

BOARD of SUPERVISORS



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MEMORANDUM

GOVERNMENT AUDIT AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

SAN FRANCISCO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

TO: Supervisor Dean Preston, Chair
Government Audit and Oversight Committee

FROM: John Carroll, Assistant Clerk

DATE: October 1, 2021

SUBJECT: **COMMITTEE REPORT, BOARD MEETING**
Tuesday, October 5, 2021

The following file should be presented as COMMITTEE REPORT at the regular Board meeting on Tuesday, October 5, 2021. This resolution was acted upon at the special Government Audit and Oversight Committee meeting on Thursday, September 30, 2021, at 10:00 a.m., by the votes indicated.

Item No. 54 File No. 210705

Resolution responding to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations contained in the 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury Report, entitled "A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience;" and urging the Mayor to cause the implementation of accepted findings and recommendations through her department heads and through the development of the annual budget.

RECOMMENDED AS AMENDED AS A COMMITTEE REPORT

Vote: Supervisor Dean Preston - Aye
 Supervisor Connie Chan - Aye
 Supervisor Rafael Mandelman - Aye

Cc: Board of Supervisors
Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board
Alisa Somera, Legislative Deputy
Anne Pearson, Deputy City Attorney

File No. 210705

Committee Item No. 7

Board Item No. 54

COMMITTEE/BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

AGENDA PACKET CONTENTS LIST

Committee: Government Audit and Oversight

Date: Sept. 30, 2021

Board of Supervisors Meeting:

Date: Oct. 5, 2021

Cmte Board

- Motion
- Resolution - VERSION 2
- Ordinance
- Legislative Digest
- Budget and Legislative Analyst Report
- Youth Commission Report
- Introduction Form
- Department/Agency Cover Letter and/or Report
- MOU
- Grant Information Form
- Grant Budget
- Subcontract Budget
- Contract/Agreement
- Form 126 – Ethics Commission
- Award Letter
- Application
- Public Correspondence

OTHER

- City Administrator Presentation – September 30, 2021
- 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury Report
- 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury Press Release
- SFPUC Response – August 27, 2021
- Mayor’s Consolidated Response – August 27, 2021
- _____
- _____
- _____

Prepared by: John Carroll

Date: Sept. 24, 2021

Prepared by: John Carroll

Date: _____

Prepared by: John Carroll

Date: _____

1 [Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve
2 Fuel Resilience]

3 **Resolution responding to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings**
4 **and recommendations contained in the 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury Report, entitled “A**
5 **Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience;” and urging the Mayor to**
6 **cause the implementation of accepted findings and recommendations through her**
7 **department heads and through the development of the annual budget.**

8
9 WHEREAS, Under California Penal Code, Section 933 et seq., the Board of
10 Supervisors must respond, within 90 days of receipt, to the Presiding Judge of the Superior
11 Court on the findings and recommendations contained in Civil Grand Jury Reports; and

12 WHEREAS, In accordance with California Penal Code, Section 933.05(c), if a finding or
13 recommendation of the Civil Grand Jury addresses budgetary or personnel matters of a
14 county agency or a department headed by an elected officer, the agency or department head
15 and the Board of Supervisors shall respond if requested by the Civil Grand Jury, but the
16 response of the Board of Supervisors shall address only budgetary or personnel matters over
17 which it has some decision making authority; and

18 WHEREAS, Under San Francisco Administrative Code, Section 2.10(a), the Board of
19 Supervisors must conduct a public hearing by a committee to consider a final report of the
20 findings and recommendations submitted, and notify the current foreperson and immediate
21 past foreperson of the civil grand jury when such hearing is scheduled; and

22 WHEREAS, In accordance with San Francisco Administrative Code, Section 2.10(b),
23 the Controller must report to the Board of Supervisors on the implementation of
24 recommendations that pertain to fiscal matters that were considered at a public hearing held
25 by a Board of Supervisors Committee; and

1 WHEREAS, The 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury Report, entitled “A Fluid Concern: San
2 Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience” (“Report”) is on file with the Clerk of the Board of
3 Supervisors in File No. 210704, which is hereby declared to be a part of this Resolution as if
4 set forth fully herein; and

5 WHEREAS, The Civil Grand Jury has requested that the Board of Supervisors respond
6 to Finding Nos. F3, F4, F18, and F19, as well as Recommendation Nos. R9, R17, and R18
7 contained in the subject Report; and

8 WHEREAS, Finding No. F3 states: “The City’s lack of agency sponsorship and
9 dedicated staffing and budgeting for fuel resilience efforts weakens its ability to ensure fuel
10 resilience in an emergency;” and

11 WHEREAS, Finding No. F4 states: “The cessation of fuel resilience progress during
12 COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of
13 lifeline resilience;” and

14 WHEREAS, Finding No. F18 states: “The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in
15 the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience
16 comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience;” and

17 WHEREAS, Finding No. F19 states: “Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by
18 the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source;” and

19 WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R9 states: “In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should
20 commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity
21 for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment
22 Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an
23 additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available;” and

1 WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R17 states: “In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City
2 should commit to funding capital projects that are identified in the Fuel Plan as a high priority
3 to improve fuel resilience in the City over the subsequent ten years;” and

4 WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R18 states: “In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City
5 should specify how it will provide at least \$10 million in dedicated funding for fuel resilience
6 capital projects within the next ten years using general obligation bond revenue;” and

7 WHEREAS, In accordance with California Penal Code, Section 933.05(c), the Board of
8 Supervisors must respond, within 90 days of receipt, to the Presiding Judge of the Superior
9 Court on Finding Nos. F3, F4, F18, and F19, as well as Recommendation Nos. R9, R17, and
10 R18 contained in the subject Report; now, therefore, be it

11 RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports to the Presiding Judge of the
12 Superior Court that they partially disagree with Finding No. F3 for reason as follows: we agree
13 that the City needs to dedicate more resources for emergency response, including improved
14 fuel resilience, however assigning agency sponsorship and dedicating staff and budget falls
15 outside the Board of Supervisor’s purview; and, be it

16 FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports to the Presiding Judge
17 of the Superior Court that they partially disagree with Finding No. F4 for reason as follows: the
18 COVID pandemic has only highlighted the need for San Francisco to better plan and prioritize
19 all aspects of lifeline resilience, including a plan to improve fuel resilience by decreasing the
20 City’s dependency on fossil fuels, however determining the workscope of City agencies falls
21 outside the Board’s purview; and, be it

22 FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports to the Presiding Judge
23 of the Superior Court that they partially disagree with Finding No. F18 for reason as follows:
24 while inclusion on the City’s Capital Plans can be an indicator of the City’s priorities for
25 infrastructure development, improved fuel resilience can also be achieved by reducing the

1 City's dependency on fossil fuels, efforts which would not be included in Capital Plans; and,
2 be it

3 FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports to the Presiding Judge
4 of the Superior Court that they agree with Finding No. F19 for reason as follows: without a
5 dedicated investment of resources, including both staffing and funding, limited progress can
6 be made; and, be it

7 FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation
8 No. R9 requires further analysis by the City Administrator's Office, the San Francisco Public
9 Utilities Commission, and the Fuel Working Group for alternative sites as the Southeast
10 Treatment Plant is not an appropriate location given the community's long fought efforts for
11 environmental justice to remove toxins and pollutants from District 10 and any alternate sites
12 should consider cumulative environmental impacts on vulnerable and impacted communities,
13 which should be considered concurrently with the City Administrator's planned analysis; and,
14 be it

15 FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation
16 No. R17 will not be implemented as it is not within the purview of the Board of Supervisors
17 due to our agency's lack of direct jurisdiction over projects within the City's Capital Plan; and,
18 be it

19 FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation
20 No. will not be implemented as it is not within the purview of the Board of Supervisors due to
21 our agency's lack of direct jurisdiction over funding mechanisms for projects within the City's
22 Capital Plan; and, be it

23 FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges the Mayor to cause the
24 implementation of the accepted findings and recommendations through her department heads
25 and through the development of the annual budget.



A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience

JUNE 2021

City and County of San Francisco
Civil Grand Jury | 2020–2021



About the Civil Grand Jury

The Civil Grand Jury is a government oversight panel of volunteers who serve for one year. It makes findings and recommendations resulting from its investigations.

Reports of the Civil Grand Jury do not identify individuals by name. Disclosure of information about individuals interviewed by the jury is prohibited.

California Penal Code, section 929.

2020–2021 Jurors

Ellie Schafer, *Foreperson*

Allen Cohn, *Foreperson Pro Tem*

Stephanie Jacques, *Recording Secretary*

Donna Hurowitz, *Corresponding Secretary*

Ron Boring

Geoffrey Brown

Mike Fitzgerald

JR Formanek

Nina Huebsch

Evelyn Hunt

Simone Manganelli

James Matthews

Dr. Janet Mohle-Boetani

Kenneth Moses

Judi Sanderlin

Adam J. Thaler

Nicholas Weininger

Bebo White

Thomas Yankowski

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Executive Summary | 4 |
| Background | 5 |
| Lifeline Services Defined | 5 |
| The Scope of this Report | 6 |
| Lifeline Interdependencies: Why Fuel is Critical | 6 |
| Types of Disasters that Could Cause Fuel Shortages | 7 |
| Prior Work on Fuel Resilience: the 2018 Fleet Week Exercise | 8 |
| Methodology | 8 |
| Discussion | 9 |
| Why Fuel Resilience is Important | 9 |
| How the City has Approached Resilience of Other Lifelines | 11 |
| Why Fuel Resilience Needs a Clear Owner | 12 |
| Assessing Fuel Demand and Supply in Advance | 13 |
| Equipping the City for Real-Time Emergency Fuel Management | 17 |
| Securing The Fuel Supply Chain | 18 |
| Planning for a Resilient Future | 21 |
| Findings | 25 |
| Recommendations | 27 |
| Request for Responses | 30 |
| Bibliography | 31 |
| Disclaimer | 33 |

Executive Summary

The San Francisco Bay Area is vulnerable to many types of disasters, including natural events such as earthquakes and wildfires and technological threats such as cyberattacks. A major disaster could disrupt essential services—electric power, fuel, water, sewage disposal, communications, and transportation—for extended periods of time. These disruptions could pose major safety risks, and preparing to mitigate the damage from such disruptions is critical.

All of these essential services depend on a reliable fuel supply. Fuel shortages, especially in a power outage, will cause many other failures. Vehicles for first responders and service maintainers need gasoline to run. Facilities that run on electricity, such as pumping stations, communications towers, and operations buildings, need diesel fuel for backup generators.

After a region-wide disaster, fuel shortages could last for weeks. If fuel runs out, the resulting failures of other essential services would pose a serious life-safety threat. The City and County of San Francisco (the City) is insufficiently prepared to prevent this failure from happening. The state of California advises counties to plan for a 10-14 day period of self-sufficiency after a disaster, and the City does not meet this standard. Moreover, the City paused work-in-progress on fuel preparedness during the COVID pandemic even though it continued work in other disaster planning areas. Finally, there is no plan for keeping essential services reliable as the City moves away from fossil fuels and toward net-zero emissions by 2050.

The City should invest in a systematic program to address fuel preparedness both technically and organizationally, as it is doing for other comparable disaster preparedness challenges. Key elements of such a program should include:

- Clear organizational ownership of fuel preparedness within City government
- Improved assessment of fuel demand and supply citywide
- Better equipment for managing local fuel reserves in an emergency
- Secure supply chains to ensure the City can receive fuel deliveries
- Comprehensive planning and dedicated funding for fuel preparedness improvements
- Long-term planning for keeping critical infrastructure reliable in a fossil fuel-free future

Background

Lifeline Services Defined

A primary source and inspiration for this report is the Lifelines Restoration Performance Project (the Lifelines Project) produced on behalf of the San Francisco Lifelines Council. The Lifelines Council was formed in 2009 at the behest of then-Mayor Edwin Lee, with the specific charge to:

- Develop and improve collaboration in the City and within the San Francisco Bay Area
- Understand operational interdependencies to enhance planning, restoration, and reconstruction following a disaster
- Share information among affected parties concerning recovery plans, projects, and priorities
- Establish coordination for lifeline restoration and recovery following a disaster
- Issue a report summarizing findings and recommendations

A lifeline is defined as an entity or a process that provides security, relief, and continuity in the face of a difficult situation. Lifeline services, likewise, are those infrastructure services required to sustain life safety and the basic comforts of modern civilization for residents of a given area. The lifelines examined by the Lifelines Project included:

- Energy services, including electric power, natural gas, and fuel
- Water and wastewater service
- Transportation services, including roads and highways, ports, and airports
- Solid waste disposal
- Communications

The [Lifelines Project report](#), released in October 2020, resulted from a sustained research effort to understand the City's likely performance relative to these lifeline services in a disaster. The report summarizes how each lifeline's infrastructure operates, assesses how quickly each lifeline service can be restored in the aftermath of a disaster, and recommends improvements to help restore lifeline services more quickly and reliably.

The Scope of this Report


As the Lifelines Project report points out, “The complexity of lifeline systems—their differing purposes, physical structures, ownerships, and regulations—pose a challenge for local leaders setting expectations for restoration plans and timeframes.”¹ Because of this complexity, the Civil Grand Jury (the Jury) could not feasibly investigate all aspects of lifelines’ performance. The Jury chose to focus on fuel after completing high-level surveys of the condition of several lifelines. There are two primary reasons for this focus:

1. All other lifeline services depend on fuel. Improved fuel supply in a disaster increases the reliability of all other lifeline services.
2. The City has given less attention to fuel compared to the other lifeline services, and as a result, more effort is needed to improve its resilience. In the Jury’s initial broad-ranging interviews with lifeline experts, fuel was most commonly mentioned as the weakest point. This is likely due to a lack of clear ownership over this area.

Lifeline Interdependencies: Why Fuel is Critical

Lifeline interdependency simply means that to sustain the operation of one lifeline service, it may be necessary for another one to be at least partially operational. The following figure summarizes the various lifelines that depend on fuel:

Figure 1. Summary of Lifeline Dependencies on Fuel



¹ City and County of San Francisco, *Lifelines Restoration Performance Project*. PDF file. https://onesan-francisco.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Lifelines%20Restoration%20Performance%20Project%20Report_Oct%202020.pdf.

Figure 1 demonstrates the importance of fuel as a critical lifeline: literally, everything else depends substantially on fuel to operate. In summary:

- Lifeline transportation vehicles need fuel, as do first responder vehicles such as ambulances and fire trucks.
- Most lifelines have service vehicles that are essential to maintaining key portions of their service infrastructure, and those need fuel too.
- If grid power is disrupted, lifeline infrastructure facilities need backup power to continue running. This backup power typically comes from fuel-based generators.

The City has known about this issue since at least since 2014 when the Lifelines Council released a report focused on evaluating interdependencies.² This makes the relative lack of attention to fuel preparedness more concerning.

Types of Disasters that Could Cause Fuel Shortages

The most common example of a potential disaster for the City is a major earthquake of magnitude 7.0 or greater. Earthquakes are an important focus not only because of the likelihood of damage across the region but also because the possible damage is subject to variability and uncertainty. Geological studies suggest that the San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras faults have equally destructive potential.

An earthquake could increase emergency fuel demand while disrupting the fuel supply. Refineries could be damaged and become inoperable, pipelines could rupture, roads and bridges could become impassable, and the power grid infrastructure could face several types of widespread damage. This report focuses on how that possible combination of effects can create severe, long-lasting fuel shortages and explores how the City can reduce the likelihood of such shortages.

Other types of disasters can also cause widespread, long-lasting power outages and increased demand for backup power, further depleting the limited fuel supply. These include:

- Wildfires. The last several years of megafires have necessitated Public Safety Power Shutoffs in many parts of the Bay Area and across California.³ None of these have affected the City so far, but that could change in the future, especially if climate change makes fires larger and more frequent.
- Cyberattacks. Control systems for refineries and pipelines, or even the pipelines themselves are subject to cyberattacks.⁴ Such attacks might also affect fuel supply directly if the attackers targeted control systems for pipelines and/or refineries.

² The Lifelines Council, *Lifelines Interdependency Study | Report*. PDF file. <https://sfgov.org/ccsfgsa/sites/default/files/ORR/documents/Lifelines%20Council%20Interdependency%20Study.pdf>

³ In a Public Power Safety Shutoff, power is turned off in specific areas in an effort to reduce the risk of fires caused by electric infrastructure.

⁴ The May 2021 Colonial Pipeline cyberattack is a notorious and severe recent example.

- Power shortages. Heatwaves and other climate-related changes impact the demand for power.

Prior Work on Fuel Resilience: the 2018 Fleet Week Exercise

The City's Department of Emergency Management (DEM) holds exercises periodically during a Fleet Week event that tests various aspects of emergency preparedness, with a focus on coordinating with other levels of government. The 2018 exercises used seminars, tabletop exercises, and real-world scenarios to focus on supply chain logistics for fuel delivery.

The scenarios included delivering fuel to Pier 96 by emergency watercraft, organized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and delivering a truck by barge to Treasure Island. Communications and resource request systems were also tested.

These Fleet Week exercises produced an After Action Report that described the conduct of the exercises in detail. It also included extensive background information on fuel and recommended multiple follow-up steps to improve fuel preparedness.

Methodology

The Jury interviewed more than 30 officials in various city and state agencies with knowledge of the City's disaster preparedness programs and plans as well as private consultants and business leaders performing relevant work for the City. Interviewed agencies include:

- San Francisco Public Utilities Commission Water, Power, and Sewer divisions
- Department of Emergency Management
- Office of Resilience and Capital Planning
- Office of the City Administrator
- General Services Administration
- Office of Contract Administration
- Department of the Environment
- Port of San Francisco
- San Francisco International Airport
- California Energy Commission

The Jury attended public meetings of the [Capital Planning Committee](#) to learn how the capital planning process incorporated disaster preparedness needs. The Jury also read and analyzed publicly available documents from agency websites. Contracts, policies, best-practices presentations, and idea discussions from the various agencies were also reviewed.

Discussion

Why Fuel Resilience is Important

Shortages Could Last Much More than 72 Hours After a Disaster

A 72-hour assumption is embedded in many existing City disaster preparedness practices, from the size of backup generators' fuel tanks to the title of the City's citizen information website on disaster preparedness, sf72.org. However, both spikes in demand and limitations in the supply of fuel are likely to last well beyond 72 hours. Planners should not assume, even unconsciously, that "after 72 hours everything will be fine again."

Reasons for longer-lasting spikes in demand include:

- Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) will likely achieve only moderate restoration within two weeks of a major earthquake,⁵ and the same is true of power provided by the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) Power Enterprise.
- San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and Treasure Island will likely be without grid power beyond 72 hours. The Lifelines Project report notes that "Depending on fuel availability, they may continue to have power from backup generators, provided there is enough fuel."⁶
- There is widespread skepticism, among both interviewees and the general public, regarding PG&E's ability to follow through on its commitments to restore power given its performance over the past few years with Public Safety Power Shutoffs.
- The 2014 Bay Area Catastrophic Earthquake Regional Logistics Response Plan gives detailed estimates on power restoration timelines. The plan estimates that 161,300 San Francisco households will be without power 72 hours after a major earthquake and 73,100 still without power after seven days.⁷ Restoration steps envisaged for the 72-hour to 14-day timeframe imply that power disruptions will continue to affect critical facilities and ordinary households for more than 72 hours.⁸

⁵ City and County of San Francisco, *Lifelines Restoration Performance Project*. PDF file. https://onesanfrancisco.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Lifelines%20Restoration%20Performance%20Project%20Report_Oct%202020.pdf.

⁶ *Lifelines Restoration Performance Project*

⁷ California Office of Emergency Services and Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative, *Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Logistics Response Plan*. PDF file. http://www.bayareauasi.org/sites/default/files/resources/Regional%20Logistics%20Response_February%202014.pdf.

⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Logistics Response Plan*. PDF file. http://bayareauasi.org/sites/default/files/resources/Regional%20Logistics%20Response_February%202014.pdf

Likewise, reasons for longer-lasting limitations in supply include:

- The Lifelines Project report noted severe uncertainty in the restoration of fuel supply, to the point of not committing to an estimated restoration timeframe.⁹ Sufficient information on the vulnerability of region-wide fuel production and delivery infrastructure was not available.
- The California Energy Commission (CEC) recommends counties plan for a 10–14 day period of fuel self-sufficiency after a major earthquake.¹⁰
- The 2018 Fleet Week exercises assumed that fuel supplies would not arrive for 9–10 days following an earthquake.¹¹
- The Regional Logistics Response Plan’s restoration objectives for fuel in the 72-hour timeframe do not include restoring fuel supply.¹² Identifying resources and implementing fuel distribution plans are objectives for the period from 72 hours to 14 days after a disaster.
- A disaster large enough to disrupt the City’s fuel and power supply will likely cause similar disruptions throughout the Bay Area. Emergency demand for fuel will most likely be a regional problem, and mutual aid opportunities could be limited. The City might be on its own and might have to “get in line” behind other Bay Area municipalities facing worse problems.

While emergency aid coordinated by state and federal authorities will eventually relieve fuel shortages, that aid is not expected to arrive until much later than 72 hours. The City needs the capability to manage scarce supplies until outside help arrives, and that management task could be difficult.

Shortages Could Cause Consequential Cascading Failures

Figure 1 illustrated that *all lifelines depend on fuel*, especially in a power outage. In particular, lifeline failures that could occur with power and fuel disruptions include:

- Communication outages due to failures in cell towers and/or switching equipment could imperil the ability of other lifeline services to coordinate restoration efforts and imperil life safety if first responders are unable to communicate.
- Traffic signal outages could cause traffic snarls.

⁹ City and County of San Francisco, *Lifelines Restoration Performance Project*. PDF file. https://onesanfrancisco.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Lifelines%20Restoration%20Performance%20Project%20Report_Oct%202020.pdf.

¹⁰ California Energy Commission, “California Fuel Overview & Emergency Fuels Set-Aside Program” (PowerPoint presentation, University of California at San Francisco, November 4, 2020).

¹¹ San Francisco Department of Emergency Management, *2018 San Francisco Fleet Week Exercise After Action Report*. PDF file.

¹² U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Logistics Response Plan*. PDF file. http://bayareauasi.org/sites/default/files/resources/Regional%20Logistics%20Response_February%202014.pdf

- Fuel shortages could affect not only vehicles using local roads but also the equipment required to repair those roads. Notably, such shortages could cause difficulties reaching and evacuating injured people.
- Water shortages could imperil public health. The Lifelines Project states that SFPUC Water has enough backup generator fuel for only 72 hours of operation.
- Bay Area Rapid Transit and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA) could fail as power and fuel for transit vehicles run out.
- Natural gas service could fail due to loss of power to shut-off valves.
- Wastewater pump stations could lose power, causing diminished capacity to handle wastewater treatment.
- Garbage service could be disrupted if Recology facilities lose power and/or garbage trucks cannot get fuel. This is a potential public health issue.
- Transportation via the Port and SFO could be disrupted if sea and air vehicles cannot get fuel.

Moreover, fuel shortages could cause or exacerbate grid power outages *and vice versa*. The Regional Logistics Response Plan lists several types of power-fuel interdependencies: for example, power maintenance vehicles require fuel to run, and fuel pumps and pipeline monitoring equipment require power to operate.¹³

How the City has Approached Resilience of Other Lifelines

Fuel resilience is of *at least* comparable importance to the resilience of other lifelines since other lifelines depend on fuel. The investments the City has made in securing other lifelines, and the success of these investments, can help determine what is reasonable to invest in fuel resilience.

Water and wastewater provide a particularly useful comparison since both involve complex infrastructures for transporting fluids over wide areas with multiple points of seismic vulnerability. Numerous redundancy and backup measures mitigate these vulnerabilities. For example, if some water reservoirs fail in an earthquake, they can be valved off without disrupting the water supply. Similarly, wastewater can be buffered in “storage boxes” if treatment plants are temporarily unavailable.

The City has invested in program upgrades to improve the resilience of both water and wastewater systems: the [Water System Improvement Program](#) (WSIP) and [Sewer System Improvement Program](#) (SSIP), respectively. These programs deploy billions of dollars of bond funding over decades to install state-of-the-art seismic upgrades to key pieces of lifeline infrastructure, including reservoirs, pipes, and treatment plants.

¹³ Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Logistics Response Plan.

The WSIP and SSIP have made steady progress in the face of logistical and budgetary constraints, including the COVID pandemic.

The City needs to approach fuel resilience similarly. Two key features of the water and sewer improvement programs are:

1. Each has a clear organizational owner
2. Each has dedicated funding streams for both capital and personnel

The City should provide similar organizational and budgetary foundations to fuel resilience.

Why Fuel Resilience Needs a Clear Owner

Recognizing the importance of fuel resilience to the safety of San Franciscans, the City Administrator's Office and DEM endorsed the creation of a Fuel Working Group in 2019. This working group made important progress in its first year but was paused in 2020 at the start of the COVID pandemic. The fact that work on other lifeline services continued while this fuel group was paused is indicative of the lack of organizational support for fuel resilience.

The Fuel Working Group was composed of emergency managers from many city agencies and co-led by logisticians from the City Administrator's Office and DEM. The group determined work priorities based on team members' knowledge and concerns, and they met monthly for approximately eight hours. Group projects included designing a small, easy-to-make, battery-powered pump to withdraw fuel from storage tanks, drafting a San Francisco Fuel Plan, and developing theoretical best practices for fuel resilience.

At the onset of COVID in 2020, however, most emergency managers in the group were reassigned to the COVID Command Center or emergency management responsibilities within their own departments; this caused the group's efforts to pause.

Members of the Fuel Working Group worked together successfully and collegially and were personally committed to improving fuel resilience in the City. But the deliverables and expectations of the Fuel Working Group were not defined, prioritized, or funded by the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, City Administrator, or DEM. The Fuel Working Group operated on an ad-hoc basis with a group of committed City employees who defined their own deliverables and had no funding.

The Fuel Working Group needs to be sponsored formally and funded adequately. The DEM logistician is grant-funded which limits the work that can be performed. Effective planning for the acquisition of consumable supplies (e.g., vaccines, personal protective equipment, cleaning supplies) requires dedicated staff with supply chain experience and logistics skills. By comparison, most other lifelines have clear organizational owners with aligned incentives for appropriate planning and resilience.

For example, SFPUC is the clear organizational owner of water and wastewater. SFPUC and PG&E collectively manage electric power, the Department of Technology oversees emergency communications, Recology manages waste disposal, San Francisco Public Works (SFPW) maintains local roads, and the Port and SFO manage their facilities. These organizations have both the authority and the resources to focus on the resilience of their respective lifelines.

There is no such owner for fuel. Since fuel demand and supply are not managed centrally, the City has a patchwork approach to fuel resilience with multiple departments and agencies focusing on small segments. As a result, there are no consistent citywide policies, and departments vary in their level of preparedness at even the most basic levels, such as keeping fleet vehicles' fuel tanks full in case of emergency.

Agency sponsorship of the Fuel Working Group would help empower the group to address fuel resilience in a more overarching and coordinated manner. Possible agency sponsors include The Office of Resilience and Capital Planning (ORCP), which oversees the Lifelines Council, and DEM. ORCP has been studying lifeline interdependencies since at least 2014, and DEM has institutional expertise around fuel as a result of the 2018 Fleet Week exercise.

Additionally, lifeline programs with clear owners, such as water and wastewater, continued their resilience work during the COVID pandemic while the work on fuel resilience was paused. Unfortunately, due to the lifeline interdependencies, this created a priority inversion since fuel resilience is a prerequisite for the resilience of the other lifelines. While the redeployment of resources is understandable, the presence of one emergency did not lessen the risk of others occurring. Other state and local governments have faced overlapping disasters during the pandemic, from megafires in California to winter storms in Texas.

Finally, a dedicated agency sponsor for fuel preparedness would enable region-wide coordination of fuel demand and supply. Other lifeline services have regional coordination bodies that address common challenges, such as Bay Area Clean Water Agencies for water. Coordination of fuel needs will be necessary but difficult to achieve without a dedicated owner.

Assessing Fuel Demand and Supply in Advance

Proactively Assessing Demand

If a disaster happens tomorrow and results in fuel shortages, understanding the fuel demand of critical infrastructures, including essential vehicles and backup generators, and the available fuel supply will be critical. However, both fuel demand and supply could vary widely based on the type and severity of the disaster. Therefore, proactive planning for a wide range of demand and supply constraints is essential.

The 2018 Fleet Week After Action Report included baseline data on potential fuel demand and supply. These data are summarized in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2: Fuel Demand and Supply Estimates from the 2018 Fleet Week After Action Report

| Gasoline | | Diesel | |
|--|---------|--|---------|
| Gasoline demand from vehicles, gallons per day | 1,649 | Diesel demand from vehicles, gallons per day | 905 |
| Gasoline demand from generators, gallons per day | 350 | Diesel demand from generators, gallons per day | 425,865 |
| Total gasoline demand | 1,999 | Total diesel demand | 426,770 |
| Total gasoline storage capacity, all City fueling stations | 132,000 | Total diesel storage capacity, all City fueling stations | 255,400 |

These amounts are reported as baseline estimates only because it is unclear how they were determined or whether they are reliable; this is, in itself, disturbing. Nevertheless, the figures do provide a starting point for considering the kind of demand and supply sources that should be assessed.

Assuming there is any relative accuracy to these figures, the gap between diesel demand and supply is the most concerning problem. If, hypothetically, every storage tank at the City’s fueling stations was full, the gasoline supply would last for two months at this level of demand, but the diesel supply, primarily used for backup generators, would last less than a single day.

Due to the likelihood that the demand for diesel fuel could far exceed the supply, the City needs to prioritize estimating backup generator demand in advance. This is a sizable challenge because of the widely distributed nature and ownership of critical backup generators throughout the City. Multiple types of facilities—some City-owned, some not—have generators. This includes operations buildings, hospitals, fire and police stations, water and wastewater pumping stations, and communications towers. These generators typically have storage tanks on premises sufficient for 24–72 hours of operation without refueling, at most; this is likely not enough to keep these facilities operational until power is restored. The City-owned generators are typically managed by the particular City agencies that own the facilities for which they provide backup power, and there is no centralized management.

Backup generator usage is especially difficult to estimate for several reasons:

- Backup generators are rarely used under normal operating conditions. They are tested periodically to ensure they work, but these tests do not provide sufficient information to assess the load capacity of the generators in a disaster or how the generators would behave over an extended period.
- The backup generators needed would vary based on the type and severity of the disaster. Power could be disrupted in some parts of the City and not others. It is highly unlikely that all available generators would be needed at the same time and for an extended period, but it is impossible to predict which generators will be needed and for how long.

- The range of potential use patterns for backup generators could change over time as progress on power resilience in other areas is made. For example, some critical facilities are provided with dual redundant power feeds from PG&E such that a single substation failure will not cause loss of power, and there are projects underway such as the Bay Corridor project that will expand the usage of dual feeds.¹⁴

There have been ad hoc efforts to catalog critical backup generators citywide, but a formal central inventory that catalogs the location and capacity of these generators does not appear to exist. It also does not appear that the City has performed any exercises to test how much fuel could be used realistically in a range of plausible disasters.

Preparing and maintaining an inventory of generators would not only help estimate fuel demand but would also be logistically useful during the actual disaster. Knowledge of which generators need to be checked on and/or refueled and when, and how to deliver fuel to them if needed, is key strategic information for emergency responders. Gathering that information centrally and keeping it updated regularly is a logical first step toward better fuel resilience.

Building New Storage Capacity

The next logical question is how to expand diesel storage capacity. There are a few reasons that local fuel storage capacity in the City is difficult to increase:

- The City's density and geographical constraints leave few suitable spaces for building large fuel tanks.
- Permitting for new tanks is time-consuming and expensive due to the risk of leakage or fire.
- Gas stations will likely become smaller and more sparse over time as gas-powered vehicles are replaced by electric vehicles.

There is a rare opportunity, however, to build new fuel storage capacity locally. The SFPUC wastewater enterprise plans to free up significant space at the Southeast Treatment Plant within the next 6–8 years by replacing the old digester equipment at the plant. A second fueling station for City vehicles is one proposed use of the space. As of now, no decision as to how this space will be used has been made. The original motivation for the fueling station proposal was improved convenience for refueling SFPUC vehicles.

But the second station could also serve as a very useful backup fuel supply source in an emergency, and the City should capitalize on this opportunity.

¹⁴ The Bay Corridor Transmission and Distribution Project aims to better serve large SFPUC Power customers in the southeast portion of the City.

Making Private Fuel Reserves Accessible

Most existing fuel storage within the City's limits is owned privately (and thereby not included in Figure 2). There are eighty-five retail gas stations in the City whose storage tanks can hold a total of two million gallons of gasoline and 293 thousand gallons of diesel. In particular, these stations hold more diesel than all of the City-owned fueling stations combined. This is enough for an additional 16 hours of backup generator refueling.¹⁵

But even if the stations were not damaged in an earthquake, and if the reserve tanks were mostly full, their use is unpredictable due to the following:

- Heightened citizen demand (i.e., panic buying) could exhaust the supply quickly.
- Most retail gas stations have limited storage capacity and are on smaller, less accessible streets.
- Retail gas stations are not typically equipped to operate without power.

The City could mitigate these difficulties but has not. For example, the City has not signed any Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), contracts, or other agreements with station owners to ensure that fuel from these stations could be used to meet critical infrastructure needs. The CEC recommends that counties undertake such agreements.

Some stations will be more useful in an emergency than others. Stations with one or more of the following characteristics would be preferred partners:

- Large onsite fuel storage capacity
- Proximity to priority travel routes
- 24/7 operations with onsite staff
- Ability to operate without power, through backup generators or transfer switches

There are eight Shell and three Chevron stations that have relatively large capacities for both gasoline and diesel (at least 30 thousand gallons gasoline and 10 thousand gallons diesel storage). Agreements with these providers would improve the City's fuel resilience. This is limited information, and a more thorough analysis of existing gas stations is warranted.

The City should also consider agreements with nearby hypermarket stations outside of the City limits.¹⁶ These stations often have the largest amounts of onsite storage capacity, and two of them are located near SFO.

¹⁵ San Francisco Department of Emergency Management, *2018 San Francisco Fleet Week Exercise After Action Report*. PDF file.

¹⁶ A hypermarket is a large retail supplier of general merchandise or grocery items that also sells gasoline. 16

Equipping the City for Real-Time Emergency Fuel Management

The best-laid plans for managing fuel demand and supply will surely require adjustments when an actual disaster occurs. On the demand side, some backup generators will be required to run at full capacity for an extended period, and others will not. The vehicles that need to be deployed for disaster response will depend on the nature of the disaster. On the supply side, some storage tanks might be damaged while others are not. For those that are available, some will be full when the disaster strikes while others will be empty. The specifics cannot be predicted perfectly in advance.

To ensure the greatest resilience and ability to manage fuel needs in the aftermath of a disaster, emergency responders will need to do two key things:

1. Assess fuel demand and supply as quickly as possible
2. Transport fuel from available supply sources to where it is needed the most

The City needs better equipment to accomplish these two tasks.

Real-Time Supply and Demand Assessment

In an emergency, it is important for responders to know how much fuel is available and where to find it. A real-time monitoring system that tracks fuel availability would result in emergency responders being directed to the available resources more quickly. Knowing where the fuel is stored is not enough—the amount of fuel at a given location is also critical. Real-time data on fuel demand would also result in more efficient delivery to the areas where it is needed most.

The City does not have a centralized system for monitoring fuel availability in the fuel tanks owned by City agencies. The estimated time to create an inventory in an emergency is 4–8 hours and would require technicians that could themselves be affected adversely by the disaster or could be deployed elsewhere. The City's ability to create this inventory is only hypothetical since it has never been tested. Similarly, the City has not performed any exercise to predict fuel demand. The level of preparedness on the demand side is even less since, as discussed previously, an inventory of critical backup generators does not exist. The City lacks knowledge of where generators are and the amount of fuel they might consume.

One option for creating a real-time inventory of fuel supply is automated sensors that monitor fuel levels. The use of such sensors in vehicle fleets is common; for example, many car-sharing companies use them. While it is unclear whether these sensors are suitable for emergency use (e.g., whether they depend on power or Internet service), the City would benefit from investigating the use of fuel sensors or some other comparable technology.

Equipment for Local Fuel Transportation

Tanker trucks deliver fuel to both public and retail gas stations in the City. Either large tractor-trailer trucks (18 wheels and 11,000-gallon capacity) or smaller bobcat-style trucks (10 wheels and 6,000-gallon capacity) carry fuel across bridges and through City streets every day. Many of these trucks are compartmentalized and capable of carrying more than one type of fuel, and they can pump fuel both into and out of storage tanks.

In a disaster, however, bridges could possibly be damaged and impassable, leaving the City with fewer delivery options. To move fuel quickly within the City limits, equipment needed to do that, i.e., tanker trucks, must already be located within the City limits. Trucks should be purchased or retrofitted for this purpose.

The City has taken two steps in this direction. First, it converted a former fire engine (10 wheels and 3,500-gallon capacity) into a fuel tanker with compartments for both gasoline and diesel fuels. The truck has already proven to be useful in refueling multiple fire engines while they are engaged with a fire. In the event of a broader emergency, however, this one truck will not be enough. It will likely be used to resupply the fire engines as it is now.

Second, the City Administrator's Office received a grant in 2020 from the Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative to purchase another tanker truck for general use with the City, one with large capacity and multiple compartments for both types of fuel. The grant award of \$200,000, however, is much less than the \$600,000 bid received for this type of truck. Because of this sizable price gap, the capabilities of the truck will likely be scaled down.

The City has explored alternative technologies for disaster-resilient fuel transport, such as the prototype battery-powered fuel pump developed by the Fuel Working Group mentioned above, and other types of tank and pump equipment that could be retrofitted onto existing trucks. Whether these are the most feasible options or not, it is clear that the City needs to invest in upgrades or other equipment solutions to enhance its ability to refuel both backup generators and critical response vehicles in the aftermath of a disaster.

Securing The Fuel Supply Chain

The ability to resupply fuel to the City after a disaster depends on a complex set of systems with multiple points of vulnerability. A large portion of the supply chain is outside of the City's control and, as mentioned above, resupply could take up to 14 days after a major disaster. This makes the importance of managing the scarce local resources all the more critical. The more the City can do to reduce the time to resupply fuel from outside the City limits, the more quickly the stress on the scarce local resources can be reduced. The following are three ways the City can improve the fuel supply chain:

1. Improve the reliability of contracted fuel vendors and consider adding an out-of-region backup vendor
2. Secure reliable mooring sites for emergency fuel delivery by fuel barge, tanker ship, or similar vessel

3. Correlate priority routes within the City to critical fuel supply and demand sources

Background on San Francisco's Fuel Supply Chain

The City's fuel infrastructure is relatively compact and robust compared to other major urban areas. Within a distance of forty-five miles, for example, there are five crude oil refineries, forty miles of direct delivery pipeline (eight of which are under the bay), a multi-grade fuel terminal just one mile from the City limits, and more than 80 retail gas stations. However, the City's seismic situation and geographical limitations creates unusual vulnerabilities at each link in the supply chain.

Five refineries along the northern edge of Contra Costa County supply most of the Bay Area's gasoline and diesel fuels. The Bay Area, like California in general, imports relatively few refined fuel products. Fuel gets to the City from the refineries directly by truck or by a private pipeline owned and operated by Kinder Morgan, a large and publicly-held corporation based in Texas. The pipeline runs beneath the bay to the Kinder Morgan distribution terminal in Brisbane. From here, fuel is loaded onto trucks for delivery to the City.

Each route has vulnerabilities. Direct truck transport from the refineries is typically across the Bay Bridge, which is known to be at risk of damage in a major earthquake. The Kinder Morgan pipeline, on the other hand, runs close and nearly parallel to the Hayward fault, which is active and dangerous. If that fault gave way and damaged the pipeline and the Bay Bridge, a serious, perhaps long-term disruption to fuel supply to the City would result.

Kinder Morgan has been less forthcoming than other lifeline service operators (public or private) with information on the degree of vulnerability of its infrastructure and any mitigation measures it has taken. Because of this lack of information, the Lifelines Project report gave no estimated restoration timeline for the pipeline in the event of a disaster. The pipeline might survive a large earthquake—the Loma Prieta quake did not cause pipeline failures in the Bay Area, and the general seismic record of large steel pipes is good—but this does not mean it is not vulnerable. Moreover, there is a commercial as well as a physical risk. In an emergency, the Kinder Morgan terminal could face shortages resulting from unusual demand from both new and existing customers. The May 2021 cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline disrupted fuel supply to the southeastern United States for six days.

Improving Vendor Reliability

The City maintains fuel contracts with two vendors, Golden Gate Petroleum and Western States Oil. Each of these vendors acts as a backup for the other: the primary vendor for gasoline can serve as a secondary vendor for diesel and vice versa. But since both vendors' distribution and storage sites are located in the Bay Area, even though outside of the City, there is a significant risk that both vendors could become temporarily unable to supply the City after a major region-wide disaster.

The extent to which the two vendors' supply chains are interdependent or the risks of events that might cause them to become unable to deliver fuel at the same time is unclear. Although the contracts both specify provision of "Priority 1" emergency service, the meaning of "Priority 1" is not well-defined and does not provide any specific quantifiable level of risk reduction in emergency supply. Additionally, there is no evidence of participation by these vendors in fuel preparedness exercises, and they have not practiced emergency fuel delivery with the City.

The CEC recommends a backup vendor in a different region of the state as an available fuel supplier if in-region suppliers are unable to deliver fuel.¹⁷ The City does not currently have any agreement with such a backup vendor and has not tested how delivery of fuel from an out-of-area emergency backup vendor would work. The City should rectify these vulnerabilities and ensure that truly independent, out-of-area fuel supplies are available in an emergency.

Preparing for Emergency Delivery by Water

There are three alternatives for delivering fuel to a distribution point: by truck, by water, or by air. Fuel delivery by air is too risky, and the capacity too low, for this to be a useful option. So delivery by truck or by water are the most viable options.

Unfortunately, a disaster that disrupts the normal fuel supply chain could disrupt infrastructure vital to truck delivery, including:

- Major routes, such as the Golden Gate Bridge, Bay Bridge, 101, and 280
- Loading and unloading facilities
- Truck and truck driver availability

These risks motivated the 2018 Fleet Week exercises to test fuel delivery by water. Fuel providers in an emergency water delivery situation could include private vendors or emergency government suppliers such as FEMA and the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration. Delivery vehicles could be ships, barges, or other specialized watercraft for petroleum transport. Once the fuel has arrived dockside at a staging area, it can be transferred to trucks for intra-city delivery.

Several City piers, including Piers 50, 80, and 96, have supported heavy traffic between trucks and the ships moored there in the past. However, these piers have not been reinforced in many years and might not be seismically sound enough to receive fuel trucks after a disaster. Pier 96, for example, is a sand dike with unknown seismic vulnerability. Full assessment of its level of vulnerability does not appear to have been performed because of limited soil quality data. Experts estimate that improved geotechnical data to assess the vulnerabilities around this site would require an appropriation of several million dollars.

¹⁷ California Energy Commission, "California Fuel Overview & Emergency Fuels Set-Aside Program" (PowerPoint presentation, University of California at San Francisco, November 4, 2020).

A study of the southern portion of the Port is expected to occur in 2022 in cooperation with FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers. In the meantime, even if Pier 96 ultimately proves to be a seismically suitable and reliable site, the City should explore other sites to ensure that a reliable over-water fuel delivery and truck staging area will be available when needed.

Securing Intra-City Fuel Delivery Routes

Whether the fuel is delivered to the staging area by land or by water, trucks must then transport it to where it is needed. This requires careful planning. The City completed a foundational piece of this planning in 2019 with an analysis of priority routes for critical supply delivery and first responder operations.¹⁸ These routes are prioritized by SFPW to be restored to usability first in the aftermath of a disaster.

The City has not, however, taken the next step to correlate priority routes with fuel demand and supply specifically. There is not a map or other document that links priority routes with key fuel storage sites such as fueling stations for fleet vehicles or critical infrastructure facilities with backup generators.

Such a map could assist in refining the priority routes. The City needs to determine whether there are roadways that need additional seismic improvements to secure the reliability of fuel supply lines after a major earthquake. Additionally, a digital map could be updated in real-time after a disaster to inform emergency responders and fuel suppliers of the current condition of priority routes.

Planning for a Resilient Future

Thorough planning, ideally with comprehensive written plans and playbooks that are reviewed and publicly available, is a key reliability driver for any complex system. The City can plan better to ensure fuel resilience on several timescales.

Short Term: Publishing a Comprehensive Plan

City agencies have discussed and known about the need for a fuel plan for many years. The 2018 Fleet Week After Action Report mentions a fuel plan as a resource for guiding follow-up actions and lists the publication of such a plan as one of its top recommendations. The Fuel Plan was intended to be published formally as part of the City's overall [emergency response plan](#).¹⁹

But this "plan to make a plan" was never done. The formal Fuel Plan referred to in the After Action Report was neither fully vetted nor approved, and it remained a concept rather than a plan. As mentioned previously, the Fuel Working Group's work on the plan was interrupted in 2020 by the onset of COVID.

¹⁸ San Francisco Public Works, *Emergency Priority Routes Project*. PDF file. <https://www.onesanfrancisco.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/DPW%20Priority%20Route%20Program.pdf>

¹⁹ The plan was intended to be an attachment to the *Logistics Annex* (ESF #7).

Many recommendations from the 2018 Fleet Week After Action Report illustrate the benefits that a Fuel Plan could provide. Notably, these recommendations include:

- Establishing regional and City logistics task forces and workgroups that meet regularly to vet and enhance the logistical capabilities outlined in the Bay Area Earthquake Plan
- Establishing and exercising a thorough fuel handling, storage, and supply chain plan for disasters
- Establishing a statewide vendor contract database for disaster response agencies
- Expanding outreach to communication and resource supply chain private sector partners
- Incorporating resource request mechanisms and coordination paths information into plans

A Fuel Plan will also be an appropriate place to incorporate lessons learned from the COVID pandemic, with which many Fuel Working Group members now have experience. Supply chain management for the personal protective equipment needed during COVID is analogous to emergency fuel management in that both are scarce resources, both are supplied by outside vendors, both have high regional demand, and both need to be directed to the most life-critical uses. Emergency fuel management raises similar concerns to COVID regarding equity in that fuel supplies must be prioritized to sustain the infrastructure needs of underserved populations, just as medical supplies had to be prioritized for that purpose in the pandemic.

Publishing the Fuel Plan is a critical step in anticipating the actions, drills, and investments required to protect the City from fuel shortages in the weeks after a disaster. The City's leaders should take action to make this plan a reality.

Medium Term: Capital Planning for Fuel Resilience

The City allocates funding for long-term public projects through a regular capital planning process. Every two years the ORCP creates a [Capital Plan](#) (the Plan) detailing planned, budgeted, in-progress, and deferred projects that the City expects to work on over the ten years following the Plan's publication. The Plan typically includes budget estimates and funding sources for major projects along with planning for future general obligation bond issues.

Disaster preparedness is a major priority in the Plan. The City's stated prioritization principles for capital planning make this explicit by listing "protecting life safety and enhancing resilience" as the second-highest priority after legal mandates. For example, facility seismic upgrades are often in the Plan.

The City has engaged in long-term capital planning for several multi-decade, multi-billion-dollar projects to upgrade other aspects of lifelines resilience substantially, including the WSIP, SSIP, and the [Waterfront Resilience Program](#) (WRP) which funds seismic improvements to the seawall. The most recent 2021 draft Capital Plan discusses all of these extensively and references multiple line item subprojects for each one. These projects have substantial sources of dedicated ongoing funding, ranging from general obligation bonds to SFPUC revenue bonds to grants from several levels of government.

The 2021 draft Capital Plan demonstrates that work on all three of these programs has continued and new milestones have been reached, even during the COVID pandemic. The City has advanced these long-term lifeline resilience goals despite the budgetary uncertainty that arose from drastic changes to tax revenue and redeployment of personnel to COVID emergency response.

The lack of similar planned funding for fuel resilience is likely why this work was paused during COVID. It is also why projects like the purchase of another fuel transport truck have relied on grant funding. While fuel resilience initiatives do not generally require the same level of expenditures as the complex physical infrastructure upgrades required by the WSIP, SSIP, and WRP, they do need and deserve the same organizational support to succeed, and that requires consideration and inclusion in the Plan.

In particular, the Plan envisages a 2027 general obligation bond issue focused on earthquake safety and emergency response. Fuel resilience should be added to this bond issue to ensure long-term sustained progress on this lifeline. The specific studies, exercises, and Fuel Working Group meetings will likely turn up other high-priority resilience projects. Looking even further down the road, a decarbonized future, discussed below, will demand new types of capital investments for energy resilience over several decades. Establishing a dedicated bond revenue stream for fuel resilience will ensure that the City continues to support fuel resilience commensurate with its life-safety impact, now and into the future.

Long Term: Energy Resilience in a Decarbonized Future

Discussion to this point has been centered on fossil fuels (gasoline and diesel) and ensuring the appropriate management of both their demand and supply after a disaster. But if the [San Francisco Climate Action Plan](#) proceeds as intended, the focus will need to shift away from fossil fuel within the next generation, and possibly sooner. The Climate Action Plan aims to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, and at the state level, an [executive order](#) from Governor Newsom directs the California Air Resources Board to develop regulations banning the sale of new fossil fuel-powered vehicles by 2035 and requiring heavy-duty vehicles to operate emission-free by 2045.

To ensure that the City's critical infrastructure remains resilient in 2050, the City should begin planning now. Some emergency vehicles and backup generators may initially be exempted from the zero-emissions requirements.

But even if they are exempted, it will be more difficult to supply those vehicles and generators with fuel when there is less overall demand for that fuel and thus a less robust supply chain to meet that demand. For example, gas stations will become less common as gas-powered vehicles are replaced with electric vehicles. The City will need an alternative.

The primary foreseeable alternative is battery-stored electricity, including onboard backup batteries in electric vehicles and stationary batteries installed near critical facilities.

Bidirectional charging capability could allow electric vehicles to charge each other or act as backup power supplies for buildings. But the City has not planned for how electric fleet vehicles will be used and recharged in the aftermath of a disaster.

Multiple authoritative sources endorse the use of “solar plus storage” installations for disaster resilience. These are stationary batteries coupled to solar panels that can recharge them even during a grid power outage. The Lifelines Project report recommends installing solar plus storage at critical facilities whenever feasible to mitigate the impact of grid outages.²⁰ It also recommends electrifying fleet vehicles to reduce dependence on the fuel supply chain. Likewise, the Climate Action Plan lists installation of solar plus storage at key facilities as a strategic action.

Despite commitments in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans to pursue solar plus storage installations, the City has made minimal progress. SFPUC has installed a few pilot solar plus storage projects, but they are not designed to provide backup power in an emergency and are not located at critical facilities. A study commissioned by the San Francisco Department of the Environment identifying possible sites for solar plus storage did not include critical infrastructure facilities among the sites considered and did not discuss how solar plus storage might be used for disaster resilience.

Power experts agree that battery backup could work in principle but caution that battery technology is not yet ready for this sort of critical use. Indeed, there are concerns still to be worked out around the cost, complexity, safety, and reliability of battery installations. But the time to start resolving those concerns is now because the service life of generators, fleet vehicles, fuel storage facilities, and other components of critical energy infrastructure is typically measured in decades. If the next generation of such components is still all fossil fuel-based, it will be much more difficult to get to a resilient, electrified infrastructure by 2050. And if that next generation of components is *not* to be fossil fuel-based, the City needs to start planning for that future.

This planning process should begin in the next few years. There is much that the City still does not know about how a transition to electrified disaster response infrastructure will work, what the costs and risks will be, and on what timescale it can be accomplished. Studying those questions in light of the changing technological landscape is the crucial first step toward enabling lifeline services to remain reliable without fossil fuels.

²⁰ City and County of San Francisco, *Lifelines Restoration Performance Project*. PDF file. https://onesanfrancisco.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Lifelines%20Restoration%20Performance%20Project%20Report_Oct%202020.pdf.

Findings

- F1.** In the aftermath of a major earthquake (magnitude 7.0 or greater), there will likely be severe citywide fuel and power shortages lasting *more than 72 hours*.
- F2.** If these shortages resulted in lack of power to lifeline infrastructure facilities and/or lack of fuel for critical lifeline vehicles, the resulting cascading failures of other lifelines could have life safety and quality-of-life impacts greater than the fuel and power shortages themselves.
- F3.** The City's lack of agency sponsorship and dedicated staffing and budgeting for fuel resilience efforts weakens its ability to ensure fuel resilience in an emergency.
- F4.** The cessation of fuel resilience progress during COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifeline resilience.
- F5.** In the aftermath of a major disaster, it will be difficult for emergency responders to catalog the citywide fuel needs of backup generators.
- F6.** It is impossible to determine how much fuel storage is needed to meet emergency demands after a disaster because the City has not prepared proper estimates of fuel needs in a range of disaster scenarios.
- F7.** Compiling inventories of available fuel in a disaster will likely take at least half a day and will rely partly on manual assessment of sites by personnel who might themselves be unavailable under disaster conditions.
- F8.** The City will have a severely limited and unreliable ability in a disaster to get fuel from available reserves to sites such as generator tanks that need fuel urgently.
- F9.** The City has not invested in technological solutions to augment the ability to refuel critical vehicles and generators in a disaster.
- F10.** The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain due to the lack of partnerships between the City and private gas station operators and incomplete data about which private stations could best augment critical supplies.
- F11.** Opportunities to expand fuel reserves within the City are very rare due to geographic constraints but very valuable for fuel resilience.
- F12.** In the aftermath of a region-wide disaster such as a major earthquake, the ability of the City's two contracted suppliers to deliver fuel might be compromised temporarily because they would both be susceptible to the same infrastructure failures.

- F13.** The City has not contracted with an emergency out-of-region backup vendor in case the two regular vendors cannot deliver fuel, as recommended by the California Energy Commission, despite the risk of region-wide disruptions compromising both.
- F14.** Although the City's two fuel suppliers are contractually responsible for providing technical support on products and offering assistance required by City personnel, they do not participate actively in the planning, simulation exercises, or ongoing work of the Fuel Working Group.
- F15.** If an emergency fuel delivery by water is needed, the City has not planned adequately for the risk that landing sites might be damaged, thereby compromising their ability to receive fuel delivery vessels or support tanker trucks for city transport.
- F16.** The City has insufficient knowledge about whether restoration of routes on the Priority Routes map will allow effective refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles in the event of a disaster.
- F17.** The lack of a published San Francisco Fuel Plan makes it harder to coordinate on consistent fuel resilience best practices citywide.
- F18.** The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience.
- F19.** Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source.
- F20.** The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this.
- F21.** The City will likely need to rely at least partially on electric vehicles for critical infrastructure functions by 2050 but has not initiated planning for how this can be done in a disaster-resilient manner.

Recommendations

- R1.** The Mayor's Office should determine an appropriate agency sponsor for the Fuel Working Group by December 2021.
- R2.** The Fuel Working Group should be reconvened by its agency sponsor by February 2022. The working group should meet at least quarterly thereafter.
- R3.** The agency sponsor of the Fuel Working Group should select members with strong experience in supply chain logistics and emergency management. The Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Contract Administration, the City Administrator's Office, and other City departments who are significant users of fuel, including SFPUC, SFMTA, and DPW should dedicate staff time each month through December 2024, or until the subsequent recommendations in this report are implemented.
- R4.** By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should compile an inventory of generators critical to life safety in the City and their locations, portability, fuel needs, tank storage capacities, and burn rates. This inventory should be updated at least annually thereafter. The inventory should include information including generator location, fuel type, connection type, and any access codes needed for emergency delivery.
- R5.** By June 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should perform a team exercise to estimate likely ranges of fuel usage for critical generators in the City's inventory in the aftermath of a plausible disaster in which those usage needs would have to be met from local sources. The exercise should give lower and upper bounds stemming from possible variations in which generators would have to run and for how long.
- R6.** By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should develop and test a plan for the quick assessment of local fuel reserves available to City agencies in a disaster, including protocols that ensure incident commanders can assess emergency fuel supply and demand in real-time citywide.
- R7.** By December 2023, the City should build, retrofit, or purchase a minimum of two additional tanker trucks that can each extract up to 2,500 gallons of fuel from a tank, even in the absence of grid power, and transport it to where it is needed. These vehicles should have the ability to transport both gasoline and diesel fuel.

- R8.** By December 2022, the City should enter into Memoranda of Understanding or contracts with a minimum of two local private gas station operators to ensure that emergency vehicles can access fuel stored at their stations, including making that fuel technically accessible even in the event of a grid power outage. The operators chosen should be prioritized based on criteria relevant for usefulness in a disaster, such as:
- Amount of fuel stored at the station
 - Availability of both gas and diesel
 - 24/7 staffed operation
 - Ability to dispense fuel without relying on grid power
 - Proximity to priority routes
 - Geographical distribution of stations (i.e., not all in the same place)
- R9.** In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available.
- R10.** By December 2022, the Office of Contract Administration should prepare a supply chain vulnerability assessment of the City's two contracted fuel suppliers.
- R11.** If the two contracted fuel suppliers are found to have joint vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated adequately, the Office of Contract Administration should enter into a Memorandum of Understanding by December 2023 for emergency backup delivery with a vendor whose facilities and equipment are based outside of the Bay Area.
- R12.** By December 2021, the Fuel Working Group should ask each City-contracted fuel supplier to send a qualified representative to the Group's planning meetings, field simulations, and other events where the technical advice and operational experience of fuel distributors are needed to help secure disaster readiness.
- R13.** By December 2023, as part of a Fleet Week live exercise, the Department of Emergency Management and the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should test a scenario in which the City's normal supply line is damaged and delivery by water is necessary. This exercise should include a full demonstration of marine cargo delivery, readiness of the staging area, performance of the transfer-storage-filling equipment, and performance of the tanker trucks.

- R14.** By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning, and the Port should prepare a seismic vulnerability assessment of likely delivery sites for emergency fuel delivery by water, including Pier 96, Pier 80, Pier 50, and at least one alternative delivery site.
- R15.** By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should publish an analysis of the priority routes determining whether they will allow sufficiently reliable refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles.
- R16.** By June 2022, the City Administrator’s Office should publish a San Francisco Fuel Plan developed in collaboration with the Fuel Working Group. The Fuel Plan should cover key resilience measures such as:
- Processes and timescales for identifying fuel on hand in City-accessible storage
 - Citywide policies for maintaining fuel reserves in available tanks (e.g., keeping fleet vehicles topped up at the end of each day, reserve requirements for generator tanks)
 - Keeping track of burn rates in normal and plausible emergency scenarios
 - Information centralization for key sources and users of fuel, (e.g., types of hose connections used by fuel tanks)
 - Scheduling drills around emergency fuel deliveries including surrounding counties
 - Functional evaluation of city assets needed for emergency fuel delivery (e.g., piers, roadways, and equipment)
 - Reviewing city contracts with fuel vendors
 - Developing specifications for equipment that needs to be purchased

The Fuel Plan should also incorporate logistical lessons learned from the COVID pandemic.

- R17.** In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to funding capital projects that are identified in the Fuel Plan as a high priority to improve fuel resilience in the City over the subsequent ten years.
- R18.** In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should specify how it will provide at least \$10 million in dedicated funding for fuel resilience capital projects within the next ten years using general obligation bond revenue.

- R19.** By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a feasibility study on replacing current City backup generators with battery backup installations or other zero-emission technology by 2050. The study should examine costs, risks, and alternatives, including mobile and stationary battery sources, taking into account not only the present state of battery technology but likely future developments in upcoming decades.
- R20.** By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a plan for achieving disaster resilience with a zero-emissions City vehicle fleet. This plan should analyze the stationary backup power sources that might be needed to recharge critical response vehicles in the event of a disaster and how bidirectional charging technology might be used to enable the batteries in City fleet vehicles to serve as mobile backup power sources analogous to mobile backup generators but also likely future developments.

Request for Responses

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the Jury requests responses as follows:

From the following City agencies within 60 days:

- From the Office of the Mayor:

| | |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|
| Findings | 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,15,16,17,18,19,20,21 |
| Recommendations | 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,12,13,14,15,16,17,18 |
- From the City Administrator’s Office:

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| Findings | 3,4,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,17,18,19,20,21 |
| Recommendations | 1,2,3,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,16,17,18,19,20 |
- From the Department of Emergency Management:

| | |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Findings | 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,14,15,16,17,20,21 |
| Recommendations | 4,5,6,13,14,15 |
- From the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning:

| | |
|-----------------|---------------------|
| Findings | 8,9,18,19 |
| Recommendations | 9,13,14,17,18,19,20 |
- From the Office of Contract Administration:

| | |
|-----------------|-------------|
| Findings | 10,12,13,14 |
| Recommendations | 7,8,10,11 |

- From the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission:

| | |
|-----------------|-------|
| Findings | 11,20 |
| Recommendations | 3,9 |

From the following governing body within 90 days:

- From the Board of Supervisors:

| | |
|-----------------|-----------|
| Findings | 3,4,18,19 |
| Recommendations | 9,17,18 |

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Disclaimer

Two members of the Civil Grand Jury recused themselves from involvement with the investigation and preparation of this report.



CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

2020-2021 CIVIL GRAND JURY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contacts: Allen Cohn, Foreperson Pro Tem, (415) 551-3635
Nicholas Weininger, Committee Chairperson, (415) 551-3635

A FLUID CONCERN: SAN FRANCISCO MUST IMPROVE FUEL RESILIENCE

San Francisco, CA, June 29, 2021 – In the aftermath of a major earthquake or other disaster, fuel shortages could cause life-critical water, sewer, and communications services to fail and transportation and infrastructure repairs to be delayed, according to a new report from the 2020–2021 Civil Grand Jury. Today’s report, “A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience,” found that fuel shortages after a disaster could last up to 14 days and that the City has not prepared adequately to deal with these shortages.

The Jury found that problems with the City’s fuel preparedness include:

- Unclear ownership of fuel preparedness planning within City government
- Inadequate assessment of likely fuel demand and supply in an emergency
- Inadequate equipment for managing local fuel reserves in an emergency
- Fuel supply chain vulnerabilities imperiling the ability to resupply the City
- Lack of published plans and dedicated funds for fuel preparedness improvements
- Lack of long-term plans for reliable infrastructure in a fossil-fuel-free future

The report recommends a series of specific changes to address all these problems.

The Superior Court selects 19 San Franciscans to serve year-long terms as Civil Grand Jurors. The Jury has the authority to investigate City and County government by reviewing documents and interviewing public officials and private individuals. At the end of its inquiries, the Jury issues reports of its findings and recommendations. Agencies identified in the report must respond to these findings and recommendations within either 60 or 90 days, and the Board of Supervisors conducts a public hearing on each Civil Grand Jury report after those responses are submitted.

Civil Grand Jury reports may be viewed online at <http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/report.html>.

###



CCSF Response to the Civil Grand Jury Report

*“A Fluid Concern: San Francisco
Must Improve Fuel Resilience”*

Deputy City Administrator Jennifer Johnston
September 30, 2021

CCSF Agency Joint Response

Comprehensive joint response coordinated through the Mayor's Office, on behalf of City agencies identified for response:

- Department of Emergency Management (DEM)
- Mayor's Office
- City Administrator/General Services Agency (GSA) Offices
 - Office of Resilience and Capital Planning (ORCP)
 - Central Shops/Fleet
 - Office of Contract Administration (OCA)
- Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC)
- Department on the Environment (ENV)

Includes responses to the Findings and Recommendations requiring Board of Supervisors response as well:

- Findings #3, 4, 18 and 19; and
- Recommendations #9, 17 and 18

Responses to the Findings

Agreed/General Concurrence

Findings #1, 2, 7, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20 & 21

Partially Disagreed

Findings #3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14 & 17

Wholly Disagreed

Findings #4, 9, 15, 16 & 18

(Underlined numbers in italics are Findings assigned to the Board of Supervisors for response as well)

Findings Requiring BOS Response

| Finding | | CCSF Agency Joint Response | |
|---------|--|----------------------------|---|
| F3 | The City's lack of agency sponsorship and dedicated staffing and budgeting for fuel resilience efforts weakens its ability to ensure fuel resilience in an emergency. | Disagree partially | While we agree that we can always dedicate more resources to improve fuel resiliency, there is and continues to be agency sponsorship on fuel resilience. Over the last 16 months, other emergency planning efforts had to be paused to respond to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. Although further emergency planning was paused, San Francisco's existing emergency response plans remained in place and the City was (and is) prepared to respond to an earthquake or other natural disaster. |
| F4 | The cessation of fuel resilience progress during COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifeline resilience. | Disagree wholly | The COVID-19 pandemic was and continues to be the world's most significant emergency within the last century. San Francisco's response to COVID-19 prevented countless immediate deaths and sicknesses of residents and guests. Emergency managers who were generally engaged in fuel resilience planning were wholly engaged in the City's COVID-19 response. Even with the COVID-19 pandemic, San Francisco remained prepared to implement its emergency response plans in the event of an earthquake or other natural disaster. There is no correlation between the City's focus on COVID-19 response and its commitment to fuel resilience. |
| F18 | The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience. | Disagree wholly | Unlike other lifelines like water and wastewater, the City does not own fuel infrastructure, such as refineries, pipelines, pumping stations and terminals. Given different infrastructure ownership structures, the Capital Plan should not be used to compare relative levels of priority for lifelines resilience. Priority City investments for fuel resilience may be for non-capital items and therefore not reflected in the Capital Plan. |
| F19 | Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source. | Agree | |

Responses to the Recommendations

Two Recommendations have already been implemented: #1 & 3

Seven Recommendations will be implemented no later than winter 2023: #2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14 & 15

Eight Recommendations require further analysis: #7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 18, 19 & 20

Three Recommendations will not be implemented: #12, 13 & 16.

(Underlined numbers in italics are Findings assigned to the Board of Supervisors for response as well)

Recommendations Implemented/To Be Implemented

| # | Recommendation | Response |
|-----|--|---|
| R1 | The Mayor's Office should determine an appropriate agency sponsor for the Fuel Working Group by December 2021. | Has been implemented - The City Administrator's Office has been designated as the sponsor of, and lead agency for, the Fuel Working Group ("FWG"). |
| R2 | The Fuel Working Group should be reconvened by its agency sponsor by February 2022. The working group should meet at least quarterly thereafter. | Will be implemented in the next 60 days . |
| R3 | The agency sponsor of the Fuel Working Group should select members with strong experience in supply chain logistics and emergency management. The Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Contract Administration, the City Administrator's Office, and other City departments who are significant users of fuel, including SFPUC, SFMTA, and DPW should dedicate staff time each month through December 2024, or until the subsequent recommendations in this report are implemented. | Has been implemented. |
| R4 | By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should compile an inventory of generators critical to life safety in the City and their locations, portability, fuel needs, tank storage capacities, and burn rates. This inventory should be updated at least annually thereafter. The inventory should include information including generator location, fuel type, connection type, and any access codes needed for emergency delivery. | Will be implemented by December 2022 . |
| R5 | By June 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should perform a team exercise to estimate likely ranges of fuel usage for critical generators in the City's inventory in the aftermath of a plausible disaster in which those usage needs would have to be met from local sources. The exercise should give lower and upper bounds stemming from possible variations in which generators would have to run and for how long. | Will be implemented by June 2023 . |
| R6 | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should develop and test a plan for the quick assessment of local fuel reserves available to City agencies in a disaster, including protocols that ensure incident commanders can assess emergency fuel supply and demand in real-time citywide. | Will be implemented by December 2023 . |
| R10 | By December 2022, the Office of Contract Administration should prepare a supply chain vulnerability assessment of the City's two contracted fuel suppliers. | Will be implemented by June 2022 |
| R14 | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning, and the Port should prepare a seismic vulnerability assessment of likely delivery sites for emergency fuel delivery by water, including Pier 96, Pier 80, Pier 50, and at least one alternative delivery site. | Will be implemented this fall 2021 . |
| R15 | By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should publish an analysis of the priority routes determining whether they will allow sufficiently reliable refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles. | Will be implemented by December 2022 . |

Recommendations Requiring Further Analysis

| # | Recommendation | Response |
|----|--|---|
| R7 | By December 2023, the City should build, retrofit, or purchase a minimum of two additional tanker trucks that can each extract up to 2,500 gallons of fuel from a tank, even in the absence of grid power, and transport it to where it is needed. These vehicles should have the ability to transport both gasoline and diesel fuel. | Central Shops is currently in the process of building one tanker truck to support refueling of critical vehicles and generators. This will supplement the existing SFFD fuel tanker truck and the one that is being purchased by the Department of Public Works. Further analysis is needed to determine the number of tanker trucks needed, the availability of additional tanker trucks if mutual aid can be exercised, and available funding. Further analysis will be completed by January 2023 . |
| R8 | By December 2022, the City should enter into Memoranda of Understanding or contracts with a minimum of two local private gas station operators to ensure that emergency vehicles can access fuel stored at their stations, including making that fuel technically accessible even in the event of a grid power outage. The operators chosen should be prioritized based on criteria relevant for usefulness in a disaster [...]. | <p>By March 2022, the City will provide an analysis addressing opportunities and constraints for utilizing private gas stations for emergency use. The scope of the analysis shall include, but not be limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of emergency vehicles currently with and without access to private gas stations, including both City and private emergency fleet (for example, two private ambulance companies currently do utilize private gas stations.) • Analysis of private stations • Determination of whether private fueling locations should be added to the City's fuel plan |
| R9 | <i>In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available.</i> | <p>The City Administrator, ORCP, DEM and SFPUC will need to complete analysis of the City's fuel needs and identify potential fuel storage project scopes, costs, and target dates to understand if there are locations in San Francisco that are viable for such a storage project. This analysis should include looking at the fuel needs and potential fuel storage locations for City infrastructure located outside of San Francisco, such as the Hetch Hetchy Regional Water System.</p> <p>Regarding the potential use of the Southeast Treatment Plant (SEP) for fuel storage, the SFPUC is completing a SEP Campus Plan to determine how to best utilize the space at SEP. Any analysis of using SEP for fuel storage will need to be completed in the context of the SEP Campus Plan, and must include analysis around future SFPUC Wastewater and Recycled Water plans for SEP, the safety of storing large amounts of fuel in the same footprint as a wastewater treatment plant, and ensure consistency and compliance with the SFPUC's Racial Justice Resolution and Environmental Justice Policies regarding land use equity objectives. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan.</p> |

Recommendations Requiring Further Analysis (Cont.)

| # | Recommendation | Response |
|-----|--|---|
| R11 | If the two contracted fuel suppliers are found to have joint vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated adequately, the Office of Contract Administration should enter into a Memorandum of Understanding by December 2023 for emergency backup delivery with a vendor whose facilities and equipment are based outside of the Bay Area. | Within six months , the City will undertake an analysis to identify vulnerabilities of current fuel vendors (Western States Oil and Golden Gate Petroleum) and assessing potential alternative vendors outside of the Bay Area. |
| R17 | <i>In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to funding capital projects that are identified in the Fuel Plan as a high priority to improve fuel resilience in the City over the subsequent ten years.</i> | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City's Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |
| R18 | <i>In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should specify how it will provide at least \$10 million in dedicated funding for fuel resilience capital projects within the next ten years using general obligation bond revenue.</i> | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City's Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |

Recommendations Requiring Further Analysis (Cont.)

| # | Recommendation | Response |
|-----|--|---|
| R19 | <p>By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a feasibility study on replacing current City backup generators with battery backup installations or other zero-emission technology by 2050. The study should examine costs, risks, and alternatives, including mobile and stationary battery sources, taking into account not only the present state of battery technology but likely future developments in upcoming decades.</p> | <p>This recommendation requires further analysis with key City stakeholders to determine a clear scope and identify funding. This analysis will be completed by December 31, 2022.</p> |
| R20 | <p>By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a plan for achieving disaster resilience with a zero-emissions City vehicle fleet. This plan should analyze the stationary backup power sources that might be needed to recharge critical response vehicles in the event of a disaster and how bidirectional charging technology might be used to enable the batteries in City fleet vehicles to serve as mobile backup power sources analogous to mobile backup generators but also likely future developments.</p> | <p>This recommendation needs further analysis. Specifically, the analysis will inform the recommended plan. For instance, the analysis will identify bi-directional charging applications (case studies, technologies) and their barriers / how to overcome them. It will also identify the vehicle types / cohort of mixed vehicles ideal for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), as well as location of those vehicles and general, preliminary estimates of any grid and City facility electrical upgrades necessary to support V2I. Additionally, it should address the various emergency infrastructure and automation required to enable V2I - as well as their costs. Finally, the analysis must include participation from the SFPUC because subject matter expertise in behind-the-meter electrical infrastructure and jurisdiction over City facility connections to the electric grid. This analysis will be completed by December 31, 2022.</p> |

Recommendations That Will Not Be Implemented

| | Recommendation | Response | |
|-----|---|--|--|
| R12 | <p>By December 2021, the Fuel Working Group should ask each City-contracted fuel supplier to send a qualified representative to the Group's planning meetings, field simulations, and other events where the technical advice and operational experience of fuel distributors are needed to help secure disaster readiness.</p> | <p>Will not be implemented - The City has continuously engaged with its fuel vendors in fuel resilience discussions, planning and exercises in numerous ways over the years. [...] We agree, however, that we should explore additional ways to engage our vendors in assisting the City proactively plan for events and strengthen fuel resiliency. This will be formally included in a future FWG agenda for consideration and recommendation to DEM.</p> | |
| R13 | <p>By December 2023, as part of a Fleet Week live exercise, the Department of Emergency Management and the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should test a scenario in which the City's normal supply line is damaged and delivery by water is necessary. This exercise should include a full demonstration of marine cargo delivery, readiness of the staging area, performance of the transfer-storage-filling equipment, and performance of the tanker trucks.</p> | <p>Will not be implemented - The San Francisco Fleet Week Exercise Program is developed jointly between San Francisco emergency managers, local first responder stakeholders, and state and federal military partners based on mutual need to test shared vulnerabilities. Fuel delivery and resilience was exercised in 2018 and 2019 and response to many other risks need to be examined, practiced and tested. Therefore, it is unlikely that fuel resilience will be tested again before December 2023.</p> | |
| R16 | <p>By June 2022, the City Administrator's Office should publish a San Francisco Fuel Plan developed in collaboration with the Fuel Working Group. The Fuel Plan should cover key resilience measures such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processes and timescales for identifying fuel on hand in City-accessible storage • Citywide policies for maintaining fuel reserves in available tanks (e.g., keeping fleet vehicles topped up at the end of each day, reserve requirements for generator tanks) • Keeping track of burn rates in normal and plausible emergency scenarios • Information centralization for key sources and users of fuel, (e.g., types of hose connections used by fuel tanks) • Scheduling drills around emergency fuel deliveries including surrounding counties • Functional evaluation of city assets needed for emergency fuel delivery (e.g., piers, roadways, and equipment) • Reviewing city contracts with fuel vendors • Developing specifications for equipment that needs to be purchased <p>The Fuel Plan should also incorporate logistical lessons learned from the COVID pandemic.</p> | <p>Will not be implemented - The timeline presented in the recommendation is unrealistic. The San Francisco Emergency Fuel Plan and other corresponding documents that outline the key resilience measures will be published by December 2022.</p> | |

Conclusion

Thank you for your time and consideration.

CCSF Agency Representatives Available for Questions:

- Adrienne Bechelli (DEM)
- John Scarpulla and Josh Gale (SFPUC)
- Jennifer Johnston (City Administrator/GSA)
- Don Jones (GSA – Central Shops/Fleet)
- Brian Strong (GSA – OCRP)
- Sailaja Kurella (GSA – OCA)
- Lowell Chu (ENV)
- Ashley Groffenberger (Mayor)

BOARD of SUPERVISORS



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DATE: September 8, 2021
TO: Members of the Board of Supervisors
FROM: *ACC* Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board
SUBJECT: 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury report, entitled
"A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience"

We are in receipt of the following required responses to the San Francisco Civil Grand Jury report released June 29, 2021, entitled: "A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience." Pursuant to California Penal Code, Sections 933 and 933.05, named City Departments shall respond to the report within 60 days of receipt, or no later than August 28, 2021.

For each finding, the Department response shall:

- 1) agree with the finding; or
- 2) disagree with it, wholly or partially, and explain why.

As to each recommendation, the Department shall report that:

- 1) the recommendation has been implemented, with a summary explanation; or
- 2) the recommendation has not been implemented but will be within a set timeframe as provided; or
- 3) the recommendation requires further analysis. The officer or agency head must define what additional study is needed. The Grand Jury expects a progress report within six months; or
- 4) the recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable, with an explanation.

The Civil Grand Jury Report identified the following City Departments to submit responses (attached):

- Office of the Mayor:
Received August 27, 2021;
- City Administrator:
Received August 27, 2021;
- Department of Emergency Management:
Received August 27, 2021;
- Public Utilities Commission General Manager:
Received August 27, 2021; and
- Public Utilities Commission:
Received August 27, 2021.

These department responses are being provided for your information, as received, and may not conform to the parameters stated in California Penal Code, Section 933.05 et seq. The Government Audit and Oversight Committee will consider the subject report, along with the responses, at a hearing in September of 2021.

jec:bjj:ams

c:

Sophia Kittler, Office of the Mayor
Andres Power, Office of the Mayor
Sally Ma, Office of the Mayor
Rebecca Peacock, Office of the Mayor
Anne Pearson, Office of the City Attorney
Ben Rosenfield, City Controller, Office of the Controller
Todd Rydstrom, Office of the Controller
Peg Stevenson, Office of the Controller
Mark de la Rosa, Office of the Controller
Carmen Chu, City Administrator
Ken Bukowski, Office of the City Administrator
Vivian Po, Office of the City Administrator
Nicole Agbayani, Office of the City Administrator
Mary Ellen Carroll, Executive Director, Department of Emergency Management
Victor Lim, Department of Emergency Management
Michael Carlin, Acting General Manager, Public Utilities Commission
Donna Hood, Public Utilities Commission
John Scarpulla, Public Utilities Commission
Alisa Somera, Office of the Clerk of the Board
Severin Campbell, Office of the Budget and Legislative Analyst
Reuben Holoher, Office of the Budget and Legislative Analyst
Ellie Schafer, 2020-2021 Foreperson, San Francisco Civil Grand Jury
Janet Mohle-Boetani, 2020-2021, Member, San Francisco Civil Grand Jury
Michael N. Hofman, 2021-2022, Foreperson, San Francisco Civil Grand Jury



August 27, 2021

Sent via U.S. Mail and email to CGrandJury@sftc.org

The Honorable Samuel K. Feng,
 Presiding Judge
 Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco
 400 McAllister Street, Room 008
 San Francisco, CA 94102-4512

Dear Judge Feng:

In accordance with Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05, and pursuant to the request of Ms. Ellie Schafer, Foreperson of the City and County of San Francisco 2020-21 Civil Grand Jury, attached please find the response of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission to the 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury Report, *A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience*. At its regularly scheduled public meeting of August 24, 2021, the Commission voted to approve the attached responses by Resolution No. 21-0133.

The Commission would like to thank the members of the 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury for their service and their interest in our vital infrastructure.

Sincerely,

Sophie Maxwell
 President
 San Francisco Public Utilities Commission

cc: Mayor London Breed

London N. Breed
 Mayor

Sophie Maxwell
 President

Anson Moran
 Vice President

Tim Paulson
 Commissioner

Ed Harrington
 Commissioner

Michael Carlin
 Acting
 General Manager



PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

City and County of San Francisco

RESOLUTION NO. 21-0133

WHEREAS, On June 29, 2021, the 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury released a report entitled, "A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience," a copy of which is on file with the Commission Secretary; and

WHEREAS, The Civil Grand Jury requires responses from the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission to the report's Findings numbers 11 and 20, and Recommendations numbers 3 and 9; and

WHEREAS, California Penal Code §933(c) requires the Commission's response be submitted to the Presiding Judge no later than August 28, 2021; and

WHEREAS, At its public meeting held on August 24, 2021, this Commission reviewed the attached written responses to the above stated findings and recommendations in the Civil Grand Jury Report; now, therefore be it

RESOLVED, That this Commission hereby approves the responses attached hereto to the relevant findings and recommendations of the June 29, 2021, Civil Grand Jury Report entitled, "A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience," and authorizes and directs the Commission President to submit the responses to the Presiding Judge of the Civil Grand Jury by August 28, 2021, as required by California Penal Code §933(c).

I hereby certify that the foregoing resolution was adopted by the Public Utilities Commission at its meeting of August 24, 2021.



Secretary, Public Utilities Commission

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | F# | Finding | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree) | Finding Response Text |
|---|-----|--|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F11 | Opportunities to expand fuel reserves within the City are very rare due to geographic constraints but very valuable for fuel resilience. | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F20 | The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this. | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
|---|-----------------|---|---|--|--|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R3 [for F4] | The agency sponsor of the Fuel Working Group should select members with strong experience in supply chain logistics and emergency management. The Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Contract Administration, the City Administrator’s Office, and other City departments who are significant users of fuel, including SFPUC, SFMTA, and DPW should dedicate staff time each month through December 2024, or until the | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Has been implemented | Pre-Covid, the Fuel Working Group (FWG) met monthly. Members included the emergency managers from: DPW, SFMTA, SFPUC, CAO, DEM, SFFD and subject matter experts from SFO, Central Shops and DPW. Port staff will be included once the group relaunches its regular meetings in the next 90 days. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R9 [for F11] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available. | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | The City Administrator’s Office (ADM), Office of Resilience and Capital Planning (ORCP), Department of Emergency Management (DEM), and San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) will need to complete analysis of the City’s fuel needs and identify potential fuel storage project scopes, costs, and target dates to understand if there are locations in San Francisco that are viable for such a storage project. This analysis should include looking at the fuel needs and potential fuel storage locations for City infrastructure located outside of San Francisco, such as the Hetch Hetchy Regional Water System. Regarding the potential use of the Southeast Treatment Plant (SEP) for fuel storage, the SFPUC is completing a SEP Campus Plan to determine how to best utilize the space at SEP. Any analysis of using SEP for fuel storage will need to be completed in the context of the SEP Campus Plan, and must include analysis around future SFPUC Wastewater and Recycled Water plans for SEP, the safety of storing large amounts of fuel in the same footprint as a wastewater treatment plant, and ensure consistency and compliance with the SFPUC’s Racial Justice Resolution and Environmental Justice Policies regarding land use equity objectives. |



August 27, 2021

The Honorable Samuel K. Feng
Presiding Judge, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco
400 McAllister Street, Room 008
San Francisco, CA 94102-4512

Dear Judge Feng,

In accordance with Penal Code 933 and 933.05, the following is in response to the 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury Report, *A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience*. We would like to thank the members of the 2020-2021 Civil Grand Jury for their interest in disaster preparedness and in improving the resiliency of our fuel infrastructure.

San Francisco takes its disaster planning and emergency response plans very seriously. Our City departments are committed to ensuring San Francisco is prepared for disasters, which includes fuel resiliency. We continue to improve our City's resiliency each day through our ongoing investments in public infrastructure and equipment. Our Office of Resilience and Capital Planning coordinates much of these investments by conducting strategic long-term planning across major programs and projects. The Department of Emergency Management is regularly planning for emergencies and disaster response, and develops plans that factor in fuel resilience as one of the myriad considerations necessary to continue life-critical services and protect all communities in San Francisco.

The City Administrator's Office, the Department of Emergency Management, and other City departments have met regularly regarding fuel resilience in San Francisco since 2017. With our citywide mobilization to respond to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, other aspects of emergency planning were temporarily suspended as emergency managers who were generally engaged in fuel resilience planning were engaged in pandemic response. That said, even with the COVID-19 pandemic, San Francisco remained prepared to quickly activate and implement its emergency response plans in the event of an earthquake or other natural disaster. We are also pleased to share that we are on track to resume the Fuel Work Group and implement many of the other recommendations from the Civil Grand Jury.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Civil Grand Jury report findings and recommendations. Moving forward, and as appropriate, the City plans to analyze several of the recommendations in coordination with other key stakeholders and as part of our next 10-Year Capital Plan.

A detailed response from the Mayor's Office, City Administrator's Office, Department of Emergency Management, and Public Utilities Commission is attached.

Each signatory prepared its own responses and is able to respond to questions related to its respective part of the report.

Sincerely,



London N. Breed
Mayor



Carmen Chu
City Administrator



Mary Ellen Carroll
Executive Director, Department of Emergency
Management



Michael Carlin
Acting General Manager, Public Utilities
Commission

| Report Title [Publication Date] | F# | Finding | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree) | Finding Response Text |
|---|----|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F1 | In the aftermath of a major earthquake (magnitude 7.0 or greater), there will likely be severe citywide fuel and power shortages lasting more than 72 hours. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F2 | If these shortages resulted in lack of power to lifeline infrastructure facilities and/or lack of fuel for critical lifeline vehicles, the resulting cascading failures of other lifelines could have life safety and quality-of-life impacts greater than the fuel and power shortages themselves. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F3 | The City's lack of agency sponsorship and dedicated staffing and budgeting for fuel resilience efforts weakens its ability to ensure fuel resilience in an emergency. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | While we agree that we can always dedicate more resources to improve fuel resiliency, there is and continues to be agency sponsorship on fuel resilience. Over the last 16 months, other emergency planning efforts had to be paused to respond to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. Although further emergency planning was paused, San Francisco's existing emergency response plans remained in place and the City was (and is) prepared to respond to an earthquake or other natural disaster. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F4 | The cessation of fuel resilience progress during COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifeline resilience. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | The COVID-19 pandemic was and continues to be the world's most significant emergency within the last century. San Francisco's response to COVID-19 prevented countless immediate deaths and sicknesses of residents and guests. Emergency managers who were generally engaged in fuel resilience planning were wholly engaged in the City's COVID-19 response. Even with the COVID-19 pandemic, San Francisco remained prepared to implement its emergency response plans in the event of an earthquake or other natural disaster. There is no correlation between the City's focus on COVID-19 response and its commitment to fuel resilience. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F5 | In the aftermath of a major disaster, it will be difficult for emergency responders to catalog the citywide fuel needs of backup generators. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The Department of Emergency Management (DEM) managed a citywide continuity of operations planning working group in 2018 and 2019 that asked City departments to consider resources required (such as fuel) to keep their essential services going during or after an emergency. DEM and the City Administrator's Office partnered together to compile a list of citywide backup generators and their fuel needs. This was set to be finalized in March of 2020 but was delayed. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F6 | It is impossible to determine how much fuel storage is needed to meet emergency demands after a disaster because the City has not prepared proper estimates of fuel needs in a range of disaster scenarios. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | It is impossible to predict the exact amount of fuel that will be needed since emergencies are unpredictable and performance of Bay Area pipelines and refineries are not well understood. We know that all of the fuel needed immediately after a major event in San Francisco is stored in vehicles or local storage tanks, which is already captured in the 2020 Lifelines Restoration Performance Project Report. However, the amount of fuel needed is less important than whether the supply chain is stable. If the refineries and other fuel infrastructure remains functional, local storage is irrelevant. |

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|---|-----|--|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F7 | Compiling inventories of available fuel in a disaster will likely take at least half a day and will rely partly on manual assessment of sites by personnel who might themselves be unavailable under disaster conditions. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F15 | If an emergency fuel delivery by water is needed, the City has not planned adequately for the risk that landing sites might be damaged, thereby compromising their ability to receive fuel delivery vessels or support tanker trucks for city transport. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | As part of Fleet Week annual drills and exercises, in 2018 and 2019 San Francisco performed multiple tests of how to bring supplies, including fuel, to shore from military water vessels, and planned for the City's response in the event that landing sites might be damaged. These tests included arrival to Treasure Island, Ocean Beach, and port infrastructure. In 2021, many City departments joined the Port of San Francisco in a Disaster Response Exercise that reviewed emergency operations planning and assumptions for reopening of port infrastructure. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F16 | The City has insufficient knowledge about whether restoration of routes on the Priority Routes map will allow effective refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles in the event of a disaster. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | The City's draft priority routes reopening plan was completed in order to allow for critical activities to occur quickly, including moving fuel from one place to another throughout the city. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F17 | The lack of a published San Francisco Fuel Plan makes it harder to coordinate on consistent fuel resilience best practices citywide. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The draft San Francisco fuel plan does not address resiliency practices, but provides a guide for how fuel will be managed, who will collect the current fuel levels (at the time of the incident) and other operational factors. The plan is meant to be a functional document versus a roadmap for fuel resilience. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F18 | The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | Unlike other lifelines like water and wastewater, the City does not own fuel infrastructure, such as refineries, pipelines, pumping stations and terminals. Given different infrastructure ownership structures, the Capital Plan should not be used to compare relative levels of priority for lifelines resilience. Priority City investments for fuel resilience may be for non-capital items and therefore not reflected in the Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F19 | Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F20 | The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | F# | Finding | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree) | Finding Response Text |
|---|-----|---|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F21 | The City will likely need to rely at least partially on electric vehicles for critical infrastructure functions by 2050 but has not initiated planning for how this can be done in a disaster-resilient manner. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
|---|----------------|---|---|--|--|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R1 [for F3] | The Mayor's Office should determine an appropriate agency sponsor for the Fuel Working Group by December 2021. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has been implemented | The City Administrator's Office has been designated as the sponsor of, and lead agency for, the Fuel Working Group ("FWG"). |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R2 [for F3] | The Fuel Working Group should be reconvened by its agency sponsor by February 2022. The working group should meet at least quarterly thereafter. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | Pre-COVID-19, the FWG met monthly. Now that the FWG members are returning to their regular functions following the conclusion of their deployment as Disaster Service Workers to support COVID-19 response, the FWG will resume meeting on a regular basis (no less than quarterly) in the next 90 days. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R3 [for F4] | The agency sponsor of the Fuel Working Group should select members with strong experience in supply chain logistics and emergency management. The Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Contract Administration, the City Administrator's Office, and other City departments who are significant users of fuel, including SFPUC, SFMTA, and DPW should dedicate staff time each month through December 2024, or until the | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has been implemented | Pre-COVID-19, the FWG met monthly. Members included the emergency managers from: DPW, SFMTA, SFPUC, CAO, DEM, SFFD and subject matter experts from SFO, Central Shops and Public Works. Port staff will be included once the group relaunches its regular meetings in the next 90 days. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R4 [for F5] | By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should compile an inventory of generators critical to life safety in the City and their locations, portability, fuel needs, tank storage capacities, and burn rates. This inventory should be updated at least annually thereafter. The inventory should include information including generator location, fuel type, connection type, and any access codes needed for emergency delivery. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by December 2022. |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R5 [for F6] | By June 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should perform a team exercise to estimate likely ranges of fuel usage for critical generators in the City's inventory in the aftermath of a plausible disaster in which those usage needs would have to be met from local sources. The exercise should give lower and upper bounds stemming from possible variations in which generators would have to run and for how long. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by June 2023. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R6 [for F7] | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should develop and test a plan for the quick assessment of local fuel reserves available to City agencies in a disaster, including protocols that ensure incident commanders can assess emergency fuel supply and demand in real-time citywide. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by December 2023 in coordination with the City Administrator's Office. |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R9 [for F11] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | The City Administrator’s Office (ADM), Office of Resilience and Capital Planning (ORCP), Department of Emergency Management (DEM), and San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) will need to complete analysis of the City’s fuel needs and identify potential fuel storage project scopes, costs, and target dates to understand if there are locations in San Francisco that are viable for such a storage project. This analysis should include looking at the fuel needs and potential fuel storage locations for City infrastructure located outside of San Francisco, such as the Hetch Hetchy Regional Water System. Regarding the potential use of the Southeast Treatment Plant (SEP) for fuel storage, the SFPUC is completing a SEP Campus Plan to determine how to best utilize the space at SEP. Any analysis of using SEP for fuel storage will need to be completed in the context of the SEP Campus Plan, and must include analysis around future SFPUC Wastewater and Recycled Water plans for SEP, the safety of storing large amounts of fuel in the same footprint as a wastewater treatment plant, and ensure consistency and compliance with the SFPUC’s Racial Justice Resolution and Environmental Justice Policies regarding land use equity objectives. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R12 [for F14] | By December 2021, the Fuel Working Group should ask each City-contracted fuel supplier to send a qualified representative to the Group’s planning meetings, field simulations, and other events where the technical advice and operational experience of fuel distributors are needed to help secure disaster readiness. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The City has continuously engaged with its fuel vendors in fuel resilience discussions, planning and exercises in numerous ways over the years. Our vendors have informally participated in fuel exercises, and provide ongoing guidance and technical advice and assistance in improving our fuel resilience and developing our fuel plans. However, we do not agree that it would be appropriate to include them formally in the City’s exercises because there is often confidential information relayed on the City’s critical infrastructure. In addition, there may be additional costs incurred on contracts as a result of this requirement. We agree, however, that we should explore additional ways to engage our vendors in assisting the City proactively plan for events and strengthen fuel resiliency. This will be formally included in a future FWG agenda for consideration and recommendation to DEM. |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
|---|---------------------|--|---|--|---|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R13 [for F15] | By December 2023, as part of a Fleet Week live exercise, the Department of Emergency Management and the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should test a scenario in which the City's normal supply line is damaged and delivery by water is necessary. This exercise should include a full demonstration of marine cargo delivery, readiness of the staging area, performance of the transfer-storage-filling equipment, and performance of the tanker trucks. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The San Francisco Fleet Week Exercise Program is developed jointly between San Francisco emergency managers, local first responder stakeholders, and state and federal military partners based on mutual need to test shared vulnerabilities. Fuel delivery and resilience was exercised in 2018 and 2019 and response to many other risks need to be examined, practiced and tested. Therefore, it is unlikely that fuel resilience will be tested again before December 2023. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R14 [for F15] | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning, and the Port should prepare a seismic vulnerability assessment of likely delivery sites for emergency fuel delivery by water, including Pier 96, Pier 80, Pier 50, and at least one alternative delivery site. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | The Port completed an earthquake and flood risk assessment of all northern waterfront facilities in November 2020 and commenced an earthquake assessment of Piers 50, 80, and 94/96 that is scheduled for completion in fall 2021. The new earthquake assessment information will inform a joint Port and DEM disaster response exercise focused on evaluating missions and capabilities including fuel supply. Results are expected by the end of 2021 and will help inform Port investments in earthquake resilience and disaster response. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R15 [for F16] | By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should publish an analysis of the priority routes determining whether they will allow sufficiently reliable refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by December 2022. |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
|---|-----------------------|--|---|--|--|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R16 [for F1, F2, F17] | <p>By June 2022, the City Administrator’s Office should publish a San Francisco Fuel Plan developed in collaboration with the Fuel Working Group. The Fuel Plan should cover key resilience measures such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processes and timescales for identifying fuel on hand in City-accessible storage • Citywide policies for maintaining fuel reserves in available tanks (e.g., keeping fleet vehicles topped up at the end of each day, reserve requirements for generator tanks) • Keeping track of burn rates in normal and plausible emergency scenarios • Information centralization for key sources and users of fuel, (e.g., types of hose connections used by fuel tanks) • Scheduling drills around emergency fuel deliveries including surrounding counties • Functional evaluation of city assets needed for emergency fuel delivery (e.g., piers, roadways, and equipment) • Reviewing city contracts with fuel vendors | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The timeline presented in the recommendation is unrealistic. The San Francisco Emergency Fuel Plan and other corresponding documents that outline the key resilience measures will be published by December 2022. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R17 [for F18] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to funding capital projects that are identified in the Fuel Plan as a high priority to improve fuel resilience in the City over the subsequent ten years. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City’s Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R18 [for F19] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should specify how it will provide at least \$10 million in dedicated funding for fuel resilience capital projects within the next ten years using general obligation bond revenue. | Mayor [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City's Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | F# | Finding | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree) | Finding Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F3 | The City's lack of agency sponsorship and dedicated staffing and budgeting for fuel resilience efforts weakens its ability to ensure fuel resilience in an emergency. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | While we agree that we can always dedicate more resources to improve fuel resiliency, there is and continues to be agency sponsorship on fuel resilience. Over the last 16 months, other emergency planning efforts had to be paused to respond to the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. Although further emergency planning was paused, San Francisco's existing emergency response plans remained in place and the City was (and is) prepared to respond to an earthquake or other natural disaster. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F4 | The cessation of fuel resilience progress during COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifeline resilience. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | The COVID-19 pandemic was and continues to be the world's most significant emergency within the last century. San Francisco's response to COVID-19 prevented countless immediate deaths and sicknesses of residents and guests. Emergency managers who were generally engaged in fuel resilience planning were wholly engaged in the City's COVID-19 response. Even with the COVID-19 pandemic, San Francisco remained prepared to implement its emergency response plans in the event of an earthquake or other natural disaster. There is no correlation between the City's focus on COVID-19 response and its commitment to fuel resilience. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F8 | The City will have a severely limited and unreliable ability in a disaster to get fuel from available reserves to sites such as generator tanks that need fuel urgently. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The City has service stations where fuel can be siphoned from generators that are not in use. These "reserves" are limited but are consistent with the City's fuel planning and intentional decision to rely on supply chain infrastructure and mutual aid methods to bring needed fuel into the City as needed. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F9 | The City has not invested in technological solutions to augment the ability to refuel critical vehicles and generators in a disaster. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | A key technological investment the City is prioritizing is fuel pumping, transport, and refueling equipment in the form of fuel trucks. These trucks are extremely costly and funding them is challenging. However, Central Shops, which is part of the City's General Services Agency and provides high quality, cost effective and sustainable fleet management and maintenance services to its customer departments and the City, is currently in the process of building one tanker truck to support refueling of critical vehicles and generators. This will supplement the existing SFFD fuel tanker truck and the one that is being purchased by San Francisco Public Works. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F10 | The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain due to the lack of partnerships between the City and private gas station operators and incomplete data about which private stations could best augment critical supplies. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain, but this is mainly due to a limited ability for the City to access these reserves rather than due to lack of partnerships. After an emergency, there will likely be localized power outages, and many privately-held local fuel reserves are depending on power to get the fuel out of storage. Therefore, the City will need to use fuel in order to get more fuel, which is not the most efficient solution to the problem. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F11 | Opportunities to expand fuel reserves within the City are very rare due to geographic constraints but very valuable for fuel resilience. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | F# | Finding | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree) | Finding Response Text |
|---|-----|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F12 | In the aftermath of a region-wide disaster such as a major earthquake, the ability of the City's two contracted suppliers to deliver fuel might be compromised temporarily because they would both be susceptible to the same infrastructure failures. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F13 | The City has not contracted with an emergency out-of-region backup vendor in case the two regular vendors cannot deliver fuel, as recommended by the California Energy Commission, despite the risk of region-wide disruptions compromising both. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F14 | Although the City's two fuel suppliers are contractually responsible for providing technical support on products and offering assistance required by City personnel, they do not participate actively in the planning, simulation exercises, or ongoing work of the Fuel Working Group. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The City's fuel vendors continuously engage in San Francisco's fuel resilience planning, including participating in specific fuel-related simulation exercises and providing guidance and technical advice. Vendors are not always invited to participate in all emergency exercises and planning efforts due to confidentiality of City infrastructure discussions and likely increases in costs to fuel contracts to account for participation. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F17 | The lack of a published San Francisco Fuel Plan makes it harder to coordinate on consistent fuel resilience best practices citywide. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The draft San Francisco fuel plan does not address resiliency practices, but provides a guide for how fuel will be managed, who will collect the current fuel levels (at the time of the incident) and other operational factors. The plan is meant to be a functional document versus a roadmap for fuel resilience. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F18 | The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | Unlike other lifelines like water and wastewater, the City does not own fuel infrastructure, such as refineries, pipelines, pumping stations and terminals. Given different infrastructure ownership structures, the Capital Plan should not be used to compare relative levels of priority for lifelines resilience. Priority City investments for fuel resilience may be for non-capital items and therefore not reflected in the Capital Plan. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | F# | Finding | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree) | Finding Response Text |
|---|-----|---|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F19 | Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F20 | The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F21 | The City will likely need to rely at least partially on electric vehicles for critical infrastructure functions by 2050 but has not initiated planning for how this can be done in a disaster-resilient manner. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R1 [for F3] | The Mayor’s Office should determine an appropriate agency sponsor for the Fuel Working Group by December 2021. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Has been implemented | The City Administrator’s Office has been designated as the sponsor of, and lead agency for, the Fuel Working Group (“FWG”). |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R2 [for F3] | The Fuel Working Group should be reconvened by its agency sponsor by February 2022. The working group should meet at least quarterly thereafter. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | Pre-COVID-19, the FWG met monthly. Now that the FWG members are returning to their regular functions following the conclusion of their deployment as Disaster Service Workers to support COVID-19 response, the FWG will resume meeting on a regular basis (no less than quarterly) in the next 90 days. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R3 [for F4] | The agency sponsor of the Fuel Working Group should select members with strong experience in supply chain logistics and emergency management. The Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Contract Administration, the City Administrator’s Office, and other City departments who are significant users of fuel, including SFPUC, SFMTA, and DPW should dedicate staff time each month through December 2024, or until the | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Has been implemented | Pre-COVID-19, the FWG met monthly. Members included the emergency managers from: DPW, SFMTA, SFPUC, CAO, DEM, SFFD and subject matter experts from SFO, Central Shops and Public Works. Port staff will be included once the group relaunches its regular meetings in the next 90 days. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R7 [for F8, F9] | By December 2023, the City should build, retrofit, or purchase a minimum of two additional tanker trucks that can each extract up to 2,500 gallons of fuel from a tank, even in the absence of grid power, and transport it to where it is needed. These vehicles should have the ability to transport both gasoline and diesel fuel. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Central Shops is currently in the process of building one tanker truck to support refueling of critical vehicles and generators. This will supplement the existing SFFD fuel tanker truck and the one that is being purchased by the Department of Public Works. Further analysis is needed to determine the number of tanker trucks needed, the availability of additional tanker trucks if mutual aid can be exercised, and available funding. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023. |

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R8 [for F10] | By December 2022, the City should enter into Memoranda of Understanding or contracts with a minimum of two local private gas station operators to ensure that emergency vehicles can access fuel stored at their stations, including making that fuel technically accessible even in the event of a grid power outage. The operators chosen should be prioritized based on criteria relevant for usefulness in a disaster, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amount of fuel stored at the station • Availability of both gas and diesel • 24/7 staffed operation • Ability to dispense fuel without relying on grid power • Proximity to priority routes • Geographical distribution of stations (i.e., not all in the same place) | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | By March 2022, the City will provide an analysis addressing opportunities and constraints for utilizing private gas stations for emergency use. The scope of the analysis shall include, but not be limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Identification of emergency vehicles currently with and without access to private gas stations, including both City and private emergency fleet (for example, two private ambulance companies currently do utilize private gas stations): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Type --Number --Fuel needs -Analysis of private stations to identify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Amount of fuel stored at the station --Availability of both gas and diesel --Fuel suppliers and suppliers' locations --Staffing, and self-serve capabilities --Availability of generators on-site to power pumps without grid power --Proximity to priority routes --Geographical distribution of stations in relation to potential priority routes --Ability to siphon fuel -Determination of whether private fueling locations should be added to the City's fuel plan |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R9 [for F11] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | The City Administrator’s Office (ADM), Office of Resilience and Capital Planning (ORCP), Department of Emergency Management (DEM), and San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) will need to complete analysis of the City’s fuel needs and identify potential fuel storage project scopes, costs, and target dates to understand if there are locations in San Francisco that are viable for such a storage project. This analysis should include looking at the fuel needs and potential fuel storage locations for City infrastructure located outside of San Francisco, such as the Hetch Hetchy Regional Water System. Regarding the potential use of the Southeast Treatment Plant (SEP) for fuel storage, the SFPUC is completing a SEP Campus Plan to determine how to best utilize the space at SEP. Any analysis of using SEP for fuel storage will need to be completed in the context of the SEP Campus Plan, and must include analysis around future SFPUC Wastewater and Recycled Water plans for SEP, the safety of storing large amounts of fuel in the same footprint as a wastewater treatment plant, and ensure consistency and compliance with the SFPUC’s Racial Justice Resolution and Environmental Justice Policies regarding land use equity objectives. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R10 [for F12] | By December 2022, the Office of Contract Administration should prepare a supply chain vulnerability assessment of the City’s two contracted fuel suppliers. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | The California Energy Commission may have already prepared such an assessment. The Office of Contract Administration (OCA) and the FWG will conduct outreach to determine if an assessment exists. If it does not, OCA, in coordination with the FWG, will provide a supply chain vulnerability assessment by June 2022. |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R11 [for F13] | If the two contracted fuel suppliers are found to have joint vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated adequately, the Office of Contract Administration should enter into a Memorandum of Understanding by December 2023 for emergency backup delivery with a vendor whose facilities and equipment are based outside of the Bay Area. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Within six months, the City will undertake an analysis to identify vulnerabilities of current fuel vendors (Western States Oil and Golden Gate Petroleum) and assessing potential alternative vendors outside of the Bay Area. The scope of the analysis shall include, but not be limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locations of fuel depots for each current vendor, and assessment of vulnerabilities at each location • Current vendors' fuel transport/delivery options should any of their fuel depots become inaccessible, including assessment of deliveries by road/highway and water (barge). • City's fuel transport options from within the Bay Area should vendors be unable to delivery, including ability for new City fuel truck(s) to transport from the fuel depots within region • Identification and assessment of fuel vendors outside the Bay Area, including locations/distance, transportation options, fuel types, and potential delivery volumes and turnaround time. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R12 [for F14] | By December 2021, the Fuel Working Group should ask each City-contracted fuel supplier to send a qualified representative to the Group's planning meetings, field simulations, and other events where the technical advice and operational experience of fuel distributors are needed to help secure disaster readiness. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The City has continuously engaged with its fuel vendors in fuel resilience discussions, planning and exercises in numerous ways over the years. Our vendors have informally participated in fuel exercises, and provide ongoing guidance and technical advice and assistance in improving our fuel resilience and developing our fuel plans. However, we do not agree that it would be appropriate to include them formally in the City's exercises because there is often confidential information relayed on the City's critical infrastructure. In addition, there may be additional costs incurred on contracts as a result of this requirement. We agree, however, that we should explore additional ways to engage our vendors in assisting the City proactively plan for events and strengthen fuel resiliency. This will be formally included in a future FWG agenda for consideration and recommendation to DEM. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R13 [for F15] | By December 2023, as part of a Fleet Week live exercise, the Department of Emergency Management and the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should test a scenario in which the City's normal supply line is damaged and delivery by water is necessary. This exercise should include a full demonstration of marine cargo delivery, readiness of the staging area, performance of the transfer-storage-filling equipment, and performance of the tanker trucks. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The San Francisco Fleet Week Exercise Program is developed jointly between San Francisco emergency managers, local first responder stakeholders, and state and federal military partners based on mutual need to test shared vulnerabilities. Fuel delivery and resilience was exercised in 2018 and 2019 and response to many other risks need to be examined, practiced and tested. Therefore, it is unlikely that fuel resilience will be tested again before December 2023. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R14 [for F15] | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning, and the Port should prepare a seismic vulnerability assessment of likely delivery sites for emergency fuel delivery by water, including Pier 96, Pier 80, Pier 50, and at least one alternative delivery site. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | The Port completed an earthquake and flood risk assessment of all northern waterfront facilities in November 2020 and commenced an earthquake assessment of Piers 50, 80, and 94/96 that is scheduled for completion in fall 2021. The new earthquake assessment information will inform a joint Port and DEM disaster response exercise focused on evaluating missions and capabilities including fuel supply. Results are expected by the end of 2021 and will help inform Port investments in earthquake resilience and disaster response. |

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R16 [for F17] | <p>By June 2022, the City Administrator’s Office should publish a San Francisco Fuel Plan developed in collaboration with the Fuel Working Group. The Fuel Plan should cover key resilience measures such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processes and timescales for identifying fuel on hand in City-accessible storage • Citywide policies for maintaining fuel reserves in available tanks (e.g., keeping fleet vehicles topped up at the end of each day, reserve requirements for generator tanks) • Keeping track of burn rates in normal and plausible emergency scenarios • Information centralization for key sources and users of fuel, (e.g., types of hose connections used by fuel tanks) • Scheduling drills around emergency fuel deliveries including surrounding counties • Functional evaluation of city assets needed for emergency fuel delivery (e.g., piers, roadways, and equipment) • Reviewing city contracts with fuel vendors | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The timeline presented in the recommendation is unrealistic. The San Francisco Emergency Fuel Plan and other corresponding documents that outline the key resilience measures will be published by December 2022. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R17 [for F18] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to funding capital projects that are identified in the Fuel Plan as a high priority to improve fuel resilience in the City over the subsequent ten years. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City’s Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R18 [for F19] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should specify how it will provide at least \$10 million in dedicated funding for fuel resilience capital projects within the next ten years using general obligation bond revenue. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City's Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R19 [for F20] | By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a feasibility study on replacing current City backup generators with battery backup installations or other zero-emission technology by 2050. The study should examine costs, risks, and alternatives, including mobile and stationary battery sources, taking into account not only the present state of battery technology but likely future developments in upcoming decades. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | This recommendation requires further analysis with key City stakeholders to determine a clear scope and identify funding. This analysis will be completed by December 31, 2022. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R20 [for F21] | By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a plan for achieving disaster resilience with a zero-emissions City vehicle fleet. This plan should analyze the stationary backup power sources that might be needed to recharge critical response vehicles in the event of a disaster and how bidirectional charging technology might be used to enable the batteries in City fleet vehicles to serve as mobile backup power sources analogous to mobile backup generators but also likely future developments. | City Administrator [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | This recommendation needs further analysis. Specifically, the analysis will inform the recommended plan. For instance, the analysis will identify bi-directional charging applications (case studies, technologies) and their barriers / how to overcome them. It will also identify the vehicle types / cohort of mixed vehicles ideal for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), as well as location of those vehicles and general, preliminary estimates of any grid and City facility electrical upgrades necessary to support V2I. Additionally, it should address the various emergency infrastructure and automation required to enable V2I - as well as their costs. Finally, the analysis must include participation from the SFPUC because subject matter expertise in behind-the-meter electrical infrastructure and jurisdiction over City facility connections to the electric grid. This analysis will be completed by December 31, 2022. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F1 | In the aftermath of a major earthquake (magnitude 7.0 or greater), there will likely be severe citywide fuel and power shortages lasting more than 72 hours. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F2 | If these shortages resulted in lack of power to lifeline infrastructure facilities and/or lack of fuel for critical lifeline vehicles, the resulting cascading failures of other lifelines could have life safety and quality-of-life impacts greater than the fuel and power shortages themselves. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F4 | The cessation of fuel resilience progress during COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifeline resilience. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | The COVID-19 pandemic was and continues to be the world's most significant emergency within the last century. San Francisco's response to COVID-19 prevented countless immediate deaths and sicknesses of residents and guests. Emergency managers who were generally engaged in fuel resilience planning were wholly engaged in the City's COVID-19 response. Even with the COVID-19 pandemic, San Francisco remained prepared to implement its emergency response plans in the event of an earthquake or other natural disaster. There is no correlation between the City's focus on COVID-19 response and its commitment to fuel resilience. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F5 | In the aftermath of a major disaster, it will be difficult for emergency responders to catalog the citywide fuel needs of backup generators. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The Department of Emergency Management (DEM) managed a citywide continuity of operations planning working group in 2018 and 2019 that asked City departments to consider resources required (such as fuel) to keep their essential services going during or after an emergency. DEM and the City Administrator's Office partnered together to compile a list of citywide backup generators and their fuel needs. This was set to be finalized in March of 2020 but was delayed. |

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F6 | It is impossible to determine how much fuel storage is needed to meet emergency demands after a disaster because the City has not prepared proper estimates of fuel needs in a range of disaster scenarios. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | It is impossible to predict the exact amount of fuel that will be needed since emergencies are unpredictable and performance of Bay Area pipelines and refineries are not well understood. We know that all of the fuel needed immediately after a major event in San Francisco is stored in vehicles or local storage tanks, which is already captured in the 2020 Lifelines Restoration Performance Project Report. However, the amount of fuel needed is less important than whether the supply chain is stable. If the refineries and other fuel infrastructure remains functional, local storage is irrelevant. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F7 | Compiling inventories of available fuel in a disaster will likely take at least half a day and will rely partly on manual assessment of sites by personnel who might themselves be unavailable under disaster conditions. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F8 | The City will have a severely limited and unreliable ability in a disaster to get fuel from available reserves to sites such as generator tanks that need fuel urgently. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The City has service stations where fuel can be siphoned from generators that are not in use. These “reserves” are limited but are consistent with the City’s fuel planning and intentional decision to rely on supply chain infrastructure and mutual aid methods to bring needed fuel into the City as needed. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F9 | The City has not invested in technological solutions to augment the ability to refuel critical vehicles and generators in a disaster. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | A key technological investment the City is prioritizing is fuel pumping, transport, and refueling equipment in the form of fuel trucks. These trucks are extremely costly and funding them is challenging. However, Central Shops, which is part of the City’s General Services Agency and provides high quality, cost effective and sustainable fleet management and maintenance services to its customer departments and the City, is currently in the process of building one tanker truck to support refueling of critical vehicles and generators. This will supplement the existing SFFD fuel tanker truck and the one that is being purchased by San Francisco Public Works. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F14 | Although the City’s two fuel suppliers are contractually responsible for providing technical support on products and offering assistance required by City personnel, they do not participate actively in the planning, simulation exercises, or ongoing work of the Fuel Working Group. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The City’s fuel vendors continuously engage in San Francisco’s fuel resilience planning, including participating in specific fuel-related simulation exercises and providing guidance and technical advice. Vendors are not always invited to participate in all emergency exercises and planning efforts due to confidentiality of City infrastructure discussions and likely increases in costs to fuel contracts to account for participation. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F15 | If an emergency fuel delivery by water is needed, the City has not planned adequately for the risk that landing sites might be damaged, thereby compromising their ability to receive fuel delivery vessels or support tanker trucks for city transport. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | As part of Fleet Week annual drills and exercises, in 2018 and 2019 San Francisco performed multiple tests of how to bring supplies, including fuel, to shore from military water vessels, and planned for the City’s response in the event that landing sites might be damaged. These tests included arrival to Treasure Island, Ocean Beach, and port infrastructure. In 2021, many City departments joined the Port of San Francisco in a Disaster Response Exercise that reviewed emergency operations planning and assumptions for reopening of port infrastructure. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F16 | The City has insufficient knowledge about whether restoration of routes on the Priority Routes map will allow effective refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles in the event of a disaster. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | The City’s draft priority routes reopening plan was completed in order to allow for critical activities to occur quickly, including moving fuel from one place to another throughout the city. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F17 | The lack of a published San Francisco Fuel Plan makes it harder to coordinate on consistent fuel resilience best practices citywide. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The draft San Francisco fuel plan does not address resiliency practices, but provides a guide for how fuel will be managed, who will collect the current fuel levels (at the time of the incident) and other operational factors. The plan is meant to be a functional document versus a roadmap for fuel resilience. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F20 | The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F21 | The City will likely need to rely at least partially on electric vehicles for critical infrastructure functions by 2050 but has not initiated planning for how this can be done in a disaster-resilient manner. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R4 [for F5] | By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should compile an inventory of generators critical to life safety in the City and their locations, portability, fuel needs, tank storage capacities, and burn rates. This inventory should be updated at least annually thereafter. The inventory should include information including generator location, fuel type, connection type, and any access codes needed for emergency delivery. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by December 2022. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R5 [for F6] | By June 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should perform a team exercise to estimate likely ranges of fuel usage for critical generators in the City’s inventory in the aftermath of a plausible disaster in which those usage needs would have to be met from local sources. The exercise should give lower and upper bounds stemming from possible variations in which generators would have to run and for how long. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by December 2022. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R6 [for F7] | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should develop and test a plan for the quick assessment of local fuel reserves available to City agencies in a disaster, including protocols that ensure incident commanders can assess emergency fuel supply and demand in real-time citywide. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by December 2023 in coordination with the City Administrator’s Office. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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|---|---------------------|--|---|--|---|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R13 [for F15] | By December 2023, as part of a Fleet Week live exercise, the Department of Emergency Management and the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should test a scenario in which the City's normal supply line is damaged and delivery by water is necessary. This exercise should include a full demonstration of marine cargo delivery, readiness of the staging area, performance of the transfer-storage-filling equipment, and performance of the tanker trucks. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The San Francisco Fleet Week Exercise Program is developed jointly between San Francisco emergency managers, local first responder stakeholders, and state and federal military partners based on mutual need to test shared vulnerabilities. Fuel delivery and resilience was exercised in 2018 and 2019 and response to many other risks need to be examined, practiced and tested. Therefore, it is unlikely that fuel resilience will be tested again before December 2023. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R14 [for F15] | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning, and the Port should prepare a seismic vulnerability assessment of likely delivery sites for emergency fuel delivery by water, including Pier 96, Pier 80, Pier 50, and at least one alternative delivery site. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | The Port completed an earthquake and flood risk assessment of all northern waterfront facilities in November 2020 and commenced an earthquake assessment of Piers 50, 80, and 94/96 that is scheduled for completion in fall 2021. The new earthquake assessment information will inform a joint Port and DEM disaster response exercise focused on evaluating missions and capabilities including fuel supply. Results are expected by the end of 2021 and will help inform Port investments in earthquake resilience and disaster response. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R15 [for F16] | By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should publish an analysis of the priority routes determining whether they will allow sufficiently reliable refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles. | Department of Emergency Management [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | This recommendation will be implemented by December 2022. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | F# | Finding | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Finding Response (Agree/ Disagree) | Finding Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F8 | The City will have a severely limited and unreliable ability in a disaster to get fuel from available reserves to sites such as generator tanks that need fuel urgently. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The City has service stations where fuel can be siphoned from generators that are not in use. These “reserves” are limited but are consistent with the City’s fuel planning and intentional decision to rely on supply chain infrastructure and mutual aid methods to bring needed fuel into the City as needed. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F9 | The City has not invested in technological solutions to augment the ability to refuel critical vehicles and generators in a disaster. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | A key technological investment the City is prioritizing is fuel pumping, transport, and refueling equipment in the form of fuel trucks. These trucks are extremely costly and funding them is challenging. However, Central Shops, which is part of the City’s General Services Agency and provides high quality, cost effective and sustainable fleet management and maintenance services to its customer departments and the City, is currently in the process of building one tanker truck to support refueling of critical vehicles |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F18 | The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Disagree wholly | Unlike other lifelines like water and wastewater, the City does not own fuel infrastructure, such as refineries, pipelines, pumping stations and terminals. Given different infrastructure ownership structures, the Capital Plan should not be used to compare relative levels of priority for lifelines resilience. Priority City investments for fuel resilience may be for non-capital items and therefore not reflected in the Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F19 | Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

Member, Board of Supervisors
District 5



City and County of San Francisco

DEAN PRESTON

DATE: September 29, 2021

TO: Angela Calvillo
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors

FROM: Supervisor Preston
Chairperson

RE: Government Audit and Oversight Committee
COMMITTEE REPORTS

Pursuant to Board Rule 4.20, as Chair of the Government Audit and Oversight Committee I have deemed the following matters to be of an urgent nature and request each be considered by the full Board on Tuesday, October 5, 2021, as Committee Reports:

1. [210701 – \[Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - Continuity Report\]](#)
2. [210703 – \[Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - Van Ness Avenue: What Lies Beneath\]](#)
3. [210705 – \[Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience\]](#)
4. [210707 – \[Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - Strategic Alignment: Breaking Through to a Living Wage\]](#)

These matters will be heard at a Special Government Audit and Oversight Committee meeting on September 30, 2021, at 10am.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Dean Preston".

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
|---|------------------|--|--|--|---|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R9 [for F11] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | The City Administrator’s Office (ADM), Office of Resilience and Capital Planning (ORCP), Department of Emergency Management (DEM), and San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) will need to complete analysis of the City’s fuel needs and identify potential fuel storage project scopes, costs, and target dates to understand if there are locations in San Francisco that are viable for such a storage project. This analysis should include looking at the fuel needs and potential fuel storage locations for City infrastructure located outside of San Francisco, such as the Hetch Hetchy Regional Water System. Regarding the potential use of the Southeast Treatment Plant (SEP) for fuel storage, the SFPUC is completing a SEP Campus Plan to determine how to best utilize the space at SEP. Any analysis of using SEP for fuel storage will need to be completed in the context of the SEP Campus Plan, and must include analysis around future SFPUC Wastewater and Recycled Water plans for SEP, the safety of storing large amounts of fuel in the same footprint as a wastewater treatment plant, and ensure consistency and compliance with the SFPUC’s Racial Justice Resolution and Environmental Justice Policies regarding land use equity objectives. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R13 [for F15] | By December 2023, as part of a Fleet Week live exercise, the Department of Emergency Management and the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should test a scenario in which the City’s normal supply line is damaged and delivery by water is necessary. This exercise should include a full demonstration of marine cargo delivery, readiness of the staging area, performance of the transfer-storage-filling equipment, and performance of the tanker trucks. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable | The San Francisco Fleet Week Exercise Program is developed jointly between San Francisco emergency managers, local first responder stakeholders, and state and federal military partners based on mutual need to test shared vulnerabilities. Fuel delivery and resilience was exercised in 2018 and 2019 and response to many other risks need to be examined, practiced and tested. Therefore, it is unlikely that fuel resilience will be tested again before December 2023. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R14 [for F15] | By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning, and the Port should prepare a seismic vulnerability assessment of likely delivery sites for emergency fuel delivery by water, including Pier 96, Pier 80, Pier 50, and at least one alternative delivery site. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | The Port completed an earthquake and flood risk assessment of all northern waterfront facilities in November 2020 and commenced an earthquake assessment of Piers 50, 80, and 94/96 that is scheduled for completion in fall 2021. The new earthquake assessment information will inform a joint Port and DEM disaster response exercise focused on evaluating missions and capabilities including fuel supply. Results are expected by the end of 2021 and will help inform Port investments in earthquake resilience and disaster response. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R17 [for F18] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to funding capital projects that are identified in the Fuel Plan as a high priority to improve fuel resilience in the City over the subsequent ten years. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City's Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R18 [for F19] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should specify how it will provide at least \$10 million in dedicated funding for fuel resilience capital projects within the next ten years using general obligation bond revenue. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Fuel resilience is critical to City operations. When developing the City's Capital Plan, the City should consider available alternative methods to building fuel resilience as well as other immediate/critical citywide capital needs. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R19 [for F20] | By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a feasibility study on replacing current City backup generators with battery backup installations or other zero-emission technology by 2050. The study should examine costs, risks, and alternatives, including mobile and stationary battery sources, taking into account not only the present state of battery technology but likely future developments in upcoming decades. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | This recommendation requires further analysis with key City stakeholders to determine a clear scope and identify funding. This analysis will be completed by December 31, 2022. |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R20 [for F21] | By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a plan for achieving disaster resilience with a zero-emissions City vehicle fleet. This plan should analyze the stationary backup power sources that might be needed to recharge critical response vehicles in the event of a disaster and how bidirectional charging technology might be used to enable the batteries in City fleet vehicles to serve as mobile backup power sources analogous to mobile backup generators but also likely future developments. | Office of Resilience and Capital Planning [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | This recommendation needs further analysis. Specifically, the analysis will inform the recommended plan. For instance, the analysis will identify bi-directional charging applications (case studies, technologies) and their barriers / how to overcome them. It will also identify the vehicle types / cohort of mixed vehicles ideal for vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), as well as location of those vehicles and general, preliminary estimates of any grid and City facility electrical upgrades necessary to support V2I. Additionally, it should address the various emergency infrastructure and automation required to enable V2I - as well as their costs. Finally, the analysis must include participation from the SFPUC because subject matter expertise in behind-the-meter electrical infrastructure and jurisdiction over City facility connections to the electric grid. This analysis will be completed by December 31, 2022. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F10 | The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain due to the lack of partnerships between the City and private gas station operators and incomplete data about which private stations could best augment critical supplies. | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain, but this is mainly due to a limited ability for the City to access these reserves rather than due to lack of partnerships. After an emergency, there will likely be localized power outages, and many privately-held local fuel reserves are depending on power to get the fuel out of storage. Therefore, the City will need to use fuel in order to get more fuel, which is not the most efficient solution to the problem. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F12 | In the aftermath of a region-wide disaster such as a major earthquake, the ability of the City's two contracted suppliers to deliver fuel might be compromised temporarily because they would both be susceptible to the same infrastructure failures. | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F13 | The City has not contracted with an emergency out-of-region backup vendor in case the two regular vendors cannot deliver fuel, as recommended by the California Energy Commission, despite the risk of region-wide disruptions compromising both. | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F14 | Although the City's two fuel suppliers are contractually responsible for providing technical support on products and offering assistance required by City personnel, they do not participate actively in the planning, simulation exercises, or ongoing work of the Fuel Working Group. | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Disagree partially | The City's fuel vendors continuously engage in San Francisco's fuel resilience planning, including participating in specific fuel-related simulation exercises and providing guidance and technical advice. Vendors are not always invited to participate in all emergency exercises and planning efforts due to confidentiality of City infrastructure discussions and likely increases in costs to fuel contracts to account for participation. |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R7 [for F9] | By December 2023, the City should build, retrofit, or purchase a minimum of two additional tanker trucks that can each extract up to 2,500 gallons of fuel from a tank, even in the absence of grid power, and transport it to where it is needed. These vehicles should have the ability to transport both gasoline and diesel fuel. | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | Central Shops is currently in the process of building one tanker truck to support refueling of critical vehicles and generators. This will supplement the existing SFFD fuel tanker truck and the one that is being purchased by the Department of Public Works. Further analysis is needed to determine the number of tanker trucks needed, the availability of additional tanker trucks if mutual aid can be exercised, and available funding. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023. |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R8 [for F10] | By December 2022, the City should enter into Memoranda of Understanding or contracts with a minimum of two local private gas station operators to ensure that emergency vehicles can access fuel stored at their stations, including making that fuel technically accessible even in the event of a grid power outage. The operators chosen should be prioritized based on criteria relevant for usefulness in a disaster, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amount of fuel stored at the station • Availability of both gas and diesel • 24/7 staffed operation • Ability to dispense fuel without relying on grid power • Proximity to priority routes • Geographical distribution of stations (i.e., not all in the same place) | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | By March 2022, the City will provide an analysis addressing opportunities and constraints for utilizing private gas stations for emergency use. The scope of the analysis shall include, but not be limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Identification of emergency vehicles currently with and without access to private gas stations, including both City and private emergency fleet (for example, two private ambulance companies currently do utilize private gas stations): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Type --Number --Fuel needs -Analysis of private stations to identify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Amount of fuel stored at the station --Availability of both gas and diesel --Fuel suppliers and suppliers' locations --Staffing, and self-serve capabilities --Availability of generators on-site to power pumps without grid power --Proximity to priority routes --Geographical distribution of stations in relation to potential priority routes --Ability to siphon fuel -Determination of whether private fueling locations should be added to the City's fuel plan |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R10 [for F12] | By December 2022, the Office of Contract Administration should prepare a supply chain vulnerability assessment of the City's two contracted fuel suppliers. | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Has not yet been implemented but will be implemented in the future | The California Energy Commission may have already prepared such an assessment. The Office of Contract Administration (OCA) and the FWG will conduct outreach to determine if an assessment exists. If it does not, OCA, in coordination with the FWG, will provide a supply chain vulnerability assessment by June 2022. |

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|---|---------------------|--|---|--|--|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R11 [for F13] | If the two contracted fuel suppliers are found to have joint vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated adequately, the Office of Contract Administration should enter into a Memorandum of Understanding by December 2023 for emergency backup delivery with a vendor whose facilities and equipment are based outside of the Bay Area. | Office of Contract Administration [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | <p>Within six months, the City will undertake an analysis to identify vulnerabilities of current fuel vendors (Western States Oil and Golden Gate Petroleum) and assessing potential alternative vendors outside of the Bay Area. The scope of the analysis shall include, but not be limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Locations of fuel depots for each current vendor, and assessment of vulnerabilities at each location • Current vendors' fuel transport/delivery options should any of their fuel depots become inaccessible, including assessment of deliveries by road/highway and water (barge). • City's fuel transport options from within the Bay Area should vendors be unable to delivery, including ability for new City fuel truck(s) to transport from the fuel depots within region • Identification and assessment of fuel vendors outside the Bay Area, including locations/distance, transportation options, fuel types, and potential delivery volumes and turnaround time |

2020-21 CIVIL GRAND JURY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F11 | Opportunities to expand fuel reserves within the City are very rare due to geographic constraints but very valuable for fuel resilience. | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | F20 | The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this. | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Agree | |

| Report Title [Publication Date] | R# [for F#] | Recommendation | Respondent Assigned by CGJ [Response Due Date] | Recommendation Response (Implementation) | Recommendation Response Text |
|---|--------------------|---|---|--|---|
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R3 [for F4] | The agency sponsor of the Fuel Working Group should select members with strong experience in supply chain logistics and emergency management. The Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Contract Administration, the City Administrator’s Office, and other City departments who are significant users of fuel, including SFPUC, SFMTA, and DPW should dedicate staff time each month through December 2024, or until the | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Has been implemented | Pre-COVID-19, the FWG met monthly. Members included the emergency managers from: DPW, SFMTA, SFPUC, CAO, DEM, SFFD and subject matter experts from SFO, Central Shops and Public Works. Port staff will be included once the group relaunches its regular meetings in the next 90 days. |
| A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel Resilience [June 29, 2021] | R9 [for F11] | In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available. | Public Utilities Commission [August 28, 2021] | Requires further analysis | The City Administrator’s Office (ADM), Office of Resilience and Capital Planning (ORCP), Department of Emergency Management (DEM), and San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) will need to complete analysis of the City’s fuel needs and identify potential fuel storage project scopes, costs, and target dates to understand if there are locations in San Francisco that are viable for such a storage project. This analysis should include looking at the fuel needs and potential fuel storage locations for City infrastructure located outside of San Francisco, such as the Hetch Hetchy Regional Water System. Regarding the potential use of the Southeast Treatment Plant (SEP) for fuel storage, the SFPUC is completing a SEP Campus Plan to determine how to best utilize the space at SEP. Any analysis of using SEP for fuel storage will need to be completed in the context of the SEP Campus Plan, and must include analysis around future SFPUC Wastewater and Recycled Water plans for SEP, the safety of storing large amounts of fuel in the same footprint as a wastewater treatment plant, and ensure consistency and compliance with the SFPUC’s Racial Justice Resolution and Environmental Justice Policies regarding land use equity objectives. The analysis will be completed by January 31, 2023 for consideration in the FY 2024-33 Capital Plan. |

Member, Board of Supervisors
District 5



City and County of San Francisco

DEAN PRESTON

DATE: September 29, 2021

TO: Angela Calvillo
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors

FROM: Supervisor Preston
Chairperson

RE: Government Audit and Oversight Committee
COMMITTEE REPORTS

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