissions, consultants, and RFP evaluation panel members.

*The Airport implemented its Competitive Selection Process Communications Policy on December 19, 2020.

The City May Benefit From Codifying Limitations on Commissioner and Board Director Involvement in the Contract Award Process

The San Francisco Charter, Section 4.102, outlines the powers and duties of boards and commissions, but says very little about what boards and commissions should not do. One of the main limitations is that “Each board or commission... shall deal with administrative matters solely through the department head or his or her designees, and any dictation, suggestion or interference herein prohibited on the part of any member of a board or commission shall constitute official misconduct...”

In contrast, Los Angeles County has codified director and commissioner involvement in contracts. The Los Angeles Municipal Code, Section 49.5.11, states that “except at a public meeting, a member of a City board or commission shall not participate in the development, review, evaluation, or negotiation of or the recommendation process for bids, proposals, or any other requests for the award or termination of a contract, amendment, or change order involving that board, commission, or agency...”

Preliminary Finding:

The City may benefit from codifying requirements to make explicit directors’ and commissioners’ roles, including the limitations thereon, in the contract award process.

SF Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 1.126

The San Francisco Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 1.126, prohibits city contractors or affiliates from contributing to city elective officers where a contract must be approved by the city elective officer, a candidate for a city elective office, or a committee controlled by such an individual.

Since January 1, 2019, city departments and city elective officers* have been required to report when a contract has a value of \$100,000 or more per fiscal year and requires the approval of a city elective officer.

- Departments must comply with Section 1.126(f)(2) and file Form SFEC-126f2 within 30 days of receipt of the proposal.
- City elective officers must comply with Section 1.126(f)(4) and file Form SFEC-126f4 within 5 business days of the approval of a contract.

Forms SFEC-126f2 and SFEC-126f4 are not in the City's financial system; they are submitted separately to the Ethics Commission.

* City elective officers include the assessor, city attorney, district attorney, mayor, public defender, sheriff, treasurer, and members of the Board of Supervisors

SF Charter, Section 9.118

Under the San Francisco Charter, Section 9.118, certain contracts and actions require Board of Supervisors' approval, including:

- Contracts with anticipated revenue of \$1 million or more or the modification, amendment, or termination of any such contract.
- Excluding construction contracts, contracts with a term of ten years or more, contracts requiring anticipated expenditures of \$10 million or more, or the modification of a contract with an impact of more than \$500,000.
- Leases of real property for a period of ten or more years, including options to renew, or having anticipated revenue of \$1 million or more; the modification, amendment, or termination of any covered lease.
- Any sale or other transfer of city-owned real property.

Such contracts, which may be entered into by any department, may be subject to the Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 1.126.

Ethics Forms SFEC-126f2 and SFEC-126f4

Form	Required Filers	Information Required to File
SFEC-126f2	City departments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Filing information • City contract information • Contract information, including RFP number, file number, and nature of the contract • Contractor information, including contractor or subcontractor name, contractor type, and date of proposal submission • Verification signature
SFEC-126f4	City elective officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Filing information • City elective office or board • Filer's contact information • Contracting department contact • Contractor information • Contract information, including RFP number, file number, contract amount, and nature of the contract • Contract approvals • Affiliates and subcontractors, including members of the contractor's board of directors; contractor's principal officers, including chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief operating officer, or other persons with similar titles; any individual or entity who has an ownership interest of 10 percent or more in the contractor; and any subcontractor listed in the bid or contract • Verification signature

Increased Sightline for Contract Approvers by Using Information on Form SFEC-126f4

Preliminary Finding:

Before a contract is awarded, departmental and commission contract approvers may not know of contractor information that could help them avoid conflicts of interest. The City could use information elected officials must provide when filing Form SFEC-126f4, which includes the name of the bidder, its subcontractor(s), subcontractor owner(s), directors, and officers.* If this information was collected when the bid proposal was submitted and through the City's financial system instead of through departmental subsystems, this information could then be distributed to contract approvers before award approval so they know who is subject to the City's competitive selection policies.

This information would increase transparency, may help avoid violations of competitive selection policies, and should facilitate the completion of Form SFEC-126f4. If sharing this information with contract approvers proves useful to help prevent conflicts of interest, the City should consider requiring that this information be obtained for other contracts and enter it in the City's financial system.

* A bidder may already be required to file this information as part of its business registration and tax filings, such as on IRS tax returns for nonprofit organizations, in Securities and Exchange Commission filings for publicly traded corporations, and in business registration filings with the State of California and the City.

Recommendations

Given the findings of our preliminary assessment, we offer the following preliminary recommendations, which we may refine as the investigation and review continue and we consider the feedback we receive in the review process.

1. **City commissions and boards should revise their policies and procedures to include requirements to address members' involvement in contract award processes and prohibit communications during competitive selection.**
2. **In consultation with the Ethics Commission, each city commission and board should annually train its members on the department's statement of incompatible activities. The training should state that if proposers request inappropriate assistance, commissioners should report this to the commission secretary on public record and consult with the City Attorney's Office and the Ethics Commission for next steps.**
3. **City law should be amended to codify that city officials and employees shall not knowingly provide selective assistance to individuals or entities that confers a competitive advantage on a proposer or potential proposer for a city contract.**

Recommendations *(continued)*

4. The Ethics Commission should work with the City Attorney's Office to consider codifying prohibitions in the statement of incompatible activities to ensure citywide consistency in their enforcement and increase the visibility of these prohibitions.
5. City departments should include in their competitive solicitation documents the restrictions on communication by and with potential bidders and enforce the restrictions by requiring commissions and board members to affirm compliance in writing annually.
6. The Airport should regularly issue reports to the Airport Commission listing published solicitation documents, so commissioners are aware of the pending restricted communications period for each solicitation, pursuant to the Airport's Competitive Selection Process Communications Policy.
7. The Airport should implement the remaining newly proposed aspects of the department's competitive solicitation process.

Recommendations *(continued)*

8. The City should consider whether it would be warranted to codify the roles of commission and board members, including the limitations thereon, in the contract award process.
9. To promote data-driven decisions and consistency and transparency in city contracting:
 - a. City departments should work with the Controller's Office to develop and implement plans for enhancing the City's financial system to accommodate management of departmental revenue contracts, including bid opportunities, outreach, contract award, revenue collection, and revenue recognition.
 - b. The Controller's Office should, to enable this change, improve the City's financial system to better meet departments' needs.

Recommendations *(continued)*

10. The City should:

- a. Direct departments to require proposers to submit key information about their affiliates and subcontractors, including identification of owners, directors, and officers, for contracts subject to the Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 1.126(f)(4), in their response to the competitive solicitation process and enter this information in the City's financial system.
- b. Consider requiring departments to obtain this information for contracts not subject to Section 1.126(f)(4).

Completed and Upcoming Public Integrity Reporting

Our Public Integrity Review, performed in consultation with the City Attorney, will continue to assess selected city policies and procedures to evaluate their adequacy in preventing abuse and fraud. Completed, current, and future assessments and reports address the following topics:

1. [San Francisco Public Works Contracting](#) (report issued on June 29, 2020)
2. [Gifts to Departments Through Non-City Organizations Lack Transparency and Create “Pay-to-Play” Risk](#) (report issued on September 24, 2020)
3. [San Francisco’s Debarment Process](#) (report issued on November 5, 2020)
4. Citywide ethics reporting requirements
5. The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission contracting process
6. The Department of Building Inspection’s policies and practices to award permits
7. A final report on the topics covered in these preliminary assessments

Additional reviews and assessments will be determined and performed as the City Attorney’s investigation proceeds.


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Public Integrity Review

Preliminary Assessment:

Gifts to Departments Through Non-City Organizations Lack Transparency and Create “Pay-to-Play” Risk



CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Office of the Controller

September 24, 2020

Assessment Summary

This preliminary assessment report summarizes gifts and support benefitting city departments from city contractors and building permit applicants and holders through **non-city organizations**, including *Friends of organizations*, and focuses on San Francisco Parks Alliance (the Parks Alliance), a nonprofit organization, and its relationship with San Francisco Public Works (Public Works), a city department. This assessment is the second in the series, is offered for public comment and review, and may be revised in the future as our work continues. Additional reviews of other internal control processes will be released as our Public Integrity Review progresses.

- **Inappropriate fundraising and directed spending.** Mohammed Nuru and others would direct staff to procure goods and services for staff appreciation, volunteer programs, merchandise, community support, and events from specific vendors, circumventing city purchasing controls. These purchases would then be reimbursed through Public Works subaccounts held by the Parks Alliance, a non-city organization, again outside of city purchasing rules. Mr. Nuru solicited funds for these purchases from interested parties, including businesses that had contracts with the department or city building permits. The gifts, which were not accepted or disclosed by the City, create a perceived “pay-to-play” relationship.

Assessment Summary *(continued)*

This assessment offers recommendations to reduce these risks:

- **The City should prohibit non-elected department heads and employees from soliciting donations from those they regulate or do business with (“interested parties”), unless specifically authorized by the Board of Supervisors.** Given the reliance of some functions on philanthropy, such as for the City’s museums and parks, exceptions to this prohibition would be narrowly approved by the Board to permit fundraising by specific employees for specific public purposes. Authorized fundraising should be publicly reported using existing procedures that apply to elected officials but do not currently apply to other city officers and employees.
- **The City needs to improve compliance with restrictions on and reporting requirements for acceptance of gifts from outside sources.** The City has laws requiring acceptance and reporting of gifts for public purposes, but adherence to these laws is not uniform. Policies and procedures should be reviewed and strengthened, including establishment of clearer procedures and definitions, improved public reporting and transparency, and periodic auditing of these processes.

Assessment Summary *(continued)*

- **Donors of all gifts accepted by the City should be disclosed, and consistent with existing law, anonymous donations should be prohibited.** To avoid the real and perceived risk of facilitating “pay-to-play” relationships, any donations that will be used to benefit a city department or city employees should be publicly reported in a manner that permits public transparency. By accepting anonymous donations, which are prohibited by the City’s Sunshine Ordinance, the City runs the risk of taking payments from donors with financial interest.
- **The City should amend practices and procedures to reduce the incentive to use outside gifts to support staff appreciation.** Although our review found instances of gifts received being spent through seemingly inappropriate processes, they appeared to generally be for legitimate public purposes, including staff appreciation and celebration of team accomplishments. The City could reduce risks arising from use of gifts for staff appreciation by more clearly defining the permissible uses of public funds for these purposes, removing administrative barriers that make such uses impractical, and appropriating funds for these purposes.

Background on the Public Integrity Investigation

The City Attorney's Office (City Attorney) is leading the investigation into alleged wrongdoing by city employees outlined in criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's Office against Mohammed Nuru, former director of Public Works; Nick Bovis, owner of Lefty's Grill and Buffet at Fisherman's Wharf and other restaurants; Sandra Zuniga, former director of the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services; Florence Kong, former member of the Immigrant Rights Commission; Balmore Hernandez, chief executive of engineering firm AzulWorks, Inc., a company with large city contracts; and Wing Lok "Walter" Wong, permit expediter and owner of numerous entities that do business with the City.

Mr. Bovis and Mr. Wong have pled guilty to schemes to defraud the City using bribery and kickbacks. Mr. Wong admitted to conspiring with Mr. Nuru and other unnamed city officials since 2004. Both are now cooperating with the ongoing federal investigation.

The City Attorney has focused its investigation on misconduct by current and former city employees and any remedies for specific decisions or contracts tainted by conflicts of interest or other legal or policy violations. On July 14, 2020, the City Attorney moved to debar AzulWorks, Inc., from contracting with the City for five years — the maximum duration allowed under the law.

The Criminal Complaint Against Nuru and Bovis

The FBI affidavit in support of the criminal complaint alleges that Mr. Nuru and Mr. Bovis tried to bribe a member of the San Francisco Airport Commission in exchange for assistance in obtaining a city lease at San Francisco International Airport for a company of Mr. Bovis. The complaint details the relationship between Mr. Nuru and Mr. Bovis, including a recorded conversation in which they discussed a voucher deal that allowed **Public Works employees to receive free meals from one of Mr. Bovis's restaurants**, the cost of which was then **reimbursed to Mr. Bovis's company with Public Works funds.***

Further, according to the complaint, in another recorded conversation Mr. Bovis stated that, in exchange for Mr. Nuru's assistance in steering one or more city contracts to Mr. Bovis, Mr. Bovis (or others at his direction, presumably) would make **donations to nonprofit organizations of a city official's choice.**

* It appears that these reimbursements were made through the *Friends of* account's subaccounts associated with Public Works held by the Parks Alliance.

Non-City Organizations

Some **nonprofit or third-party (non-city) organizations** provide financial and/or programmatic support to a city department or group of departments to improve delivery of government services, meet philanthropic goals, support the training and development of city employees, or provide other support services to the department(s).

On February 7, 2020, the Controller requested all 56 city departments to provide information about accounts for non-city organizations supporting them.

Departments responded, and based on the responses received:

- 33 departments report non-city organizations with **588** accounts or subaccounts associated with them.
- 23 departments report no non-city organizations associated with them.

The **588** reported accounts or subaccounts for non-city organizations associated with one or more city departments include fiscal agents, fiscal sponsors, trustee or agent accounts, contracts, grants, foundations, funds, *friends of* organizations, and others. Many of these accounts are not actually with non-city organizations because they are subject to city processes, are reported in the financial system, and do not receive gifts that are ultimately spent on the City.

Friends of Organizations

Friends of organizations are generally distinguished by the fact that they are intended to financially support the department with which they are associated and charitable donations are their primary revenue source, and thus are spent on the City. For example, the description of one *Friends of* organization states it was created upon, “realizing that the city budget had no discretionary funds for training, education, special projects and small programs...”

The next section focuses on *Friends of* organizations identified through the Controller’s survey. **Recommendations determined by this analysis of *Friends of* organizations should be applied to non-city organizations that operate in a comparable manner.**

Friends of Organizations Reported by Departments

Listed below are *Friends of* organizations and their reported use, the amount of city funding received, and whether donors are publicly reported

<i>Friends of</i> Organization	Department or Commission	Donors Publicly Reported?	Reported Purpose & Use	City Funding Received ¹ July 1, 2015, Through June 30, 2020
San Francisco Aeronautical Society	Airport	No	Preserve and share history of commercial aviation to enrich the public experience at the Airport	\$50,000
Friends of Animal Care & Control	Animal Care & Control	No	Support department programs and services	none
Friends of the Arts Commission	Arts Commission	Yes ²	Support restoration of civic art collection and arts education initiatives, host annual awards events	none
Friends of SF Environment	Environment	No	Staff development and training, community engagement events	none
Friends of the Film Commission	Film Commission	No	Support Film SF to increase and facilitate opportunities for production	none
Friends of City Planning	Planning	No	Various projects	none

¹ City funding may not be directly for or associated with role as a *Friends of* organization.

² Anonymous donors reported, sometimes as funds or matching gifts.

Continued on next page.

Friends of Organizations Reported by Departments *(continued)*

<i>Friends of Organization</i>	Department or Commission	Donors Publicly Reported?	Reported Purpose & Use	City Funding Received ¹ July 1, 2015, Through June 30, 2020
Friends of the Port	Port	Yes ²	Promote civic events on San Francisco Bay waterfront	none
San Francisco Public Health Foundation	Public Health	No	Support administrative and support services for various programs	\$9.7 million
San Francisco General Hospital Foundation		Yes ²	Support initiatives including research, education, and care	\$485,381
Friends of Laguna Honda		No	Support programs that spark joy and connection to the community and engage residents' interests	none
Friends of the SF Public Library	Public Library	Yes ²	Support department programs and services	\$109,000
Friends of the Cable Car Museum	SFMTA	No	Preserve cable car history	none
Friends of the Urban Forest	SFPUC	Yes ²	Support programs that plant and care for the City's ideal urban forest	\$7.6 million

¹ City funding may not be directly for or associated with role as a *Friends of* organization.

² Anonymous donors reported, sometimes as funds or matching gifts.

Continued on next page.

Friends of Organizations Reported by Departments *(continued)*

<i>Friends of Organization</i>	Department or Commission	Donors Publicly Reported?	Reported Purpose & Use	City Funding Received ¹ July 1, 2015, Through June 30, 2020
San Francisco Parks Alliance	Public Works	Yes ²	Support department projects and programs, including community events, recreation programs, and staff appreciation programs	\$11.9 million
	Recreation and Park	Yes ²		
Randall Museum Friends	Recreation and Park	No	Support Randall Museum	\$111,075
Friends of Camp Mather		No	Promote, enhance, protect, and support aspects of Camp Mather	\$23,282
Friends of Sharon Arts Studio		No	Promote artistic development, craftsmanship, and creative expression	none
Friends of the Commission on the Status of Women	Status of Women	No	Support programs that ensure equal treatment of women and girls	\$11,525
San Francisco Performing Arts Center Foundation	War Memorial	No	Contribute to and assist in the operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation of War Memorial and Performing Arts Center buildings	\$197,694

¹ City funding may not be directly for or associated with role as a *Friends of* organization.

² Anonymous donors reported, sometimes as funds or matching gifts.

Anonymous Donations

If funds will be spent for city purposes, non-city organizations that either do not publicly report donations or do so but allow anonymous donations violate the disclosure requirement of the City's Sunshine Ordinance and prevent the detection of any financial interest anonymous donors may have with the City. By accepting anonymous donations, the City runs the risk of receiving payments from those it regulates, which is prohibited by the Sunshine Ordinance.

The **Sunshine Ordinance**, Section 67.29-6, states that no "official or employee or agent of the City shall accept, allow to be collected, or direct or influence the spending of, any money, or any goods or services worth more than one hundred dollars in aggregate, for the purpose of carrying out or assisting any City function unless the amount and source of all such funds is disclosed . . ." City departments must disclose donor names and whether the donor has a financial interest with the City. According to the City Attorney, a financial interest is any contract, grant, lease, or request for license, permit, or other entitlement with or pending before the City. Changes to this section of the Sunshine Ordinance require voter approval.

Preliminary Finding

If non-city organizations receive donations that will be used to benefit the City, they must comply with the donation disclosure requirements of the City's Sunshine Ordinance. Further, the Sunshine Ordinance should define "financial interest."

Public Works and the Parks Alliance

The next section focuses on the Parks Alliance subaccounts for Public Works. Although 33 city departments report having relationships with non-city organizations, we focus here on the relationship between Public Works and the Parks Alliance because of the criminal investigation of Mohammed Nuru, who, as the former Public Works director, allegedly solicited donations from private companies or individuals, directed these donations to the Parks Alliance subaccounts for Public Works, and influenced procurement decisions from those subaccounts.

The Parks Alliance states it did not know that its fiscal agency was being used unscrupulously by city officials. The Parks Alliance also states that it did not profit from the relationship with Public Works and had reached out to Mr. Nuru in 2019 to formalize its relationship with the department through a memorandum of understanding, though this effort was ignored.

The Parks Alliance

The Parks Alliance is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that works with or serves as a fiscal sponsor for 200 groups and city agencies, allowing them to seek grants and solicit tax-deductible donations under its tax-exempt status. In addition to Public Works, the Parks Alliance partners with the Office of the City Administrator, Office of Economic and Workforce Development, Office of the Mayor, Port of San Francisco, Recreation and Park Department, and San Francisco Planning (the Planning Department) to support citywide open space and park infrastructure.

According to its website and annual reports, the Parks Alliance addresses issues affecting not just parks, but also public spaces such as plazas, parklets, staircases, medians, and alleys. In 2018 it worked with its partners to complete over 20 park projects, engage over 100,000 residents in park programming, and help raise over \$20 million for essential capital projects. In 2019 it brought thousands of people together for sing-alongs at movies in parks, transformed abandoned alleys into welcoming pedestrian thoroughfares, and built over 20 miles of park trails.

The Parks Alliance regularly posts its annual report and audit reports on its website. According to its 2019 audit report, the Parks Alliance received grants and contributions of \$18.9 million and spent \$17.7 million.

The Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance Operate Like a City Account Without City Oversight

Preliminary Finding

The Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance operate like a city account in that invoices were directed and approved by Public Works employees and tracked by both Public Works and the Parks Alliance, although all outside of the City's procurement and financial system. **Because the subaccounts operate outside of the City's purview, they are not subject to the same review and controls that would otherwise occur to comply with the City's accounting and procurement policies and procedures.**

This arrangement created the opportunity for unethical steering of purchases to occur. According to Public Works staff, Mr. Nuru directed some of the purchases made from the account. According to Public Works, this direction, consistent with the **tone at the top** when Mr. Nuru was the director, and the fact that other departments have accounts with non-city organizations that are not regulated, caused staff not to question the way the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance functioned.

Differences in Controls Over Friends of Organizations

Contrary to the lack of controls over the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance, the Parks Alliance, in its relationship with Recreation and Park, and the Friends of the San Francisco Public Library, whose mission is to strengthen, support and advocate for a premier public library system, have policies, processes, and reporting requirements that give the City and the public a view into the accounts and promote confidence that their expenditures will be legitimate.

Policy, Process, or Reporting Requirement Involving the City	San Francisco Parks Alliance		Friends of the San Francisco Public Library
	Public Works	Recreation and Park	Public Library
Memorandum of Understanding Defining Its Relationship With City	No	Yes*	Yes
Gift Reporting to Board of Supervisors, Including Formal Process for Accept and Expend	No	Yes	Yes
Existing Agreement to Comply With San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6	No	No	Yes

* Recreation and Park and the Parks Alliance set up memorandums of understanding for individual projects.

Friends of the San Francisco Public Library

All non-city organizations should comply with the Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6, which states that if the funds are provided or managed by an entity, not an individual, that entity must agree in writing to abide by the ordinance. As shown on the preceding slide, the Public Library has a memorandum of understanding with the Friends of the San Francisco Public Library that defines the organization's roles and allowable practices, contains an audit clause, and establishes requirements for it to adhere to the City's Administrative Code with respect to the acceptance of gifts. Consistent with this agreement, the Public Library:

- Annually accepts and expends funds as part of its budget process to obtain the Board of Supervisors' approval for cash or in-kind goods or services worth over \$100,000 from Friends of the San Francisco Public Library for direct support of the department's programs and services in the upcoming fiscal year (**Administrative Code, Sec. 10.100-87, Library Gift Fund**).
- Discloses all gifts over \$100 on its website and, since fiscal year 2019-20, discloses donors with active contracts (**Sunshine Ordinance, Sec. 67.29-6**).

Legal Requirements for Gifts to the City

City departments may have special funds with authorized sources and uses in Administrative Code Sec. 10.100 that they can use to accept and expend gifts. Regardless of the fund to which gifts are directed, all departments must comply with the following reporting and disclosure requirements.

The **Administrative Code, Section 10.100-305 (San Francisco Gift Funds)**, requires city departments, boards, and commissions to report all gifts of cash or goods to the Controller, obtain the Board of Supervisors' approval, by resolution, for acceptance and expenditure of any gift of cash or goods with a market value greater than \$10,000, and annually report gifts received, detailing the donors' names, nature or amount of the gifts, and their disposition.

The **Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6 (Sources of Outside Funding)**, requires disclosure of the true source of any money, goods, or services received worth more than \$100 in aggregate. Disclosure must be on the receiving department's website and must include donor names and any financial interest a donor has with the City. Last, if the funds are provided or managed by an entity, not an individual, that entity must agree in writing to abide by the ordinance.

Impose Gift Requirements for Non-City Organizations

Preliminary Finding

Because the City does not consistently impose gift requirements for non-city organizations, a lack of transparency and inconsistent practices exist among Public Works and the Parks Alliance, and potentially among the 33 other city departments and non-city organizations. To the extent that non-city organizations receive gifts that will be spent on city departments, they should comply with city gift requirements. City departments should formalize their relationships with any non-city organization with which they interact through a memorandum of understanding that is posted on the department's website and that:

- Requires the organization to adhere to the City's Administrative Code, including Section 10.100-305, and any other section that applies to the department.
- States the organization agrees to comply with the City's Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6, and will file required reports with the Board of Supervisors and Controller.
- Includes clearly defined roles and expenditure requirements and prohibitions.
- Has a clause granting the Controller audit authority and access to the organization's records.
- A requirement to report donations, including grants, on the organization's website.
- Regular public reporting on these funds to occur not less than annually, at the donor or payee recipient level, and posted on the recipient department's website.

Data for the Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance

The assessment reviewed both the Public Works log for its subaccounts at the Parks Alliance (the Public Works log) and the Parks Alliance's data about the Public Works subaccounts. During July 1, 2015, through January 17, 2020, (the review period) contributions and payments recorded in the **Public Works log were higher by \$26,705 and \$13,391, respectively**. In the two data sets, 98 percent of line items agree.

Some significant disparities between the two datasets include:

- Public Works log shows donations of \$42,750 by SF Clean City Coalition and \$12,083 by PG&E that Parks Alliance data does not.
- Parks Alliance data shows a city grant of \$22,925 that the Public Works log does not.
- Variances in recorded individual payment amounts range from nine cents to \$7,429 and are spread among 27 vendors or individuals.

Data for the Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance *(continued)*

Preliminary Finding

Public Works does not properly oversee the Parks Alliance subaccounts.

Departments should work with their non-city organizations to ensure funds in such organizations are managed appropriately. Because the funds the Parks Alliance raised were to be spent on the department, Public Works should have an accurate and timely understanding of all contributions to and payments from the organizations. Although Public Works received data from the Parks Alliance, which the department then turned into its log, Public Works did not maintain communication to ensure its documentation of contributions and payments agreed with the Parks Alliance's records. According to Public Works, unclear and inaccurate recordkeeping was largely due to the tone at the top, as Mohammed Nuru did not give staff clear direction or guidelines and did not define roles or responsibilities for managing these subaccounts.

For the remainder of the assessment, **the team focused on the Public Works log** because its data is nearly the same as the Parks Alliance financial data. In fact, it contains more information—and was available for Mr. Nuru to review.

Four Parks Alliance Subaccounts Relate to Public Works

The Public Works log for **July 1, 2015, through January 17, 2020**, shows the following Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance. (To put the totals below in context, a Parks Alliance 2019 audit report shows the organization in one year received grants and contributions of \$18.9 million and spent \$17.7 million.)

Subaccount	Reported Description & Uses	Contributions	Expenses
DPW Special Projects (8420)	Payments and reimbursements for staff appreciation	\$400,216	\$370,230
DPW Clean Team (8421)	Payments and reimbursements for monthly Clean Team events	198,114	197,520
DPW Giant Sweep (8423)	Payments and reimbursements related to the Giant Sweep campaign	390,500	402,616
Fix-It Team (8424)	For community outreach and to fix quick, actionable problems in the City	2,000	1,807
	Three subaccounts no longer in use*		8,565
	Total	\$990,830	\$980,738

* Three subaccounts had no expenditures after fiscal year 2018-19: DPW Maintenance (8419), DPW Street Parks (8433), and American Community Gardening Association Conference (8422).

Source: Public Works log and Public Works

Much of the Spending From the Parks Alliance's Public Works Subaccounts Was for Employee Events

For the review period, the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance were largely used to pay for staff appreciation, department initiatives with volunteers, and merchandise, generally at Public Works' direction.

Expense Type	Amount
Employee events, appreciation, and training, including holiday parties, picnics, meals, awards, conferences, and Bay to Breakers participation	\$375,631
Purchases for volunteer programs and campaigns, such as Arbor Day, Love Our City, Community Clean Team, and Giant Sweep	284,906
Merchandise, including shirts, hats, tote bags, key tags, and pins	249,693
Community support or events for neighborhoods or community groups	42,906
Employee attendance at community events, such as luncheons and galas for community organizations	17,542
Other miscellaneous or vague reimbursements	10,060
Total	\$980,738

Source: Public Works log

The Public Works Log Lacks Detail

We could not identify the purpose of some expenditures from the Public Works log (which matched the Parks Alliance financial data) due to insufficient detail in the records to justify the cost.

- Example 1: From April 2016 through May 2019, multiple payments totaling \$164,885 were made to SDL Merchandising for various shirts, caps, and merchandise. No quantities are documented.
- Example 2: On April 27, 2018, two payments totaling \$27,316 were made to Spice It Up Catering. No detail, including the quantity of food and/or beverages provided, is documented.
- Example 3: On January 31, 2016, an employee was reimbursed \$1,654. The only detail documented is "Exp. Reimbursements."
- Example 4: On September 13, 2015, an employee was reimbursed \$1,520. The detail documented is "Reimb." and "Special Projects."

Further, \$4,000 is recorded incorrectly because \$6,000 was deducted from the department's Special Projects subaccount, with a note that it is for the Fix-it subaccount (that Sandra Zuniga oversaw), yet the corresponding entry shows only \$2,000 added to the Fix-it subaccount. This amount is not missing from the Parks Alliance data.

The Public Works Log Lacks Detail *(continued)*


Preliminary Findings

Due to insufficient oversight and documentation, it is unclear how thousands of dollars of Parks Alliance funds were spent, making it difficult to ascertain whether the funds were spent for legitimate and legal purposes.

Although they agree to the Parks Alliance financial data, some transactions on the Public Works log are unclear, so we cannot identify the true nature of payments or whether the products and services ordered were consistent with the price paid. Further, based on our review, at least \$4,000 is recorded incorrectly in the Public Works log.

Although it did not appear that any payments were gifts, if any were, they may have come from restricted sources, as some donations clearly came from those doing business with the City, which is prohibited by the City's Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 3.216. Further, if any were gifts instead of reimbursements, this could violate Public Works' Statement of Incompatible Activities, which prohibits officers and employees from accepting any gift that is given in exchange for doing their city job.

The Flow of Funds Between the City and the Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance Is Complex



Donations to the Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance Could Give the Appearance of “Pay to Play”



For the review period, Public Works paid **eight** contractors a total of **\$572 million** through contract purchase orders or other voucher payments, and the Department of Building Inspection issued **218 building permits** to **seven** entities that, during this same period, donated **\$966,247** to the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance. Other donors contributed an additional \$26,583 to the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance, bringing total donations to \$992,830.*

* Total donations exclude a Fix-it subaccount adjustment that reduced the amount by \$2,000.

Donations to the Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance

Below are the city contractors and building permit holders that donated to the Parks Alliance's Public Works subaccounts during the review period.

Donors	Donations Made to Public Works Subaccounts at Parks Alliance		Building Permits at Time of Donation	Public Works' Payments to Contractor/Permit Holder		Other Departments' Payments to Contractor/Permit Holder	
	Amount	% Total	Number	Amount	% Total	Amount	% Total
SF Clean City Coalition ¹	\$721,250	88%	0	\$3,288,175	1%	\$1,784,618	0%
Recology ¹	131,948		4	5,775,113	1%	116,493,379	10%
Pacific Gas & Electric	42,083	4%	8	3,236,409	1%	211,720,652	18%
Emerald Fund II LLC ²	17,000	2%	6	0	0%	22,745,925	2%
Clark Construction	16,266	2%	60	247,209,740	43%	27,706,950	3%
Webcor Construction	15,000	2%	45	193,766,898	34%	762,909,564	66%
Laborer's Int'l Union	11,200	1%	0	273,197	0%	7,145,116	1%
Pankow Construction	10,500	1%	88	118,719,636	20%	966,497	0%
Airbnb	1,000	0%	7	0	0%	0	0%
Total	\$966,247		218	\$572,269,168		\$1,151,472,701	

¹ According to the City Attorney's Public Integrity Unit, SF Clean City Coalition received \$150,000 from Recology in each of three years—2015, 2017, and 2018—for Public Works' Giant Sweep program, Clean Team program, staff enrichment, and community events. In 2019 Recology donated \$180,000 for the Giant Sweep and Clean Team programs to SF Clean City Coalition, which then paid \$171,000 to the Parks Alliance.

² Emerald Fund II LLC, also known as Emerald Fund, Inc., includes 1045 Mission LP, Harrison Fremont Holdings LLC, 100 Van Ness Associates, Hayes Van Ness Associates, Emerald Polk LLC, and EBG II LLC.

Source: Public Works log; City's financial system for contractor/permit holder payments; DataSF for permits

Donations to the Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance *(continued)*

Preliminary Finding

When city contractors or city building permit applicants or holders donate to non-city organizations, such as those maintained by the Parks Alliance for Public Works, it can create a “pay-to-play” relationship. Specifically, a non-city organization can serve as an intermediary between the City and a contractor or potential contractor, wherein the contractor donates money to influence (or try to influence) a city department to grant, extend, or augment a city contract, subcontract, or grant. Similarly, a non-city organization can also serve as an intermediary between the City and a building permit applicant, wherein the applicant donates money to influence (or try to influence) the permit approval process.

Departments are not required to track or report on donors to their affiliated non-city organizations that have contracts or permits with the department or City. However, as donations to non-city organizations ultimately benefit the City, departments should report the donors to non-city organizations and the donor’s financial interest as required under the City’s Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6, on both the non-city organization’s and department’s website.

Tone at the Top

“Tone at the top” refers to the ethical atmosphere that is created in the workplace by the organization's leadership. **Failure to maintain such a workplace culture can result in the pressure, rationalization, and ability to carry out ethical violations.**

The 2019 Office of the City Administrator and Public Works holiday party illustrates this problem.

Based on information from the City Attorney's Public Integrity Unit, Mr. Nuru solicited funds from companies with business or regulatory decisions before Public Works. These funds were then used to host the party and other employee appreciation events that benefitted those in the department. **Together these acts create an acceptance of a gift from a “restricted source,” which is prohibited under city ethics laws.**

Tone at the Top *(continued)*

Mr. Nuru personally solicited these funds and directed others in the department to do the same. Approximately \$33,000 (or 80 percent) of the event's total cost of more than \$40,000 was donated by restricted sources, including Recology, Inc. His appointing authority, the City Administrator, was aware of his solicitation efforts.

The holiday party was limited to 350 attendees, including both city staff and contractor representatives, leading to a total benefit per person in excess of the \$25 non-cash gift threshold, per Ethics Commission Regulation 3.216(b)-5, Gifts from Restricted Sources—Exemptions.

These donations were not approved by the Board of Supervisors, which is required for contributions greater than \$10,000 per the City's Administrative Code, nor were they reported to the Controller or on the departments' websites, as city codes require.

The City Does Not Require Department Heads to File the Behested Payments Form

“Behested payments” include **payments made for a legislative, governmental, or charitable purpose at the suggestion, solicitation, or request of, or made in cooperation, consultation, coordination, or concert with a public official.**

When a payment of \$1,000 or more is made at their behest by an “interested party,” certain city officials—but not department heads—must file the City’s Form SFEC-3610(b). Under these circumstances, this form must be filed by the mayor, city attorney, district attorney, treasurer, sheriff, assessor-recorder, public defender, a member of the Board of Supervisors, or any member of a board or commission who is required to file Form 700 (Statement of Economic Interests), including all persons holding positions listed in the City’s Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 3.1-103(a)(1).

Preliminary Finding

Because the City does not require appointed department heads to file a behested payment form (Form SFEC-3610(b)), they could, as Mohammed Nuru did, encourage, ask, or direct a city contractor to donate to a non-city organization that supports the department head’s department and not be required to report it.

Because Mohammed Nuru Did Not Have to File the Behested Payments Form, Behested Regulations Did Not Apply to the Parks Alliance or Its Donors for His Behests

Who Must File	Definition	Parks Alliance Scenario
City Official	A city officer must file Form SFEC-3610(b) when a payment of \$1,000 or more is made at his or her behest by an "interested party."	As an appointed department head, Mr. Nuru was not required to file Form SFEC-3610(b).
Donor	A donor must file Form SFEC-3620 if he or she makes a payment or series of payments in a single calendar year of \$10,000 or more at the behest of a city officer. The donor must make this disclosure only if he or she is an "interested party" in a proceeding involving the city officer who solicited the payment(s).	Because Mr. Nuru did not file Form SFEC-3610(b), Form-3620 was also not required. Further, it is unclear whether the donor was an "interested party," which is discussed on the next slide.
Recipient	An individual or organization must file Form SFEC-3630 if it receives a payment or series of payments in a single calendar year of \$100,000 or more that was made at the behest of any city officer.	Because no Form SFEC-3610(b) was required or filed, Form SFEC-3630 was also not required.

The “Interested Party” Definition for Behested Payments Does Not Clearly Include All City Contractors

According to the Ethics Commission website, the donor is only required to file Form SFEC-3620 if he or she is an “interested party,” which means a person who is a **party** or **participant** to administrative enforcement proceedings regarding permits, licenses, or other entitlements for use before the official in question. A **party** is someone who files the application or is the subject of the proceeding, and a participant has a financial interest in the decision. State regulations specify that a license, permit, or other entitlement includes, “all entitlements for land use, all contracts (*other than competitively bid, labor, or personal employment contracts*), and all franchises.” (emphasis added, Fair Political Practices Commission, Title 2, Division 6, California Code of Regulations, Section 84308)

Preliminary Finding

The City’s definition of an interested party does not explicitly include all city contracts because certain contracts are excluded under the California Government Code, Section 84308. When city contractors with any contract type donate to non-city organizations, it can create a “pay-to-play” relationship. To reduce that risk, the “interested party” definition should be expanded so that persons with all contract types file for behested payments when applicable.

Behested Regulations Only Began in January 2018

The City's Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Article 3, Chapter 6, Section 3.610, Required Filing of Behested Payment Reports, and Section 3.620, Filing by Donors, became effective on January 1, 2018, and were updated on January 1, 2019. Section 3.630, Filing by Recipients of Major Behested Payments, became effective on January 1, 2019. As such, for much of the life of the Parks Alliance's Public Works subaccounts and Mohammed Nuru's career at Public Works, these requirements did not exist.

If the current requirements had been in place since July 2015, if Mr. Nuru had been required to file Form SFEC-3610(b), and if the donors were found to have been "interested parties," the Parks Alliance and some of its donors would have had to file behested forms.

If Behested Regulations Had Been Operational and Applied to Department Heads, Further Filings May Have Been Required

Who Must File	Definition	Scenario if Behested Requirements Had Been Operational				
City Official	An officer must file Form SFEC-3610(b) when a payment of \$1,000 or more is made at his or her behest by an "interested party."	If Mohammed Nuru asked that the payments be made and had been required to file due to the payments to the Parks Alliance, the organizations below also would have been required to file.				
Donor	A donor must file Form SFEC-3620 if he or she makes a payment, or series of payments in a single calendar year of \$10,000 or more at the behest of an officer. The donor must make this disclosure only if he or she is an "interested party" in a proceeding involving the officer who solicited the payment(s).	If all payments were behested payments and the donor was an "interested party," a Form SFEC-3620 would have had to be filed for payments to the Parks Alliance by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SF Clean City Coalition for \$721,250 paid over five years. • Recology for \$131,948 paid over five years. • PG&E for \$40,000 paid over three years. 				
Recipient	An individual or organization must file Form SFEC-3630 if it receives a payment or series of payments in a single calendar year of \$100,000 or more that was made at the behest of any officer.	If all payments were behested payments by Mr. Nuru, the Parks Alliance would have had to file Form SFEC-3630 in the following calendar years for the payments it received: <table border="1" data-bbox="966 1285 1825 1380"> <tr> <td>2016 - \$199,500</td> <td>2018 - \$258,714</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2017 - \$197,000</td> <td>2019 - \$285,200</td> </tr> </table>	2016 - \$199,500	2018 - \$258,714	2017 - \$197,000	2019 - \$285,200
2016 - \$199,500	2018 - \$258,714					
2017 - \$197,000	2019 - \$285,200					

Improve Controls Over Solicitations and Behested Payment Reporting


Preliminary Finding

Controls over solicitations and behested payment reporting must be improved to increase transparency. This could be done by reintroducing and updating previous proposals, including:

- File No. 090795 of October 27, 2009, that would have revised the City's Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code to **prohibit city employees and officers from soliciting donations** to nonprofit organizations to fund city departments.
- File No. 180001 to update the Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 3.207(a)(4), to **prohibit city officials from soliciting behested payments** from individuals who have business before the official.

Given the reliance of some functions on philanthropy, such as for the City's museums and parks, exceptions to this prohibition would be narrowly approved by the Board to permit fundraising by specific employees for specific public purposes. Those authorized to solicit donations should be required to file Form SFEC-3610(b) for behested payments, and consequences for failure to report should be enforced.


Public Works Used the Parks Alliance's Public Works Subaccounts to Make Payments on Its Behalf



According to the Public Works log, during the review period, the Parks Alliance made **960** payments totaling **\$978,739** to support Public Works activities. As directed by Public Works, the Parks Alliance remitted this amount as direct payments to vendors for the purchase of goods and/or services or as payments to individuals, primarily city employees, who were reimbursed for costs they had incurred. These payments were made directly from the Parks Alliance's Public Works subaccount, so did not interface with and are not reflected in the City's financial system.

* Total payments exclude a Fix-it subaccount adjustment that increased the expenses by \$2,000.

Public Works Directed the Parks Alliance to Pay Vendors



In the review period, more than half—almost \$370,000—of the Parks Alliance’s payments to vendors, totaling almost \$720,000, were to five vendors. These funds were largely spent on staff appreciation and events that benefited city employees. Further, as alleged in the criminal complaint, the principals of at least two of the contractors—Lefty O’Doul’s Foundation or Ballpark Buffet and Walter Wong Construction or Alternate Choice, LLC—had personal and business relationships with Mohammed Nuru.

Preliminary Finding

According to Public Works, Mohammed Nuru would direct staff to use Parks Alliance funds to procure goods and services for events and staff appreciation purchases from specific vendors, and the Parks Alliance would then reimburse those vendors. **Although some purchases appear to be appropriate, others may have been directed by Public Works through these subaccounts due to favoritism and/or to avoid city procurement rules and regulations.**

The Top Five Vendors Paid at Public Works' Direction

Amounts paid from the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance in the review period.

Vendor Paid at Public Works' Direction	Amount Paid	% Total*	Analysis of Payments
SDL Merchandising	\$164,885	23%	The vendor is owned by a former Public Works employee, who was still employed when the payments occurred. Absent an additional employment approval, it is inappropriate for city employees to do business with the City. Also, accounting records show payments were for shirts, caps, and other merchandise created for Public Works, but lack detail of quantity purchased to indicate whether payments were justified or reasonable.
Spice It Up Catering	108,621	15%	Payments were for catering at several annual picnics and other Public Works events. Accounting records lack detail to indicate whether payments were justified or reasonable.
W. Wong Construction & Alternate Choice, LLC	41,673	6%	Payments were for equipment, set up, and "trash pickers" for events. Accounting records lack further detail to indicate whether payments were justified or reasonable.
Community Youth Center	29,450	4%	Payments were mostly for sponsoring community events and activities at this organization's site, which appears reasonable.
Lefty O'Doul's Ballpark Buffet & Lefty O'Doul's Foundation	25,327	3%	Payments were for catering and musical performances for events and for staff appreciation. It most likely would have been more appropriate for a city-approved contractor to cater these events.
Total	\$369,956	51%	

*Percentages based on the net amount paid to all contractors of \$720,044.

Source: Public Works log

Some of the Payments Made From the Parks Alliance's Public Works Subaccounts Funded Staff Appreciation

Preliminary Finding

Public Works used its Parks Alliance subaccounts to fund holiday parties, staff appreciation events, and other events that solely benefitted employees.

Unless money is specifically budgeted for this purpose, which is uncommon, the City does not promote staff appreciation through departmental funds. This is true although such appreciation may help to maintain or increase employee morale and recognize good work in an environment where it is often impossible to legitimately grant additional pay. However, the City's practice of avoiding staff appreciation costs in departmental budgets may have contributed to Public Works' reliance on the subaccounts at the Parks Alliance for this purpose.

The City could reduce risks arising from use of gifts for staff appreciation by more clearly defining permissible use of public funds for these purposes, removing administrative barriers that make such uses impractical, and appropriating funds for these purposes. **If departmental budgets more often included public funds for staff appreciation, the City would bring these expenses into its control environment and have more oversight to ensure appropriate and reasonable spending.**

Public Works Employees Used Personal Funds to Pay Upfront Costs for City-Sponsored Events



In the review period, 164 individuals received a net total of \$260,429 in payments from or a refund to the Parks Alliance. Of these 164 individuals, 139 were city employees, and they were paid \$213,790. These payments were usually documented in Parks Alliance records as reimbursements for items such as food, beverages, entry fees for volunteer events, staff appreciation events, or various meetings. The records show that Public Works employees commonly incurred costs (paid out of pocket) on behalf of the department and then sought reimbursement with a request to the Parks Alliance.

Public Works Employees Used Personal Funds to Pay Upfront Costs for City-Sponsored Events *(continued)*

In the review period, the Parks Alliance reimbursed 63 city (mostly Public Works) employees over \$200 each for expenses they incurred related to their city jobs. These reimbursements from the Parks Alliance included payments of:

- **\$10,464** to Sandra Zuniga and **\$483** to Mohammed Nuru, primarily for expenses related to employee appreciation and team building.
- **More than \$10,000 each** to three other employees, one of whom received **almost \$60,000**.

Payments to or (after a cash advance) a refund from 25 other non-city employees totaling \$46,639, which:

- Range from **\$33,000** for a Giant Sweep campaign video and photo production to as little as **\$23.50** for a petty cash replenishment.
- Include **\$482** paid to the family of a Public Works employee.

Public Works Employees Used Personal Funds to Pay Upfront Costs for City-Sponsored Events *(continued)*

Preliminary Finding

Excessive use of non-city organizations to reimburse Public Works employees causes the City to lose financial control over these transactions. Non-city reimbursements to city employees are risky because they occur outside the City's control environment. They lack city pre-approvals, encumbrances of funds, and disbursements, which are designed to prevent and detect improper purchases and payments. Further, asking employees to front money, sometimes up to thousands of dollars, may put an undue financial burden on them even if they are later reimbursed.

No city policy addresses city employees seeking reimbursement from non-city organizations. However, the City's Accounting Policies and Procedures state that employees may be reimbursed (from city funds) for work-related costs, minor, and non-recurring goods up to \$200. This amount was exceeded by some of the reimbursements to city employees from the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance. The City's policy also directs departments to develop detailed internal procedures for their employee reimbursement pre-approval processes.

Recommendations

Given the findings in this preliminary assessment, we offer the following preliminary recommendations. Recommendations for *Friends of* organizations should be applied to non-city organizations that operate in a comparable manner. We will continue to refine these recommendations as the investigation and review continues and will consider feedback we receive in the review process.

- 1. The City should amend the San Francisco Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code to prohibit non-elected department heads and employees from soliciting donations from interested parties (to be further defined in legislation) of their department, unless specifically authorized by the Board of Supervisors. Those authorized to solicit donations must file Form SFEC-3610(b) for behested payments. Consequences for failure to report should be enforced.**
- 2. The Ethics Commission should expand the definition of who is considered an “interested party” so that it includes all city contractors.**

Recommendations *(continued)*

3. The City should require departments and non-city organizations to formalize their relationships through memorandums of understanding that are posted to departmental websites and include:
 - a) A requirement to adhere to city law on the acceptance of gifts, including the Administrative Code, Section 10.100-305, or other sections that apply to the department.
 - b) An agreement to comply with the Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6.
 - c) A clause granting the Controller audit authority and access to the organization's records.
 - d) Regular public reporting on these funds to occur not less than annually, at the donor or payee recipient level, and posted on the recipient department's website.
 - e) A requirement to report donations, including grants, on the organization's website.
 - f) Clearly defined roles regarding expenditures, including prohibitions against spending directed or controlled by the recipient.

Recommendations *(continued)*

4. Departments should comply with the Administrative Code, Section 10.100-305, or other sections specifically related to the department, by uniformly obtaining advance acceptance of any gifts from outside sources greater than \$10,000 for the department through non-city organizations, including explicit authorization for uses of these funds for employee recognition or appreciation.
5. The City should require annual certification from department heads that all gifts of goods, services, and funds have been approved by the Board of Supervisors and reported on time, as required.
6. The City should make it easier for departments to use city funds for employee recognition and appreciation events and provide explicit (line-item) appropriations for this purpose.
7. The Controller should, on a sample basis, annually audit organizations that both give gifts to the City and have a financial interest with the City, including a contract, grant, permit, permit application, or other entitlement.

Recommendations *(continued)*

8. Departments should comply with the Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6, for their non-city organizations by not accepting any donation through anonymous donors or for which they cannot identify the true source.
9. The City should amend the Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6, to clearly define “financial interest” so that it is aligned with the City’s updated “interested party” definition.
10. For all recommendations made as part of this assessment that require reporting, the City should review and strengthen its consequences for noncompliance.

Completed and Upcoming Public Integrity Reporting

Our Public Integrity Review, performed in consultation with the City Attorney, will continue to assess selected city policies and procedures to evaluate their adequacy in preventing abuse and fraud. Completed, current, and future assessments and reports address the following topics:

1. [San Francisco Public Works Contracting](#) (report issued on June 29, 2020)
2. Ethical standards for commissioners regarding procurement processes of the Airport Commission and other city commissions
3. The City's contractor debarment process
4. The Department of Building Inspection's policies and practices to award permits
5. A final report on the topics covered in this preliminary assessment


Additional reviews and assessments will be determined and performed as the City Attorney's investigation proceeds.

Questions or comments?

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Public Integrity Review

Preliminary Assessment: San Francisco Public Works Contracting



CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Office of the Controller

June 29, 2020

Assessment Summary

This preliminary review assesses procurement citywide and focuses on San Francisco Public Works (Public Works). Additional reviews of other internal control processes will be released as our Public Integrity Review progresses. Highlights of our findings and recommendations detailed in this assessment include:

- Public Works awarded 366 contracts worth \$1.4 billion during July 2017 through March 2020. Contracts with a value of \$1.1 billion were awarded through construction contracting procedures. Although low-bid and other competitive requirements provide protections, some procedures and policies could be strengthened to provide additional safeguards to reduce the risks of fraud and abuse.
- Weaknesses in other allowable procurement approaches at Public Works create undue risk of abuse and should be improved. Of particular note, the department awarded 15 contracts for projects addressing homelessness worth \$25 million through legally permitted exceptions to standard procurement processes without adequate safeguards. Public Works has instituted new controls over these procedures, which should be continued and expanded citywide.

Assessment Summary *(continued)*

- Citywide laws, guidance, requirements, and monitoring processes need improvement to reduce risks of fraud and abuse in the citywide contracting process. These include requiring competitive solicitation of grants, use of further selection methods within prequalified contracting pools, better guidance regarding certain steps in the procurement process, and eliminating gaps in gifts restrictions.
- The City's centralized oversight of procurement practices has significant gaps that should be closed to ensure adequate citywide monitoring of these activities. No entity is charged with full oversight over citywide procurement. We believe the role of the Office of Contract Administration or some other city entity should be expanded to serve this function, and it should be adequately resourced to perform this work.

Background on the Nuru Investigation

The City Attorney's Office (City Attorney) is leading the investigation into alleged wrongdoing by city employees outlined in criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's Office against Mohammed Nuru, former director of Public Works; Nick Bovis, owner of Lefty's Grill and Buffet at Fisherman's Wharf; Sandra Zuniga, former director of the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services; Florence Kong, former member of the Immigrant Rights Commission; Balmore Hernandez, chief executive of engineering firm AzulWorks, Inc., a company with large city contracts, and Wing Lok "Walter" Wong, permit expeditor with numerous entities that do business with the City. The City Attorney has focused its investigation into misconduct by current city employees as well as any remedies for specific decisions or contracts tainted by conflicts of interest or other legal or policy violations.

The Office of the Controller (Controller) will continue to support the City Attorney's investigation by reviewing implicated contracts, purchase orders, and payments.

Background on the Nuru Investigation

Given the overwhelming public interest in this matter, the City Attorney will provide periodic public updates on components of its investigation. However, there are strict limits to what can be disclosed publicly. For instance, a public report disclosing compelled statements made by a city employee as part of an internal investigation could taint any criminal prosecution of that employee. Because a criminal conviction is a prerequisite to forfeiture of a city pension as well as a significant aid in any debarment proceeding of a complicit city contractor, the City has every interest in preserving the integrity of these criminal prosecutions. Also, some disclosures might impair an ongoing internal investigation or be restricted by employee privacy rights.

The City Attorney's priorities continue to be rooting out bad employees, recouping illicit gains, and helping ensure unethical contractors cannot do business with the City.

Investigative Update

As part of this investigation, the City Attorney has:

- Issued 10 subpoenas to companies and nonprofits suspected of being involved in funneling donations through a nonprofit to fund city programs and events, including a Public Works holiday party.
- Issued an additional 14 subpoenas focused on the mixed-use project at 555 Fulton Street and on Walter Wong, a building permit expediter and contractor, and firms associated with him.
- Cancelled the \$171,000 portable toilet contract with a company tied to Nick Bovis.
- Contributed to the release of four employees or officials from their city positions and is continuing its employee misconduct investigations.

From February 4 through June 12, 2020, the Controller's Public Integrity Tip Line received 54 tips related to this investigation, which were reviewed and referred to agencies with the appropriate jurisdiction to investigate. From January 1 through June 25, 2020, the City's Whistleblower Program received approximately 284 complaints on this and other topics, including 17 complaints referred from the Public Integrity Tip Line.

Public Integrity Review

While the City Attorney's investigation proceeds, the Controller is conducting related assessments of targeted processes, procedures, and practices within city contracting, with the goal of offering recommendations to improve transparency, reduce the risk of fraud, and safeguard public funds. The results of each of these reviews will be made available to the public, first as a preliminary assessment report and later as a final report.

This preliminary assessment report is on [Public Works Contracting](#) and is the first in the series. This assessment is offered for public comment and review and may be revised in the future as our work continues.

Other reviews are underway, one focusing on support of city activities by "friends of" and similar nonprofit organizations, another on ethical standards for commissions' contract approval processes at the Airport and other City commissions, and other topics outlined at the close of this report. Additional review topics may be added as the investigation continues.

Fraud Risks in Contracting

All governments procure goods and services to support their delivery of public services. In any government organization, risk is associated with this activity. The risk increases as the complexity of these services, the volume of agreements, and their value increases.

The City maintains a control environment with **internal controls** to minimize a host of risks, including fraud. This includes an array of federal, state, and local laws and procedures that create **preventive**, **detective**, and **corrective** controls designed to minimize these risks.

Effective internal controls provide reasonable assurance and increase the likelihood that an organization will achieve its objectives. To achieve objectives, management needs to **effectively balance risks** and **controls**. Although ineffective or lax control activities increase organizational risk, too stringent or overly prescriptive control requirements may encourage shortcuts or control overrides.

Fraud Risks in Contracting *(continued)*


This preliminary review assesses the adequacy of the internal controls at Public Works over contracting activities, with a focus on each of the procurement methods Public Works uses to select vendors and award contracts itself or with the assistance of the Office of Contract Administration when applicable. These methods include standard, low-bid procurements and others permitted under city code, including use of prequalified pools of eligible vendors, emergency procurements, and other allowed methods.

Background on Public Works

San Francisco Public Works (Public Works) is a department reporting to the city administrator. The Office of Contract Administration, which is responsible for the purchases of non-construction commodities, professional services, and general services under the San Francisco Administrative Code (Administrative Code), Chapter 21, also reports to the city administrator, who in turn reports to the Mayor.

Public Works is charged with a host of responsibilities, including design, construction, cleanliness, and improvement of the City's infrastructure, public right of way, and facilities. The department is organized into several bureaus and divisions to meet these responsibilities, including Building Design and Construction, Infrastructure Design and Construction, Building Repair, Street and Sewer Repair, Street Environmental Services, Street Use and Mapping and Urban Forestry. A central Finance and Administration Division supports these units.

Public Works Reporting and Organizational Structure



Background on Public Works Contracting

During July 1, 2017, through March 31, 2020, Public Works awarded **366** contracts worth **\$1.4 billion**.

Contract Type	Number of Contracts	Percentage of Contracts	Contract Not-to-Exceed Amount	Percentage of Contract Not-to-Exceed Amount
Construction	198	54%	\$1.2B	86%
Professional services for construction	142	39%	\$173M	12%
Non-construction professional and general services	7	2%	\$6M	0%
Grants	19	5%	\$24M	2%
Total Contracts Awarded 7/1/17-3/31/20	366	100%	\$1.4B	100%

Background on Public Works Contracting *(continued)*

During July 1, 2017, through March 31, 2020, Public Works paid **\$636 million** for 366 contracts worth \$1.4 billion.

Contracting Method	Number of Contracts	Contract Not-to-Exceed Amount	Payment Amount
Formal Competitive Solicitation (Higher Value)	298	\$1.4B*	\$597.3M
Construction (non-pool)	125	\$1.1B	\$569.7M
Construction (pre-qualified pool)	45	\$65.9M	\$4.9M
Professional services for construction (non-pool)	7	\$21.3M	\$5.6M
Professional services for construction (pre-qualified pool)	114	\$150.7M	\$16.0M
Non-construction professional and general services	7	\$6.2M	\$1.1M
Informal Solicitation (Lower Value)	26	\$4.0M	\$2.8M
Construction and non-construction	14	\$3.9M	\$2.8M
Under \$10,000	12	\$0.1M	\$0.07M
No Solicitation Required	23	\$28.0M	\$25.9M
Sole source	2	\$0.2M	\$0.2M
Emergency authority	6	\$3.2M	\$3.0M
Projects addressing homelessness	15	\$24.6M	\$22.7M
Grants	19	\$23.8M	\$10.0M
Total Contracts and Payments Remitted	366	\$1.4B	\$636.0M

* Rounded

Formal Competitive Solicitation

Formal competitive solicitation is required at certain thresholds, which have different requirements under Chapter 6 and Chapter 21 of the Administrative Code. Chapter 6 governs construction and construction-related professional services, which are generally procured directly by certain departments. Chapter 21 governs general services, professional services, and commodities procured by the Office of Contract Administration, in coordination with the requesting department.

The City's procurement laws require formal solicitation for:

- Most construction contracts and construction-related professional services above \$706,000, per Chapter 6.
- Most commodities and professional services above \$129,000, and general services above \$706,000, per Chapter 21.

Chapter 6 Formal Competitive Solicitation

Public Works is one of six departments with authority over construction procurement under Administrative Code Chapter 6, which grants authority over construction procurement. Other Chapter 6 departments include the Airport Commission, Port Commission (Port of San Francisco), Recreation and Park Department, Municipal Transportation Agency, and Public Utilities Commission. All Chapter 6 departments except Public Works are overseen by a board or commission, which approves the department's contracts in excess of a threshold amount.

In compliance with Chapter 6, in August 2011 Mayor Edwin M. Lee designated Mr. Nuru as the director of Public Works to act on the Mayor's behalf in the approval of various aspects of the contracting process, including to award all public work, professional service, and construction contracts in excess of the threshold amount, which is currently set at \$706,000. Mr. Nuru, in turn, designated three deputy directors to serve as contract approvers.

Chapter 6 Formal Competitive Solicitation *(continued)*

Preliminary Finding

- Unlike other Chapter 6 departments, Public Works is not overseen by a board or commission, and the designation authority provided by the Mayor to the director of Public Works to approve contracts over the threshold amount is inconsistent with practices at other Chapter 6 departments. As such, **there is no external oversight over Public Works' Chapter 6 procurement.**

Chapter 6 Formal Competitive Solicitation *(continued)*

According to the criminal complaint against Balmore Hernandez filed on June 4, 2020, there is probable cause that Mr. Hernandez bribed Mr. Nuru, allegedly in exchange for details about open or upcoming requests for proposals (RFPs). Mr. Nuru forwarded these details from his personal e-mail account to Mr. Hernandez, giving him an unfair advantage in preparing a response to an RFP and, ultimately, in his attempt to win a city contract.

Preliminary Finding

- **A city employee acting in bad faith could circumvent the City's procurement controls and avoid detection.** Mr. Nuru allegedly violated Public Works' Statement of Incompatible activities, which states that no officer or employee of the department may knowingly provide selective assistance (i.e., assistance that is not generally available to all competitors) to individuals or entities, including nonprofit entities for whom an officer or employee volunteers, in a manner that confers a competitive advantage on a bidder or proposer who is competing for a city contract.

Gaps Exist in Gifts Restrictions and Enforcement

City officers and designated employees must disclose reportable financial interests, including gifts, by filing the Statement of Economic Interests (Form 700). Elected officials, department heads, board members, and commissioners must file this form annually and electronically, while designated employees must also file it annually but can only file it in paper form.

Despite these requirements, gaps exist in gifts restrictions. San Francisco Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 3.216 and Ethics Commission regulations state that no officer or employee may solicit or receive any gift from any person or entity that contracts or is seeking to contract with the department of the officer or employee, or any person who knowingly attempted to influence the officer or employee in any legislative or administrative action during the prior 12 months. However, current restrictions apply narrowly and may not restrict gifts to officials or employees when the gift giver is the owner of or employed by a company that could do business with their department, based on the definitions of a person in the Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 3.216(b), Gifts from Restricted Sources.

Gaps Exist in Gifts Restrictions and Enforcement *(continued)*

Further, the Regulations of the Fair Political Practices Commission, Title 2, Division 6, California Code of Regulations, Section 18942, allow a payment provided to an official by an individual with whom the official has a long-term, close personal friendship unrelated to the official's position with the agency, unless the individual providing the benefit is a person who has, or may reasonably foreseeably have, a contract, license, permit, or other entitlement for use pending before the official's agency . . . if the official makes or participates in making those governmental decisions.

The Ethics Commission may take steps to initiate enforcement of late filers of Form 700 and may conduct random audits of filings submitted. Any person who violates any of the City's governmental ethics laws may be subject to criminal, civil, and administrative penalties (Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Section 3.242).

Preliminary Finding

- **Loopholes in city and state restrictions in this area create avenues for unethical behavior and manipulation through the giving of gifts that are permitted and are difficult to enforce against.**

Chapter 21 Formal Competitive Solicitation

Preliminary Findings

- **Formal solicitation requirements for procurement under Chapter 21 and supplemental procedures from the Office of Contract Administration are generally sufficient, but there are opportunities to improve transparency in the solicitation award process.**
- **The processes used to award the contract that is the subject of the federal complaint against Mohammed Nuru generally complied with Chapter 21 requirements for competitive solicitations. However, these processes would not have identified the behind-the-scenes bid steering that allegedly occurred.** The Office of Contract Administration, which managed the solicitation for two ADA-compliant portable restroom trailers on behalf of Public Works, advertised the bidding opportunity longer than the required five days, and the contract was awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, although there was only one bid, so no comparison of bids was possible.

Chapter 21 Formal Competitive Solicitation *(continued)*

Preliminary Finding

- The Office of Contract Administration invited 22 vendors to the pre-bid conference for portable restroom trailers, including the 8 contacted through outreach and the 14 that were already in the City's bid system as previous bidders or city vendors. Of the 3 vendors that attended the pre-bid conference (2 of whom were from the same entity), only 1 submitted a bid.
- **Unlike Chapter 6, which has special requirements for departments to follow when no bid or only one bid is received, no such requirements exist in Chapter 21 or the Office of Contract Administration's policies.** The Office of Contract Administration has a guidebook that recommends but does not require contacting vendors on the bidder's list when no or only one bid is received to determine why they did not bid. For this formal competitive solicitation, the Office of Contract Administration deemed the one bid received to be reasonable and did not contact the other vendors on the bidder's list.

Pre-Qualified Contracting Pools

Both Chapter 21 (Section 21.4) and Chapter 6 (Sections 6.62, 6.64) allow city departments to use pre-qualified contracting pools, where departments can prequalify a group of vendors using a competitive solicitation process and then establish a contract with one of the vendors from the pool when the need arises. Once the pool is created, the department can select its preferred vendor instead of going through another solicitation for the specific scope of work.

Preliminary Finding

- **The City does not have standard procedures for selecting vendors once they are in a pre-qualified contracting pool.** According to Public Works, there have been instances in which the same vendor would be selected repeatedly from a pre-qualified pool, at times by the direction of the department's former director, Mr. Nuru. Although this practice is not prohibited, it presents opportunities for ethical breaches and unethical favors, such as accepting gifts in exchange for bid steering. Additional processes can be implemented to ensure fairness and promote competition and transparency.

Pre-Qualified Contracting Pools *(continued)*

- One common practice at other city departments – including in many instances in Public Works – to ensure a fair, competitive process when using pre-qualified vendor pools is to require a relatively limited and quick solicitation process for vendors in the pool, whereby they must bid on the specific scope of work.
- According to Public Works, one practice the department uses to further promote competition within the pool is to rank candidates based on their qualifications, and only admit the top candidates to the pool, rather than admitting all vendors that simply meet the minimum qualifications. However, without a further process to select a vendor, even based on price, it still allows a city official to simply select his or her favorite.
- General as-needed contracts under Chapter 6 only require the department head's written determination that the work is needed and written justification for using this contracting process rather than a formal competitive process. Such contracts made up 90 percent of Public Works Chapter 6 professional services contracts for construction (pre-qualified pool), equivalent to \$135.7 million in contract value.

Informal Solicitation

Contracts valued at over \$10,000 and under the Threshold Amount (\$706,000 for construction and general services) or under the Minimum Competitive Amount (\$129,000 for commodities and professional services) may be informally solicited (as opposed to formally solicited) under Chapter 21 and Chapter 6, and per the Contract Monitoring Division's Chapter 14B Rules & Regulations. This means departments must solicit at least three quotes.

Preliminary Finding

- **The review did not identify any issues related to contracts under informal solicitation at this time.** Public Works' general practice is to competitively bid all contracts over \$10,000, and it generally does not use informal solicitation.

No Solicitation Required

There are some instances in which competitive solicitation requirements can be waived, including:

- *Sole Source Contracts*, where goods or services can only be obtained from a single source. The reason the vendor is the sole source of the good or service must be documented.
- *Emergency Authority*, where in the event of a declared emergency, departments can procure goods and services in the most expeditious manner without following the City's usual competitive bidding requirements.
- *Projects Addressing Homelessness Authority*, where certain departments may establish or amend any contract for any construction or professional service without following the usual competitive bidding requirements.

Sole Source

Sole source contracts are those where goods or services can only be obtained from a single source, such as the inventor of a new vaccine or the only regional provider of integrated pest management.

Under Chapter 21, sole source requires approval by the Office of Contract Administration and the Contract Monitoring Division. Chapter 6 departments require their commission's or the Mayor's approval. Because Public Works is the only Chapter 6 department that does not have a commission, it needs the approval of the Mayor or mayoral designee for a sole source waiver.

During the review period, Public Works had two sole source contracts with total contract value of \$214,080.

Preliminary Finding

- **The review did not identify issues related to sole source contracts at this time.**

Projects Addressing Homelessness

According to Public Works, it awarded 15 contracts with a value of \$24.6 million related to projects addressing homelessness under Chapter 21B and Section 6.76,* which became effective in 2019. However, the practice to award such contracts started two years earlier, in 2017, under an uncodified ordinance.

The Administrative Code defines “Projects Addressing Homelessness” as projects designed to prevent homelessness through housing subsidies or services, and projects to provide shelter, housing, food, and/or social services. The code states that competitive procurement requirements may be waived for such contracts, grants, and procurement processes. Within one year, departments must report to the Board of Supervisors on the use of this authority.

In response to the federal complaint, the acting director of Public Works issued new policies and procedures requiring solicitation for all projects addressing homelessness, regardless of their value. According to Public Works, it is now implementing the new procedures.

* Section 6.76 is titled “Public Works Addressing Homelessness” and became effective in 2019.

Projects Addressing Homelessness *(continued)*

Preliminary Findings

- **Although Chapter 21B and Section 6.76 allow for departments to bypass the standard competitive solicitation process, needed controls over such solicitations were lacking in Public Works.** Expected procedures to ensure minimum solicitation requirements, vendor qualifications, and fair selection were not uniformly applied nor required, either by code or by department procedure.
- Although the code allowed Public Works to bypass the competitive solicitation process, Public Works staff conducted some outreach and documented solicitations for projects addressing homelessness, as discussed on the next slides.

Projects Addressing Homelessness *(continued)*

According to Public Works, it used the following methods to award 15 contracts totaling \$24.6 million for projects addressing homelessness:

- Four contracts totaling \$10.7 million resulted from informal solicitations, for which Public Works conducted outreach and documented the multiple quotes it received. These contracts were valued at:
 - \$7.8 million
 - \$1.6 million
 - \$0.8 million
 - \$0.5 million

Projects Addressing Homelessness *(continued)*

- Seven contracts totaling \$10.5 million did not go through solicitation of any kind and were directly awarded by Public Works. These contracts were valued at:
 - \$4.7 million
 - \$2.7 million
 - \$2.0 million
 - \$0.9 million
 - \$110,595
 - \$70,685
 - \$4,800
- It is unclear what method was used to award four contracts totaling \$3.5 million because no outreach or solicitation documentation exists. These contracts were valued at:
 - \$2.9 million
 - \$315,000
 - \$170,295
 - \$130,000

Emergency Purchasing Authority

Public Works awarded 6 contracts with a value of \$3.2 million through an emergency procurement process during the review period. Administrative Code Section 6.60 authorizes the Board of Supervisors to declare an emergency and direct any department head to perform repair or other emergency work in a manner the board determines to be in the City's best interest.

The code defines an actual emergency as "a sudden, unforeseeable and unexpected occurrence involving a clear and imminent danger to life, health, property or essential public services." The department head responsible for addressing the emergency may also declare an emergency with immediate notice to the Board of Supervisors, Mayor, Controller, and board or commission with jurisdiction over the area affected by the emergency. The department head may proceed with the required work without additional approvals if the emergency work is estimated to cost \$250,000 or less. Emergency work estimated to cost more than \$250,000 requires the written approval of the Mayor or board or commission concerned, and the Board of Supervisors.

Grants

For the review period, city departments granted 5,746 awards with a value of \$5.4 billion, of which Public Works awarded 19 grants with a value of \$23.8 million (0.4% of the total citywide award amount).

Public Works awarded grants for a variety of workforce development, job training, and other services. According to Public Works, its practice is to competitively bid all grants, but it also applies the same process for awarding grants through a pre-qualified pool process.

Preliminary Finding

- **City law and rules have historically provided insufficient requirements or guidance on the procurement process for grants awarded to nonprofit organizations.** Specifically, the only citywide guidance on this process is a nonbinding agreement that has no force of law to require competitive solicitation. Consequently, practices vary significantly among departments and, in some cases, lack adequate controls.

Grants *(continued)*

- Before September 2018, there were two instances when guidance was developed to help departments distinguish a grant award from a contract for goods or services. These are summarized by a 1984 City Attorney opinion and a 1997 “Summary of Consensus” reached by the City Attorney, Controller, Department of Human Resources, and the Office of Contract Administration.
- Because some departments raised issues about strict application of the 1997 Consensus, the new factors for the four-prong bright-line test were updated in a 2018 Consensus (underlined sections represent changes made):
 1. The grantee must be either a nonprofit entity that serves the public interest or a government agency;

Grants *(continued)*

2. The grantee must be selected through a competitive grant application and award process, unless the grant is to a government agency for programs, activities, or services that can only be practically performed by that particular government agency and cannot be performed by any other party;
3. The agreement must not involve the acquisition of goods or services for the direct benefit or use of the department or commission; and
4. The agreement must not involve the contracting out of, or delegation of the responsibility for, any services that have at any time been performed by employees of the department or commission.

Grants *(continued)*

Preliminary Finding

There is no centralized monitoring of citywide grant solicitation or grant spending.

- According to the Office of Contract Administration, “the City has provided very little guidance to city departments regarding the grant development and/or grant writing process. In addition, OCA has no oversight authority on grants.”

Other Topics – Tone at the Top

According to Public Works staff, the “tone at the top” promulgated by the former director of Public Works prioritized low cost and expediency and created a lack of organizational transparency among staff.

Tone at the top refers to the ethical atmosphere that is created in the workplace by the organization's leadership. According to the Institute of Internal Auditors, all organizations are exposed to a degree of fraud risk in any process where human input is required. The degree to which an organization is exposed relates to the fraud risk inherent in the business process, the extent to which effective internal controls are present to either prevent or detect fraud, and the honesty and integrity of those involved in the process.

Although some of the opportunities to commit the schemes alleged in the federal government's complaint were created by the control weaknesses outlined, it was the “tone at the top,” lack of cross-functional sharing of information, and disregard of ethics and gift laws propagated by the former director of Public Works that provided the pressure, rationalization, and ability necessary to carry out these actions.

Other Topics – Oversight

The City's centralized oversight over procurement practices has gaps that should be closed to ensure adequate citywide monitoring. The Charter gives responsibility for city procurement to the city administrator, and Chapter 21 delegates that responsibility, as it relates to non-construction procurement, to the city purchaser. Chapter 6 grants authority over construction procurement to six departments.

Because no one entity has full oversight over procurement, the City lacks centralized monitoring to ensure procedures are performed in accordance with the Administrative Code and any corresponding policies. Further, the City lacks comprehensive citywide procurement regulations, policies, or procedures for departments to refer to throughout the procurement process and lacks a formal process for reviewing policy that should include the collaboration of the City's subject matter experts.

Division of purchasing oversight responsibilities among multiple entities by the municipal code and inadequate resources dedicated to policy development and maintenance have resulted in no entity taking responsibility for coordinating monitoring or centralized policies and procedures for all types of purchases.

Other Topics – Centralized Procurement System

City departments do not fully utilize the City's centralized procurement systems. Most departments do not enter contract information into the City's system until a contract has gone through the entire solicitation, vendor selection, and negotiation processes. Only after the City awards a contract and creates a purchase order is certain basic contract information entered into the system.

Greater use of the centralized procurement system would improve the City's ability to monitor pre-award activities, including information on contract planning, solicitation, outreach, and award. This would enable the City to detect red flags, inconsistencies, and noncompliance.

The City's centralized procurement system does not currently meet all department needs. For example, the system does not currently allow departments to fully track the life and details of a construction project, such as when subcontractors are brought on after the notice to proceed has been issued.

Recommendations

Given the findings in this preliminary assessment, we offer the following preliminary recommendations. We will continue to refine these recommendations as our investigation and review continues and will consider the feedback we receive in the review process.

- 1. Under Chapter 6 of the Administrative Code, the Mayor should delegate final approval for Public Works construction contracts to an official other than the department director. The Mayor and Board should amend Chapter 6 to prohibit delegation to the department head for these contracting activities.**
- 2. The Ethics Commission should examine and close loopholes in the San Francisco Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code to ensure that city law does not create avenues for unethical behavior in acceptance of gifts.**

Recommendations *(continued)*

3. The Ethics Commission should expeditiously enable and require that all Statements of Economic Interests (Form 700s) are filed electronically by all required filers, and conduct annual compliance reviews of these filings. The Mayor and Board should prioritize funding and other support necessary to accomplish this goal.
4. The Mayor, Board, and Office of Contract Administration should establish clear guidelines for selecting a vendor or vendors from a pre-qualified pool. Possible methods for such selections include soliciting quotes for a defined item or scope of work from all vendors in the pool.
5. Public Works should adhere to the new procurement procedures implemented by its acting director for projects addressing homelessness and emergency procurement. The City should implement similar procedures for such purchases citywide.

Recommendations *(continued)*

6. The Mayor, Board, and Office of Contract Administration should establish minimum requirements to ensure competitive solicitation of grants, similar to requirements for contracts, and formalize these requirements in code and policy.
7. To promote data-driven decisions and transparency, city departments should be required to use the City's centralized systems throughout the purchasing life cycle, from planning through contract award. To enable this change, these systems should be improved to better meet department needs.
8. The City should close gaps in centralized monitoring of all procurement activities by strengthening and resourcing the Office of Contract Administration or some other city entity to expand its monitoring and oversight to all city procurement activities.

Next Steps

Our Public Integrity Review, performed in consultation with the City Attorney, will continue to conduct assessments of various city procedures and policies to assess their adequacy to prevent abuse and fraud. Future reports and assessments are underway on the following topics:

1. A final report on the topics covered in this preliminary assessment.
2. The use of “friends of” organizations to support city operations.
3. Ethical standards for commissions’ contract approval processes at the Airport and other City commissions.
4. The City’s contractor debarment process.
5. Policies and practices to award permits at the Department of Building Inspection.

Additional reviews and assessments will be determined and performed as the Nuru investigation proceeds.

Any questions or comments?

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Public Integrity Review

Preliminary Assessment:

Gifts to Departments Through
Non-City Organizations Lack Transparency
and Create "Pay-to-Play" Risk

Presentation to the Board of Supervisors
Government Audit & Oversight Committee



CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Office of the Controller

October 1, 2020

Public Integrity Review & Investigations Introduction

2

- The Controller continues to conduct assessments of targeted processes, procedures, and practices related to the Mohammed Nuru investigation. The goal is to offer recommendations to improve transparency, reduce the risk of fraud, and safeguard public funds.
- City Attorney is leading the investigation into alleged wrongdoing by city employees and contractors outlined in criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney's Office against Mr. Nuru. On July 14, 2020, the City Attorney debarred AzulWorks, Inc., a company with large city contracts.
- This Controller report summarizes our review of gifts and support benefitting city departments from city contractors, focusing on San Francisco Public Works' subaccounts held by the San Francisco Parks Alliance, a non-city organization.
- This preliminary assessment is offered for public comment and review and may be revised in the future as our work continues.

Non-City Organizations & the Parks Alliance

3

- Non-city organizations are nonprofit/third-party organizations providing financial or programmatic support to a city department.
- 33 departments reported having non-city organizations with 588 accounts/subaccounts, including fiscal agents, fiscal sponsors, trustee accounts, contracts, grants, foundations, friends of organizations.
- Friends of organizations are intended to financially support the department and receive donations as primary revenue source
- The Parks Alliance is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that works with 200 groups and city agencies. In 2019, it received grants and contributions of \$18.9 million and spent \$17.7 million.
- The Parks Alliance states it did not know its fiscal agency was being used unscrupulously by city officials. The Parks Alliance had reached out to Mr. Nuru in 2019 to formalize its relationship but was ignored.

Four Public Works Subaccounts at the Parks Alliance

The Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance operate like a city account. The Public Works log for July 1, 2015, through January 17, 2020, shows the following Public Works subaccounts.

Subaccount	Reported Description & Uses	Contributions	Expenses
DPW Special Projects (8420)	Payments and reimbursements for staff appreciation	\$400,216	\$370,230
DPW Clean Team (8421)	Payments and reimbursements for monthly Clean Team events	198,114	197,520
DPW Giant Sweep (8423)	Payments and reimbursements related to the Giant Sweep campaign	390,500	402,616
Fix-It Team (8424)	For community outreach and to fix quick, actionable problems in the City	2,000	1,807
	Three subaccounts no longer in use*		8,565
Total		\$990,830	\$980,738

* Three subaccounts had no expenditures after fiscal year 2018-19: DPW Maintenance (8419), DPW Street Parks (8433), and American Community Gardening Association Conference (8422).

Source: Public Works log and Public Works

Donations to the Public Works Subaccounts

Below are city contractors and building permit holders that donated to the Parks Alliance’s Public Works subaccounts during review period.

Donors	Donations Made to Public Works Subaccounts at Parks Alliance		Building Permits at Time of Donation	Public Works’ Payments to Contractor/Permit Holder		Other Departments’ Payments to Contractor/Permit Holder	
	Amount	% Total	Number	Amount	% Total	Amount	% Total
SF Clean City Coalition ¹	\$721,250	88%	0	\$3,288,175	1%	\$1,784,618	0%
Recology ¹	131,948		4	5,775,113	1%	116,493,379	10%
Pacific Gas & Electric	42,083	4%	8	3,236,409	1%	211,720,652	18%
Emerald Fund II LLC ²	17,000	2%	6	0	0%	22,745,925	2%
Clark Construction	16,266	2%	60	247,209,740	43%	27,706,950	3%
Webcor Construction	15,000	2%	45	193,766,898	34%	762,909,564	66%
Laborer's Int'l Union	11,200	1%	0	273,197	0%	7,145,116	1%
Pankow Construction	10,500	1%	88	118,719,636	20%	966,497	0%
Airbnb	1,000	0%	7	0	0%	0	0%
Total	\$966,247³		218	\$572,269,168		\$1,151,472,701	

¹ According to the City Attorney’s Public Integrity Unit, SF Clean City Coalition received \$150,000 from Recology in each of three years—2015, 2017, and 2018—for Public Works’ Giant Sweep program, Clean Team program, staff enrichment, and community events. In 2019 Recology donated \$180,000 for the Giant Sweep and Clean Team programs to SF Clean City Coalition, which then paid \$171,000 to the Parks Alliance.

² Emerald Fund II LLC, also known as Emerald Fund, Inc., includes 1045 Mission LP, Harrison Fremont Holdings LLC, 100 Van Ness Associates, Hayes Van Ness Associates, Emerald Polk LLC, and EBG II LLC.

³ Other donors contributed an additional \$26,583 to the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance, bringing total donations to \$992,830, excluding a Fix-it subaccount adjustment that reduced the amount by \$2,000.

Source: Public Works log; City’s financial system for contractor/permit holder payments; DataSF for permits

Much of the Spending Was for Employee Events

6


The Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance were largely used to pay for staff appreciation, department initiatives with volunteers, and merchandise, generally at Public Works' direction.

Expense Type	Amount
Employee events, appreciation, and training, including holiday parties, picnics, meals, awards, conferences, and Bay to Breakers participation	\$375,631
Purchases for volunteer programs and campaigns, such as Arbor Day, Love Our City, Community Clean Team, and Giant Sweep	284,906
Merchandise, including shirts, hats, tote bags, key tags, and pins	249,693
Community support or events for neighborhoods or community groups	42,906
Employee attendance at community events, such as luncheons and galas for community organizations	17,542
Other miscellaneous or vague reimbursements	10,060
Total	\$980,738

Source: Public Works log

Flow of Funds Between the City & Public Works Subaccounts

The flow of funds between the City and the Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance is complex.



Preliminary Findings

- Mr. Nuru solicited funds from interested parties, including businesses that had contracts with the department or city building permits.
 - The gifts, create a perceived “pay-to-play” relationship.
 - Mr. Nuru solicited donations to fund the 2019 Office of the City Administrator and Public Works holiday party.
~ \$33,000 (or 80%) of the event’s \$40,000 cost was donated by restricted sources, including Recology, Inc.
- City *does not* require appointed department heads to file a behested payment form (Form SFEC-3610(b))
- The City needs to improve compliance with restrictions on and reporting requirements for acceptance of gifts from outside sources.
 - The City has laws requiring acceptance and reporting of gifts for public purposes, but adherence to these laws is not uniform.
 - Existing policies and procedures should be reviewed and strengthened.

Recommendations

- The City should amend the San Francisco Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code to prohibit non-elected department heads and employees from soliciting donations from interested parties (to be further defined in legislation) of their department, unless specifically authorized by the Board of Supervisors. Those authorized to solicit donations must file Form SFEC-3610(b) for behested payments. Consequences for failure to report should be enforced.
- Departments should comply with the Administrative Code, Section 10.100-305, or other sections specifically related to the department, by uniformly obtaining advance acceptance of any gifts from outside sources greater than \$10,000 for the department through non-city organizations, including explicit authorization for uses of these funds for employee recognition or appreciation.
- The City should require annual certification from department heads that all gifts of goods, services, and funds have been approved by the Board of Supervisors and reported on time, as required.
- The Controller should, on a sample basis, annually audit organizations that both give gifts to the City and have a financial interest with the City, including a contract, grant, permit, permit application, or other entitlement.
- For all recommendations made as part of this assessment that require reporting, the City should review and strengthen its consequences for noncompliance.

“Interested Party” Definition is Unclear

10

Preliminary Findings

- The City’s definition of an interested party does not explicitly include all city contracts because certain contracts are excluded under the California Government Code, Section 84308. This regulation specifies that a license, permit, or other entitlement includes, “all entitlements for land use, all contracts (other than competitively bid, labor, or personal employment contracts), and all franchises.” When city contractors with any contract type donate to non-city organizations, it can create a “pay-to-play” relationship.

Recommendation

- The Ethics Commission should expand the definition of who is considered an “interested party” so that it includes all city contractors.

Anonymous Donations Prohibition

11

Preliminary Findings

- The *Friends of* organizations either did not publicly report donors or those that publicly reported their donors also reported anonymous donors, sometimes as funds or matching gifts.
- If funds spent for city purposes, non-city organizations that either do not publicly report donations or do so but allow anonymous donations violate the disclosure requirement of the **Sunshine Ordinance**, Section 67.29-6, and prevent the detection of any financial interest of anonymous donors.
- Voter approval is needed to change the requirements to accept anonymous donations.

Recommendations

- Departments should comply with the Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6, for their non-city organizations by not accepting any donation through anonymous donors or for which they cannot identify the true source.
- The City should amend the Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6, to clearly define “financial interest” so that it is aligned with the City’s updated “interested party” definition.

Public Works Subaccount Lacked City Oversight

12

Preliminary Findings

- Because the City does not consistently impose requirements for non-city organizations, there is a lack of transparency and inconsistent practices, creating the opportunity for unethical steering of purchases.
- The Public Works subaccounts at the Parks Alliance operate like a city account, although all outside the City's procurement and financial system and not subject to City policies and procedures.

Policy, Process, or Reporting Requirement Involving the City	San Francisco Parks Alliance		Friends of the San Francisco Public Library
	Public Works	Recreation and Park	Public Library
Memorandum of Understanding Defining Its Relationship With City	No	Yes*	Yes
Gift Reporting to Board of Supervisors, Including Formal Process for Accept and Expend	No	Yes	Yes
Existing Agreement to Comply With San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6	No	No	Yes

* Recreation and Park and the Parks Alliance set up memorandums of understanding for individual projects.

Recommendation

- The City should require departments and non-city organizations to formalize their relationships through memorandums of understanding that are posted to departmental websites and include:
 - a) A requirement to adhere to city law on the acceptance of gifts, including the Administrative Code, Section 10.100-305, or other sections that apply to the department.
 - b) An agreement to comply with the Sunshine Ordinance, Section 67.29-6.
 - c) A clause granting the Controller audit authority and access to the organization's records.
 - d) Regular public reporting on these funds to occur not less than annually, at the donor or payee recipient level, and posted on the recipient department's website.
 - e) A requirement to report donations, including grants, on the organization's website.
 - f) Clearly defined roles regarding expenditures, including prohibitions against spending directed or controlled by the recipient.

Preliminary Findings

- Public Works used its Parks Alliance subaccounts to fund employee events. The City's practice of avoiding staff appreciation costs in departmental budgets may have contributed to Public Works' reliance on the subaccounts.
- The City does not usually promote staff appreciation through departmental funds. Such appreciation may increase employee morale and recognize good work in an environment where it is often impossible to grant additional pay.

Recommendation

- The City should make it easier for departments to use city funds for staff appreciation events and provide explicit appropriations for this purpose.

Our Public Integrity Review, performed in consultation with the City Attorney, will continue to conduct assessments of various city procedures and policies to assess their adequacy to prevent abuse and fraud.

Future reports and assessments are underway on the following topics:

1. Ethical standards for commissioners regarding procurement processes of the Airport Commission and other city commissions
2. The City's contractor debarment process
3. The Department of Building Inspection's policies and practices to award permits
4. A final report on the topics covered in this preliminary assessment

Additional reviews and assessments will be determined and performed as the Nuru investigation proceeds.


Any questions or comments?

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Public Integrity Review

Preliminary Assessment: San Francisco Public Works Contracting

Presentation to the Board of Supervisors
Government Audit & Oversight Committee



CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Office of the Controller

July 2, 2020

Public Integrity Review & Investigations Introduction

2

- The Controller is conducting **assessments of targeted processes, procedures, and practices** within city contracting related to the Mohammed Nuru investigation. The goal is to offer recommendations to improve transparency, reduce the risk of fraud, and safeguard public funds.
- This preliminary review assesses the adequacy of the internal controls at **Public Works** over **contracting activities**, with a focus on vendor procurement methods.
- The **City Attorney** has:
 - Issued 10 subpoenas to agencies suspected of funneling donations
 - Issued 14 additional subpoenas focused on a mixed-use project at 555 Fulton Street and on Walter Wong
 - Cancelled the \$171,000 portable toilet contract tied to Nick Bovis
 - Contributed to the release of 4 city employees or officials
- From February 4 to June 12, 2020, the **Controller's Public Integrity Tip Line** received 54 tips related to this investigation.

Background on Public Works Contracting

3

From July 1, 2017, through March 31, 2020, Public Works awarded **366** contracts worth **\$1.4 billion**.

Contract Type	Number of Contracts	Percentage of Contracts	Contract Not-to-Exceed Amount	Percentage of Contract Not-to-Exceed Amount
Construction	198	54%	\$1.2B	86%
Professional services for construction	142	39%	\$173M	12%
Non-construction professional and general services	7	2%	\$6M	0%
Grants	19	5%	\$24M	2%
Total Contracts Awarded 7/1/17-3/31/20	366	100%	\$1.4B	100%

Background on Public Works Contracting *(continued)*

4

From July 1, 2017, through March 31, 2020, Public Works paid **\$636 million** for 366 contracts worth \$1.4 billion.

Contracting Method	Number of Contracts	Contract Not-to-Exceed Amount	Payment Amount
Formal Competitive Solicitation (Higher Value)	298	\$1.4B*	\$597.3M
Construction (non-pool)	125	\$1.1B	\$569.7M
Construction (pre-qualified pool)	45	\$65.9M	\$4.9M
Professional services for construction (non-pool)	7	\$21.3M	\$5.6M
Professional services for construction (pre-qualified pool)	114	\$150.7M	\$16.0M
Non-construction professional and general services	7	\$6.2M	\$1.1M
Informal Solicitation (Lower Value)	26	\$4.0M	\$2.8M
Construction and non-construction	14	\$3.9M	\$2.8M
Under \$10,000	12	\$0.1M	\$0.07M
No Solicitation Required	23	\$28.0M	\$25.9M
Sole source	2	\$0.2M	\$0.2M
Emergency authority	6	\$3.2M	\$3.0M
Projects addressing homelessness	15	\$24.6M	\$22.7M
Grants	19	\$23.8M	\$10.0M
Total Contracts and Payments Remitted	366	\$1.4B	\$636.0M

* Rounded

Preliminary Finding

- Public Works is not overseen by a board or commission. Also, the director of Public Works has authority to approve contracts over the threshold amount resulting in no external oversight over Public Works' Chapter 6 procurement.

Recommendation

- Under Chapter 6 of the Administrative Code, the Mayor should delegate final approval for Public Works construction contracts to an official other than the department director. The Mayor and Board should amend Chapter 6 to prohibit delegation to the department head for these contracting activities.

Preliminary Findings

- Public Works lacks controls over the competitive solicitation process
- 15 contracts or \$24.6 million awarded through this allowance. 11 of these contracts worth \$14 million had no discernible selection process.

Recommendation

- Public Works should adhere to the new procurement procedures implemented by its acting director for projects addressing homelessness and emergency procurement. The City should implement similar procedures for such purchases citywide.

Preliminary Finding

- The City has no standard procedures for selecting vendors once they are in a pre-qualified contracting pool. According to Public Works, same vendors were selected repeatedly from a pre-qualified pool, at times by the direction of Mohammed Nuru. This practice presents opportunities for ethical breaches and unethical favors.

Recommendation

- The Mayor, Board, and Office of Contract Administration should establish clear guidelines for selecting a vendor or vendors from a pre-qualified pool. Possible methods for such selections include soliciting quotes for a defined item or scope of work from all vendors in the pool.

Preliminary Findings

- The only citywide guidance on the procurement process for grants awarded to nonprofit organizations is a nonbinding agreement that has no force of law to require competitive solicitation.
- Before September 2018, only two guidance were developed to help departments distinguish a grant award from a contract for goods or services.
 - 1984 City Attorney opinion
 - 1997 “Summary of Consensus”

Recommendation

- The Mayor, Board, and Office of Contract Administration should establish minimum requirements to ensure competitive solicitation of grants, similar to requirements for contracts, and formalize these requirements in code and policy.

Preliminary Findings

- Because no one entity has full oversight over procurement, the City lacks centralized monitoring to ensure procedures are performed in accordance with city law and policies.
- City departments do not fully utilize the City's centralized procurement systems.

Recommendations

- The City should close gaps in centralized monitoring of all procurement activities by strengthening and resourcing the Office of Contract Administration or some other city entity to expand its monitoring and oversight to all city procurement activities.
- To promote data-driven decisions and transparency, city departments should be required to use the City's centralized systems throughout the purchasing life cycle, from planning through contract award.

Preliminary Finding

- The lack of cross-functional sharing of information at Public Works' "tone at the top", and disregard of ethics and gift laws propagated by the former director of Public Works provided the pressure, rationalization, and ability necessary to carry out the alleged schemes.

Gaps Exist in Gifts Restrictions and Enforcement

11

Preliminary Findings

- Loopholes in city and state restrictions in this area create avenues for unethical behavior and manipulation.
- The behind-the-scenes bid steering that allegedly occurred were difficult to detect.

Recommendations

- The Ethics Commission should:
 - Examine and close loopholes in the Campaign Code to ensure city law does not create avenues for unethical behavior in the acceptance of gifts.
 - Expediently enable and require that all Statements of Economic Interests are filed electronically by filers and conduct annual compliance. The Mayor and Board should prioritize funding and other support necessary to accomplish this goal.

Our Public Integrity Review, performed in consultation with the City Attorney, will continue to conduct assessments of various city procedures and policies to assess their adequacy to prevent abuse and fraud.

Future reports and assessments are underway on the following topics:

1. The use of “friends of” organizations to support city operations.
2. Ethical standards for commissions’ contract approval processes at the Airport and other city commissions.
3. The City’s contractor debarment process.
4. Policies and practices to award permits at the Department of Building Inspection.

Additional reviews and assessments will be determined and performed as the Nuru investigation proceeds.

Any questions or comments?

Contact us at: ben.rosenfield@sfgov.org
todd.rydstrom@sfgov.org
mark.p.delarosa@sfgov.org

From: [Natalie Downe](#)
To: [Carroll, John \(BOS\)](#)
Subject: Entering my public comment on item #5 into the record for today's supervisors meeting
Date: Thursday, July 2, 2020 3:36:45 PM

This message is from outside the City email system. Do not open links or attachments from untrusted sources.

Hello,

Regarding item #5 in today's supervisors meeting I would like to submit my fill comment for public record as I didn't finish in the allotted time for public comment:

Hello, Natalie Downe from Hayes Valley, district 5 here

My comment is Relating to a culture of corruption and a culture lack of oversight of contractors

With regards to tree maintenance and removal, I'd love to ask what level of ecology training that tree pruning and removal contractors are required to have?

The reason I ask is because in operation of the work that happened this week to remove ficus trees in Hayes Valley, I filmed contractors doing heavy pruning on non-ficus trees that were not authorized and also had visible nests in, it is currently nesting season for birds. This should not have happened, certainly without any biologist oversight on site. DPW & Bureau of Urban Forestry have since admitted in writing that this was a mistake on behalf of the contractors.

This isn't an isolated incident, we can point to any number of mistakes by contractors with regards to interactions with trees, for example building projects that destroy trees by damaging roots without a permit to remove the trees, street work has happened that relief on trees being removed before the permit for removal is issued.

also just last nights in the Board of Appeals hearing, a case was brought where trees that have been removed before the appeals process of the permit had been completed, DPW claimed ignorance of the fact public could appeal permits and not knowing that this process had to reach conclusion before permits are officially issued and the trees removed as the reason for this error.

Each one of these incidents is an affront to the environment, and a degradation of the public trust.

When we plant a tree we have a responsibility to it to help it grow and protect it, both physically with watering and maintenance but also with process and adequate oversight for it not to be damaged or removed without justification.

The city's interaction with trees is largely unsupervised, and the current protocols for oversight are inadequate.

Since DPW took over stewardship and maintenance of the city's street trees a few years ago

the canopy has steadily and drastically diminished. Opting for removals rather than a more expensive pruning and maintenance schedule

San Francisco already has one of the the smallest urban canopy coverages in the country and in this time of climate change and increasing local temperatures we can't afford to loose any more. Removing mature healthy trees and replacing with small saplings with no watering budget is just appalling. Additionally replacement trees are also often non-californian native trees that offer little carbon sequestration and ecological benefits, like olive trees. One tree is not equivalent to another.

Director Nuru himself called for the removal of all ficus trees in the city, thousands of trees, claiming each tree as an emergancy removal in the interest of public safety, by way of avoiding the CEQA environmental protections and precautions that a project of this scale would usually undergo.

The City have been cagy about providing specific tree incidents' species data to the public for analysis but in the 2017 City's own tree census done in collaboration with the planning department, DPW, Friends of the urban forrest and arborpro, rated the risk of all the city's trees. Ficus is only the fifth most dangerous after plum, acacia, pittosporum, and London Plane.

We respectfully call for a halt to all tree removals not of imminent danger, pending an investigation into the ficus removal order and the ecology training and competence of contractors who work with trees.

Kind regards
Natalie Downe

--

Natalie Downe

From: [Kasey Rios Asberry](#)
To: [Carroll, John \(BOS\)](#)
Cc: [Mar, Gordon \(BOS\)](#); [Haney, Matt \(BOS\)](#); [Preston, Dean \(BOS\)](#); [Mahogany, Honey \(BOS\)](#); [PrestonStaff \(BOS\)](#); [Marstaff \(BOS\)](#)
Subject: SFGOV Audit Committee Public Comment: #5 200279[Hearing - Investigations Into Public Corruption]
Date: Thursday, July 2, 2020 10:26:53 AM

This message is from outside the City email system. Do not open links or attachments from untrusted sources.

200279 [Hearing - Investigations Into Public Corruption]Sponsors: Mar; Haney and PrestonHearing on the progress and findings of investigations into public corruption; and requesting the Controller and City Attorney to report.

- 1) Since DPW took over stewardship of street trees the canopy has steadily and drastically diminished
- 2) Existent protocols for BUF oversight are inadequate re: SF Urban Forest Council, DPW Board of Appeals - Commissioner Tanner in hearing 2020.07.01 encouraged the public to ask for BOS help with this issue
- 3) We call for a halt to all non-emergency tree removals pending an investigation
- 4) Investigate:
 - En lieu fees and penalties for illegal removals: structure, assessment and amounts
 - Administration of Adopt-a-tree fund and en lieu fees
 - Actual costs of removals
 - Real value of trees: green infrastructure, ecology and public health contributions
 - Outdated ecology model that supports removing healthy trees because they are the wrong species without regard for climate change emergency
 - Lack of accountability for multiple DPW mistakes, reporting gaps, expedient design choices
 - Lack of responsiveness to ADA and public health requirements for access to nature in our most underserved communities

Moratorium on tree removals is an environmental health and justice priority.
Investigation of improper incentives structure is a public fiduciary stewardship priority.

5-years of Tree Planting and Removal Since Urban Forest Plan Adopted

DEFICIT TOWARDS GOAL



- Goal of planting 2500 trees per year to have 50,000 new trees in 20 years
- Net new trees added (planted – removed) is now a negative number
- More trees have been removed than planted during the past 5 years



Maric Munn, SF Healthy Street Trees Initiative, Demonstration Gardens May 2020



~~~~~  
Bloom Where You Are Planted

~~~~~  
Demonstration Gardens
Healthy Street Trees Initiative
<http://demonstration-gardens.org>
San Francisco - Detroit
Kasey Asberry
415-283-8570

BOARD of SUPERVISORS



City Hall
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Tel. No. 554-5184
Fax No. 554-5163
TDD/TTY No. 554-5227

MEMORANDUM

TO: Anne Pearson, Office of the City Attorney
Ben Rosenfield, City Controller

FROM: John Carroll, Assistant Clerk,
Government Audit and Oversight Committee, Board of Supervisors

DATE: March 18, 2020

SUBJECT: LEGISLATION INTRODUCED

The Board of Supervisors' Government Audit and Oversight Committee has received the following proposed legislation, introduced by Supervisor Mar on March 10, 2020:

File No. 200279

Hearing on the progress and findings of investigations into public corruption; and requesting the Controller and City Attorney to report.

If you have any additional comments or reports to be included with the file, please forward them to me at the Board of Supervisors, City Hall, Room 244, 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, San Francisco, CA 94102.

c: Todd Rydstrom, Office of the Controller
Peg Stevenson, Office of the Controller

Introduction Form

By a Member of the Board of Supervisors or Mayor

RECEIVED
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
SAN FRANCISCO

2020 MAR 10 PM 12:13
Time stamp
for meeting date

BY AK

I hereby submit the following item for introduction (select only one):

- 1. For reference to Committee. (An Ordinance, Resolution, Motion or Charter Amendment).
- 2. Request for next printed agenda Without Reference to Committee.
- 3. Request for hearing on a subject matter at Committee.
- 4. Request for letter beginning : "Supervisor [] inquiries"
- 5. City Attorney Request.
- 6. Call File No. [] from Committee.
- 7. Budget Analyst request (attached written motion).
- 8. Substitute Legislation File No. []
- 9. Reactivate File No. []
- 10. Topic submitted for Mayoral Appearance before the BOS on []

Please check the appropriate boxes. The proposed legislation should be forwarded to the following:

- Small Business Commission
- Youth Commission
- Ethics Commission
- Planning Commission
- Building Inspection Commission

Note: For the Imperative Agenda (a resolution not on the printed agenda), use the Imperative Form.

Sponsor(s):

Mar; Haney, Preston

Subject:

Hearing on investigations into public corruption

The text is listed:

Hearing on the progress and findings of investigations into public corruption; and requesting the Controller and City Attorney to report.

Signature of Sponsoring Supervisor: [Signature]

For Clerk's Use Only