

File No. 161043

Committee Item No. \_\_\_\_\_

Board Item No. 43

# COMMITTEE/BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

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Committee: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Board of Supervisors Meeting

Date: October 4, 2016

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- California State Proposition 62
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: Brent Jalipa

Date: September 29, 2016

Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

1 [Supporting California State Proposition 62 - The Justice That Works Act - Initiative to End the  
2 Death Penalty]

3 **Resolution supporting California State Proposition 62, The Justice That Works Act Of**  
4 **2016, to end the death penalty in California and replace it with life imprisonment**  
5 **without the possibility of parole.**  
6

7 WHEREAS, The statewide measure to repeal the death penalty will appear as  
8 Proposition 62 on the November 2016 Ballot; and

9 WHEREAS, The death penalty is not used in 20 states and the District of Columbia;  
10 and

11 WHEREAS, Since 1973, 156 innocent persons have been freed from death rows  
12 across the United States for crimes they did not commit; and

13 WHEREAS, There are racial and geographic disparities in the application of the death  
14 penalty; and

15 WHEREAS, The death penalty has been rejected by a majority of the world's nations  
16 and most major religions; and

17 WHEREAS, The California Legislative Analyst's Office has determined that \$150  
18 million could be saved each year by abolishing the death penalty in California in favor of life  
19 imprisonment without possibility of parole; and

20 WHEREAS, Proposition 62, The Justice That Works Act Of 2016, a citizen's initiative  
21 on the November 2016 General Election ballot, would end the death penalty in California in  
22 favor of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, while requiring convicted murderers  
23 to pay restitution to their victim's families; now, therefore, be it  
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RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco,  
formally supports Proposition 62, The Justice That Works Act of 2016, to end the death  
penalty in California and replace it with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Mike Farrell  
5 Third Street  
Suite 724  
San Francisco, CA 94103  
(415) 243-0143

**RECEIVED**

SEP 15 2015

INITIATIVE COORDINATOR  
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Ashley Johansson, Initiative Coordinator  
Office of the Attorney General  
1300 I Street, 17<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Sacramento, CA 95814  
(916) 445-4752

**Re: Request for Title and Summary for *The Justice That Works Act of 2016***

Dear Ms. Johansson,

Pursuant to Article II, Section 10(d) of the Constitution of the State of California, I am proposing a statewide ballot initiative called ***The Justice That Works Act of 2016***. I respectfully request that the Attorney General prepare a Title and Summary for this measure as required by state law.

In accordance with Election Code sections 9001 and 9608 a check for \$200 is enclosed and the required certifying statements are attached to this letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,



Mike Farrell, Proponent

Dated this Fifteenth day of September, 2015.

This Act amends and repeals sections of the Penal Code; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in ~~strikeout type~~ and new provisions proposed to be added are printed in *italic type* to indicate that they are new.

## PROPOSED LAW

### The Justice That Works Act of 2016

#### SECTION 1. Title

This initiative shall be known and may be cited as "The Justice That Works Act of 2016."

#### SEC. 2. Findings and Declarations

The People of the State of California do hereby find and declare all of the following:

1. Violent killers convicted of first degree murder must be separated from society and severely punished.
2. Under current law, California sentences many criminals to death who commit first degree murder, but the state rarely carries out executions. Instead, the state spends millions of taxpayer dollars providing lawyers for death row inmates, only to see the murderers it has sentenced to death by execution die of old age in prison.
3. Since 1978, California has spent more than \$4 billion on a death penalty system that has sentenced nearly one thousand criminals to death by execution but has executed only 13 people. Even though there are over 700 inmates now on death row, California has not executed anyone in almost eleven years.
4. Violent murderers who are sentenced to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole in California are never eligible for parole. They spend the rest of their lives in prison and they die in prison.
5. Fewer than 1% of death row inmates work and pay their wages to compensate their victims. Murderers sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are required to work in prison and use their wages to pay restitution to the victims of their crimes.
6. All convicted murderers sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole should be legally required to work while in prison and pay 60% of their wages to compensate their victims for the damage they caused.
7. While many think it is cheaper to execute murderers than to imprison them for life, in fact it is far more expensive. The death penalty system costs over \$100 million more per year to maintain than a system that has life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as its harshest punishment, according to a study by former death penalty prosecutor and judge, Arthur Alarcon, and law professor Paula Mitchell. By replacing the death penalty with life imprisonment without

the possibility of parole, California taxpayers would save well over \$100 million every year.

8. The death penalty is a failed government program that wastes taxpayer dollars and makes fatal mistakes. More than 150 innocent people have been sentenced to death in this country, and some innocent people have actually been executed. Wrongful convictions rob innocent people of decades of their lives, waste tax dollars, and re-traumatize the victims' families, while the real killers remain free to kill again.

9. Retroactive application of this act will end a costly and ineffective practice immediately and ensure that California never executes an innocent person.

10. California's death penalty is an empty promise. Death penalty cases drag on for decades. A sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole provides swift and certain justice for grieving families.

11. Life in prison without the possibility of parole ensures that the worst criminals stay in prison forever and saves money. By replacing the death penalty with life in prison without the possibility of parole, we would save the state \$1 billion in five years without releasing a single prisoner – \$1 billion that could be invested in crime prevention strategies, services for victims, education, and keeping our communities and families safe.

### **SEC. 3. Purpose and Intent**

The people of the State of California declare their purpose and intent in enacting the Act to be as follows:

1. To end California's costly and ineffective death penalty system and replace it with a common sense approach that sentences persons convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole so they are permanently separated from society, and required to pay restitution to their victims.
2. To require everyone convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to work while in prison, and to increase to 60% the portion of wages they must pay as restitution to their victims.
3. To eliminate the risk of executing an innocent person.
4. To end the decades-long appeals process in which grieving family members attending multiple hearings are forced to continually relive the trauma of their loss.
5. To achieve fairness and uniformity in sentencing, through retroactive application of this act to replace the death penalty with life in prison without the possibility of parole.

### **SEC. 4. Section 190 of the Penal Code is amended to read:**

190. (a) Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life. The penalty to be applied shall be determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5. Except as provided in subdivision (b), (c), or (d), every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life if the victim was a peace officer, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 830.1, subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of Section 830.33, or Section 830.5, who was killed while engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.

(c) Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole if the victim was a peace officer, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 830.1, subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of Section 830.33, or Section 830.5, who was killed while engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and any of the following facts has been charged and found true:

- (1) The defendant specifically intended to kill the peace officer.
- (2) The defendant specifically intended to inflict great bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, on a peace officer.
- (3) The defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of the offense, in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 12022.
- (4) The defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense, in violation of Section 12022.5.

(d) Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 20 years to life if the killing was perpetrated by means of shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury.

(e) Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 shall not apply to reduce any minimum term of a sentence imposed pursuant to this section. A person sentenced pursuant to this section shall not be released on parole prior to serving the minimum term of confinement prescribed by this section.

*(f) Every person found guilty of murder and sentenced or resentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to this section shall be required to work within a high-security prison as many hours of faithful labor in each day and every day during his or her term of imprisonment as shall be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, pursuant to Section 2700. In any case where the*

*prisoner owes a restitution fine or restitution order, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall deduct money from the wages and trust account deposits of the prisoner and shall transfer those funds to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board according to the rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, pursuant to Sections 2085.5 and 2717.8.*

**SEC. 5. Section 190.1 of the Penal Code is repealed.**

~~190.1. A case in which the death penalty may be imposed pursuant to this chapter shall be tried in separate phases as follows:~~

~~(a) The question of the defendant's guilt shall be first determined. If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of all special circumstances charged as enumerated in Section 190.2 except for a special circumstance charged pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 where it is alleged that the defendant had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder in the first or second degree.~~

~~(b) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and one of the special circumstances is charged pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 which charges that the defendant had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder of the first or second degree, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the question of the truth of such special circumstance.~~

~~(c) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances as enumerated in Section 190.2 has been charged and found to be true, his sanity on any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity under Section 1026 shall be determined as provided in Section 190.4. If he is found to be sane, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the question of the penalty to be imposed. Such proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 190.3 and 190.4.~~

**SEC. 6. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read:**

190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 to be true:

(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.

(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree.

(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.



(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.

(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an escape from lawful custody.

(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.

(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace officer under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.

(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed during the commission or attempted commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph, "juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this or any other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the federal government, or of any local or state government of this or any other state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity" means a conscienceless or pitiless crime that is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.

(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait.

(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.

(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:

(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.

(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.

(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.

(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.

(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.

(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.

(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.

(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.

(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.

(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.

(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.

(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.

(M) To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder.

(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.

(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of poison.

(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.

(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.

(b) Unless an intent to kill is specially required under subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.

(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.

**SEC. 7. Section 190.3 of the Penal Code is repealed.**

~~190.3. If the defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree, and a special circumstance has been charged and found to be true, or if the defendant may be subject to the death penalty after having been found guilty of violating subdivision (a) of Section 1672 of the Military and Veterans Code or Sections 37, 128, 219, or 4500 of this code, the trier of fact shall determine whether the penalty shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation;~~

mitigation, and sentence including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense, any prior felony conviction or convictions whether or not such conviction or convictions involved a crime of violence, the presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence, and the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition.

However, no evidence shall be admitted regarding other criminal activity by the defendant which did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or which did not involve the express or implied threat to use force or violence. As used in this section, criminal activity does not require a conviction.

However, in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted. The restriction on the use of this evidence is intended to apply only to proceedings pursuant to this section and is not intended to affect statutory or decisional law allowing such evidence to be used in any other proceedings.

Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced without such notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in mitigation.

The trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of confinement to state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole may in future after sentence is imposed, be commuted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of parole by the Governor of the State of California.

In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant:

- (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
- (b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.
- (c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
- (d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
- (e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
- (f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
- (g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
- (h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication.

(i) ~~The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.~~

(j) ~~Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.~~

(k) ~~Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.~~

~~After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.~~

**SEC. 8. Section 190.4 of the Penal Code is amended to read:**

190.4. (a) Whenever special circumstances as enumerated in Section 190.2 are alleged and the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trier of fact shall also make a special finding on the truth of each alleged special circumstance. The determination of the truth of any or all of the special circumstances shall be made by the trier of fact on the evidence presented at the trial or at the hearing held pursuant to Subdivision (b) of Section 190.1. In case of a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, the defendant is entitled to a finding that is not true. The trier of fact shall make a special finding that each special circumstance charged is either true or not true. Whenever a special circumstance requires proof of the commission or attempted commission of a crime, such crime shall be charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime. If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and by the people, in which case the trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and by the people.

~~If the trier of fact finds that any one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 as charged is true, there shall be a separate penalty hearing *the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment in state prison for life without the possibility of parole.* and neither the finding that any of the remaining special circumstances charged is not true, nor if the trier of fact is a jury, the inability of the jury to agree on the issue of the truth or untruth of any of the remaining special circumstances charged, shall prevent the holding of a separate penalty hearing. In any case in which the defendant has been found guilty by a jury, and the jury has been unable to reach an unanimous verdict that one or more of the special circumstances charged are true, and does not reach a unanimous verdict that all the special circumstances charged are not true, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the issues, but the issue of guilt shall not be tried by such jury, nor shall such jury retry the issue of the truth of any of the special circumstances which were found by an unanimous verdict of the previous jury to be untrue. If such new jury is unable to reach the unanimous verdict that one or more of the special circumstances it is trying are true, the court shall dismiss the jury and in the court's discretion shall either order a new jury impaneled to try the issues the previous jury was unable to reach the unanimous verdict on, or impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for a~~

~~term of 25 years.~~

~~(b) If defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and the people, in which case the trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and the people.~~

~~If the trier of fact is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the issue as to what the penalty shall be. If such new jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court in its discretion shall either order a new jury or impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.~~

~~(e) (b) If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to *imprisonment in state prison for life without the possibility of parole* the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to Section 1026, and the truth of any special circumstances which may be alleged, and the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. The court shall state facts in support of the finding of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered into the minutes.~~

~~(d) In any case in which the defendant may be subject to the death penalty, evidence presented at any prior phase of the trial, including any proceeding under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to Section 1026 shall be considered on any subsequent phase of the trial, if the trier of fact of the prior phase is the same trier of fact at the subsequent phase.~~

~~(e) In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict or finding pursuant to Subdivision 7 of Section 11. In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings.~~

~~The judge shall set forth the reasons for his ruling on the application and direct that they be entered on the Clerk's minutes. The denial of the modification of the death penalty verdict pursuant to subdivision (7) of Section 1181 shall be reviewed on the defendant's automatic appeal pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1239. The granting of the application shall be reviewed on the People's appeal pursuant to paragraph (6).~~

**SEC. 9. Section 2085.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:**

2085.5. (a) (1) In any case in which a prisoner owes a restitution fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (b) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the fine amount,

whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, and shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury. The amount deducted shall be credited against the amount owing on the fine. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments.

*(2) In any case in which a prisoner sentenced or resentenced on or after the effective date of this act to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole owes a restitution fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (b) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the fine amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 60 percent from the wages and up to a maximum of 50 percent from the trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, and shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury. The amount deducted shall be credited against the amount owing on the fine. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments.*

(b) (1) When a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, in any case in which a prisoner owes a restitution fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (b) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated is authorized to deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the fine amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the county jail equivalent of wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, and shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury. The amount deducted shall be credited against the amount owing on the fine. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments.

(2) If the board of supervisors designates the county sheriff as the collecting agency, the board of supervisors shall first obtain the concurrence of the county sheriff.

(c) (1) In any case in which a prisoner owes a restitution order imposed pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (h) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the order amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for direct payment to the victim, or payment shall be made to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance pursuant to that program. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments made to victims and of the payments deposited to the Restitution Fund pursuant to this subdivision.

*(2) In any case in which a prisoner sentenced or resentenced on or after the effective date of this act to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole owes a restitution order imposed pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (h) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the order amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 60 percent from the wages and up to a maximum of 50 percent from the trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for direct payment to the victim, or payment shall be made to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance pursuant to that program. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments made to victims and of the payments deposited to the Restitution Fund pursuant to this subdivision.*

(d) When a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, in any case in which a prisoner owes a restitution order imposed pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (h) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated is authorized to deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the order amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the county jail equivalent of wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law. The agency shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for direct payment to the victim, or payment shall be made to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance pursuant to that program, or may pay the victim directly. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments made to the victims and of the payments deposited to the Restitution Fund pursuant to this subdivision.

(e) The secretary shall deduct and retain from the wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, an administrative fee that totals 10 percent of any amount transferred to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board pursuant to subdivision (a) or (c). The secretary shall deduct and retain from any prisoner settlement or trial award, an administrative fee that totals 5 percent of any amount paid from the settlement or award to satisfy an outstanding restitution order or fine pursuant to subdivision (n), unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary shall deposit the administrative fee moneys in a special deposit account for reimbursing administrative and support costs of the restitution program of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The secretary, at his or her discretion, may retain any excess funds in the special deposit account for future reimbursement of the department's administrative and support costs for the restitution program or may transfer all or part of the excess funds for deposit in the Restitution Fund.

(f) When a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated is authorized to deduct and retain from the county jail equivalent of wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, an



administrative fee that totals 10 percent of any amount transferred to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d). The agency is authorized to deduct and retain from a prisoner settlement or trial award, an administrative fee that totals 5 percent of any amount paid from the settlement or award to satisfy an outstanding restitution order or fine pursuant to subdivision (n), unless prohibited by federal law. Upon release from custody pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the agency is authorized to charge a fee to cover the actual administrative cost of collection, not to exceed 10 percent of the total amount collected. The agency shall deposit the administrative fee moneys in a special deposit account for reimbursing administrative and support costs of the restitution program of the agency. The agency is authorized to retain any excess funds in the special deposit account for future reimbursement of the agency's administrative and support costs for the restitution program or may transfer all or part of the excess funds for deposit in the Restitution Fund.

(g) In any case in which a parolee owes a restitution fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (b) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, the secretary, or, when a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated, may collect from the parolee or, pursuant to Section 2085.6, from a person previously imprisoned in county jail any moneys owing on the restitution fine amount, unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary or the agency shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury. The amount deducted shall be credited against the amount owing on the fine. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments.

(h) In any case in which a parolee owes a direct order of restitution, imposed pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 13967 of the Government Code, as operative prior to September 29, 1994, subdivision (h) of Section 730.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 1202.4, the secretary, or, when a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated or a local collection program, may collect from the parolee or, pursuant to Section 2085.6, from a person previously imprisoned in county jail any moneys owing, unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary or the agency shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for direct payment to the victim, or payment shall be made to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance pursuant to that program, or the agency may pay the victim directly. The sentencing court shall be provided a record of the payments made by the offender pursuant to this subdivision.

(i) The secretary, or, when a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated, may deduct and retain from moneys collected from parolees or persons previously imprisoned in county jail an administrative fee that totals 10 percent of any amount transferred to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board pursuant to subdivision (g) or (h), unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary shall deduct and retain from any settlement or trial award of a parolee an administrative fee that totals 5 percent of an amount paid from the settlement or award to satisfy an outstanding restitution

order or fine pursuant to subdivision (n), unless prohibited by federal law. The agency is authorized to deduct and retain from any settlement or trial award of a person previously imprisoned in county jail an administrative fee that totals 5 percent of any amount paid from the settlement or award to satisfy an outstanding restitution order or fine pursuant to subdivision (n). The secretary or the agency shall deposit the administrative fee moneys in a special deposit account for reimbursing administrative and support costs of the restitution program of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or the agency, as applicable. The secretary, at his or her discretion, or the agency may retain any excess funds in the special deposit account for future reimbursement of the department's or agency's administrative and support costs for the restitution program or may transfer all or part of the excess funds for deposit in the Restitution Fund.

(j) When a prisoner has both a restitution fine and a restitution order from the sentencing court, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall collect the restitution order first pursuant to subdivision (c).

(k) When a prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and that prisoner has both a restitution fine and a restitution order from the sentencing court, if the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated collects the fine and order, the agency shall collect the restitution order first pursuant to subdivision (d).

(l) When a parolee has both a restitution fine and a restitution order from the sentencing court, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or, when the prisoner is punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated, may collect the restitution order first, pursuant to subdivision (h).

(m) If an inmate is housed at an institution that requires food to be purchased from the institution canteen for unsupervised overnight visits, and if the money for the purchase of this food is received from funds other than the inmate's wages, that money shall be exempt from restitution deductions. This exemption shall apply to the actual amount spent on food for the visit up to a maximum of fifty dollars (\$50) for visits that include the inmate and one visitor, seventy dollars (\$70) for visits that include the inmate and two or three visitors, and eighty dollars (\$80) for visits that include the inmate and four or more visitors.

(n) Compensatory or punitive damages awarded by trial or settlement to any inmate, parolee, person placed on postrelease community supervision pursuant to Section 3451, or defendant on mandatory supervision imposed pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of Section 1170, in connection with a civil action brought against a federal, state, or local jail, prison, or correctional facility, or any official or agent thereof, shall be paid directly, after payment of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs approved by the court, to satisfy any outstanding restitution orders or restitution fines against that person. The balance of the award shall be forwarded to the payee after full payment of all outstanding restitution orders and restitution fines, subject to subdivisions (e) and (i). The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall make all reasonable efforts to notify the victims of the crime for which that

person was convicted concerning the pending payment of any compensatory or punitive damages. For any prisoner punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, the agency is authorized to make all reasonable efforts to notify the victims of the crime for which that person was convicted concerning the pending payment of any compensatory or punitive damages.

(o) (1) Amounts transferred to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for payment of direct orders of restitution shall be paid to the victim within 60 days from the date the restitution revenues are received by the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. If the restitution payment to a victim is less than fifty dollars (\$50), then payment need not be forwarded to that victim until the payment reaches fifty dollars (\$50) or until 180 days from the date the first payment is received, whichever occurs sooner. (2) If a victim cannot be located, the restitution revenues received by the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board on behalf of the victim shall be held in trust in the Restitution Fund until the end of the state fiscal year subsequent to the state fiscal year in which the funds were deposited or until the time that the victim has provided current address information, whichever occurs sooner. Amounts remaining in trust at the end of the specified period of time shall revert to the Restitution Fund.

(3) (A) A victim failing to provide a current address within the period of time specified in paragraph (2) may provide documentation to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which shall verify that moneys were collected on behalf of the victim. Upon receipt of that verified information from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board shall transmit the restitution revenues to the victim in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (c) or (h).

(B) A victim failing to provide a current address within the period of time specified in paragraph (2) may provide documentation to the agency designated by the board of supervisors in the county where the prisoner punished by imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 is incarcerated, which may verify that moneys were collected on behalf of the victim. Upon receipt of that verified information from the agency, the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board shall transmit the restitution revenues to the victim in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (d) or (h).

#### **SEC. 10. Retroactive Application of Act**

(a) In order to best achieve the purpose of this act as stated in Section 3 and to achieve fairness, equality and uniformity in sentencing, this act shall be applied retroactively.

(b) In any case where a defendant or inmate was sentenced to death prior to the effective date of this act, the sentence shall automatically be converted to imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole under the terms and conditions of this act. The State of California shall not carry out any execution following the effective date of this act.

(c) Following the effective date of this act, the Supreme Court may transfer all death penalty appeals and habeas petitions pending before the Supreme Court to any district of the Court of

Appeal or superior court, in the Supreme Court's discretion.

**SEC. 11. Effective Date**

This act shall become effective on the day following the election pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution.

**SEC. 12. Severability**

The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of this act or its application is held invalid, including but not limited to Section 10, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

Print Form

# Introduction Form

By a Member of the Board of Supervisors or the Mayor

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BY \_\_\_\_\_  
Time stamp  
or meeting date

I hereby submit the following item for introduction (select only one):

- 1. For reference to Committee.  
An ordinance, resolution, motion, or charter amendment.
- 2. Request for next printed agenda without reference to Committee.
- 3. Request for hearing on a subject matter at Committee.
- 4. Request for letter beginning "Supervisor [ ] inquires"
- 5. City Attorney request.
- 6. Call File No. [ ] from Committee.
- 7. Budget Analyst request (attach written motion).
- 8. Substitute Legislation File No. [ ]
- 9. Request for Closed Session (attach written motion).
- 10. Board to Sit as A Committee of the Whole.
- 11. Question(s) submitted for Mayoral Appearance before the BOS on [ ]

Please check the appropriate boxes. The proposed legislation should be forwarded to the following:

- Small Business Commission     Youth Commission     Ethics Commission
- Planning Commission     Building Inspection Commission

**Note: For the Imperative Agenda (a resolution not on the printed agenda), use a Imperative**

**Sponsor(s):**

Campos, Mar, Peskin, Kim, Wiener, Breed, Avalos, Cohen, Farrell

**Subject:**

Resolution supporting Proposition 62, The Justice That Works Act of 2016, to end the death penalty in California and replace it with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

**The text is listed below or attached:**

Please see attached resolution.

Signature of Sponsoring Supervisor: Paul Campos

For Clerk's Use Only:

