| File No. 170662 | 2. |
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| Committee Item | No. | 3 | |
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| Board Item No. | · ' | 25 | |

COMMITTEE/BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

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| | Motion Resolution Prdinance Legislative Digest Budget and Legislative Analyst Youth Commission Report Introduction Form Department/Agency Cover Lette MOU Grant Information Form Grant Budget Subcontract Budget Contract/Agreement Form 126 – Ethics Commission Award Letter Application Public Correspondence | | r Rep | ort |
| OTHER . | | | | • |
| | Board Response Transmittal - O Resolution No. 360-17 - October CGJ Responses - September 20 SFERS Required Responses - S Mayor's Office Required Responses Controller's Office Required Res 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Rep | 5, 201), 2017 Septemk ises - A ponses | 7 oer 13, ugust - Aug | , 2017 15, 2017 ust 11, 2017 |
| Prepared by: Prepared by: | | Date: | | ary 12, 2018 ry 18, 2018 |

PREPARED IN COMMITTEE 1/17/2018

MOTION NO.

FILE NO. 170662

[Follow-Up Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight]

Motion responding to the Civil Grand Jury's request to provide a status update on the Board of Supervisor's response to Recommendation No. R2.2 contained in the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report, entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight."

WHEREAS, The 2016-2017 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury published a report, entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight" ("Report") on June 16, 2017; and

WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors' Government Audit and Oversight Committee ("GAO") conducted a public hearing to hear and respond to the Report on September 20, 2017; and, the Board of Supervisors adopted Resolution No. 360-17 on September 26, 2017 reflecting the GAO responses to the Report; a copy of which is on file with the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors in File No. 170663; and

WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R2.2 states: "That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board;" and

WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors on September 20, 2017, responded in Resolution No. 360-17 that Recommendation No. R2.2 requires further analysis as the Board of Supervisors needs to investigate the consequences of adding members to the Retirement Board, and will report back to the Civil Grand Jury by December 16, 2017; and

WHEREAS, The GAO Committee conducted an additional hearing on January 17, 2017, to receive an update from City departments on Recommendation No. R2.2; now, therefore, be it

MOVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation No. R2.2 will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable; the Board of Supervisors may consider alteration of the composition of the Retirement Board in an alternative manner.

BOARD of SUPERVISORS



City Hall 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 244 San Francisco 94102-4689 Tel. No. 554-5184 Fax No. 554-5163 TDD/TTY No. 554-5227

October 12, 2017

The Honorable Teri Jackson Presiding Judge Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 400 McAllister Street, Department 206 San Francisco, CA 94102

RE: Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight

Dear Judge Jackson:

The Board of Supervisors' Government Audit and Oversight Committee conducted a public hearing on September 20, 2017, to review the findings and recommendations of the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury report, entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight."

Prior to the Committee meeting, the following City Departments submitted required responses to the Civil Grand Jury:

- Office of the Controller: Received August 11, 2017, for Findings F2, F3, and F4; and Recommendations R2.1, R2.2, R3.1, R3.2, R4.1, and R4.2; and
- The Mayor's Office submitted a consolidated response for the following departments:
 - a. Office of the Mayor;
 - b. Elections Department; and
 - c. Elections Commission

Received August 15, 2017, for Findings F1, F2, and F3; and Recommendations R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R2.2, R3.1, and R3.2.

• Retirement Board: Received September 13, 2017, for Findings F1, F2, and F4; and Recommendations R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R2.2, R4.1 and R4.2.

At the September 20, 2017 meeting, the Government Audit and Oversight Committee prepared a resolution responding to the requested findings and recommendations identified in the report. The response was prepared by Resolution No. 360-17, enacted on October 5, 2017.

Civil Grand Jury Report - The San acisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight
Office of the Clerk of the Board Transmittal
October 12, 2017
Page 2

By this message, the Office of the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors is transmitting Resolution No. 360-17 to your attention.

If you have any questions, please contact John Carroll, Government Audit and Oversight Committee Clerk at (415) 554-4445, or via email to john.carroll@sfgov.org.

Sincerely,

Angela Calvillo
Clerk of the Board

Kathie Lowry, Foreperson, 2016, 2017 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury c: Kitsaun King, 2015-2016 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury Jason Elliot, Chief of Staff, Mayor's Office Kate Howard, Deputy Chief of Staff, Mayor's Office Melissa Whitehouse, Budget Director, Mayor's Office Marie Valdez, Mayor's Office Ben Rosenfield, Controller, Office of the Controller Asja Steeves, Office of the Controller Peg Stevenson, Office of the Controller John Arntz, Director, Department of Elections Chris Jerdonek, Elections Commission Jay Huish, Executive Director, Employee's Retirement System Norm Nickens, Retirement Board Jon Givner, Deputy City Attorney Alisa Somera, Legislative Deputy Director, Office of the Clerk of the Board Severin Campbell, Budget and Legislative Analyst Ashley Clark, Budget and Legislative Analyst



City and County of San Francisco Certified Copy

City Hall 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place San Francisco, CA 94102-4689

Resolution

170663

[Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight]

Resolution responding to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations in the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight;" and urging the Mayor to cause the implementation of accepted findings and recommendations through his/her department heads and through the development of the annual budget. (Clerk of the Board)

9/26/2017 Board of Supervisors - AMENDED, AN AMENDMENT OF THE WHOLE BEARING SAME TITLE

Ayes: 11 - Breed, Cohen, Farrell, Fewer, Kim, Peskin, Ronen, Safai, Sheehy, Tang and Yee

9/26/2017 Board of Supervisors - ADOPTED AS AMENDED

Ayes: 11 - Breed, Cohen, Farrell, Fewer, Kim, Peskin, Ronen, Safai, Sheehy, Tang and Yee

10/5/2017 Mayor - APPROVED

STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO **CLERK'S CERTIFICATE**

I do hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution is a full, true, and correct copy of the original thereof on file in this office.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the offical seal of the City and County of San Francisco.

October 10, 2017 Date



[Board Response - Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight]

Resolution responding to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations contained in the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report, entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight;" and urging the Mayor to cause the implementation of accepted findings and recommendations through his/her department heads and through the development of the annual budget.

WHEREAS, Under California Penal Code, Section 933 et seq., the Board of Supervisors must respond, within 90 days of receipt, to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations contained in Civil Grand Jury Reports; and

WHEREAS, In accordance with California Penal Code, Section 933.05(c), if a finding or recommendation of the Civil Grand Jury addresses budgetary or personnel matters of a county agency or a department headed by an elected officer, the agency or department head and the Board of Supervisors shall respond if requested by the Civil Grand Jury, but the response of the Board of Supervisors shall address only budgetary or personnel matters over which it has some decision making authority; and

WHEREAS, Under San Francisco Administrative Code, Section 2.10(a), the Board of Supervisors must conduct a public hearing by a committee to consider a final report of the findings and recommendations submitted, and notify the current foreperson and immediate past foreperson of the civil grand jury when such hearing is scheduled; and

WHEREAS, In accordance with San Francisco Administrative Code, Section 2.10(b), the Controller must report to the Board of Supervisors on the implementation of

recommendations that pertain to fiscal matters that were considered at a public hearing held by a Board of Supervisors Committee; and

WHEREAS, The 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report, entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System – Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight" ("Report") is on file with the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors in File No. 170662, which is hereby declared to be a part of this Resolution as if set forth fully herein; and

WHEREAS, The Civil Grand Jury has requested that the Board of Supervisors respond to Finding Nos. F1 and F2 as well as Recommendation Nos. R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, and R2.2, contained in the subject Report; and

WHEREAS, Finding No. F1 states: "That there are multiple causes for the City's \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System, including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic assumptions (\$1.1 billion). However, the principal underlying cause is the estimated \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008;" and

WHEREAS, Finding No. F2 states: "1) That the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related propositions (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening the fiscal status of the City;" and

WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R1.1 states: "That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public;" and

WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R1.2 states: "That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations;" and

WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R2.1 states: "That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The details of the committee are:

- 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee
- 2. Purpose
- a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System's unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, and present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018. All options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.
- b. Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement System.
- c. As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement

 System encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All

options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.

- d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by the Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) all propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to voters in the Voter Information Pamphlet.
- e. In furtherance of its purpose, the committee may engage in any of the following activities:
 - i. Inquire into the actions of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, financial statements, actuarial reports, or other materials related to the Retirement System.
 - ii. Holding public meetings to review the effect on San Francisco residents of actions taken by the Retirement System.

3. Public Meetings

- a. The Board of Supervisors shall provide the committee with any necessary technical assistance and shall provide administrative assistance in furtherance of its purpose and sufficient resources to publicize the conclusions of the committee.
- b. All committee proceedings shall be subject to the California Public Records Act (Section 6254, et seq., of the Government Code of the State of California) and the City's Sunshine Ordinance (Chapter 67 of this Code). The committee shall issue regular reports on the results of its activities. A report shall be issued at least once a year. Minutes of the proceedings of the committee and all documents received and reports issued shall be a matter of public record and be made available on the Board's website.

4. Membership

- a. Two-thirds of the members will be Public members and one-third will be Representative members.
 - b. Public members:
 - i. Public members must be voters.
 - ii. Public members cannot be members of the Retirement System.
 - iii. Each Supervisor will appoint a single Public member.
 - iv. The Mayor will appoint all other Public members.
 - v. Public members can only be removed for cause.
 - vi. Public members shall be experienced in life insurance, actuarial science, employee pension planning, investment portfolio management, labor negotiations, accounting, mathematics, statistics, economics, or finance.
 - vii. Public members will receive no compensation.
 - viii. Four-year term, staggered so that one-fourth of the Public members' terms expire each year.
 - ix. No more than two consecutive terms.
 - c. Representative members
 - i, Mayor's Office representative.
 - ii. Board of Supervisors' representative.
 - iii. Controller's Office representative.
 - iv. Human Resources Department representative.
 - v. Safety Unions' representative.
 - vi. Miscellaneous Unions' representative.

5. Committee Costs

a. The Board of Supervisors will decide how best to fund the Committee;" and WHEREAS, Recommendation No. R2.2 states: "That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board;" and

WHEREAS, In accordance with California Penal Code, Section 933.05(c), the Board of Supervisors must respond, within 90 days of receipt, to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on Finding Nos. F1 and F2 as well as Recommendation Nos. R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, and R2.2 contained in the subject Report; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court that they disagree partially with Finding No. F1 for reason as follows: The primary causes of the greater than expected unfunded liabilities were the lower returns on investments due to the dot-com bust and the Great Recession, the changes in demographic assumptions, and the court ruling on the Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments in the 2011 Proposition C, but not the voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court that they disagree partially with Finding No. F2 for reason as follows: The City departments did fulfill their responsibilities in overseeing the interests of City residents regarding retirement benefits-related ballot initiatives between 1996 and 2008, and that the Retirement System is not seriously underfunded, nor does it threaten the fiscal health of the City; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation No. R1.1 has not been implemented but will be; For any future retirement benefit increases or decreases, the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors shall provide information in lay-person

terms that is available and easily accessible on the City's website and that clearly presents projected financials including unfunded liabilities; in addition, when there is a ballot initiative that addresses retirement benefits, the Voter Information Pamphlet shall include an introductory paragraph written by the Controller explaining in lay-person terms the assets, liabilities, projected financials, including unfunded liabilities, and health of the retirement system; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation No. R1.2 has not been implemented but will be; The 2017 Retirement System's annual report shall include information about the Retirement System's projected finances, including unfunded liabilities; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation No. R2.1 will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable; The Mayor and Board of Supervisors have oversight over the Retirement System and review financials and projections regularly, including during the annual City budget process; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors reports that Recommendation No. R2.2 requires further analysis as the Board of Supervisors needs to investigate the consequences of adding members to the Retirement Board, and will report back to the Civil Grand Jury by December 16, 2017; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges the Mayor to cause the implementation of the accepted findings and recommendations through his/her department heads and through the development of the annual budget.



City and County of San Francisco Tails

City Hall 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place San Francisco, CA 94102-4689

Resolution

File Number: 170663

Date Passed: September 26, 2017

Resolution responding to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court on the findings and recommendations in the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight;" and urging the Mayor to cause the implementation of accepted findings and recommendations through his/her department heads and through the development of the annual budget.

September 20, 2017 Government Audit and Oversight Committee - AMENDED, AN AMENDMENT OF THE WHOLE BEARING SAME TITLE

September 20, 2017 Government Audit and Oversight Committee - RECOMMENDED AS AMENDED

September 26, 2017 Board of Supervisors - AMENDED, AN AMENDMENT OF THE WHOLE BEARING SAME TITLE

Ayes: 11 - Breed, Cohen, Farrell, Fewer, Kim, Peskin, Ronen, Safai, Sheehy, Tang and Yee

September 26, 2017 Board of Supervisors - ADOPTED AS AMENDED

Ayes: 11 - Breed, Cohen, Farrell, Fewer, Kim, Peskin, Ronen, Safai, Sheehy, Tang and Yee

File No. 170663

I hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was ADOPTED AS AMENDED on 9/26/2017 by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco.

> Angela Calvillo Clerk of the Board

Mayor

Date Approved



City and County of San Francisco Employees' Retirement System

September 13, 2017

The Honorable Teri L. Jackson Presiding Judge, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 400 McAllister Street, Room 008 San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Judge Jackson:

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the following is in reply to the 2016-17 Civil Grand Jury report, *The San Francisco Retirement System – Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight.* We would like to thank the Civil Grand Jury for their attention to this subject. The members of the Retirement Board recognize that, in performing their fiduciary duties to prudently oversee the investment and administration of the SFERS Trust, their actions impact both plan beneficiaries and the City.

The Retirement Board appreciates the Civil Grand Jury's recognition of its diligent work to protect the interests of the beneficiaries of the SFERS Trust. As a result of this work, SFERS is among the top-performing and well-funded public pension plans in the nation. The Retirement Board is confident that, over the long term, the ssets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all beneficiaries. The City and its voters have also taken important steps to address the increase in unfunded liability. The pension reform legislation approved by City voters in 2011 (Prop. C) will significantly reduce the City's long-term pension obligations and reduce the projected unfunded liabilities over time.

The Retirement Board works continuously to improve the quality and clarity of its reporting. The reports related to the projected cost of benefit improvements referenced in the Civil Grand Jury's report accurately measure the cost/effect impact of the proposed benefit changes at the time they were prepared and presented to the Board of Supervisors and the City voters.

The Civil Grand Jury's report provided important feedback to help us understand how our reporting is received. Retirement System staff is always exploring ways to simplify the presentation of sometimes complex topics and information and is prepared to assist members of the public and City employees and retirees with any questions they might have related to the financial, actuarial and administrative information provided in our reports. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various reports to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in these complex topics.

Detailed responses by the Retirement Board to the Civil Grand Jury's findings and recommendations are attached.

Respectfully submitted,

Jay Huish, Executive Director, on behalf of the

SFERS Retirement Board

Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board, City and County of San Francisco

cc:

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|----------|---|-------------|---|---------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| CGJ Year | Report Title | # · · · · · | Findings | by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| 2016-17 | | F1 | That there are multiple causes for the City's | Retirement Board | disagree with it, wholly (explanation | The Retirement Board is confident that, over the long term, the assets in the |
| 2010-11 | System- increasing | LT | \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System, | Retirement board | in next column) | SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all beneficiaries. |
| 1 | Understanding & | | Including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a | | In thext column) | |
| 1 | | - | | | | We emphasize the long term view because none of the figures cited as "debt" |
| | Adding Voter Oversight | | court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living | | | are due now. Rather, the items being called a "debt" are funding gaps (i.e., |
| | | İ | Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C | | | unfunded liabilities) which are designed to be paid off over the life of the |
| 1 | | | (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic | | | SFERS Trust. Additionally, under Proposition C, City employees now pay more |
| 1 | | Į. | assumptions (\$1.1 billion). However, the | | | out of each and every paycheck into the SFERS Trust, which has reduced the |
| | | ĺ | principal underlying cause is the estimated | | | City's cost. |
| | | | \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit | ' | | Despite investment shortfalls from two recent major recessions, including the |
| 1 | 1. | | increases implemented by voter-approved | | | Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis, SFERS is closing the gap and |
| | | | propositions between 1996 and 2008. | | | ranked in the first quartile of all U.S. public fund peers. SFERS investment |
| | | | | | | performance varies from year-to-year due to financial markets; however, |
| | | 1 | | | <u> </u> | SFERS invests for the long term, evidenced by its top quartile performance, |
| | | | | | | over the 3 year, 5 year, and 10 year time periods. SFERS investment gains |
| : | | | · | | . : | have contributed a significant amount toward reducing the unfunded |
| İ | | | | | | liabilities. |
| 1 | | | | | | In accordance with the City Charter and Retirement Board policies, the cost or |
| | | ļ | | ' | | Increase in liabilities associated with every voter-approved proposition is |
| | | | | | | amortized over up to a 20-year period. The remaining cost of the benefit and |
| | | | | • | | COLA increases approved by City voters between 1996 and 2008-was \$1,038 |
| | | • | | | | |
| | | | | | | billion, as of June 30, 2016. By 2028, this liability will be paid in full. The |
| | | | | | | present value of the increase in the unfunded liability resulting from the court |
| İ | | | | | | ruling on the Supplemental COLA retroactive payments of 2013 and 2014 was |
| İ | | 1 | , | | · · | calculated to be \$429.3 million, as of July 2016. |
| . | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
|] | | } | | | | |

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|------------|------------------------|----------|---|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| | (2007) NO. 10 (20) | | | Respondent assigned | | |
| CG! Year | Report Title | | Findings | by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement | F2 | 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently | Retirement Board | disagree with it, partially (explanation | SFERS is among the top performing and well-funded public pensions plans in |
| | System-Increasing | | protects the retirement-related interests of | | : | the United States and disagrees with the finding that the "Retirement System |
| | Understanding & |) | the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the | | | remains seriously underfunded." The Retirement Board is confident that, over |
| · | Adding Voter Oversight | | Retirement Board has a majority of members | | | the long term, the assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the |
| 1 : | | · | who are also members of the Retirement | | | promised benefits to all beneficiaries. The Retirement Board recognizes that |
| ľ | | l | System (they receive, or will receive, | | | unfunded liabilities are not a "debt" that must be paid today. Rather, the |
| \ . | | l | pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive | | | Retirement Board annually adopts and administers a funding policy to assure |
| 1 | ľ | 1 | retirement benefit increase propositions | · | | that all promised benefits will be paid over the combined lifetimes of the |
| | | | between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of | | | members and their beneficiaries. |
| | | ļ, | Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller | | | Each year, the Retirement Board receives an actuarial valuation - a detailed |
| | | ľ | did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out | | | report on the long-term progress of the SFERS Trust toward reducing all |
| | | | for the interests of the City and its residents; | | | pension liabilities. Existing funding policies are reviewed and adjusted, where |
| | | | and 4) that despite previous Retirement | | | appropriate, to ensure the long-term financial strength of the SFERS Trust. In |
| | | ļ. | System-related propositions (2010 Proposition | | | accordance with the City Charter, Retirement Board policies, and Industry best |
| | | | D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future | | | practices, any increase in the unfunded liabilities associated with every voter- |
| | | | pension liabilities, the Retirement System | | | approved proposition is spread out over a 20-year period, which minimizes |
| | | 1 | remains seriously underfunded, threatening | | | the impact to the City budget. Based on recent actuarial projections, the |
| <u> </u> | <u>'</u> | : | the fiscal status of the City. | | | Retirement Board expects a continued reduction in liabilities associated with |
| | } | 1 | | | | voter-approved benefit improvements over the long-term. |
| | |) |) | 1 | | The Retirement Board also strongly disagrees with the finding "that when it |
| | | | | | | come to retroactive retirement benefit increases between 1996 and 2008, the |
| ľ | | | | | | Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill |
|] . | | | | | | their responsibility to watch out for the interest of the City and its residents." The Retirement Board does not approve plan benefits; its fiduciary duty is to |
| ŀ | | | | | | manage the SFERS Trust and pay the mandated benefits approved by City |
| ļ. | | <u> </u> | | | ľ | voters. As fiduciaries to the SFERS Trust, the Retirement Board is legally |
| | | | | | | bound, as set forth in the California State Constitution, and in the San |
| L | <u>1 </u> | <u></u> | <u> L</u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | Construction and the complete constitution and in the constitutions |

| CGJ Year | Report Title | u. | Findings | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responsos (Agree/Disagree) | |
|----------|------------------------|------------|--|----------------------------|--|--|
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement | F4 | The Controller and the Retirement System | Retirement Board | disagree with it, wholly (explanation in | The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial |
| • | System- Increasing | | provide extensive reports about the | | | and administrative matters, available on the SFERS website, on an annual |
| | Understanding & | | Retirement System, but they are too complex | | | basis. These annual reports include audited financial statements and required |
| 1 | Adding Voter Oversight | | for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to | | | supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual |
| · . | | | understand. The data in the Retirement | | | report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed |
| | ŀ | | System reports is not available to the | | • | Information on the administration of the Retirement System. |
| - | | } | Retirement System or the public in a dataset, | | | The Retirement System can neither agree nor disagree that these reports are |
| | | | making research and analysis more difficult. | | | too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand; |
| | | 1 | · · | | · | however, Retirement System staff is always exploring ways to simplify the |
| | · | 1 | | | | presentation of sometimes complex topics and information and is prepared to |
| · : | | 1. | 1 | | | assist members of the public and City employees and retirees with any |
| | , | | | | | questions they might have related to the financial, actuarial and |
| · | | | | | | administrative information provided in our reports. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various reports to |
| | | 1 | | | | ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in |
| · | | | | | | these complex topics. The Retirement System disagrees with the finding that |
| | | 1 | 1 | | | the data in the Retirement System reports is not available in a dataset. The |
| | ** |] | | | | Retirement System has ready access to all the data used in preparing these |
| | | <u> </u> | | :- | | rehorte: |
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| .GJ Year | Report Title | Recommendations: | Respondent assigned by CGI | 2017 Responses (Implementation) 2017. Response Text |
|----------|--|--|-------------------------------|--|
| 2016-17 | The SF Rettrement System-Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any | Retirement Board | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how it was implemented in next column) The Retirement Board will continue its long-standing practice for any and all future (tity ordinances or City Charter amendments that impact retirement benefits. The Retirement Board's consulting actuary will prepare and present a cost-effect report to the Board of Supervisors, as required under the City Charter. Each report will be prepared in accordance with Industry standards and practices, using the best available demographic information and economic information at the time, as well as the long-term demographic and economic assumptions adopted by the Retirement Board. The report is intended to assist the Board of Supervisors and/or the City's voters, by providing an expert's projection of the overall cost and increase in Ilability for each proposition. These reports accurately measure the cost/effect impact of the proposition. These reports accurately measure the cost or change in Ilability final differ, in the future, due to changes in investment performance (e.g., 2007-08 clicbal Financial Crisis), changes in economic and demographic assumptions, and changes in plan provisions which are beyond the Retirement Board's control. |
| | Accelerating SF Government Performance, Taking Accountability and Transparency to the Next Level | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations. | Retirement Board | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how it was implemented in next column) The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial as administrative matters, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience, on an annual basis. These annual reports are available on the SFERS website and include audited financial, statements and report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The details of the breakout for each component of unfunded liability related to the City's retirement plan are contained in each annual actuarial valuation report. The Retirement System maintains at least five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuation report on its website, illistorical valuation reports beyond the years available on the website are available by request to the Retirement System. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic. |

| 2.5.A | | | | | | |
|---------|--|------|---|-----------------------------|--|--|
| GJ Year | Report Title | A | Recommendations | Respondent assigned by CGI. | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
| | The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public | Retirement Board | it was implemented in next column) | The Retirement Board will continue its long-standing practice for any and all future City ordinances of City Charter amendments that impact retirement benefits. The Retirement Board's consulting actuary will prepare and present a cost-effect report to the Board of Supervisors, as required under the City Charter. Each report will be prepared in accordance with industry standards and practices, using the best available demographic information and economic information at the time, as well as the long-term demographic and economic assumptions adopted by the Retirement Board. The report is intended to assist the Board of Supervisors and/or the City's voters, by providing an expert's projection of the overall cost and increase in liability for each proposition. These reports accurately measure the cost/effect impact of the proposition at the time they are prepared. Certainly, the tost or change in liability may differ, in the future, due to changes in fund investment performance (e.g. 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis), changes in |
| 1016-17 | Accelerating SF | R1.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the bubils showing each combonent of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement | Retirement Board | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how it was implemented in next column) | economic and demographic assumptions, and changes in plan provisions which are beyond the Retirement Board's control. The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial an administrative matters, including a summary of their financial statements that are |
| | Performance. Taking Accountability and Transparency to the Next Level | | System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations. | boatu | | designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience, on an annual basis. These annual reports are available on the SFERS website and include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The details of the breakout for each component of unfunded liability related to the City's retirement plan are contained in each annual actuarial valuation report. The Retirement System maintains at least five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuation reports. |
| 2762 | | | | | | beyond the years available on the website are available by request to the Retirement System. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic. |

| | | 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - | The control of the co | Tana Steer Summer | To the second section of the section of the second section of the | for a contract |
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| | | | | Park Na | | |
| | 보이 별 하나에 | | | Respondent | | |
| CGJ Year | Report Title | 11 | Recommendations | assigned by CGI | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
| | The SF Retirement | R2,1 | That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight | Retirement | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | This recommendation should be directed to the Board of Supervisors and not the |
| | System-Increasing | | Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement | Board | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | Retirement Board. |
| | Understanding & | | System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in | 1 | | • |
| 1 | Adding Voter | | a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be | | | Note: These considerations already have and do occur. For example, in 2011, the |
| | Oversight | | considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The | 1 | | Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, other City officials, employee groups, and |
| | - | | details of the committee are: 1, Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee 2. | 1 | 1.77 | members of the public worked to pass Proposition C. Now, under Proposition C, |
| | | | Purpose a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement | | | employees pay more out of each and every paycheck into the SFERS Trust, which |
| | | | System's unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, | 1 | | has reduced the City's contribution rate, as a percentage of payroll. This has |
| | | ľ | and present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018, All options should be | | | reduced the City's pension liability over the long term. |
| | | | on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / DefinedContribution plan. b. | | 1 | On an annual basis, the City's leadership reviews pension costs, contribution rates, |
| | | l | Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement System, c. | | | and their financial impacts in the City budget process and in other settings. On a |
| 1 | | ļ | As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement System | |) | regular basis, SFERS provides the City with detailed information, funding and |
| 1 | | 1 | encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All options | | | contribution projections and stress testing results from the Retirement Board's |
| | 1 | | should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution | | 1 | actuarial consultant, and any other requested information related to the pension |
| | | | plan, d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by | | | liabilities and employer contributions as part of the City's overall financial planning |
| ' | | | the Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) | | | process. All changes in SFERS benefit provisions must be approved by the City's |
| | | | all propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to | | | voters. The Retirement Board cannot approve changes in SFERS benefit provisio |
| 1 | 1 | | voters in the Voter Information Pamphlet, e. in furtherance of its purpose, the | 1 | | |
| | | 1 | committee may engage in any of the following activities: I. Inquire into the actions | | | |
| | | | of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, financial statements, | 1 | | · [|
| | | | actuarial reports, or other materials related to the Retirement System. II. Holding | | | |
| | Ļ | | public meetings to review the effect on San Francisco residents of actions taken by | | | |
| | 1 |] | the Retirement System. 3: Public Meetings a. The Board of Supervisors shall provide | è | | |
| Ì | 1 | | the committee with any necessary technical assistance and shall provide | | | |
| | | Ì | administrative assistance in furtherance of its purpose and sufficient resources to | | • | |
| | | 1 | publicize the conclusions of the committee. | | | |
| | L | l | b. All committee proceedings shall be subject to the California Public Records Act | | | |
| 2016-13 | The SF Retirement | R2.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter | Retirement | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor's Office and Board of |
| 1.7 | System-Increasing | 3 | amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who | Board | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | Supervisors and not the Retirement Board. |
| 6 | Understanding & | | are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board. | | | apply many difference me many content pounds |
| ω | Adding Voter | | · | | | Note: SFERS does not believe this recommendation will lead to the desired |
| | Oversight | 1 | · | | 1 | outcome of having representatives on the Retirement Board "to watch out for the |
| | | | • | 1 | , | Interests of the City and its residents." |
| | 1 | | | | 1 | in the second state of the second sec |
| | | | | | , | All members of the Retirement Board, regardless of who elected or appointed |
| | | 1 | 1 | | · | them to the Board, have a fiduciary duty to SFERS participants and their |
| 1 | } | | | | | beneficiaries. In accordance with the California State Constitution, this duty takes |
| | | | | 1 | | precedence over any other duty or concern. Under the State Constitution, the |
| | | | · | | | Retirement Board is required to discharge its duties with respect to the SFERS |
| | İ | | | | | Trust solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purposes of providing benefit |
| | 1 | | | | | to SFERS participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer contribution. |
| | | | | 1 | | thereto, and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system. Under |
| . } | | | | | 1 | trust law, the Retirement Board's duty to its participants and their beneficiaries |
| | 1 | 1 | | i | | takes precedence over any other duty, including any duty to the City or its |
| | | 1 . | | ľ | | residents. |
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| CGI Year | Report Title # | | Respondent assigned by CGI | | Z017 Response-Text— |
|----------|--------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|--|---|
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement R4.1 | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset | Retirement | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | |
| 1 | System-Increasing | based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and | Board | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, and |
| i | Understanding & | make that dataset available to the public. | | | operational issues; including a summary of their financial statements that are |
| | Adding Voter | | | | designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience. The Retirement System |
| | Oversight | | | A STATE OF THE STA | provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, |
| | İ | | } | | available on the SFERS website, on an annual basis. These annual reports include |
| | | | | | avidited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and |
| | | · |]. | | actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the |
| | | | | 1 | Retirement System. The data used to produce these reports is available to the |
| | | | | l and a | public to the extent it is not protected from disclosure by law. |
| | | | | | The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve the |
| | | · | 4 | | public availability of data used in preparing the various reports to ensure their |
| | | | | | ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in these complex |
| | | | | | topics. |
| | <u> </u> | | ļ | | |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement R4.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office develop and produce an annual | Retirement | | This recommendation should be directed to the Controller's Office and not the |
| | System-Increasing Understanding & | Retirement System Report that clearly explains the current and projected status of the Retirement System and its effect on the City's budget. | Board | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | Retirement Board. |
| | Adding Voter | rue tiernatuati săriett sun im strait ou tus cită a proßet. | | P\$19.罗马的 1000 1000 1000 1000 1400 1400 1400 140 | |
| • | Oversight . | | | | |
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Office of the Mayor SAN FRANCISCO



EDWIN M. LEE Mayor

August 15, 2017

The Honorable Teri L. Jackson Presiding Judge Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 400 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Judge Jackson:

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the following is in reply to the 2016-17 Civil Grand Jury report, The San Francisco Retirement System: Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight. We would like to thank the members of the Civil Grand Jury for their interest in San Francisco's Retirement System and its role in the City's long-term financial health. The report focuses primarily on two challenges with the Retirement System: reducing our long term pension obligations, and improving transparency and accountability to taxpayers about the City's pension costs.

The City remains committed to striving for responsible stewardship of the San Francisco Employees' Actirement System (SFERS). The careful management of retirement obligations and their associated costs is critical to ensuring the City's financial security. In 2011 Mayor Ed Lee worked to pass pension reform legislation which significantly reduced the City's long term pension obligations. The legislation (Prop. C) included reductions to benefits and requirements that employee contribute at least 7.5% of their salary toward their pension costs, depending on the health of the pension fund. This was estimated to save the City up to \$1.3 billion over the subsequent 10 years. Without this legislation, the City's fiscal outlook would be considerably worse.

There are mutiple drivers of the City's long term pension obligations. However, SFERS is among the top-performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. The System is currently 85% funded, versus an average of 72% funded amongst peer jurisdictions. That funding gap that will be closed over the long term, not only by the City but also by City employees as a result of the employee cost sharing provisions approved by the voters in 2011 and future investment gains. However, future pension liabilities are a great concern for the city, and are carefully tracked and analyzed closely on an ongoing basis by the Mayor's Office, Controller's Office, Retirement System and the Board of Supervisors' Budget and Legislative Analyst. We closely monitor the impact of our pension obligations on our long term fiscal deficit and will continue to seek to reduce projected deficits over time.

A detailed response from the Mayor's Office, Elections Department, and Elections Commission to the Civil Grand Jury's findings and recommendations are attached.

Each signatory prepared its own responses and is able to respond to questions related to its respective part of the report.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this Civil Grand Jury report.

Sincerely,

Edwin Lee Mayor

Director of the Department of Election

Christopher Jetdonek President of the Elections Commission

| rt Title | 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | Findings | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017. Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
|---|---|---|----------------------------|--|---|
| rement reasing ling & er Oversight | -1 | That there are multiple causes for the City's \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System, including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic assumptions (\$1.1 billion). However, the | Мауог | disagree with it, partially (explanation in next column) | We agree that there are multiple drivers of the City's long term pension obligations. However, SFE performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. We are confident that, ow assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all active and retired SF the Retirement Board receives an actuarial valuation - a snapshot of the long-term progress of the of all promised benefits - from which they review and adjust, if prudent and appropriate, existing the long-term financial strength of the SFERS Trust. In accordance with the City Charter and Retir cost or increase in liabilities associated with every voter-approved proposition is amortized over the strength of the SFERS Trust. |
| | | principal underlying cause is the estimated \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008. | | | The Retirement System unfunded liability is not a "debt", but rather a funding gap that will be materin, not only by the City, but also by City employees as a result of the employee cost sharing proceed in the city, but also by City employees as a result of the employee cost sharing proceed in the city voters in 2011 (Proposition C) and long term investment gains. As reflected in the past investment System — relative to U.S. public fund peers, SFERS' investment results ranked in the firm year and 10 year time periods, investment gains will also contribute a significant amount towards liabilities of the Retirement System. |
| | | | | | |
| rement reasing ling & er Oversight | | 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions) 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related propositions (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening | | disagree with it, partially (explanation in next column) | We are in agreement that the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement interest and Retirees (item 1). We also agree about the composition of the retirement board (item 2). However, we disagree with finding (3). Cost analyses prepared by the Controller and the Retirem upon the best available information, and were in line with actuarial and economic assumptions ir noted in those analyses, benefit costs and Retirement Fund results are highly sensitive to a numb assumptions, several of which were not met in the years following the changes approved by vote in addition, we disagree with finding 4). Future pension liabilities are a great concern for the city, and analyzed closely on an ongoing basis by the Mayor's Office, Controller's Office, Retirement Systemvisors' Budget and Legislative analyst. Projected costs are forecast and incorporated into our process which is jointly developed by the Mayor's Budget Office, the Controllers Office and the B Budget and Legislative analyst. We have also made significant strides in enacting policy to reduce our pension liability and reduce our long term pension liabilities. The SFERS retirement system is 85% funded. White and rimportant to consider that relative to comparable systems, San Francisco's SFERS is faring very w |
| | | the fiscal status of the City. | | | performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. A recent report by the City that the peer average for city employee pension plans as of FY 15 was 72% funded (compared wi instance CALPERS is currently funded at 69% and Los Angeles is funded at 83%. As of FY 15, Seatt Portland at 46%. |

| | Recommendations | Respondent assigned by CGI | Z017 Responses (implementation). | 2017: Response Text |
|----------|--|-------------------------------|---|--|
| R1.1 | That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any | Mayor | | The financial impact of major changes that impact benef |
| | future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public | | it was implemented in next column) | fully disclosed to the voters via the ballot (see below). Di |
| | · | | | by the Retirement Board are also already disclosed to th |
| | | | | are public; agendas and minutes are posted online. Any |
| | | | | is publicly posted. |
| • | • | | | All changes in SFERS benefit provisions must be approve |
| | | | | items on the ballot we are required by charter to provide |
| | . • | | | detailing the costs of the proposition, which are disclose |
| | | | | Retirement System and the Controller's Office prepare e |
| | | | | pension-related measure placed on the ballot. By neces |
| • | • | | | are brief written statements, with more detailed fi' ma |
| | | | | for inspection by members of the public intereste x depth: |
| | | | | |
| R1.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the | Mayor | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how | The Retirement System provides extensive reports detai |
| | public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement | | it was implemented in next column) | and administrative matters on an annual basis. These ar |
| * • • | System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations. | | | audited financial statements and required supplemental actuarial valuation, and a department annual report whi |
| • | Calculations. | | | Ifinancial and actuarial information with detailed information |
| | | | | administration of the Retirement System. The details of |
| 12 | | | | component of unfunded liability related to the City's ret |
| 7 | | | | contained in the annual actuarial valuation report. There |
| 83 | | | | calculation method in the appendix of the report. The R |
| - | · | | | maintains five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuat |
| | • | | | Historical valuation reports beyond the five years availal |
| | · | | | available by request to the Retirement System. |
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| | | Respondent | | |
| # | Recommendations | assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
| R2.1 | That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight | Mayor | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | The City already has a Retirement Board which functions |
| | Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement | <u> </u> - | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | Retirement System, and the Mayor's Office has no autho |
| | System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in | ĺ | | empanel a new Board committee. Mayor Lee worked to |
| | a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be | • | | reform legislation in 2011 and the City's long term pensic |
| | considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The | | The state of the s | much worse if it was not for these measures. Lastly, the (|
| | details of the committee are: | | | pension costs in our long range financial planning-through |
| | 1 | | | planning process, deficit projections as well as through the |
| - | 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee | | | |
| | 2. Purpose | } | | which are developed by the Mayor's Office in collaborati |
| • | a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System's | | | Office and the Board of Supervisors. We closely monitor |
| | unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, and | | | pension obligations on our long term deficit and will con- |
| | present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018. All options should be on | | | projected deficits over time. |
| | the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / DefinedContribution plan. | | | |
| | b. Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement | | | |
| | System. | | | |
| | c. As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement System | ł | | |
| | encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All options | | | |
| | should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution | | | |
| | t in the second of the second | 1 | | |
| | plan. | İ | | |
| | d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by the | | | |
| | Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) all | 1 | | |
| | propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to | | | |
| 27 | voters in the Voter Information Pamphlet. | | | |
| 6 | e. In furtherance of its purpose, the committee may engage in any of the following | 1 . | | |
| 9 | activities: | | | |
| | i. Inquire into the actions of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, | | | |
| | financial statements, actuarial reports, or other materials related to the | | | |
| | Retirement System. | | | |
| D2 2 | | | Telegraphic and the second state of the second | |
| R2.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter | Mayor | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | |
| | amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members | | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | board who are not beneficiaries of the trust fund, and w |
| | who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board. | | | presumably act as guardians of the public interest. How |
| | | | | obligated to act only in the fiduciary interests of the in |
| | | | | recommendation would not accomplish its intended 609 |
| | | | | will not be pursued. The City closely monitors pension co |
| | | | | financial planning - through the 5 year financial planning |
| | | | | projections as well as through the 2 year budget process |
| | | | | the Mayor's Office in collaboration with the Controller's |
| | · | | | Supervisors. We closely monitor the impact of our pensi |
| | | 1 | | long term deficit and will continute to seek to reduce pro |
| | | | | The Mayor will continue to consider any and all mechani |
| | | | | ensure fiscal sustainability. |
| | | | | Letioni E liocal onoralitanility. |
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| ****** | | <u></u> | | |

2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree)

disagree with it, wholly (explanation in next column)

2017 Response Text

The Department lacks sufficient knowledge to determine

included the information set forth in this finding.

Respondent assigned by CGJ

Department of

Elections

Findings

propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not

provide voters with complete estimates of the propositions' costs, who would pay those costs, how those costs were financed, and

That the Voter information Pamphlets for

retroactive retirement benefit increase

what the interest rates were.

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eport Title

Retirement

·Increasing

Voter Oversight

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| #/ R3.1 | That the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections ensure that future | i - | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | |
|------------|---|---------------|--|--|
| | | Elections | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | with complete financial details regarding Retirement Sys |
| | voters with complete financial details. | | | The Department of Elections does not determine the cor |
| | | | | Information Pamphlet; that determination is made by or |
| | | | | ordinances are included in the Municipal Elections Code. |
| * | • | } | | is simply to format information and transmit it to the pri |
| | _ | | | an ordinance requiring the Department of Elections to in |
| | | | | information regarding costs associated with retirement l |
| • | | | | Information Pamphlet, the Department will do so. |
| | | | | |
| R3.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, | Department of | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | 1 |
| | and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them | Elections | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | SF residents, employees, and retirees with a descri- |
| | to make informed decisions about it. | | | System that enables them to make informed decis. a |
| | | | | adopted that requires additional content to be included |
| | | | | Pamphlet, the Department will comply with the ordinan |
| | · | | 医神经原理 基 经资金数 医电视性电影器 | 医腹膜的 医格内特性遗憾 (图 · 1) (|
| | | 1 | | en Settler and the Section of the Control |

| ∍port Title | # | Findings | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) 2017 Response Text |
|--------------------------------|------|---|-----------------------------|--|
| Retirement | F3 . | That the Voter Information Pamphlets for | Elections Commission | disagree with it, wholly (explanation in next column) The Elections Commission disagrees wholly with the fine |
| Increasing | | retroactive retirement benefit increase | | Commission lacks the knowledge to assess whether thes |
| ;anding & | | propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not | | did not provide voters with full and accurate information |
| Voter Oversight | | provide voters with complete estimates of the | | propositions. |
| | | propositions' costs, who would pay those | | |
| | | costs, how those costs were financed, and | | |
| | • | what the interest rates were. | | |
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| | Recommendations | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Implementation) 2017 Response Text |
|------|---|-------------------------------|---|
| R3.1 | That the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections ensure that future | 1 | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not The Elections Commission will not implement this recom |
| | Voter Information Pamphlets for Retirement System-related propositions provide | Commission | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) Commission lacks the authority to do what is requested. |
| | voters with complete financial details. | | |
| R3.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, | Elections | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not. The Elections Commission will not implement this recom- |
| | and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them | Commission | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) Commission lacks the authority to do what is requested. |
| | to make informed decisions about it. | | |



CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER

Ben Rosenfield Controller

Todd Rydstrom Deputy Controller

August 11, 2017

The Honorable Teri L. Jackson Presiding Judge, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 400 McAllister Street, Room 008 San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Judge Jackson:

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the following is in reply to the 2016-17 Civil Grand Jury report, The San Francisco Retirement System – Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight. We would like to thank the Civil Grand Jury for their attention to this subject. Managing retirement benefits, plans and funding are among the most complex financial and workforce issues faced by governments and other entities nationwide. Consistently modeling, projecting and managing pension costs, and providing reporting and transparency to the public, is challenging. The Controller's Office works continuously to improve the quality of the City's financial management and reporting. Especially where the public are the primary users of financial information, such as in our required ballot statements, we work hard to make our reports clear and straightforward.

Overall, the Controller's Office strives to be a responsible financial steward for the City and has been a leader in analyzing ways to manage long-term costs, reduce the Retirement System's unfunded actuarial liability, and create fair cost-sharing between employees and the City as an employer. Over the last eight years, the Controller's Office has supported five different efforts to model financial and actuarial projections and make changes to pension benefits to better manage future costs. Many of these efforts have resulted in proposals moved forward by the Mayor and Board of Supervisors and ultimately adopted by City voters.

The Civil Grand Jury's report provided important findings and recommendations and helped us understand how our financial reporting and statements are received. We will use this feedback to improve efforts to communicate with leadership, stakeholders and the public on these issues.

If you have any questions about this response, please contact Deputy Controller Todd Rydstrom or me at 415-554-7500.

Respectfully submitted,

Ben Rosenfield Controller

Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board, City and County of San Francisco

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| 計學選 | | Respondent assigned | 2017 Responses | |
| # | Findings | by CGJ | (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| | 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently | | disagree with it, | While the Controller's Office finds the Civil Grand Jury's statement regarding |
| | protects the retirement-related interests of | | | the health of the Retirement Fund to be overstated, we do share the general |
| | the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the | | in next column) | concern regarding the increase in the system's net pension liability in recent |
| 1. | Retirement Board has a majority of members | | | years and its implications for future City costs. We have presented discussion |
| | who are also members of the Retirement | | | and analysis in the City's recent Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports |
| i | System (they receive, or will receive, | , | | (CAFR) and in the City's Five-Year Financial Plan on this topic. We believe that |
| | pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive | | | the health of the system needs to be closely monitored and that it is likely to |
| | retirement benefit increase propositions | | | create financial pressure for the City in the years ahead absent changes to |
| | between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of | | | benefits. The Controller's Office disagrees with the finding that our office, the |
| | Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller | | , | Mayor, and the Board of Supervisors did not fulfill our responsibilities to |
| 1 | did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out | | | watch out for the interest of the City and its residents regarding benefit |
| 1 | for the interests of the City and its residents; | | | changes on the ballot between 1996 and 2008. Cost analyses prepared by our |
| 1 | and 4) that despite previous Retirement | | · | office and the Retirement System were based upon the best available |
| | System-related propositions (2010 Proposition | · | | information, and were in line with actuarial and economic assumptions in use |
| 1 | D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future | | | at the time. As noted in those analyses, benefit costs and Retirement Fund |
| | pension liabilities, the Retirement System | | | results are highly sensitive to a number of economic assumptions, several of |
| | remains seriously underfunded, threatening | | | which were not met in the years following the changes approved by voters. |
| 1 | the fiscal status of the City. | | | I which were not ther in the years following the changes abbroved by voters: |
|) | the lister status of the City. | | ly silve | |
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| F3 | The state - Victory lafe | 0 1 1 | 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |
| lr3 | That the Voter Information Pamphlets for retroactive retirement benefit increase | Controller | disagree with it, | The Controller's Office cost analyses for measures in these years included estimates based upon actuarial and financial assumptions utilized by the |
| 1 | propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not | | in next column) | Retirement System at the time. Our analyses noted the sensitivity of the cost |
| 1 | provide voters with complete estimates of the | | in next column) | analyses to these assumptions. By necessity, these cost analyses are brief |
| 1 | provide voters with complete estimates of the propositions' costs, who would pay those | | | |
| | costs, how those costs were financed, and | | | written statements for the Voter Information Pamphlet, with detailed files |
| j | what the interest rates were. | | | maintained for stakeholders or members of the public interested in exploring further. We are open to specific comments on ways to improve our ballot |
| | what the interest rates were. | | | |
| 1 | | | | cost analyses, including those for future pension measures. We are open to |
| ļ | | | | the possibility of providing a section in the Voter Information Pamphlet with |
| 1 | | | | background on public pension structures and status, similar to our section |
| 1 1 | | | | regarding debt management and bond financing that is provided when bonds are on the ballot. |
| , | | | | are on the panot. |
| .4 | The Controller and the Retirement System | Cantroller | disagree with it. | The Detirement Sustain produces union venests details of a said estimated |
| l'** | provide extensive reports about the | | | The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, |
| | Retirement System, but they are too complex | | in next column) | and operational issues, including a summary of their financial statements that |
| } | for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to | | in next column) | are designed for a knowledgable but non-expert audience. The Controller's |
| } . | understand. The data in the Retirement | j | | Office, in the City's Five-Year Financial Plan, reports on the expected future |
| | System reports is not available to the | ĺ | 1 | retirement costs to the City, and includes discussion of the health of the |
| | | Ì | | Retirement Fund in the City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR). |
| 1 | Retirement System or the public in a dataset, | ł | | The Controller's Office has made regular public presentations at hearings held |
| | making research and analysis more difficult. | 1 | | by the Board of Supervisors on the health of the Retirement System and its |
| | | | | implications for the financial health of the City. We welcome comments on |
| l . | | ļ | | specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be |
| | · |) | | useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic. |
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| | | Respondent | | |
| # | Recommendations | assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
| 1 | That the Board of Supervisors establish | Controller | The recommendation will not be | This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor and |
| | a permanent Retirement System | | implemented because it is not | Board of Supervisors, and not the Controller's Office. In our |
| | Oversight Committee to develop a | <u> </u> | warranted or reasonable | role as financial advisor, the Controller's Office will support |
| • | , | 1 | | |
| | comprehensive, long-term solution for | i . | (explanation in next column) | whatever efforts policymakers put in place to study the |
| | the Retirement System that is fair to | | | health of the Retirement Fund and to consider changes to |
| | both employees and taxpayers, and | | | manage future financial costs for the City. We note, |
| | present it to the voters in a | | | however, that the City has rigorous ongoing practices built |
| | proposition by 2018. All options for | | · | in to its financial management to review changes in the |
| | reducing pension liabilities must be | | · | funded status of the Retirement Fund and their implications |
| | |] | | |
| | considered, including a hybrid Defined | , | | for the City's finances. Further, the Controller's Office has |
| | Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. | | | supported five different efforts in the last eight years to |
| | The details of the committee are: | | | model financial and actuarial projections and make changes |
| | 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight | | | to pension benefits to better manage future costs. Many of |
| | Committee | | | these efforts have resulted in proposals moved forward by |
| | Y | | | |
| | 2. Purpose | | | the Mayor and Board of Supervisors and ultimately adopted |
| | a. Develop a comprehensive, long- | | | by City voters. |
| | term solution for the Retirement | | · . | |
| | System's unfunded liabilities that is fair | | | |
| | | | | · · · |
| | to both employees, retirees, and | | | |
| | taxpayers, and present it to voters in a | | | |
| | proposition by the end of 2018. All | |) | |
| | options should be on the table, | | | |
| | , , | | | |
| | including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / | | | |
| | DefinedContribution plan. | | , , | |
| | b. Inform and educate the public | | · • | |
| | concerning the finances of the | | | · . |
| | | | | |
| | Retirement System. | | , | |
| | That by the end of 2018, the Mayor | Controller | The recommendation will not be | This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor and |
| | and Board of Supervisors submit a | | implemented because it is not | Board of Supervisors, and not the Controller's Office. In our |
| | | | | bodi d bi baper visors, and not the controller s office. In our |
| | Charter amendment proportion to that | | Warranted or reasonable | role as financial advisor the Controlleds Office will support |
| | Charter amendment proposition to the | | warranted or reasonable | role as financial advisor, the Controller's Office will support |
| | voters to add three additional public | | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | whatever efforts policymakers request to review |
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2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO LGJ RECOMMENDATIONS

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| | | Respondent | | |
| , | (Recommendations | assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
| | That by the end of 2018, the | Controller | The recommendation has been | The Retirement System, the Controller's Office, and others |
| | Controller's Office provide SF | | implemented (summary of how it | already produce a wide array of public reports for various |
| | residents, employees, and retirees | | was implemented in next column) | audiences on the financial health of the Retirement Fund |
| | with a description of the City's | | | and its implications for both beneficiaries and the City |
| | Retirement System that enables them | | | government. We have augmented this reporting in recent |
| | to make informed decisions about it. | | | years with additional detailed analysis and discussion in the |
| | | | | City's Five Year Financial Plan: We welcome specific |
| | | | | suggestions to improve these products, but do not believe |
| i | | | | that an additional annual report will improve public |
| ŀ | | | | knowledge of this topic. As discussed elsewhere, we are |
| 1 | | | | open to specific means of improving our ballot measure |
| | | | | analysis, including the possibility of providing additional |
| | | | | background information in the voter information pamphlet |
| i | | | | when pension measures are placed before the voters, |
| ŀ | | ł | | similar to our discussion of debt financing when bond |
| - 1 | | 1 | | authorizations are on the ballot. |
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| | That by the end of 2018, the | Controller | The recommendation will not be | This recommendation should be directed to the Retirement |
| | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and | Controller | 1. | 1. |
| | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data | Controller | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable | This recommendation should be directed to the Retirement System and not the Controller's Office. |
| | Retirement System develop and | Controller | implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable | 1. |
| | Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of | Controller | implemented because it is not | 1. |
| | Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and make that | Controller | implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable | 1. |
| | Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of | Controller | implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable | 1. |
| | Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and make that dataset available to the public. | Controller | implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable | System and not the Controller's Office. |
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CIVIL GRAND JURY | 2016-2017 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO



THE SAN FRANCISCO RETIREMENT SYSTEM INCREASING UNDERSTANDING AND ADDING VOTER OVERSIGHT

Findings, Recommendations, Responses, & SF CGJ Notes

SEPTEMBER 20, 2017

Finding F1

That there are multiple causes for the City's \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System, including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic assumptions (\$1.1 billion). However, the principal underlying cause is the estimated \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008.

Mayor's Office Response to Finding F1

Disagree with it, partially.

We agree that there are multiple drivers of the City's long term pension obligations. However, SFERS is among the top-performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. We are confident that, over the long term, the assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all active and retired SFERS members. Each year, the Retirement Board receives an actuarial valuation - a snapshot of the long-term progress of the fund toward full funding of all promised benefits - from which they review and adjust, if prudent and appropriate, existing funding policies to ensure the long-term financial strength of the SFERS Trust. In accordance with the City Charter and Retirement Board policies, the cost or increase in liabilities associated with every voter-approved proposition is amortized over up to a 20-year period.

The Retirement System unfunded liability is not a "debt", but rather a funding gap that will be made up over the very long term, not only by the City, but also by City employees as a result of the employee cost sharing provisions approved by the City voters in 2011 (Proposition C) and long term investment gains. As reflected in the past investment performance of the Retirement System – relative to U.S. public fund peers, SFERS' investment results ranked in the first quartile for the 3 year, 5 year and 10 year time periods, investment gains will also contribute a significant amount towards reducing the unfunded liabilities of the Retirement System.

SF CGI Notes

The Mayor's Office's cover letter states that "The System is currently 85% funded, versus an average of 72% funded amongst peer jurisdictions."

The 7/1/16 Actuarial Valuation Report (page 1) shows two funded ratios: 82.6% based on Market Value of Assets, and 84.6% based on Actuarial Value of Assets.

http://mysfers.org/wp-content/uploads/SFERS-2016-AVR_2017-02-01s.pdf

The 6/30/16 GASB 67/68 Report (page 9) shows the "Plan fiduciary net position as a percentage of the total pension liability" as 77.61%.

http://mysfers.org/wp-content/uploads/11092016-board-meeting-11-gasb.pdf

The 6/30/16 SFERS Annual Report (page 3) states "At the June 30, 2016 fiscal year-end measurement date, the plan net position as a percentage of total pension liability is 77.6% based on total pension liability of \$26.0 billion and plan net position of \$20.2 billion."

http://mysfers.org/wp-content/uploads/SFERS_AnnualReport_FY16_web.pdf

None of the reports explain the differences between the Actuarial Valuation Report's funded percentages and the funded percentage in the GASB 67/68 and SFERS Annual Reports.

The Retirement System unfunded liability has an outstanding balance, an annual interest rate of 7.5%, and annual payments for interest and principal, so it strongly resembles a debt. The City's employees do not pay for this debt.

The unfunded liability is part of employees' compensation for services rendered during a year for the benefit of the City's residents. By amortizing the unfunded liability over up to 20 years, we are making future residents pay for services received by current residents. This is called intergenerational inequity.

Retirement Board Response to Finding F1

Disagree with it, wholly.

The Retirement Board is confident that, over the long term, the assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all beneficiaries. We emphasize the long term view because none of the figures cited as "debt" are due now. Rather, the items being called a "debt" are funding gaps (i.e., unfunded liabilities) which are designed to be paid off over the life of the SFERS Trust. Additionally, under Proposition C, City employees now pay more out of each and every paycheck into the SFERS Trust, which has reduced the City's cost.

Despite investment shortfalls from two recent major recessions, including the Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis, SFERS is closing the gap and ranked in the first quartile of all U.S. public fund peers. SFERS investment performance varies from year-to-year due to financial markets; however, SFERS invests for the long term, evidenced by it top quartile performance, over the 3 year, 5 year, and 10 year time periods. SFERS investment gains have contributed a significant amount toward reducing the unfunded liabilities.

In accordance with the City Charter and Retirement Board policies, the cost or increase in liabilities associated with every voter-approved proposition is amortized over up to a 20-year period. The remaining cost of the benefit and COLA increases approved by City voters between 1996 and 2008 was \$1.038 billion, as of June 30, 2016. By 2028, this liability will be paid in full. The present value of the increase in the unfunded liability resulting from the court ruling on the Supplemental COLA retroactive payments of 2013 and 2014 was calculated to be \$429.3 million, as of July 2016.

SF CGJ Notes

The Retirement System's unfunded liability has an outstanding balance, an annual interest rate of 7.5%, and annual payments for interest and principal, so it strongly resembles a debt. The City's employees do not pay for this debt.

The unfunded liability is part of employees' compensation for services rendered during a year for the benefit of the City's residents. By amortizing the unfunded liability over up to 20 years, we are making future residents pay for services received by current residents. This is intergenerational inequity.

The 6/30/16 GASB 67/68 Report (page 2) states "The Net Pension Liability (NPL) increased significantly by about \$3,517 million since the prior measurement date, primarily due to investment losses (\$1,384 million), the Appeal Court's elimination of the full funding requirement for certain members (\$1,294 million), and the impact of the revised demographic assumptions and change in discount rate (\$1,087 million)."

(bolding added)

Recommendation R1.1

That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public.

Mayor's Office Response to Recommendation R1.1

The recommendation has been implemented.

The financial impact of major changes that impact benefit structure are already fully disclosed to the voters via the ballot (see below). Day to day decisions taken by the Retirement Board are also already disclosed to the public. Board meetings are public; agendas and minutes are posted online. Any action taken by the board is publicly posted.

All changes in SFERS benefit provisions must be approved by the City's voters. For items on the ballot we are required by charter to provide actuarial reports detailing the costs of the proposition, which are disclosed on the ballot. The Retirement System and the Controller's Office prepare extensive analyses of any pension-related measure placed on the ballot. By necessity, these cost analyses are brief written statements, with more detailed files maintained and available for inspection by members of the public interested in exploring the issues in more depth.

SF CGJ Notes

The Voter Information Pamphlets for retroactive retirement benefit increases have not included the actuarial reports, the debt's principal amount, the debt's interest rate, or the debt's amortization schedule.

In the June 2008 Voter Information Pamphlet, the "Information on Local Ballot Measures" page, the Proposition B pages, and the Proposition B Legal Text make no mention of "more detailed files maintained and available for inspection by members of the public."

Retirement Board Response to Recommendation R1.1

The recommendation has been implemented.

The Retirement Board will continue its long-standing practice for any and all future City ordinances or City Charter amendments that impact retirement benefits. The Retirement Board's consulting actuary will prepare and present a cost-effect report to the Board of Supervisors, as required under the City Charter. Each report will be prepared in accordance with industry standards and practices, using the best available demographic information and economic information at the time, as well as the long-term demographic and economic assumptions adopted by the Retirement Board. The report is intended to assist the Board of Supervisors and/or the City's voters, by providing an expert's projection of the overall cost and increase in liability for each proposition. These reports accurately measure the cost/effect impact of the proposition at the time they are prepared. Certainly, the cost or change in liability may differ, in the future, due to changes in fund investment performance (e.g. 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis), changes in economic and demographic assumptions, and changes in plan provisions which are beyond the Retirement Board's control.

SF CGJ Notes

The actuarial cost reports for retroactive benefit increase propositions were not mentioned in the Voter Information Pamphlets.

Recommendation R1.2

That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations.

Mayor's Office Response to Recommendation R1.2

The recommendation has been implemented.

The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters on an annual basis. These annual reports include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The details of the breakout for each component of unfunded liability related to the City's retirement plan are contained in the annual actuarial valuation report. There is a description of the calculation method in the appendix of the report. The Retirement System maintains five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuation report on its website. Historical valuation reports beyond the five years available on the website are available by request to the Retirement System.

SF CGJ Notes

The 7/1/16 SFERS Actuarial Valuation Report, page 26, "Section V – Contributions" table, shows the values for only a single year. It does not show the full amortization schedule for each proposition.

"There is a description of the calculation method in the appendix of the report." Appendix B — Actuarial Assumptions and Methods, pages 67-68, 3. Amortization Method contains high level descriptions such as "Any Charter change prior to 7/1/2014 has been amortized over 20 years from the date it was first recognized in the valuation." It does not describe the calculation method for these elements of the "Section V — Contributions" table:

Outstanding Balance, Amortization Payment, Payment as % of Pay.

Retirement Board Response to Recommendation R1.2

The recommendation has been implemented.

The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience, on an annual basis. These annual reports are available on the SFERS website and include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The details of the breakout for each component of unfunded liability related to the City's retirement plan are contained in each annual actuarial valuation report. The Retirement System maintains at least five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuation report on its website. Historical valuation reports beyond the years available on the website are available by request to the Retirement System. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic.

SF CGI Notes

The 7/1/16 SFERS Actuarial Valuation Report, page 26, "Section V – Contributions" table, shows the values for only a single year. It does not show the full amortization schedule for each proposition. The calculations are not described: See above SF CGJ Notes on Appendix B.

Finding F2

- 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees;
- 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions);
- 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and
- 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related propositions (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening the fiscal status of the City.

Mayor's Office Response to Finding F2

Disagree with it, partially.

We are in agreement that the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement interests of the City's employees and Retirees (item 1). We also agree about the composition of the retirement board (item 2).

However, we disagree with finding (3). Cost analyses prepared by the Controller and the Retirement System were based upon the best available information, and were in line with actuarial and economic assumptions in use at the time. As noted in those analyses, benefit costs and Retirement Fund results are highly sensitive to a number of economic assumptions, several of which were not met in the years following the changes approved by voters.

In addition, we disagree with finding 4). Future pension liabilities are a great concern for the city, and are carefully tracked and analyzed closely on an ongoing basis by the Mayor's Office, Controller's Office, Retirement System and the Board of Supervisors' Budget and Legislative analyst. Projected costs are forecast and incorporated into our 5-year financial planning process which is jointly developed by the Mayor's Budget Office, the Controller's Office and the Board of Supervisors' Budget and Legislative analyst.

We have also made significant strides in enacting policy to reduce our pension liability and continue to look for ways to reduce our long-term pension liabilities. The SFERS retirement system is 85% funded. While still not fully funded, it is important to consider that relative to comparable systems, San Francisco's SFERS is faring very well, and is among the top-performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. A recent report by the City Services Auditor found that the peer average for city employee pension plans as of FY 15 was 72% funded (compared with SFERS at 85%). For instance, CALPERS is currently funded at 69% and Los Angeles is funded at 83%. As of FY 15, Seattle was funded at 66% and Portland at 46%.

SF CGI Notes

Information provided in the Voter Information Pamphlets for retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions was not enough for voters to make a well-informed decision.

The City Services Auditor report mentioned is for Fiscal Year 2015, so it is not current. As stated in our report, the current funding level is 77.6% as of 6/30/2016 (GASB 67/68 Report for 6/30/16

Measurement Date).

CALPERS recently changed their expected return on investments from 7.5% to 7.0% in steps over the last few years. If the Retirement System did the same, the funding level would be significantly lowered.

Retirement Board Response to Finding F2

Disagree with it, partially.

SFERS is among the top performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States and disagrees with the finding that the "Retirement System remains seriously underfunded." The Retirement Board is confident that, over the long term, the assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all beneficiaries. The Retirement Board recognizes that unfunded liabilities are not a "debt" that must be paid today. Rather, the Retirement Board annually adopts and administer a funding policy to assure that all promised benefits will be paid over the combined lifetimes of the members and their beneficiaries.

Each year, the Retirement Board receives an actuarial valuation — a detailed report on the long-term progress of the SFERS Trust toward reducing all pension liabilities. Existing funding policies are reviewed and adjusted, where appropriate, to ensure the long-term financial strength of the SFERS Trust. In accordance with the City Charter, Retirement Board policies, and industry best practices, any increase in the unfunded liabilities associated with every voter-approved proposition is spread out over a 20-year period, which minimizes the impact to the City budget. Based on recent actuarial projections, the Retirement Board expects a continued reduction in liabilities associated with voter-approved benefit improvements over the long-term.

The Retirement Board also strongly disagrees with the finding "that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents." The Retirement Board does not approve plan benefits; its fiduciary duty is to manage the SFERS Trust and pay the mandated benefits approved by City voters. As fiduciaries to the SFERS Trust, the Retirement Board is legally bound, as set forth in the California State Constitution, and in the San Francisco Charter, to administer the SFERS Trust solely for the benefit of active and retired members of the Retirement System, and their survivors and beneficiaries. Under the State Constitution, the Retirement Board is required to discharge its duties with respect to the SFERS Trust solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to SFERS participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions thereto, and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system. Under trust law, the Retirement Board's duty to its participants and their beneficiaries takes precedence over any other duty, including any duty to the City or its residents.

For each proposition related to changes in SFERS benefits that was presented to City voters during the period from 1996 to 2008, the Retirement Board's consulting actuary prepared and presented a cost-effect report to the Board of Supervisors as required under the City Charter. Each report was prepared in accordance with industry standards and practices, using the best available demographic information and economic information at the time, as well as the long-term demographic and economic assumptions adopted by the Retirement Board, to provide an expert's projection of the overall cost and increase in liability for each proposition upon which the Board of Supervisors and the City's voters can make their determination regarding each proposition. These reports accurately measured the cost/effect impact of the propositions at the time they were prepared and presented to the Board of Supervisors and the City's voters. Certainly, these measurements may differ into the future due to changes in fund investment performance (e.g. 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis), changes in economic and demographic assumptions (e.g., people living longer than previously expected), and changes in plan provisions which are beyond the Retirement Board's control. The Retirement Board fulfilled its fiduciary responsibility, as required by law,

for each of the Retirement System-related propositions presented to the City's voters between 1996 and 2008.

SF CGJ Notes

The unfunded liabilities may not be a "debt" that must be paid today, but the \$435,750,000 interest payment must be paid today (\$5.81 billion at 7.5%).

The 6/30/16 GASB 67/68 Report (page 31) shows the "UAL Contribution" going to zero in 2083 (UAL = Unfunded Actuarial Liability).

The actuarial reports for retroactive benefit increases were not presented to the voters.

Controller's Office Response to Finding F2

Disagree with it, partially.

While the Controller's Office finds the Civil Grand Jury's statement regarding the health of the Retirement Fund to be overstated, we do share the general concern regarding the increase in the system's net pension liability in recent years and its implications for future City costs. We have presented discussion and analysis in the City's recent Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) and in the City's Five-Year Financial Plan on this topic. We believe that the health of the system needs to be closely monitored and that it is likely to create financial pressure for the City in the years ahead absent changes to benefits. The Controller's Office disagrees with the finding that our office, the Mayor, and the Board of Supervisors did not fulfill our responsibilities to watch out for the interest of the City and its residents regarding benefit changes on the ballot between 1996 and 2008. Cost analyses prepared by our office and the Retirement System were based upon the best available information, and were in line with actuarial and economic assumptions in use at the time. As noted in those analyses, benefit costs and Retirement Fund results are highly sensitive to a number of economic assumptions, several of which were not met in the years following the changes approved by voters.

SF CGJ Notes

"We believe that the health of the system needs to be closely monitored and that it is likely to create financial pressure for the City in the years ahead absent changes to benefits."

This is a reason for creating a Retirement System Oversight Committee, or a similar body.

The City does not have a standing body to address changes to the Retirement System. The CA Supreme Court has accepted two cases that will probably lead to the removal of the "California Rule". If this occurs, there will be SF propositions to change the Retirement System, and those changes might not be to the City's benefit. The City should get ahead of this situation by creating a permanent, knowledgeable group of the stakeholders and have them propose solutions to Retirement System issues.

Recommendation R2.1

That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.

The details of the committee are listed at the end of this document due to its length.

Mayor's Office Response to Recommendation R2.1

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

The City already has a Retirement Board which functions as oversight to the Retirement System, and the Mayor's Office has no authority to establish or empanel a new Board committee. Mayor Lee worked to pass major pension reform legislation in 2011 and the City's long-term pension obligations would be much worse if it was not for these measures. Lastly, the City closely monitors pension costs in our long range financial planning-through the 5 year financial planning process, deficit projections as well as through the 2 year budget process, which are developed by the Mayor's Office in collaboration with the Controller's Office and the Board of Supervisors. We closely monitor the impact of our pension obligations on our long term deficit and will continue to seek to reduce projected deficits over time.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Recommendation R2.1 to the Mayor's Office; we apologize for our error.

The Retirement Board governs and controls the Retirement System, but does not have an oversight function.

The City does not have a standing body to address changes to the Retirement System. The CA Supreme Court has accepted two cases that will probably lead to the removal of the "California Rule". If this occurs, there will be SF propositions to change the Retirement System, and those changes might not be to the City's benefit. The City should get ahead of this situation by creating a permanent, knowledgeable group of the stakeholders and have them propose solutions to Retirement System issues.

Controller's Office Response to Recommendation R2.1

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor and Board of Supervisors, and not the Controller's Office. In our role as financial advisor, the Controller's Office will support whatever efforts policymakers put in place to study the health of the Retirement Fund and to consider changes to manage future financial costs for the City. We note, however, that the City has rigorous ongoing practices built in to its financial management to review changes in the funded status of the Retirement Fund and their implications for the City's finances. Further, the Controller's Office has supported five different efforts in the last eight years to model financial and actuarial projections and make changes to pension benefits to better manage future costs. Many of these efforts have resulted in proposals moved forward by the Mayor and Board of Supervisors and ultimately adopted by City voters.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Recommendation R2.1 to the Controller's Office; we apologize for our error.

Retirement Board Response to Recommendation R2.1

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

This recommendation should be directed to the Board of Supervisors and not the Retirement Board.

Note: These considerations already have and do occur. For example, in 2011, the Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, other City officials, employee groups, and members of the public worked to pass Proposition C. Now, under Proposition C, employees pay more out of each and every paycheck into the SFERS Trust, which has reduced the City's contribution rate, as a percentage of payroll. This has reduced the City's pension liability over the long term.

On an annual basis, the City's leadership reviews pension costs, contribution rates, and their financial impacts in the City budget process and in other settings. On a regular basis, SFERS provides the City with detailed information, funding and contribution projections and stress testing results from the Retirement Board's actuarial consultant, and any other requested information related to the pension liabilities and employer contributions as part of the City's overall financial planning process. All changes in SFERS benefit provisions must be approved by the City's voters. The Retirement Board cannot approve changes in SFERS benefit provisions.

SF CGI Notes

We should not have directed Recommendation R2.1 to the Retirement Board; we apologize for our error.

The City does not have a standing body to address changes to the Retirement System. The CA Supreme Court has accepted two cases that will probably lead to the removal of the "California Rule". If this occurs, there will be SF propositions to change the Retirement System, and those changes might not be to the City's benefit. The City should get ahead of this situation by creating a permanent, knowledgeable group of the stakeholders and have them propose solutions to Retirement System issues.

Recommendation R2.2

That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board.

Mayor's Office Response to Recommendation R2.2

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

This recommendation is intended to add individuals to the retirement system board who are not beneficiaries of the trust fund, and who will therefore presumably act as guardians of the public interest. However, trustees are always obligated to act only in the fiduciary interests of the beneficiaries. Therefore, this recommendation would not accomplish its intended goals, and for that reason will not be pursued. The City closely monitors pension costs in our long range financial planning - through the 5 year financial planning process, deficit projections as well as through the 2 year budget process, which are developed by the Mayor's Office in collaboration with the Controller's Office and the Board of Supervisors. We closely monitor the impact of our pension obligations on our long-term deficit and will continue to seek to reduce projected deficits over time. The Mayor will continue to consider any and all mechanisms within his purview to ensure fiscal sustainability.

SF CGJ Notes

The current Retirement Board members fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities regardless of whether or not they are beneficiaries; three additional public members should be expected to do the same.

The Retirement Board members' duties include "minimizing employer contributions thereto".

The San Francisco Charter, Article XII: Employee Retirement and Health Service Systems, Sec. 12.100. Retirement Board, includes this statement:

In accordance with Article XVI, Section 17, of the California Constitution, the Retirement Board shall have plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of monies and administration of the Retirement System.

An excerpt from the CA Constitution, Article XVI, Section 17:

(b) The members of the retirement board of a public pension or retirement system shall discharge their duties with respect to the system solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to, participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions thereto, and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system. A retirement board's duty to its participants and their beneficiaries shall take precedence over any other duty.

Controller's Office Response to Recommendation R2.2

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor and Board of Supervisors, and not the Controller's Office. In our role as financial advisor, the Controller's Office will support whatever efforts policymakers request to review governance questions regarding the Retirement Board. We note, however, that Retirement Board members are fiduciaries that have a duty to the system's participants and not to "watch out for the interests of the City and its residents." This broader responsibility falls on the Mayor, Board of Supervisors and other policymakers. Under the City Charter ultimately the voters of San Francisco determine benefit levels, unlike the majority of governments where retirement benefits levels are not subject to a vote of the people.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Recommendation R2.2 to the Controller's Office; we apologize for our error.

Retirement Board Response to Recommendation R2.2

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor's Office and Board of Supervisors and not the Retirement Board.

Note: SFERS does not believe this recommendation will lead to the desired outcome of having representatives on the Retirement Board "to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents."

All members of the Retirement Board, regardless of who elected or appointed them to the Board, have a fiduciary duty to SFERS participants and their beneficiaries. In accordance with the California State Constitution, this duty takes precedence over any other duty or concern. Under the State Constitution, the Retirement Board is required to discharge its duties with respect to the SFERS Trust solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to SFERS participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions thereto, and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system. Under trust law, the Retirement Board's duty to its participants and their beneficiaries takes precedence over any other duty, including any duty to the City or its residents.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Recommendation R2.2 to the Retirement Board; we apologize for our error.

Finding F3

That the Voter Information Pamphlets for retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not provide voters with complete estimates of the propositions' costs, who would pay those costs, how those costs were financed, and what the interest rates were.

Elections Commission Response to Finding F3

Disagree with it, wholly.

The Elections Commission disagrees wholly with the finding because the Commission lacks the knowledge to assess whether these specific VIPs did or did not provide voters with full and accurate information regarding these propositions.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Finding F3 and Recommendations R3.1 and R3.2 to the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections; we apologize for our error.

Department of Elections Response to Finding F3

Disagree with it, wholly.

The Department lacks sufficient knowledge to determine whether these VIPs included the information set forth in this finding.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Finding F3 and Recommendations R3.1 and R3.2 to the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections; we apologize for our error.

Controller's Office Response to Finding F3

Disagree with it, partially.

The Controller's Office cost analyses for measures in these years included estimates based upon actuarial and financial assumptions utilized by the Retirement System at the time. Our analyses noted the sensitivity of the cost analyses to these assumptions. By necessity, these cost analyses are brief written statements for the Voter Information Pamphlet, with detailed files maintained for stakeholders or members of the public interested in exploring further. We are open to specific comments on ways to improve our ballot cost analyses, including those for future pension measures. We are open to the possibility of providing a section in the Voter Information Pamphlet with background on public pension structures and status, similar to our section regarding debt management and bond financing that is provided when bonds are on the ballot.

SF CGJ Notes

The "detailed files maintained for stakeholders or members of the public interested in exploring further" are not mentioned in the Voter Information Pamphlets. The actuarial analysis report for the 2008 Prop B could not be found online.

A "section in the Voter Information Pamphlet with background on public pension structures and status, similar to our section regarding debt management and bond financing that is provided when bonds are on

the ballot" would be helpful.

Recommendation R3.1

That the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections ensure that future Voter Information Pamphlets for Retirement System-related propositions provide voters with complete financial details.

Elections Commission Response to Recommendation R3.1

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

The Elections Commission will not implement this recommendation because the Commission lacks the authority to do what is requested.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Finding F3 and Recommendations R3.1 and R3.2 to the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections; we apologize for our error.

Department of Elections Response to Recommendation R3.1

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

The Department lacks the authority to ensure that future VIPS provide voters with complete financial details regarding Retirement System-related propositions. The Department of Elections does not determine the content of the Voter Information Pamphlet; that determination is made by ordinance, and those ordinances are included in the Municipal Elections Code. The Department's role is simply to format information and transmit it to the printer. If the City adopts an ordinance requiring the Department of Elections to include additional information regarding costs associated with retirement benefits in the Voter Information Pamphlet, the Department will do so.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Finding F3 and Recommendations R3.1 and R3.2 to the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections; we apologize for our error.

Recommendation R3.2

That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it.

Elections Commission Response to Recommendation R3.2

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

The Elections Commission will not implement this recommendation because the Commission lacks the authority to do what is requested.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Finding F3 and Recommendations R3.1 and R3.2 to the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections; we apologize for our error.

Department of Elections Response to Recommendation R3.2

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

The Department lacks the authority to require that the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it. If an ordinance is adopted that requires additional content to be included in the Voter Information Pamphlet, the Department will comply with the ordinance.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Finding F3 and Recommendations R3.1 and R3.2 to the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections; we apologize for our error.

Controller's Office Response to Recommendation R3.2

The recommendation has been implemented.

The Retirement System, the Controller's Office, and others already produce a wide array of public reports for various audiences on the financial health of the Retirement Fund and its implications for both beneficiaries and the City government. We have augmented this reporting in recent years with additional detailed analysis and discussion in the City's Five Year Financial Plan. We welcome specific suggestions to improve these products, but do not believe that an additional annual report will improve public knowledge of this topic. As discussed elsewhere, we are open to specific means of improving our ballot measure analysis, including the possibility of providing additional background information in the voter information pamphlet when pension measures are placed before the voters, similar to our discussion of debt financing when bond authorizations are on the ballot.

SF CGJ Notes

A "section in the Voter Information Pamphlet with background on public pension structures and status, similar to our section regarding debt management and bond financing that is provided when bonds are on the ballot" would be helpful.

Finding F4

The Controller and the Retirement System provide extensive reports about the Retirement System, but they are too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand. The data in the Retirement System reports is not available to the Retirement System or the public in a dataset, making research and analysis more difficult.

Retirement Board Response to Finding F4

Disagree with it, wholly.

The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, available on the SFERS website, on an annual basis. These annual reports include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System.

The Retirement System can neither agree nor disagree that these reports are too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand; however, Retirement System staff is always exploring ways to simplify the presentation of sometimes complex topics and information and is prepared to assist members of the public and City employees and retirees with any questions they might have related to the financial, actuarial and administrative information provided in our reports. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various reports to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in these complex topics. The Retirement System disagrees with the finding that the data in the Retirement System reports is not available in a dataset. The Retirement System has ready access to all the data used in preparing these reports.

SF CGJ Notes

The Finding refers to "data in the Retirement System reports", not "data used in preparing these reports."

Most of the Retirement System's reports are understandable for 'a knowledgeable but non-expert audience', but there are important sections that would be a challenge for even an expert audience. Some examples:

SFERS Annual Report: the "Actuarial Analysis of Financial Experience", "Schedule of Funding Progress", and "Actuarial Solvency Test" tables have no description of the tables, the data they contain, or why the data ends with the previous Fiscal Year.

SFERS Actuarial Valuation Report: Section VI – Actuarial Section of the CAFR, "Table VI-1 Analysis of Financial Experience", "Table VI-2 Solvency Test", and "Table VI-3 Schedule of Funding Progress" have minimal descriptions of the tables' purpose or the data they contain.

GASB 67/68 Report: Section VI – GASB 68 Collective Information, "Table VI-1 Schedule of Collective Deferred Inflows and Outflows of Resources", "Table VI-2 Calculation of Collective Pension Expense" do not describe the sources of the data, and why much of the data is different than what is in the SFERS Actuarial Valuation Report.

The items below could be done by the Retirement System and/or the Controller's Office.

1. Create a Sankey Diagram for the Retirement System. Here's a link to a CalMatters' Sankey Diagram of

the CA Budget: https://calmatters.org/articles/california-state-budget-best-visualization-tool/

- 2. Create an interactive online diagram that shows an employee's retirement fund life-cycle, from hire date through, and sometimes after, death.
- 3. Publish complete amortization schedules for each of the current proposition-based debts.

Controller's Office Response to Finding F4

Disagree with it, partially.

The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, and operational issues, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience. The Controller's Office, in the City's Five-Year Financial Plan, reports on the expected future retirement costs to the City, and includes discussion of the health of the Retirement Fund in the City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR). The Controller's Office has made regular public presentations at hearings held by the Board of Supervisors on the health of the Retirement System and its implications for the financial health of the City. We welcome comments on specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic.

SF CGJ Notes

See the SF CGJ Notes above for specific report sections that would be a challenge for even an expert audience, and some suggestions for improvements.

Recommendation R4.1

That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and make that dataset available to the public.

Retirement Board Response to Recommendation R4.1

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, and operational issues, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience. The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, available on the SFERS website, on an annual basis. These annual reports include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The data used to produce these reports is available to the public to the extent it is not protected from disclosure by law.

The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve the public availability of data used in preparing the various reports to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in these complex topics.

SF CGI Notes

The Retirement System data is not available on SF OpenBook (https://openbook.sfgov.org/) or DataSF (https://data.sfgov.org/), and a search of the Retirement System website found no data.

Controller's Office Response to Recommendation R4.1

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

This recommendation should be directed to the Retirement System and not the Controller's Office.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Recommendation R4.1 to the Controller's Office; we apologize for our error.

Recommendation R4.2

That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office develop and produce an annual Retirement System Report that clearly explains the current and projected status of the Retirement System and its effect on the City's budget.

Retirement Board Response to Recommendation R4.2

The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable.

This recommendation should be directed to the Controller's Office and not the Retirement Board.

SF CGJ Notes

We should not have directed Recommendation R4.2 to the Retirement Board; we apologize for our error.

Controller's Office Response to Recommendation R4.2

The recommendation requires further analysis (explanation of the scope of that analysis and a timeframe for discussion, not more than six months from the release of the report noted in next column)

The City's Five-Year Financial Plan includes clear discussion regarding the high-level financial status of the Retirement Fund and its implications for future City costs, including analysis of the effects of a downturn in investment returns that may occur in a recession. The City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report also includes discussion of the health and funded status of the Retirement Fund. The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, and operational issues, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience. We welcome comments on specific ways to improve these products to ensure that they are useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic.

SF CGJ Notes

The items below could be done by the Retirement System and/or the Controller's Office.

- 1. Create a Sankey Diagram for the Retirement System. Here's a link to a CalMatters' Sankey Diagram of the CA Budget: https://calmatters.org/articles/california-state-budget-best-visualization-tool/
- 2. Create an interactive online diagram that shows an employee's retirement fund life-cycle, from hire date through, and sometimes after, death.
- 3. Publish complete amortization schedules for each of the current proposition-based debts.

Complete text of Recommendation R2.1

That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The details of the committee are:

1. Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee

2. Purpose

- a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System's unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, and present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018. All options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.
- b. Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement System.
- c. As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement System encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.
- d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by the Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) all propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to voters in the Voter Information Pamphlet.
- e. In furtherance of its purpose, the committee may engage in any of the following activities:
 - Inquire into the actions of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, financial statements, actuarial reports, or other materials related to the Retirement System.
 - ii. Holding public meetings to review the effect on San Francisco residents of actions taken by the Retirement System.

3. Public Meetings

- a. The Board of Supervisors shall provide the committee with any necessary technical assistance and shall provide administrative assistance in furtherance of its purpose and sufficient resources to publicize the conclusions of the committee.
- b. All committee proceedings shall be subject to the California Public Records Act (Section 6254, et seq., of the Government Code of the State of California) and the City's Sunshine Ordinance (Chapter 67 of this Code). The committee shall issue regular reports on the results of its activities. A report shall be issued at least once a year. Minutes of the proceedings of the committee and all documents received and reports issued shall be a matter of public record and be made available on the Board's website.

4. Membership

a. Two-thirds of the members will be Public members and one-third will be Representative members.

b. Public members.

- i. Public members must be voters.
- ii. Public members cannot be members of the Retirement System.
- iii. Each Supervisor will appoint a single Public member.
- iv. The Mayor will appoint all other Public members.
- v. Public members can only be removed for cause.
- vi. Public members shall be experienced in life insurance, actuarial science, employee pension planning, investment portfolio management, labor negotiations, accounting, mathematics, statistics, economics, or finance.
- vii. Public members will receive no compensation.
- viii. Four-year term, staggered so that one-fourth of the Public members' terms expire each year.
- ix. No more than two consecutive terms.

c. Representative members

- i. Mayor's Office representative.
- ii. Board of Supervisors' representative.
- iii. Controller's Office representative.
- iv. Human Resources Department representative.
- v. Safety Unions' representative.
- vi. Miscellaneous Unions' representative.

5. Committee Costs

a. The Board of Supervisors will decide how best to fund the Committee.

Carroll, John (BOS)

rom: Carroll, John (BOS)

Jent: Thursday, September 14, 2017 1:57 PM

To: BOS-Supervisors

Cc: BOS-Legislative Aides; 'Calvillo, Angela (angela calvillo@sfgov.org)'; 'civilgrandjury@sftc.org';

'TJackson@sftc.org'; 'klowry@sfcgj.org'; 'kittywitty@comcast.net'; Elliott, Jason; Howard, Kate (MYR); Whitehouse, Melissa (MYR); Valdez, Marie (MYR); Rosenfield, Ben (CON); Steeves, Asja (CON); Stevenson, Peg (CON); Arntz, John (REG); Huish, Jay (RET); Nickens, Norm (RET); Jerdonek, Chris (REG); Givner, Jon; Somera, Alisa (BOS); Campbell, Severin (BUD);

Clark, Ashley (BUD)

Subject: 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report - Hearing - Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco

Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight - Required

Department Response

Categories: 170662, 170663

Supervisors:

The Office of the Clerk of the Board has received required responses to the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury report entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight," from the Retirement Board. Please find the following direct link to the response, and a link to an informational memo from the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors.

Retirement Board Response - September 13, 2017

Clerk of the Board Memo - September 14, 2017

I invite you to review the entire matter on our <u>Legislative Research Center</u> by following the link below:

Board of Supervisors File No. 170662

Thank you,

John Carroll
Assistant Clerk
Board of Supervisors
San Francisco City Hall, Room 244
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415)554-4445 - Direct | (415)554-5163 - Fax
john.carroll@sfgov.org | bos.legislation@sfgov.org



Click here to complete a Board of Supervisors Customer Service Satisfaction form.

The Legislative Research Center provides 24-hour access to Board of Supervisors legislation and archived matters since August 1998.

Disclosures: Personal information that is provided in communications to the Board of Supervisors is subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act and the San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance. Personal information provided will not be redacted. Members of the public are not required to provide personal identifying information when they communicate with the Board of Supervisors and its committees. All written or oral communications that members of the public submit to the Clerk's Office regarding pending legislation or hearings will be made available to all members of the public for inspection and copying. The Clerk's Office does not redact any information from these submissions. This means that personal information—including names, phone numbers, addresses and similar information that a rember of the public elects to submit to the Board and its committees—may appear on the Board of Supervisors website or in other public documents that members the public may inspect or copy.

BOARD of SUPERVISORS



City Hall
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 244
San Francisco 94102-4689
Tel. No. 554-5184
Fax No. 554-5163
TDD/TTY No. 554-5227

DATE:

September 14, 2017

TO:

Members of the Board of Supervisors

FROM:

Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board

SUBJECT:

2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report "The San Francisco Retirement System,

Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight"

We are in receipt of the following required response to the San Francisco Civil Grand Jury report released June 16, 2017, entitled: "The San Francisco Retirement System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight." Pursuant to California Penal Code, Sections 933 and 933.05, the City Departments shall respond to the report within 60 days of receipt, or no later than August 15, 2017.

For each finding the Department response shall:

- 1) agree with the finding; or
- 2) disagree with it, wholly or partially, and explain why.

As to each recommendation the Department shall report that:

- 1) the recommendation has been implemented, with a summary explanation; or
- 2) the recommendation has not been implemented but will be within a set timeframe as provided; or
- 3) the recommendation requires further analysis. The officer or agency head must define what additional study is needed. The Grand Jury expects a progress report within six months; or
- 4) the recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable, with an explanation.

The Civil Grand Jury Report identified the following City Department to submit a response (attached):

• Retirement Board: Received September 13, 2017, for Findings F1, F2, and F4; and Recommendations R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R2.2, R4.1 and R4.2.

This response is provided for your information, as received, and may not conform to the parameters stated in California Penal Code, Section 933.05 et seq.

The San Francisco Retirement S₂ n, Increasing Understanding and Adding Vote versight Office of the Clerk of the Board 60-Day Receipt September 14, 2017 Page 2

On August 18, 2017, the Office of the Clerk of the Board distributed the following responses from City Departments:

- Office of the Controller: Received August 11, 2017, for Findings F2, F3, and F4; and Recommendations R2.1, R2.2, R3.1, R3.2, R4.1, and R4.2; and
- The Mayor's Office submitted a consolidated response for the following departments:
 - a. Office of the Mayor;
 - b. Elections Department; and
 - c. Elections Commission

Received August 15, 2017, for Findings F1, F2, and F3; and Recommendations R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R2.2, R3.1, and R3.2.

The Government Audit and Oversight Committee will consider the subject report, along with the responses, at an upcoming hearing and will prepare the Board's official response by Resolution for the full Board's consideration.

C:

Honorable Teri L. Jackson, Presiding Judge Kathie Lowry, 2016-2017 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury Kitsaun King, 2016-2017 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury Jason Elliot, Mayor's Office Kate Howard, Mayor's Office Melissa Whitehouse, Mayor's Office Marie Valdez, Mayor's Office Ben Rosenfield, Controller, Office of the Controller Asja Steeves, Office of the Controller Peg Stevenson, Office of the Controller John Arntz, Director, Department of Elections Jay Huish, Executive Director, Employee's Retirement System Norm Nickens, Retirement Board Chris Jerdonek, Elections Commission Jon Givner, Deputy City Attorney Alisa Somera, Legislative Deputy Director Severin Campbell, Budget and Legislative Analyst Ashley Clark, Budget and Legislative Analyst



City and County of San Francisco Employees' Retirement System

September 13, 2017

The Honorable Teri L. Jackson Presiding Judge, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 400 McAllister Street, Room 008 San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Judge Jackson:

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the following is in reply to the 2016-17 Civil Grand Jury report, *The San Francisco Retirement System — Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight*. We would like to thank the Civil Grand Jury for their attention to this subject. The members of the Retirement Board recognize that, in performing their fiduciary duties to prudently oversee the investment and administration of the SFERS Trust, their actions impact both plan beneficiaries and the City.

The Retirement Board appreciates the Civil Grand Jury's recognition of its diligent work to protect the interests of the beneficiaries of the SFERS Trust. As a result of this work, SFERS is among the top-performing and well-funded public pension plans in the nation. The Retirement Board is confident that, over the long term, the assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all beneficiaries. The City and its voters have also taken important steps to address the increase in unfunded liability. The pension reform legislation approved by City voters in 2011 (Prop. C) will significantly reduce the City's long-term pension obligations and reduce the projected unfunded liabilities over time.

The Retirement Board works continuously to improve the quality and clarity of its reporting. The reports related to the projected cost of benefit improvements referenced in the Civil Grand Jury's report accurately measure the cost/effect impact of the proposed benefit changes at the time they were prepared and presented to the Board of Supervisors and the City voters.

The Civil Grand Jury's report provided important feedback to help us understand how our reporting is received. Retirement System staff is always exploring ways to simplify the presentation of sometimes complex topics and information and is prepared to assist members of the public and City employees and retirees with any questions they might have related to the financial, actuarial and administrative information provided in our reports. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various reports to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in these complex topics,

Detailed responses by the Retirement Board to the Civil Grand Jury's findings and recommendations are attached.

Respectfully submitted.

Jay Huish, Executive Director, on behalf of the

SFERS Retirement Board

Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board, City and County of San Francisco

CC:

The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Ac-

oter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ FINDINGS

| | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | · | , | | |
|----------|---------------------------------------|----|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| CGI Year | Report Title | a | Findings | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| 2015-17 | | F1 | That there are multiple causes for the City's | Retirement Board | disagree with it, wholly (explanation | The Retirement Board is confident that, over the long term, the assets in the |
| | System-Increasing | | \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System. | | in next column) | SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all beneficiaries. |
| 1 | Understanding & | | Including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a | | , | We emphasize the long term view because none of the figures cited as "debt" |
| 1 | Adding Voter Oversight | | court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living | | · | are due now. Rather, the Items being called a "debt" are funding gaps (i.e., |
| | | | Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C | | | unfunded liabilities) which are designed to be paid off over the life of the |
| | | | (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic | | · | SPERS Trust. Additionally, under Proposition C, City employees now pay more |
| | | | assumptions (\$1.1 billion). However, the | | | out of each and every paycheck into the SFERS Trust, which has reduced the |
| | | | principal underlying cause is the estimated | | | City's cost. |
| | | | \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit | | • | Despite investment shortfalls from two recent major recessions, including the |
| | , | | Increases implemented by voter-approved | | | Tech Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis, SFERS is closing the gap and |
| | | | propositions between 1996 and 2008. | | | ranked in the first quartile of all U.S. public fund peers. SFERS investment |
| | | | | | | performance varies from year-to-year due to financial markets; however, |
| | | | | • | | SFERS invests for the long term, evidenced by its top quartile performance, |
| | | | | | | over the 3 year, 5 year, and 10 year time periods. SFERS investment gains |
| | | | | | | have contributed a significant amount toward reducing the unfunded |
| | | | | | | liabilities. |
| | | | | | | In accordance with the City Charter and Retirement Board policies, the cost or |
| | | | | | | Increase in liabilities associated with every voter-approved proposition is |
| | | | | | | amortized over up to a 20-year period. The remaining cost of the benefit and |
| | | | | | | COLA increases approved by City voters between 1996 and 2008 was \$1.038 |
| | | | | | | billion, as of June 30, 2016. By 2028, this liability will be paid in full. The present value of the increase in the unfunded liability resulting from the court |
| | | 1 | | | | ruling on the Supplemental COLA retroactive payments of 2013 and 2014 was |
| | | | | | | calculated to be \$429.3 million, as of July 2016. |
| 1 | | 1 | | | · | same and Author mineril me at ball town |
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| | | | | ļ | | |

| 1 | | | | Respondent assigned | | |
|----------|------------------------|-----|---|---------------------|--|--|
| CGJ Year | Report Title | # | Findings | by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| 2016-17 | 7,110 1, 7,11.4.77 | FZ | 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently | Retirement Board | disagree with it, partially (explanation i | SFERS is among the top performing and well-funded public pensions plans in |
| | System-Increasing | | protects the retirement-related interests of | | | the United States and disagrees with the finding that the "Retirement System |
| | Understanding & | | the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the | | | remains seriously underfunded." The Retirement Board is confident that, over |
| | Adding Voter Oversight | | Retirement Board has a majority of members | | , | the long term, the assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the |
| | | | who are also members of the Retirement | | | promised benefits to all beneficiaries. The Retirement Board recognizes that |
| | | | System (they receive, or will receive, | | | unfunded liabilities are not a "debt" that must be paid today. Rather, the |
| | | | pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive | | | Retirement Board annually adopts and administers a funding policy to assure |
| | | | retirement benefit increase propositions | | | that all promised benefits will be paid over the combined lifetimes of the |
| 1 | | | between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of | | | members and their beneficiaries. |
| | | | Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller | | | Each year, the Retirement Board receives an actuarial valuation - a detailed |
| | | | did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out | | 1 | report on the long-term progress of the SFERS Trust toward reducing all |
| | | | for the interests of the City and Its residents; | | | pension liabilities. Existing funding policies are reviewed and adjusted, where |
| | | | and 4) that despite previous Retirement | | | appropriate, to ensure the long-term financial strength of the SFERS Trust. In |
| | | | System-related propositions (2010 Proposition | | | accordance with the City Charter, Retirement Board policies, and industry best |
| 1 | | | D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future | | | practices, any increase in the unfunded liabilities associated with every voter- |
| | | | pension liabilities, the Retirement System | | | approved proposition is spread out over a 20-year period, which minimizes |
| 1 | | | remains seriously underfunded, threatening | | | the impact to the City budget. Based on recent actuarial projections, the |
| | ' | | the fiscal status of the City. | | | Retirement Board expects a continued reduction in liabilities associated with |
| | | l l | | | | voter-approved benefit improvements over the long-term. |
| | | | | | | The Retirement Board also strongly disagrees with the finding "that when it |
| | | | | | | come to retroactive retirement benefit increases between 1996 and 2008, the |
| 1 | , | | · · | | - | Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill |
| 1 | | 1 | | | | their responsibility to watch out for the interest of the City and its residents." |
| | | | | | | The Retirement Board does not approve plan benefits; its fiduciary duty is to |
| | | | | | | manage the SFERS Trust and pay the mandated benefits approved by City |
| | | 1 | | | | voters. As fiduciaries to the SFERS Trust, the Retirement Board is legally |
| | | | | | | bound, as set forth in the California State Constitution, and in the San |

| CGJ Year | Report Title | Ħ | Findings | Respondent assigned by CGJ | Z017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
|----------|--|---|--|-------------------------------|--|---|
| | The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | The Controller and the Retirement System provide extensive reports about the Retirement System, but they are too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand. The data in the Retirement System reports is not available to the Retirement System or the public in a dataset, making research and analysis more difficult. | Retirement Board | disagree with it, wholly (explanation in | The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, available on the SFERS website, on an annual basis. These annual reports include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The Retirement System can neither agree nor disagree that these reports are too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand; however, Retirement System staff is always exploring ways to simplify the presentation of sometimes complex topics and information and is prepared to assist members of the public and City employees and retirees with any questions they might have related to the financial, actuarial and administrative information provided in our reports. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various reports to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in these complex topics. The Retirement System disagrees with the finding that the data in the Retirement System reports is not available in a dataset. The Retirement System has ready access to all the data used in preparing these reports. |
| | | | · | | | |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ RECOMMENDATIONS

| | Report Title The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | Recommendations That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public | Retirement | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how | 2017 Response Text The Retirement Board will continue its long-standing practice for any and all future City ordinances or City Charter amendments that impact retirement benefits. The Retirement Board's consulting actuary will prepare and present a cost-effect report to the Board of Supervisors, as required under the City Charter. Each report will be prepared in accordance with industry standards and practices, using the best available demographic information and economic information at the time, as well as the long-term demographic and economic assumptions adopted by the Retirement Board. The report is intended to assist the Board of Supervisors and/or the City's voters, by providing an expert's projection of the overall cost and increase in flability for each proposition. These reports accurately measure the cost/effect impact of the proposition at the time they are prepared. Certainly, the cost or change in liability may differ, in the future, due to changes in fund investment performance (e.g. 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis), changes in economic and demographic assumptions, and changes in plan provisions which are beyond the Retirement Board's control. |
|------|---|--|---------------------|--|--|
| 2804 | Accelerating SF Government Performance Taking Accountability and Transparency to the Next Level | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations. | Retirement Board | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how it was implemented in next column) | The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, including a summery of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience, on an annual basis. These annual reports are available on the SFERS website and include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The details of the breakout for each component of unfunded liability related to the City's retirement plan are contained in each annual actuarial valuation report. The Retirement System maintains at least five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuation report on its website. Historical valuation report beyond the years available on the website are available by request to the Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic. |

| Report Title The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | RL.i | Recommendations That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public | Respondent assigned by CGI Retirement Board | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how it was implemented in next column) | 2017 Response Text The Retirement Board will continue its long-standing practice for any and all future City ordinances or City Charter amendments that impact retirement benefits. The Retirement Board's consulting actuary will prepare and present a cost-effect report to the Board of Supervisors, as required under the City Charter. Each report will be prepared in accordance with industry standards and practices, using the best available demographic information and economic information at the time, as well as the long-term demographic and economic assumptions adopted by the Retirement Board. The report is intended to assist the Board of Supervisors and/or the City's voters, by providing an expert's projection of the overall cost and increase in liability for each proposition. These reports accurately measure the cost/effect impact of the proposition at the time they are prepared. Certainly, the cost or change in liability may differ, in the future, due to changes in fund investment performance (e.g. 2007-08 Global Financial Cisis), changes in economic and demographic assumptions, and changes in plan provisions which are beyond the Retirement Board's control. |
|--|------|--|--|--|---|
| Accelerating SF Government Performance, Taking Accountability and Transparency to the Next Level | R1.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations. | Retirement Board | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how it was implemented in next column) | The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience, on an annual basis. These annual reports are available on the SFERS website and include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The details of the breakout for each component of unfunded liability related to the City's retirement plan are contained in each annual actuarial valuation report. The Retirement System maintains at least five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuation report on its website. Historical valuation reports beyond the years available on the website are available by request to the Retirement System. The Retirement System welcomes comments on specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic. |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGI RECOMMENDATIONS

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|--------------|-------------------|--------------|--|------------|--|--|
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| | | | The state of the s | Respondent | [18] - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - 18 - | |
| CG) Year | Report Title | | Recommendations | | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
| | The SF Retirement | P2.1 | | Retirement | | This recommendation should be directed to the Board of Supervisors and not the |
| 1 | System-Increasing | RE,I | Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement | | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | Retirement Board. |
| 1 | Understanding & | | System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in | Board | Astronuch of tensoring a few high strate of three in | Vedicularit posts. |
| i | Adding Voter | 1 | f | Į | | No. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 |
| | | | a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be | | , | Note: These considerations already have and do occur. For example, in 2011, the |
| | Oversight | | considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The | | | Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, other City officials, employee groups, and |
| 1 | | ì | details of the committee are: 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee 2. | | | members of the public worked to pass Proposition C. Now, under Proposition C, |
| 1 | | | Purpose a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement | | | employees pay more out of each and every paychack into the SFERS Trust, which |
| 1 | | | System's unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, | | · | has reduced the City's contribution rate, as a percentage of payroll. This has |
| I | | I | and present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018. All options should be | İ | | reduced the City's ponsion liability over the long term. |
| | | | on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / DefinedContribution plan. b. | | · · | On an annual basis, the City's leadership reviews pension costs, contribution rates, |
| 1 | i | l | Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement System. c. | l | | and their financial impacts in the City budget process and in other settings. On a |
| 1 | | | As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement System | | | regular basis, SFERS provides the City with detailed information, funding and |
| | | | encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All options | | | contribution projections and stress testing results from the Retirement Board's |
| | 1 | | should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution | | | actuarial consultant, and any other requested information related to the pension |
| | | | plan, d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by | | | liabilities and employer contributions as part of the City's overall financial planning |
| | | | the Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) | | | process. All changes in SFERS benefit provisions must be approved by the City's |
| 1 | l | 1 | all propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to | | | voters. The Retirement Board cannot approve changes in SPERS benefit provisions. |
| 1 | | | voters in the Voter Information Pamphiet, e. In furtherance of its purpose, the | | | |
| 1 | 1 | | committee may engage in any of the following activities: I, inquire into the actions | } . | | |
| | | | of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, financial statements, | | | . 1 |
| 1 | | | actuarial reports, or other materials related to the Retirement System. II. Holding | | , | |
| 1 | | \ | public meetings to review the effect on San Francisco residents of actions taken by | 1 | | |
| 1 | | | the Retirement System. 3. Public Meetings a. The Board of Supervisors shall provide | J | | |
| | | | the committee with any necessary technical assistance and shall provide | ' | | • |
| | | | administrative assistance in furtherance of its purpose and sufficient resources to | | · · | |
| | | | publicize the conclusions of the committee. | | | |
| | | | b. All committee proceedings shall be subject to the California Public Records Act | | | |
| J | | | | · | | |
| 16-17 | The SF Retirement | 1 | That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Soard of Supervisors submit a Charter | Retirement | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor's Office and Board of |
| 806 | System-Increasing | 1 | amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who | Board | warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | Supervisors and not the Retirement Board, |
| \mathbb{Z} | Understanding & | | are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board. | | | |
| φι | Adding Voter | | | | | Note: SFERS does not believe this recommendation will lead to the desired |
| 1 | Oversight | 1 | | | | outcome of having representatives on the Retirement Board "to watch out for the |
| 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | Interests of the City and its residents." |
| 1 | | 1 | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| 1 | | | · | | | All members of the Retirement Board, regardless of who elected or appointed |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | · | 1 | | them to the Board, have a fiduciary duty to SFERS participants and their |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | : | beneficiaries. In accordance with the California State Constitution, this duty takes |
| | | 1 | | | | precedence over any other duty or concern. Under the State Constitution, the |
| 1 | | | | | | Retirement Board is required to discharge its duties with respect to the SFERS |
| | | | | | | 1 |
| | | | | 1 | • | Trust solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits. |
| | | 1 | | | | to SFERS participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions |
| 1 | | | | 1 | | thereto, and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system. Under |
| 1 | 1 | | | | | trust law, the Retirement Board's duty to its participants and their beneficiaries |
| | | | | | | takes procedence over any other duty, including any duty to the City or its |
| | | | · | | | residents. |
| 1 | L | | | | | |
| | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | -A | | |

| CGJ Year | Report Title | ı | Recommendations | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
|----------|---|---|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and make that dataset available to the public. | Retirement Board | - | The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, and operational issues, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgeable but non-expert audience. The Retirement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters, available on the SFERS website, on an annual basis. These annual reports include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the fletirement System. The data used to produce these reports is available to the public to the extent it is not protected from disclosure by law. The Retirement System velcomes comments on specific ways to improve the public availability of data used in preparing the various reports to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in these complex topics. |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office develop and produce an annual Retirement System Report that clearly explains the current and projected status of the Retirement System and its effect on the City's budget. | Retirement Board | | This recommendation should be directed to the Controller's Office and not the Retirement Board. |

Carroll, John (BOS)

From:

Carroll, John (BOS)

Sent:

Friday, August 18, 2017 4:41 PM

To:

BOS-Supervisors

Cc:

BOS-Legislative Aides; 'Calvillo, Angela (angela.calvillo@sfgov.org)'; 'civilgrandjury@sftc.org';

klowry@sfcgj.org; 'kittywitty@comcast.net'; Elliott, Jason; Howard, Kate (MYR); Whitehouse,

Melissa (MYR); Valdez, Marie (MYR); Rosenfield, Ben (CON); Steeves, Asja (CON);

Stevenson, Peg (CON); Arntz, John (REG); Nickens, Norm (RET); Huish, Jay (RET); Chan, Donald (REG); Givner, Jon; Somera, Alisa (BOS); Campbell, Severin (BUD); Newman, Debra;

Clark, Ashley (BUD)

Subject:

2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco Retirement System, Increasing

Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight - Required Department Responses

Categories:

170662

Supervisors:

The Office of the Clerk of the Board has received required responses to the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury report entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight," from the Offices of the Mayor and the Controller. Note that the Office of the Mayor has submitted a consolidated response for the Elections Department and the Elections Commission. Please find the following direct links to the individual responses, and a link to an informational memo from the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors.

Office of the Mayor Consolidated Response - August 15, 2017

Office of the Controller Response - August 11, 2017

Clerk of the Board Memo - August 18, 2017

I invite you to review the entire matter on our Legislative Research Center by following the link below:

Board of Supervisors File No. 170662

Thank you,

John Carroll
Assistant Clerk
Board of Supervisors
San Francisco City Hall, Room 244
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415)554-4445 - Direct | (415)554-5163 - Fax
john.carroll@sfgov.org | bos.legislation@sfgov.org



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BOARD of SUPERVISORS



City Hall
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 244
San Francisco 94102-4689
Tel. No. 554-5184
Fax No. 554-5163
TDD/TTY No. 554-5227

DATE:

August 18, 2017

TO:

Members of the Board of Supervisors

FROM:

Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board

SUBJECT!

2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report "The San Francisco Retirement System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight"

We are in receipt of the following required responses to the San Francisco Civil Grand Jury report released June 16, 2017, entitled: "The San Francisco Retirement System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight." Pursuant to California Penal Code, Sections 933 and 933.05, the City Departments shall respond to the report within 60 days of receipt, or no later than August 15, 2017.

For each finding the Department response shall:

- 1) agree with the finding; or
- 2) disagree with it, wholly or partially, and explain why.

As to each recommendation the Department shall report that:

- 1) the recommendation has been implemented, with a summary explanation; or
- 2) the recommendation has not been implemented but will be within a set timeframe as provided; or
- 3) the recommendation requires further analysis. The officer or agency head must define what additional study is needed. The Grand Jury expects a progress report within six months; or
- 4) the recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable, with an explanation.

The Civil Grand Jury Report identified the following City Departments to submit responses (attached):

- Office of the Controller: Received August 11, 2017, for Findings F2, F3, and F4; and Recommendations R2.1, R2.2, R3.1, R3.2, R4.1, and R4.2; and
- The Mayor's Office submitted a consolidated response for the following departments:
 - a. Office of the Mayor;
 - b. Elections Department; and
 - c. Elections Commission

Received August 15, 2017, for Findings F1, F2, and F3; and Recommendations R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R2.2, R3.1, and R3.2.

The San Francisco Retirement Sy 1, Increasing Understanding and Adding Vote 'ersight Office of the Clerk of the Board 60-Day Receipt August 16, 2017
Page 2

Responses not received within the 60-day deadline as required by California Penal Code, Section 933:

• Retirement Board: For Findings F1, F2, and F4; and Recommendations R1.1, R1.2, R2.1, R2.2, R4.1 and R4.2.

These departmental responses are being provided for your information, as received, and may not conform to the parameters stated in California Penal Code, Section 933.05 et seq. The Government Audit and Oversight Committee will consider the subject report, along with the responses, at an upcoming hearing and will prepare the Board's official response by Resolution for the full Board's consideration.

c:

Honorable Teri L. Jackson, Presiding Judge Kathie Lowry, 2016-2017 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury Kitsaun King, 2016-2017 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury Jason Elliot, Mayor's Office Kate Howard, Mayor's Office Melissa Whitehouse, Mayor's Office Marie Valdez, Mayor's Office Ben Rosenfield, Controller, Office of the Controller Asja Steeves, Office of the Controller Peg Stevenson, Office of the Controller John Arntz, Director, Department of Elections Norm Nickens, Retirement Board Donald Chan, Elections Commission Jon Givner, Deputy City Attorney Alisa Somera, Legislative Deputy Director Severin Campbell, Budget and Legislative Analyst Ashley Clark, Budget and Legislative Analyst

Office of the Mayor san francisco



EDWIN M. LEE Mayor

August 15, 2017

The Honorable Teri L. Jackson Presiding Judge Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 400 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Judge Jackson:

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the following is in reply to the 2016-17 Civil Grand Jury report, *The San Francisco Retirement System: Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight.* We would like to thank the members of the Civil Grand Jury for their interest in San Francisco's Retirement System and its role in the City's long-term financial health. The report focuses primarily on two challenges with the Retirement System: reducing our long term pension obligations, and improving transparency and accountability to taxpayers about the City's pension costs.

The City remains committed to striving for responsible stewardship of the San Francisco Employees' Retirement System (SFERS). The careful management of retirement obligations and their associated costs is critical to ensuring the City's financial security. In 2011 Mayor Ed Lee worked to pass pension reform legislation which significantly reduced the City's long term pension obligations. The legislation (Prop. C) included reductions to benefits and requirements that employee contribute at least 7.5% of their salary toward their pension costs, depending on the health of the pension fund. This was estimated to save the City up to \$1.3 billion over the subsequent 10 years. Without this legislation, the City's fiscal outlook would be considerably worse.

There are mutiple drivers of the City's long term pension obligations. However, SFERS is among the top-performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. The System is currently 85% funded, versus an average of 72% funded amongst peer jurisdictions. That funding gap that will be closed over the long term, not only by the City but also by City employees as a result of the employee cost sharing provisions approved by the voters in 2011 and future investment gains. However, future pension liabilities are a great concern for the city, and are carefully tracked and analyzed closely on an ongoing basis by the Mayor's Office, Controller's Office, Retirement System and the Board of Supervisors' Budget and Legislative Analyst. We closely monitor the impact of our pension obligations on our long term fiscal deficit and will continue to seek to reduce projected deficits over time.

A detailed response from the Mayor's Office, Elections Department, and Elections Commission to the Civil Grand Jury's findings and recommendations are attached.

Each signatory prepared its own responses and is able to respond to questions related to its respective part of the report.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this Civil Grand Jury report.

Sincerely,

Edwin Lee Mayor

John Arntz
Director of the Department of Election

Christopher Jerdonek
President of the Elections Commission

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ FINDINGS

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|----------|---|----|---|------------------------|--|--|
| CG) Year | Report Title | # | Findings | Respondent assigned by | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Yext |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement System-Incrossing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | F1 | That there are multiple causes for the City's \$5.8.1 billion debt to its Retirement System, including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic assumptions (\$1.1 billion), However, the principal underlying cause is the estimated \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit Increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008. | Mayor | disagree with it, partially (explanation in next column) | We agree that there are mutiple drivers of the City's long term pension obligations. However, SFERS is among the top- performing and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. We are confident that, over the long term, the assets in the SFERS Trust will be sufficient to pay the promised benefits to all active and retired SFERS members. Each year the Reilrement Board receives an actuarial valuation - a snapshot of the long-term progress of the fund toward full fuilding of all promised benefits - from which they review and adjust, if prudent and appropriate, existing funding policies to ensure the long-term financial strength of the SFERS Trust. In accordance with the City Charter and Retirement Board policies, the cost or increase in liabilities associated with every voter-approved proposition is amortized over up to:a 20-year period. The Retirement System unfunded liability is not a "debt", but rather a funding gap that will be made up over the very long term, not only by the City, but also by City employees as a result of the employee cost sharing provisions approved by the City voters in 2011 (Proposition C) and long term investment gains. As reflected in the past investment performance of the Retirement System - relative to U.S. public fund peers, SFERS' investment results ranked in the first quartile for the 3 year, year and 10 year time periods, investment gains will also contribute a significant amount towards reducing the unfunded liabilities of the Retirement System. |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | F2 | 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1995 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related propositions (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening the fiscal status of the City. | | disagree with it, partially (explanation in next column) | We are in agreement that the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement Interests of the City's employees and Retirees (Item 1). We also agree about the composition of the retirement board (Item 2). However, we disagree with finding (3). Cost analyses prepared by the Controller and the Retirement System were based upon the best available information, and were in line with actuarial and economic assumptions in use at the time. As noted in those analyses, benefit costs and Retirement Fund results are highly sensitive to a number of economic assumptions, several of which were not met in the years following the changes approved by voters. In addition, we disagree with finding 4). Future pension liabilites are a great concern for the city, and are carefully tracked and analyzed closely on an ongoing basis by the Mayor's Office, Controller's Office, Retirement System and the Board of Supervisors' Budget and Legislative analyst. Projected costs are forecast and fincorporated into our 5-year financial planning process which is jointly developed by the Mayor's Budget Office, the Controllers Office and the Board of Supervisors' Budget and Legislative analyst. We have also made significant strides in enacting policy to reduce our pension liability and continue to look for ways to reduce our long term pension liabilities. The SFERS retirement system is 85% funded. While still not fully funded, it is important to consider that relative to comparable systems, san Francisco's SFERS is faring very well, and is among the topperforming and well-funded public pension plans in the United States. A recent report by the City Services Auditor found that the peer average for city employee pension plans in the United States. A recent report by the City Services Auditor found that the peer average for city employee pension plans as of FY 15 was 72% funded (compared with SFERS at 85%). For instance CALPERS is currently funded at 65% and Portland at 46%. |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ RECOMMENDATIONS.

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| | | | | Respondent | | |
| CG) Year | Report Title | : # | Recommendations | assigned by CGI | | 2017 Response Text |
| | The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public | Mayor | it was implemented in next column) | The financial impact of major changes that impact benefit structure are already fully disclosed to the voters via the ballot (see below). Day to day decisions taken by the Retirement Board are also already disclosed to the public. Board meetings are public; agendas and minutes are posted online. Any action taken by the floard is publicity posted. All changes in SFERS benefit provisions must be approved by the City's voters. For items on the ballot we are required by charter to provide actuarial reports detailing the costs of the proposition, which are disclosed on the ballot. The Retirement System and the Controller's Office prepare extensive analyses of any pension-related measure placed on the ballot. By necessity, these cost analyses are brief written statements, with more detailed files maintained and available for inspection by members of the public interested in exploring the issues in more depth. |
| | The SF Retirement System- increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations. | Mayor | it was implemented in next column) | The RetIrement System provides extensive reports detailing financial, actuarial and administrative matters on an annual basis. These annual reports include audited financial statements and required supplementary information, an actuarial valuation, and a department annual report which consolidates the financial and actuarial information with detailed information on the administration of the Retirement System. The details of the breakout for each component of unfunded liability related to the City's retirement plan are contained in the annual actuarial valuation report. There is a description of the calculation method in the appendix of the report. The Retirement System maintains five years of the SFERS annual actuarial valuation report on its website. Historical valuation reports beyond the five years available on the website are available by request to the Retirement System. |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGI RECOMMENDATIONS

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| | | | | | | |
| 1 | | | | Respondent | | |
| CGJ Year | Report Title | H | Recommendations | | | 2017 Response Text |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement | R2.1 | That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight | Mayor | | The City already has a Retirement Board which functions as oversight to the |
| | System- | ļ | Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement | | The state of the s | Retirement System, and the Mayor's Office has no authority to establish or |
| | increasing | | System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in | ı l | | empanel a new Board committee. Mayor Lee worked to pass major pension |
| | Understanding & | | a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be | j | | reform legislation in 2011 and the City's long term pension obligations would be |
| | Adding Voter | | considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The | | 1 . | much worse if it was not for these measures. Lastly, the City closely monitors |
| 1 | Oversight | | details of the committee are: | | | pension costs in our long range financial planning- through the 5 year financial |
| | | İ | 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee | | | planning process, deficit projections as well as through the 2 year budget process, |
| | | | 2. Purpose | | li de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de la companya de | which are developed by the Mayor's Office in collaboration with the Controller's |
| | | | a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System's | | ł | Office and the Board of Supervisors. We closely monitor the impact of our |
| | | | unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, and | | | pension obligations on our long term deficit and will continute to seek to reduce |
| | | l | present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018. All options should be on | | | projected deficits over time. |
| | | l | the table, including a Hybrid Delined Benefit / DefinedContribution plan. | | | · |
| | - | ļ | b. Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement | | | |
| | | | System. | 1 | | |
| | | ł | c. As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement System | | | · |
| ł | | | encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All options | | | |
| | | | should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution | | | |
| - | | l | plan. | | | · |
| | | | d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by the | | | |
| | 1 | l | Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) all | l | 1 | |
| 2 | | l | propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to | | | |
| ∞ | | l | voters in the Voter Information Pamphiet. | | · · | |
| 5 | | | e. In furtherance of its purpose, the committee may engage in any of the following activities: | | | |
| | | | I. Inquire into the actions of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, | | | |
| ł | | i | financial statements, actuarial reports, or other materials related to the | | | , |
| } | | | Retirement System. | | | |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement | R2.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter | Mayor | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not | This recommendation is intended to add individuals to the retirement system |
| | System- | | amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members | 7 | , | board who are not beneficiaries of the trust fund, and who will therefore |
| | Increasing | l | who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board. | | | presumably act as guardians of the public interest. However, trustees are always |
| | Understanding & | ľ | , | | | obligated to act only in the fiduciary interests of the beneficiaries. Therefore, this |
| | Adding Voter | | | | | recommendation would not accomplish its intended goals, and for that reason |
| | Oversight | ŀ | | | | will not be pursued. The City closely monitors pension costs in our long range |
| | | İ | | | | financial planning - through the 5 year financial planning process, deficit |
| | | | , · | 1 | 1 | projections as well as through the 2 year budget process, which are developed by |
| | | | | 1 | | the Mayor's Office in collaboration with the Controller's Office and the Board of |
| | | | | | | Supervisors. We closely monitor the impact of our pension obligations on our |
| | | | | | | long term deficit and will continute to seek to reduce projected deficits over time. |
| | | | | | | The Mayor will continue to consider any and all mechanisms within his purview to |
| | | | | | | ensure fiscal sustainability. |
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2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ FINDINGS

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| CGJ Year | Report Title | # | Findings | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement | F3 | That the Voter Information Pamphlets for | Department of | disagree with it, wholly (explanation in next column) | The Department lacks sufficient knowledge to determine whether these VIPs |
| | System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not provide voters with complete estimates of the propositions' costs, who would pay those costs, how those costs were financed, and what the Interest rates were. | Elections | | included the information set forth in this finding. |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury
The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ RECOMMENDATIONS

| CGJ Year | Report Title | # # | Recommendations | Respondent assigned by CGI | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
|----------|--|--------|---|-------------------------------|--|--|
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | R3.1 | That the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections ensure that future Voter information Pamphiets for Retirement System-related propositions provide voters with complete financial details. | | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) . | The Department lacks the authority to ensure that future VIPS provide voters with complete financial details regarding Retirement System-related propositions. The Department of Elections does not determine the content of the Voter Information Pamphlet; that determination is made by ordinance, and those ordinances are included in the Municipal Elections Code. The Department's role is simply to format information and transmit it to the printer. If the City adopts an ordinance requiring the Department of Elections to include additional information regarding costs associated with retirement benefits in the Voter Information Pamphlet, the Department will do so. |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it. | Department of Elections | | The Department lacks the authority to require that the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it. If an ordinance is adopted that requires additional content to be included in the Voter information Pamphlet, the Department will comply with the ordinance. |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CG1 FINDINGS

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| | | | | Respondent assigned by | • | |
| CGJ Year | Report Title | # . | Findings | CG) | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| 2016-17 | The SF Retirement | F3 | That the Voter Information Pamphlets for | Elections Commission | disagree with it, wholly (explanation in next column) | The Elections Commission disagrees wholly with the finding because the |
| | System-Increasing | | retroactive retirement benefit increase | | · | Commission lacks the knowledge to assess whether these specific VIPs did or |
| | Understanding & | | propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not | | | did not provide voters with full and accurate information regarding these |
| ı | Adding Voter Oversight | | provide voters with complete estimates of the | | | propositions. |
| | | | propositions' costs, who would pay those | | | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |
| | | | costs, how those costs were financed, and | | | |
| | | | what the interest rates were, | | | |
| | | | | | | |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ RECOMMENDATIONS

| CGJ Year | Report Title | [1] 아이트 | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
|----------|--|--|-------------------------------|---|---|
| | The SF Retirement System- increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | That the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections ensure that future Voter Information Pamphlets for Retirement System-related propositions provide voters with complete financial details. | | | The Elections Commission will not implement this recommendation because the Commission lacks the authority to do what is requested. |
| | The SF Retirement System- Increasing Understanding & Adding Voter Oversight | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it. | Elections Commission | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | The Elections Commission will not implement this recommendation because the Commission lacks the authority to do what is requested. |



CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER

Ben Rosenfield Controller

Todd Rydstrom Deputy Controller

August 11, 2017

The Honorable Teri L. Jackson Presiding Judge, Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 400 McAllister Street, Room 008 San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Judge Jackson:

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the following is in reply to the 2016-17 Civil Grand Jury report, The San Francisco Retirement System – Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight. We would like to thank the Civil Grand Jury for their attention to this subject. Managing retirement benefits, plans and funding are among the most complex financial and workforce issues faced by governments and other entities nationwide. Consistently modeling, projecting and managing pension costs, and providing reporting and transparency to the public, is challenging. The Controller's Office works continuously to improve the quality of the City's financial management and reporting. Especially where the public are the primary users of financial information, such as in our required ballot statements, we work hard to make our reports clear and straightforward.

Overall, the Controller's Office strives to be a responsible financial steward for the City and has been a leader in analyzing ways to manage long-term costs, reduce the Retirement System's unfunded actuarial liability, and create fair cost-sharing between employees and the City as an employer. Over the last eight years, the Controller's Office has supported five different efforts to model financial and actuarial projections and make changes to pension benefits to better manage future costs. Many of these efforts have resulted in proposals moved forward by the Mayor and Board of Supervisors and ultimately adopted by City voters.

The Civil Grand Jury's report provided important findings and recommendations and helped us understand how our financial reporting and statements are received. We will use this feedback to improve efforts to communicate with leadership, stakeholders and the public on these issues.

If you have any questions about this response, please contact Deputy Controller Todd Rydstrom or me at 415-554-7500.

Respectfully submitted,

Ben Rosenfield Controller

Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board, City and County of San Francisco

415-554-7500

cc:

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ FINDINGS

| | | <u></u> | 7047 0 | |
|----|---|-------------------------------|--|--|
| # | Findings | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (Agree/Disagree) | 2017 Response Text |
| F2 | 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently | | disagree with it, | While the Controller's Office finds the Civil Grand Jury's statement regarding |
| | A) That the cys nettrement system digently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related proposition (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening the fiscal status of the City. | | | the health of the Retirement Fund to be overstated, we do share the general concern regarding the increase in the system's net pension liability in recent years and its implications for future City costs. We have presented discussion and analysis in the City's recent Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) and in the City's Five-Year Financial Plan on this topic. We believe that the health of the system needs to be closely monitored and that it is likely to create financial pressure for the City in the years ahead absent changes to benefits. The Controller's Office disagrees with the finding that our office, the Mayor, and the Board of Supervisors did not fulfill our responsibilities to watch out for the interest of the City and its residents regarding benefit changes on the ballot between 1996 and 2008. Cost analyses prepared by our office and the Retirement System were based upon the best available information, and were in line with actuarial and economic assumptions in use at the time. As noted in those analyses, benefit costs and Retirement Fund results are highly sensitive to a number of economic assumptions, several of which were not met in the years following the changes approved by voters. |
| F3 | That the Voter Information Pamphlets for retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not provide voters with complete estimates of the propositions' costs, who would pay those costs, how those costs were financed, and what the interest rates were. | Controller | disagree with it, partially (explanation in next column) | The Controller's Office cost analyses for measures in these years included estimates based upon actuarial and financial assumptions utilized by the Retirement System at the time. Our analyses noted the sensitivity of the cost analyses to these assumptions. By necessity, these cost analyses are brief written statements for the Voter Information Pamphlet, with detailed files maintained for stakeholders or members of the public interested in exploring further. We are open to specific comments on ways to improve our ballot cost analyses, including those for future pension measures. We are open to the possibility of providing a section in the Voter Information Pamphlet with background on public pension structures and status, similar to our section regarding debt management and bond financing that is provided when bonds are on the ballot. |
| F4 | The Controller and the Retirement System provide extensive reports about the Retirement System, but they are too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand. The data in the Retirement System reports is not available to the Retirement System or the public in a dataset, making research and analysis more difficult. | Controller | disagree with it, partially (explanation in next column) | The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, and operational issues, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgable but non-expert audience. The Controller's Office, in the City's Five-Year Financial Plan, reports on the expected future retirement costs to the City, and includes discussion of the health of the Retirement Fund in the City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR). The Controller's Office has made regular public presentations at hearings held by the Board of Supervisors on the health of the Retirement System and its implications for the financial health of the City. We welcome comments on specific ways to improve these various products to ensure their ability to be useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic. |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-Increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ RECOMMENDATIONS

| | | Respondent | | |
|-----------|---|------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| | Recommendations | | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
| # R2.1 | That the Board of Supervisors establish | | The recommendation will not be | This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor and |
| NZ.I | a permanent Retirement System | Controller | implemented because it is not | Board of Supervisors, and not the Controller's Office. In our |
| | Oversight Committee to develop a | | warranted or reasonable | role as financial advisor, the Controller's Office will support |
| | comprehensive, long-term solution for | | (explanation in next column) | whatever efforts policymakers put in place to study the |
| | the Retirement System that is fair to | | , | health of the Retirement Fund and to consider changes to |
| • | both employees and taxpayers, and | | | manage future financial costs for the City. We note, |
| | present it to the voters in a | | | however, that the City has rigorous ongoing practices built |
| | proposition by 2018. All options for | | | in to its financial management to review changes in the |
| | reducing pension liabilities must be | | · | funded status of the Retirement Fund and their implications |
| | considered, including a hybrid Defined | · | | for the City's finances. Further, the Controller's Office has |
| | Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. | | | supported five different efforts in the last eight years to |
| | The details of the committee are: | | | model financial and actuarial projections and make changes |
| | 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight | | | to pension benefits to better manage future costs. Many of these efforts have resulted in proposals moved forward by |
| | Committee | | | the Mayor and Board of Supervisors and ultimately adopted |
| | 2. Purpose | | | bý City voters. |
| | a. Develop a comprehensive, long- term solution for the Retirement | | | by enty voterat |
| | System's unfunded liabilities that is fair | | | · |
| | to both employees, retirees, and | | | |
| | taxpayers, and present it to voters in a | | | • |
| | proposition by the end of 2018. All | | | |
| | options should be on the table, | | | |
| | including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / | | | |
| | DefinedContribution plan. | | | |
| | b. Inform and educate the public | | | |
| | concerning the finances of the | | | |
| | Retirement System. | | | |
| R2.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Mayor | Controller | The recommendation will not be | This recommendation should be directed to the Mayor and |
| | and Board of Supervisors submit a | | implemented because it is not | Board of Supervisors, and not the Controller's Office. In our |
| | Charter amendment proposition to the | , | warranted or reasonable | role as financial advisor, the Controller's Office will support |
| | voters to add three additional public | | (explanation in next column) | whatever efforts policymakers request to review |
| | members who are not Retirement | | • | governance questions regarding the Retirement Board. We |
| • | System members to the Retirement | | | note, however, that Retirement Board members are |
| | Board. | | | fiduciaries that have a duty to the system's participants and |
| | | | | not to "watch out for the interests of the City and its residents." This broader responsibility falls on the Mayor, |
| | | | | Board of Supervisors and other policymakers. Under the City |
| | | | | Charter ultimately the voters of San Francisco determine |
| | | | , | benefit levels, unlike the majority of governments where |
| | | | | retirement benefits levels are not subject to a vote of the |
| | | | | people. |
| | | | | The opinion |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| R3.1 | That the Elections Commission and the | Controller | The recommendation requires | Both the Retirement System and the Controller's Office |
| | Department of Elections ensure that | | further analysis (explanation of the | prepare extensive analyses of any pension-related measure |
| | future Voter Information Pamphlets | | scope of that analysis and a | placed on the ballot. By necessity, these cost analyses are |
| | for Retirement System-related | | timeframe for discussion, not more | brief written statements, with more detailed files |
| | propositions provide voters with | | than six months from the release of | maintained and available for inspection by members of the |
| | complete financial details. | | the report noted in next column) | public interested in exploring the issues in more depth. We |
| | | | | are open to specific comments and thoughts on ways to |
| | 1 | | | improve our ballot cost analyses, including those for future |
| | | | | pension measures. We are open to the possibility of |
| | - | | | providing a background section in the Voter Information |
| | | | | Pamphlet with further information on public pension |
| | | | | structures and San Francisco's status. We currently provide a background section regarding debt management, bond |
| | | | | financing and San Francisco's status in all elections where |
| | | | | bonds are on the ballot. |
| | | | · | warman and arrivation warrants |
| | 1 | | | |
| | 1 | · | L | 1 |

2016-17 Civil Grand Jury The SF Retirement System-increasing Understanding Adding Voter Oversight: RESPONSES TO CGJ RECOMMENDATIONS

| # | Recommendations | Respondent assigned by CGJ | 2017 Responses (implementation) | 2017 Response Text |
|------|--|----------------------------|---|--|
| R3.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it. | Controller | The recommendation has been implemented (summary of how it was implemented in next column) | The Retirement System, the Controller's Office, and others already produce a wide array of public reports for various audiences on the financial health of the Retirement Fund and its implications for both beneficiaries and the City government. We have augmented this reporting in recent years with additional detailed analysis and discussion in the City's Five Year Financial Plan. We welcome specific suggestions to improve these products, but do not believe that an additional annual report will improve public knowledge of this topic. As discussed elsewhere, we are open to specific means of improving our ballot measure analysis, including the possibility of providing additional background information in the voter information pamphlet when pension measures are placed before the voters, similar to our discussion of debt financing when bond authorizations are on the ballot. |
| R4.1 | That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and make that dataset available to the public. | Controller | The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable (explanation in next column) | This recommendation should be directed to the Retirement System and not the Controller's Office. |
| R4.2 | That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office develop and produce an annual Retirement System Report that clearly explains the current and projected status of the Retirement System and its effect on the City's budget. | Controller | The recommendation requires further analysis (explanation of the scope of that analysis and a timeframe for discussion, not more than six months from the release of the report noted in next column) | The City's Five-Year Financial Plan includes clear discussion regarding the high-level financial status of the Retirement Fund and its implications for future City costs, including analysis of the effects of a downturn in investment returns that may occur in a recession. The City's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report also includes discussion of the health and funded status of the Retirement Fund. The Retirement System produces various reports detailing financial, actuarial, and operational issues, including a summary of their financial statements that are designed for a knowledgable but non-expert audience. We welcome comments on specific ways to improve these products to ensure that they are useful to a broad array of audiences interested in this complex topic. |

Carroll, John (BOS)

From:

Carroll, John (BOS)

Sent:

Friday, June 16, 2017 4:59 PM

To:

BOS-Supervisors

Cc:

BOS-Legislative Aides; 'Calvillo, Angela (angela calvillo@sfgov.org)'; 'civilgrandjury@sftc.org'; Elliott, Nicole (MYR); Tugbenyoh, Mawuli (mawuli tugbenyoh@sfgov.org); Rosenfield, Ben (CON); Steeves, Asia (CON); Givner, Jon; Somera, Alisa (BOS); Newman, Debra; Campbell

(CON); Steeves, Asja (CON); Givner, Jon; Somera, Alisa (BOS); Newman, Debra; Campbell, Severin (BUD); Wasilco, Jadie (BUD); Major, Erica (BOS); 'pkilkenny@sftc.org';

'klowrv@sfcai.ora'

Subject:

PUBLIC RELEASE - 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco Retirement

System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight

Categories:

170662, 170663

Supervisors:

Please find linked below the 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury report released today, Friday, June 16, 2017, entitled: The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight, as well as a press release memo from the Civil Grand Jury, and an informational memo from the Clerk of the Board.

The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight

Civil Grand Jury Press Release - June 16, 2017

Clerk of the Board Memo - June 16, 2017

I invite you to review the entire matter on our Legislative Research Center by following the link below:

Board of Supervisors File No. 170662

Thank you,

John Carroll
Assistant Clerk
Board of Supervisors
San Francisco City Hall, Room 244
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415)554-4445 - Direct | (415)554-5163 - Fax
john.carroll@sfgov.org | bos.legislation@sfgov.org



Click <u>here</u> to complete a Board of Supervisors Customer Service Satisfaction form.

The Legislative Research Center provides 24-hour access to Board of Supervisors legislation and archived matters since August 1998.

Disclosures: Personal information that is provided in communications to the Board of Supervisors is subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act and the San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance. Personal information provided will not be redacted. Members of the public are not required to provide personal identifying information when they communicate with the Board of Supervisors and its committees. All written or oral communications that members of the public submit to the Clerk's Office regarding pending legislation or hearings will be made available to all members of the public for inspection and copying. The Clerk's Office does not redact any information from these submissions. This means that personal information—including names, phone numbers, addresses and similar information that a member of the public elects to submit to the Board and its committees—may appear on the Board of Supervisors website or in other public documents that members of the public may inspect or copy.

City and County of San Francisco 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, June 16, 2017

Contacts: Chris Bacon, Civil Grand Juror

Kathie Lowry, Jury Foreperson

(415) 931-8157 (Primary Contact)

(415) 601-2770

*** PRESS RELEASE ***

SAN FRANCISCO CIVIL GRAND JURY: SAN FRANCISCO'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM NEEDS SUBSTANTIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND MORE VOTER INVOLVEMENT AND EDUCATION

San Francisco, CA – The 2016-2017 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury (CGJ) calls upon the Mayor and Board of Supervisors to enact substantial structural changes to the City's Retirement System, which has entered its second decade of being underfunded, to include more voter involvement.

For its report, *The San Francisco Retirement System: Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight*, the CGJ reviewed the recent history of the Retirement System and reached two main conclusions:

- The principal underlying cause of the Retirement System's unfunded condition is the estimated \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voterapproved propositions between 1996 and 2008.
- That when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents.

The CGJ's report states that the "fiscal status of San Francisco's Retirement System threatens the financial future of the City. As of June 30, 2016, the City and County of San Francisco owes its Retirement System \$5.81 billion; this is more than half of the City's entire 2016 budget (\$8.94 billion)."

In its boldest recommendation, the CGJ challenges the Board of Supervisors to "establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in a proposition by 2018."

The CGJ recommends that this new Retirement System Oversight Committee include representatives from the Mayor's office, the Board of Supervisors, the Controller's office, the Human Resources Department, and Unions, but that two-thirds of the Committee be public members who are not participants in the Retirement System and have financial expertise relevant to retirement systems.

The Superior Court selects 19 San Franciscans to serve year-long terms as Civil Grand Jurors. The Jury has the authority to investigate City and County government by reviewing documents and interviewing public officials and private individuals. At the end of its investigations, the Jury issues reports outlining findings and recommendations. County agencies identified in the report receive copies and must respond to these findings and recommendations. The Board of Supervisors conducts a public hearing on each CGJ report.

The public may view this report and others issued by the CGJ online at http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/report.html.

###

BOARD of SUPERVISORS



City Hall
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 244
San Francisco 94102-4689
Tel. No. 554-5184
Fax No. 554-5163
TDD/TTY No. 554-5227

MEMORANDUM

Date:

June 16, 2017

To:

Honorable Members, Board of Supervisors

From:

Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board

Subject:

2016-2017 CIVIL GRAND JURY REPORT - The San Francisco Retirement

System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight

The Office of the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors is in receipt of the San Francisco Civil Grand Jury (CGJ) Report, entitled: **The San Francisco Retirement System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight** (attached). Today is the public release date for this report.

Pursuant to California Penal Code, Sections 933 and 933.05, the Board must:

- 1. Respond to the report within 90 days of receipt, or no later than September 14, 2017.
- 2. For each finding the Department response shall:
 - · agree with the finding; or
 - disagree with the finding, wholly or partially, and explain why.
- 3. For each recommendation the Department shall report that:
 - the recommendation has been implemented, with a summary of how it was implemented;
 - the recommendation has not been, but will be, implemented in the future, with a timeframe for implementation;
 - the recommendation requires further analysis, with an explanation of the scope of the analysis and timeframe of no more than six months from the date of release; or
 - the recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable, with an explanation.

Pursuant to San Francisco Administrative Code, Section 2.10, in coordination with the Committee Chair, the Clerk will schedule a public hearing before the Government Audit and Oversight Committee to allow the Board the necessary time to review and formally respond to the findings and recommendations.

The Budget and Legislative Analyst will prepare a resolution, outlining the findings and recommendations for the Committee's consideration, to be heard at the same time as the hearing on the report.

Public Release for Civil Grand Jury Report
The San Francisco Retirement System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight
June 16, 2017
Page 2

Attachement: Civil Grand Jury Report

c: Honorable Teri L. Jackson, Presiding Judge
Nicole Elliott, Mayor's Office
Mawuli Tugbenyoh, Mayor's Office
Ben Rosenfield, Office of the Controller
Asja Steeves, Office of the Controller
Jon Givner, Office of the City Attorney
Alisa Somera, Office of the Clerk of the Board
Debra Newman, Office of the Budget and Legislative Analyst
Severin Campbell, Office of the Budget and Legislative Analyst
Jadie Wasilco, Office of the Budget and Legislative Analyst
Kathie Lowry, Foreperson, San Francisco Civil Grand Jury

CIVIL GRAND JURY | 2016-2017

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO



June 13, 2017

Board of Supervisors Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board City Hall, Room 244 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Clerk of the Board Calvillo,

The 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury will release a report entitled "The San Francisco Retirement System, Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight" to the public on Friday, June 16, 2017. Enclosed is an advance copy of this report. Please note that by order of the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, Hon. Teri L. Jackson, this report is to be kept confidential until the date of release (June 16th).

California Penal Code §933 (c) requires a response to be submitted to the Presiding Judge no later than 90 days after the date of this letter. California Penal Code §933.05 states that for each finding in the report, the responding person or entity shall indicate one of the following: (1) agree with the finding; or (2) disagree with it, wholly or partially, and explain why.

Further, as to each recommendation, your response must either indicate:

- 1) That the recommendation has been implemented, with a summary of how it was implemented;
- 2) That the recommendation has not been, but will be, implemented in the future, with a timeframe for implementation;
- 3) That the recommendation requires further analysis, with an explanation of the scope of that analysis and a timeframe for discussion, not more than six months from the release of the report; or
- 4) That the recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable, with an explanation.

Please provide your response to the Presiding Judge Teri L. Jackson at the following address:

400 McAllister Street, Room 007

San Francisco, CA 94102-4512

Email: CivilGrandJury@sftc.org

Respectfully,


Kathie Lowry, Foreperson

2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury

CIVIL GRAND JURY | 2016-2017 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO



THE SAN FRANCISCO RETIREMENT SYSTEM INCREASING UNDERSTANDING AND ADDING VOTER OVERSIGHT



JUNE 2017

THE CIVIL GRAND JURY

The Civil Grand Jury is a government oversight panel of volunteers who serve for one year. It makes findings and recommendations resulting from its investigations.

Reports of the Civil Grand Jury do not identify individuals by name. Disclosure of information about individuals interviewed by the jury is prohibited.

California Penal Code, section 929.

STATE LAW REQUIREMENT

Each published report includes a list of those public entities that are required to respond to the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court within 60 to 90 days as specified.

A copy must be sent to the Board of Supervisors. All responses are made available to the public.

For each finding, the response must:

- 1) agree with the finding, or
- disagree with it, wholly or partially, and explain why.

As to each recommendation the responding party must report that:

- 1) the recommendation has been implemented, with a summary explanation; or
- 2) the recommendation has not been implemented but will be within a set timeframe as provided; or
- the recommendation requires further analysis. The officer or agency head must define what additional study is needed. The Grand Jury expects a progress report within six months; or
- the recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or reasonable, with an explanation.

California Penal Code, Section 933.05

JURORS | 2016 – 2017

KATHIE LOWRY, FOREPERSON

KITSAUN KING, FOREPERSON PRO TEM

CHARLES HEAD, SECRETARY

CHRIS BACON

RICHARD BAKER-LEHNE

CONSTANCE BERNSTEIN

DONNA CASEY

PHYLLIS DEETS

JOHN ERICKSON

SANFORD GALLANTER

LAWRENCE GROO

YANE NORDHAV

ADAM RASKIN

.RAE RAUCCI

DANIEL ROSENTHAL

MARVIN STENDER

DAVID TEJEDA

CHARLES THOMPSON

ELLEN LEE ZHOU



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The fiscal status of San Francisco's Retirement System threatens the financial future of the City. As of June 30, 2016, the City and County of San Francisco (City) owes its Retirement System \$5.81 billion; this is more than half of the City's entire 2016 budget (\$8.94 billion). The Retirement System is 77.6% funded. This means that there are not enough funds to pay the benefits to current and future retirees. In Fiscal Year 2015-2016, the City's annual contribution to the Retirement System was \$526.8 million, \$377.1 million of which was amortization payments on the unfunded pension liability. Where does the money come from to finance the underfunding? From the City's General Fund.

The General Fund pays for the City's services (such as public works, MUNI, police, and fire), and employee salaries and benefits. When more of the General Fund is spent on the underfunding of the Retirement System, City services and staff must be reduced to ensure a balanced budget.

There are several causes for the underfunding of the Retirement System, but the main underlying cause is the retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008. These retroactive increases were very expensive gifts to employees and retirees from taxpayers, paid for with money borrowed at a high interest rate from the Retirement System, and paid back over 20 years by taxpayers. The financial details of these retroactive increases were not disclosed to voters. As Warren Buffett stated:

There probably is more managerial ignorance on pension costs than any other cost item of remotely similar magnitude. And, as will become so expensively clear to citizens in future decades, there has been even greater electorate ignorance of governmental pension costs.

The 2016-17 Civil Grand Jury investigated the Retirement Board, the Retirement System, Retirement System-related Propositions, and the public pension industry. Our purpose was to assess the effects of the costs of the current Retirement System, including the unfunded liability, on the City's financial health. Additionally, our purpose was to evaluate the ability of residents and voters to understand the financial ramifications of pension-related propositions based on information provided by the City. We conducted interviews with City staff and reviewed City and other documents. Our analysis led us to two major findings and four recommendations:

Finding F1: That there are multiple causes for the City's \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System, including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic assumptions (\$1.1 billion). However, the principal underlying cause is the estimated \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008.

Recommendation R1.1: That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public.

Recommendation R1.2: That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations.

Finding F2: 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related propositions (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening the fiscal status of the City.

Recommendation R2.1: That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. (Details about the recommended committee are presented in the Findings and Recommendations section of this report.)

Recommendation R2.2: That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board.



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BACKGROUND & METHODOLOGY

BACKGROUND

The City's Retirement Board and Retirement System is defined in the San Francisco (SF) Charter and can only be changed by voter-approved propositions. The Retirement System is also known as the SF Employees' Retirement System (SFERS); this report will use Retirement System. The Retirement Board appoints an executive director, who in turn administers the Retirement System. The Retirement Board administers the Retirement Fund and makes all the investment decisions.

In the past decade, several attempts, some successful and others not, have been made to change the Retirement System. There have been two Civil Grand Jury (CGJ) reports and five significant propositions placed before the voters. Each of these reports and propositions are summarized below in chronological order.

2000 Proposition C²

This proposition was placed on the ballot by the Board of Supervisors and approved by the voters. It retroactively increased the retirement benefits for miscellaneous employees. The description of the proposed Charter Amendment from the Voter Pamphlet said that:

Proposition C is a Charter amendment that would increase retirement benefits for miscellaneous employees hired after 1976. An employee could get a pension of up to 75 percent of final salary. The pension amount would be based on years of service and a multiplier ranging from 1% per year of service at age 50 to 2% at age 60. The employee's "final salary" would mean the average monthly salary during a one-year period when the employee earned the highest salary.

The City Controller provided the following statement on the fiscal impact of Proposition C in the Voter Pamphlet:

Should the proposed Charter amendment be adopted, in my opinion, it would increase the cost of government by an amount, estimated by the Retirement System Actuary, of \$34 million per year for 20 years and then dropping to \$17 million per year.

Even with this proposal, the City does not expect to have to make a contribution to the Retirement System for at least the next 15 years. (Bolding added)

"During the next decade, you will read a lot of news - bad news - about public pension plans."

Warren Buffett 2014

2002 Proposition H³

This proposition was placed on the ballot by the Board of Supervisors and approved by the voters. It retroactively increased the retirement benefits for police officers and firefighters by increasing the amount of pensions to 2.4 percent of salary for each year they served if they retired at age 50 and 3 percent of salary for each year served if they retired at age 55. The description of the proposed Charter Amendment from the Voter Pamphlet said that:

Proposition H is a Charter amendment that would change the formula for police and firefighter retirement benefits. Police and firefighters who retire at age 50 would receive, for each year of service, 2.4 percent of the salary earned at the time of retirement. Police and firefighters who retire at age 55 would receive, for each year of service, 3 percent of the salary earned at the time of retirement. The maximum retirement benefit police and firefighters could receive would be 90 percent of the salary at the time of retirement. Police and firefighters who retire before January 1, 2003 would not be eligible for this increase.

The City Controller provided the following statement on the fiscal impact of Proposition H in the Voter Pamphlet:

Should the proposed amendment be adopted, in my opinion, the cost to the City and County would increase, as estimated by the Retirement System Actuary, by about \$28 million per year for the next 20 years, dropping after 20 years to an ongoing cost of approximately \$8.2 million per year. However, no cash would be required since the City's Retirement System currently has a large surplus. While the cost of this proposal would reduce that surplus, the City nonetheless should not be required to make employer contributions to the Retirement System for at least the next ten years. The Amendment also provides that if the City is required to make employer contributions to the Retirement System, the City will negotiate a cost-sharing agreement with the police officers and firefighters to cover all or part of the cost of providing the additional retirement benefits through employee contributions.

(Bolding added.)

Notwithstanding the Controller's statement with respect to both the 2000 Proposition C and the 2002 Proposition H, the City had to commence contributions to the Retirement System in 2005⁴, and for FY 2016 the City had to make a \$526.8 million contribution, \$377.1 million of which was payment towards the unfunded pension liability.

June 2008 Proposition B5

This proposition was placed on the ballot by the Board of Supervisors and approved by the voters. The June 2008 Proposition B included Pension Benefits and Retiree Health Benefits; this report addresses only the Pension Benefits. The Voter Information Pamphlet described the changes to the Retirement System as follows:

In addition, Proposition B would make the following changes to retirement benefits and COLAs for miscellaneous City employees who retire on or after January 10, 2009:

- The age factor for employees who retire at age 60 would increase to 2.1% and rise to 2.3% at age 62. Thus, employees with 20 years of service would receive 42% of their highest annual salary if they retire at age 60 or 46% if they retire at age 62.
- The basic COLA benefit would be compounded annually based on the retirement benefits payable on June 30th of the prior year.
- The supplemental COLA, which is paid when there is enough excess investment earnings, also would increase for a total adjustment of retirement benefits up to 3-1/2%.

The City would freeze wages and other economic benefits for miscellaneous City employees from July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010.

This proposition is described in more detail under Proposition Costs & Disclosures.

As a result of the propositions increasing retirement benefits, the declining investment returns experienced by the Retirement System and the increasing cost to the City of the Retirement System, two Civil Grand Juries investigated the Retirement System:

2008-2009 CGJ Report: "Pensions Beyond Our Ability to Pay"6

This CGJ investigated both health care and pension benefits for City employees and focused much attention on pension spiking and a Deferred Retirement Option Program. In response to the findings they made regarding spiraling pension costs, the CGJ recommended:

A task force should be established to evaluate a change to a defined-contribution (DC) plan for all new employees of the City and County of San Francisco. By adopting a DC, the Mayor, the [Board of Supervisors], and [San Francisco Employee Retirement System] can do more to restore credibility to the public Retirement Systems than any other action they can take.

The Mayor's Office responded⁷ to the 2008-2009 CGJ report in general and also specifically to the recommendation listed above. The general comment from the

Mayor's office was that the Mayor did not believe that San Francisco was experiencing a pension crisis and that the Retirement System was among the most well-funded retirement systems in the country with a strong record of superior returns on its investments. Specifically, the Mayor disagreed with the recommendation to convert to a DC plan because he believed that the Retirement System's defined benefit (DB) plan offered a more secure investment strategy.

2009-2010 CGJ Report: Pension Tsunami: The Billion Dollar Bubble⁸

This CGJ investigated the ever-increasing Retirement System unfunded liability and its effects on City services since the City is financially responsible for the unfunded liability, as well as "pension-spiking." The investigation concluded, among other issues, that the current DB plan is financially unsustainable without cutbacks in jobs and City services. The investigation report recommended that the City consider a hybrid DB and DC plan for future employees and that no cost-of-living increases accrue to retirees unless the plan is fully funded. The Mayor's Office responded to the finding of the CGJ report regarding the unsustainability of the Retirement System that:

San Francisco's Defined Benefit Plan is one of the most soundly funded and managed public retirement plans in the United States; the system itself is sustainable, despite the impact of the severe economic downturn. The City has faced economic downturns before, and, as it has in the past, our system will recover and remain financially sound.

The Mayor's Office also disagreed with the recommendation that a hybrid DB and DC plan should be considered because of the risks associated with a DC plan.

2010 Proposition D¹⁰

This proposition was placed on the ballot by the Board of Supervisors and approved by the voters. It changed the formula for determining the highest salary on which the pension benefits would be based from the highest average monthly salary within one year to the average salary in two consecutive fiscal years or 24 months prior to retirement. This proposition also changed the formula for City contributions to the Retirement System depending on the Retirement System's investment earnings. Specifically, the Voter Pamphlet said that:

For employees hired on and after July 1, 2010, "final compensation" would be calculated using a two-year formula. An employee's final compensation would be determined by averaging monthly compensation during:

- any two consecutive fiscal years of earnings, or
- the 24 months immediately before retirement.

"Pension reform can be hard to talk about. In the long run, reform now means fewer demands for layoffs and less draconian measures in the future. It's in the best interest of all Californians to fix this system now."

Ierry Brown

The final basis for retirement benefits would be the higher of the two figures. For safety employees and CalPERS members hired on and after July 1, 2010, the employee contribution to SFERS or CalPERS would increase to 9.0% of compensation. In years when the City's contribution to SFERS is less than expected because of large investment earnings, the amount saved would be deposited into the Retiree Health Care Trust Fund. The participating employers could choose to have this rule apply to them.

The City Controller provided the following statement on Proposition D:

Taken together, the change in the SFERS safety and CalPERS employee contribution rates from 7.5% to 9.0%, and the two year final compensation calculation, are expected to reduce the employer long-term cost (called the 'normal' cost) of pension funding by approximately 0.7% over the 25 year period between fiscal year 2011-2012 and fiscal year 2035-2036. Cumulatively, the savings for that same 25 year period is estimated to range between \$300 and \$500 million depending on future wage and benefit rates for employees, and other factors.

2011 Proposition C¹¹

This proposition was placed on the ballot by the Board of Supervisors and approved by the voters. It changed the pension benefits by increasing the age requirement for obtaining maximum retirement benefits and also required that retirement benefits be based on an average of the last three years of service, as well as limiting certain cost-of-living increases. Specifically, the Voter Information Pamphlet said that:

Proposition C is a Charter amendment that would change the way the City and current and future employees share in funding SFERS pension benefits. The base employee contribution rate would remain the same—7.5% for most employees—when the City contribution rate is between 11% and 12% of City payroll. Employees making at least \$50,000 would pay an additional amount up to 6% of compensation when the City contribution rate is over 12% of City payroll. When the City contribution rate falls below 11%, employee contributions would be decreased proportionately.

Proposition C would also create new retirement plans for employees hired on or after January 7, 2012, that would:

- For miscellaneous employees, increase the minimum retirement age to 53 with 20 years of service or 65 with 10 years;
- For safety employees, the minimum retirement age would remain at 50 with five years of service, but the age for maximum benefits would increase to 58;
- For all employees, limit covered compensation, calculate final compensation from a three-year average, and change the multipliers used to calculate pension benefits, and
- For miscellaneous employees, raise the age of eligibility to receive vesting allowances to 53 and reduce by half the City's contribution to vesting allowances.

The Voter Information Pamphlet also stated that:

Proposition C would limit cost-of-living adjustments for SFERS retirees.

The City Controller provided the following statement on the fiscal impact of Proposition C:

Should the proposed Charter amendment be approved by the voters and implemented, in my opinion, the City's costs to fund employee retirement benefits will be reduced by approximately \$40 to \$50 million in fiscal year (FY) 2012–13. City costs will be reduced by approximately \$1 billion to \$1.3 billion cumulatively over the ten years between FY 2012–13 and FY 2021–22, of which \$85 million is attributable to retiree health benefit savings, and the balance to pension contribution savings.

Unfortunately, much of the predicted City savings from Proposition C have not materialized as a result of litigation between Protect Our Benefits¹² and the City regarding the interpretation of Proposition C's provisions limiting cost-of-living adjustments.

The California Rule

In the 1955 case of Allen v City of Long Beach¹³, the California Supreme Court established what became known as "The California Rule" for public employee pensions which has been interpreted as constitutionally prohibiting any reduction of pension benefits for current employees and retirees as an infringement of the right of contract. The Great Recession of 2008-09 drastically diminished the market value of pension funds and, along with demographic factors such as longer life expectancy, resulted in a nationwide increase in the underfunding of pension plans. Although lowering benefits for prospective employees is allowed under the California Rule such a lowering of future pension obligations is insufficient to solve the underfunding which has been variously estimated nationwide as between two to over four trillion dollars and, as a California Court of Appeals sardonically noted, "As so often occurs California was in first place." Under the City's Charter the City is obligated to contribute to the Retirement System to compensate for underfunding, but actuarial predictions show that only lowering benefits for current employees can bring the system to full funded status¹⁴.

As that Court of Appeals' decision (which is presently before the California Supreme Court) held, a current public employee's pension may be reduced so long as such reduction does not "deprive the employee of a 'reasonable' pension." The final determination of the scope of the California Rule remains to be determined by the California Supreme Court, but if it upholds the lower court's decision there may be an opportunity to begin the process of bringing pension plans in California, including the City's Retirement System, into a fully funded condition.

Financial Economics and Public Pension Plans

Financial Economics and its use with public pension plans is a topic we came across late in our investigation. We have not been able to study it in detail, but wanted to point it out as an important, and controversial, topic. Currently, public pension plans use the long-term investment return of assets to value liabilities. This is challenged by those who say public pension plan liabilities should be valued using risk-free interest rates. Below are some helpful links on this topic:

Pensions & Investments 8/3/2016 article:
Actuarial leaders disband task force, object to paper on public plan liabilities

The paper mentioned in the article: Financial Economics Principles Applied to Public Pension Plans

Joint AAA (American Academy of Actuaries)/SOA (Society of Actuaries) Task Force on Financial Economics and the Actuarial Model: Pension Actuary's Guide to Financial Economics, 2006

Hoover Institution essay: <u>Hidden Debt, Hidden Deficits: 2017 Edition, How Pension Promises Are Consuming State and Local Budgets</u>

METHODOLOGY

During our investigation, we reviewed numerous reports and studies, and interviewed City staff regarding the Retirement System. A list of our sources is included in <u>Appendix A</u>.

We reviewed:

- Prior CGJ reports on the Retirement System;
- Prior propositions dealing with the Retirement System;
- Retirement System Annual Reports, Actuarial Valuation Reports, Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 67/68 Reports, and Financial Reports
- San Francisco Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR)
- Press articles, academic articles and studies dealing with pension reform throughout the United States.
- Reform efforts by other public retirement systems.

We interviewed:

- Present and former staff of the Controller's Office;
- Present and former staff of the Retirement System;
- Present and former staff of the Mayor's Office;
- Members of the Retirement Board.

We consulted with outside experts familiar with retirement systems.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

The Retirement System is a defined-benefit pension plan which provides a specified retirement benefit that is based on the member's retirement age, service length, and final salary. The Retirement System is governed by a seven-member Retirement Board; three are employees or retirees elected by all employees and retirees, three are Mayoral appointees, and one is a Board of Supervisors (BOS) member appointed by the BOS President. Elected officials, including the Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, and the Controller, are members of the Retirement System.

The Retirement Board appoints the Retirement System's Executive Director and an Actuary. The Executive Director administers the Retirement System; the Actuary advises the Retirement Board on actuarial matters and monitors an independent consulting actuarial firm, Cheiron, which prepares the Retirement System's annual Actuarial Valuation and GASB 67/68¹⁵ Reports, and other actuarial analyses. The Retirement System publishes an Annual Report, an annual Financial Statements and Required Supplementary Information Report, and the Retirement Systems' CPA, MGO Certified Public Accountants, performs an audit of the Financial Statements and produces an audit report.

The Retirement Board receives advice from the Retirement System's Chief Investment Office (CIO) and the investment staff, and it makes all the investment decisions for the Retirement Fund.

Health care for the City's employees and retirees is a significant portion of benefits, but it is not in the scope of this report. The SF Deferred Compensation Plan is also not within this report's scope.

Any defined-benefit pension plan is hard for the average person to understand. A mortgage covers 30 years and is complex; a pension plan can cover 60 years or more, and is very complex. Predicting how much an individual makes each year, if or when they quit, if they're married or have kids, if they become disabled, when they retire, or when they die — is impossible. But for a large group of people, actuaries can, and do, make reasonably accurate predictions about these events. Predicting what investments will do in the future is far more uncertain. The Great Recession of 10 years ago is a prime example.


A pension plan must take the long view, at least 60 years. Making decisions based on a shorter view almost always turns out badly. The stock market booms in the late 1990s and the 2000s led to some short-term pension decisions, and we are currently facing the results. Any solution to the current situation needs to take the long view.

"We cannot continue. Our pension costs and health care costs for our employees are going to bankrupt this city."

Michael Bloomberg

THE CITY & ITS EMPLOYEES

The chart below provides a 10-year overview of the City's Budget and employees' Salaries and Benefits¹⁶. After adjusting for inflation¹⁷, the Budget has increased by 40%, and Salaries and Benefits by 33%, in the last 10 years. Salaries and Benefits have been 50-53% of the Budget in each of the last 10 years. Keep in mind that inflation has been very low for the last 10 years, but it will likely pick up in the future. The 3/23/17 update of the City's Five-Year Financial Plan for FY 2017-18 through FY 2021-22¹⁸ estimates Salaries and Benefits increasing by 51% over the next five years.




2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Budget 5,749,169,447 6,079,785,411 6,531,467,931 6,586,787,453 6,562,658,343 6,833,766,939 7,354,311,244 7,908,801,656 8,581,831,912 8,938,774,083

Salaries + Benefits 2,996,227,877 3,192,230,671 3,333,905,306 3,415,844,176 3,382,826,871 3,526,508,012 3,789,360,557 4,021,165,840 4,309,497,053 4,455,556,464


The chart below provides a FY 2007 through FY 2016 overview of the number of City Employees and Retirees¹⁹. Employees have increased by 7.3%, and Retirees by 34.0%, over the last 10 years. As the Baby-Boomers continue to retire, it is possible there will be more Retirees than Employees in the future.



RETIREMENT SYSTEM - FUNDING


The Retirement System is funded by contributions from the City and its employees, and by investment returns²⁰. The City's contributions include amortization payments on the unfunded liability debt. The chart below shows these funding sources between FY 2007 and FY 2016. The table below the chart shows the amounts. The wide swings in Investment Returns, and their size in relation to City and Employee Contributions, illustrate the market's risks and rewards. For example, during the Great Recession in FY 2008 and FY 2009 the Retirement System lost more than \$4.2 billion, in FY 2014 it made \$3.2 billion, and in FY 2016 made only \$150 million.

After adjusting for inflation²¹, the City's Contributions have increased by 71%, and the Employee Contributions by 37%, in the last 10 years.



RETIREMENT SYSTEM - LIABILITY, ASSETS, UNFUNDED LIABILITY

The chart below shows the Retirement System's Liability, Assets, and Unfunded Liability for FY 2007 to FY 2016²². Unfunded Liability = Liability - Assets. After adjusting for inflation²³, Liability has increased by 35%, and Assets by 3%, over the last 10 years. Between FY 2007 and FY 2009, the Retirement System went from being \$3.4 billion overfunded to \$4.6 billion underfunded, an \$8.0 billion swing in three years. Between FY 2009 and FY 2014, Assets almost caught up with Liability, but since then Liability has continued to increase while Assets have been relatively flat.



PROPOSITION COSTS & DISCLOSURES

For most pension retirement benefits, the City and its employees make payments each pay period during the employees' time of service. Those payments are invested and earn money over time. Retroactive pension increases do not work the same. The total projected future costs of a proposition's retroactive pension increase are calculated for all employees and retirees for their lifetime; this is usually a large amount. When the proposition's pension increase goes into effect, that total becomes a proposition debt owed by the City to the Retirement System – employees and retirees owe nothing. The proposition debt is added to the Unfunded Actuarial Liability²⁴ of the Retirement System. The proposition debt is expressed as a percentage of the City's payroll, so it increases each year based upon the Salary Increase Rate²⁵ percentage (3.75% - 4.50%), and increases or decreases in the number of employees. The proposition debt is paid back over 20 years at the Discount Rate (7.50% - 8.00%).

"Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn't afford."

A list of retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions from 1996 – 2008 can be found in <u>Appendix B</u>.

The Little Hoover Commission is an independent state oversight agency that was created in 1962. The Commission's mission is to investigate state government operations and — through reports, recommendations and legislative proposals — promote efficiency, economy and improved service. The Commission published a report, "Public Pensions for Retirement Security" on February 24, 2011. The report's cover letter starts with:

California's pension plans are dangerously underfunded, the result of overly generous benefit promises, wishful thinking and an unwillingness to plan prudently. Unless aggressive reforms are implemented now, the problem will get far worse, forcing counties and cities to severely reduce services and layoff employees to meet pension obligations.

As part of the report's Recommendations 3 and 4, it states:

To minimize risk to taxpayers, the responsibility for funding a sustainable pension system must be spread more equally among parties.

The Legislature must prohibit retroactive pension increases.

To improve transparency and accountability, more information about pension costs must be provided regularly to the public.

- The Legislature must require government retirement boards to restructure their boards to add a majority or a substantial minority of independent, public members to ensure greater representation of taxpayer interests.
- All proposed pension increases must be submitted to voters in their respective jurisdictions. The ballot measures must by accompanied by sound actuarial information, written in a clear and concise format.

Governor Brown published a "Twelve Point Pension Reform Plan" on October 27, 2011²⁷. One of the points was to "Prohibit Retroactive Pension Increases." It states:

In the past, a number of public employers applied pension benefit enhancements like earlier retirement and increased benefit amounts to work already performed by current employees and retirees. Of course, neither employee nor employer pension contributions for those past years of work accounted for those increased benefits. As a result, billions of dollars in unfunded liabilities continue to plague the system. My plan will ban this irresponsible practice.

(Bolding added)

June 2008 Proposition B - Changing Qualifications for Retiree Health and Pension Benefits and Establishing a Retiree Health Care Trust Fund²⁸

The June 2008 Proposition B includes Pension Benefits and Retiree Health Benefits; this report addresses only the Pension Benefits. The Voter Information Pamphlet for the June 2008 Proposition B includes the standard Controller's statement on the fiscal impact of Proposition B:

Should the proposed charter amendment be approved by the voters, in my opinion, the City will have both significant added costs in the near and medium term for the cost of employee pension benefits and significant savings in the near term under its labor contracts and in the long term for the cost of retiree health benefits.

Pension Benefits: The Charter amendment would increase the maximum retirement benefit available to City miscellaneous employees from the current 2% of final pay at 60 years of age, up to 2.3% of final pay at age 62 and enhance cost of living increases for pension recipients. These changes would add approximately 3.5% of salary to the cost of funding an average employee's retirement benefits, or an ongoing annual cost to the City of approximately \$84 million for the next 20 years, dropping after 20 years to an ongoing annual cost of 1.1% of salary or approximately \$27 million at current rates.

To partially pay for this increased retirement benefit, the amendment freezes wages for the 2009-2010 fiscal year. This provision is estimated to save the City approximately 2.1% of salary or an estimated \$35 million on an annual basis. These savings estimates are based on an assumption that the City would otherwise have provided wage increases at percentage rates at or near the projected consumer price index for that period and is consistent with the City's historical experience in negotiated labor contracts. Finally, the Charter amendment specifies that the City's ongoing expenditures for improved retirement benefits under this proposal must be considered the equivalent of wages in future labor arbitration proceedings. Note that these provisions do not apply to the labor contracts for police, firefighters, sheriffs, nurses and transit operators.

The actuary's analysis of Proposition B²⁹ prior to the election shows an estimated increase in Unfunded Liability of \$674 million. When Proposition B came into effect,

the Unfunded Liability was increased by \$750 million, a debt that 8 years later the City has paid \$595 million on, \$542 million in interest and \$53 million in principal. The debt will not be paid off until 2028.


Reviewing the Voter Information Pamphlet's arguments for and against Proposition B, it's clear that they focused on the Retiree Health Benefits and the Retiree Health Care Trust Fund, and considered the Pension Benefits to be a minor change. Several of the proponents stated that it would save \$1.4 billion in healthcare costs over 30 years. No one noted that the pension increases would cost \$1.68 billion over 20 years. Some quotes from the arguments:

Increases Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA) for retirees and modestly improves pensions for employees who retire at or after age 60

Proposition B is just the latest minor proposal to appear on the ballot in a City Charter election, costing taxpayers a mountain of money for a molehill of municipal employee law change.

The June 2008 Proposition B chart below shows the Outstanding Balance due to be paid by the City to the Retirement System, the Cumulative Interest paid, and the Cumulative Principal paid³⁰. Note that after eight years the City has paid \$542 million in Interest, \$53 million in Principal, and has an Outstanding Balance of \$697 million. The Outstanding Balance increased during the first four years, and over the next twelve years it will be paid down to zero.

All retroactive pension increase propositions will have a similar pattern of interest and principal costs over time.



RETIREMENT SYSTEM REPORTS

Each fiscal year there are five financial documents published by the Controller and SFERS that describe the City's Retirement System: 1) the Controller's Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR); 2) the SFERS Annual Report; 3) the SFERS Financial Statements; 4) the SFERS Actuarial Valuation Report; and 5) the SFERS GASB 67/68 Report. These reports are described below.

An actuarial report was produced by the SFERS Actuary and sent to the Board of Supervisors, the Mayor, and the Controller for each proposition that retroactively increased retirement benefits. Each actuarial report estimated the detailed costs of the proposition and was the basis of the Controller's estimate provided in the Voter Information Pamphlet. These actuarial reports could not be found online.

For the most part, these reports are not meant for the average City taxpayer, employee, or retiree. There are no other readily available sources of information about the Retirement System's finances. This results in there being little transparency or accountability to the public for the Retirement System's finances. Taxpayers have not had the information needed to make an informed decision about the retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions. However, the Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, and the Controller understood these reports, but failed to communicate it to voters in a clear and complete manner.

"Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans."

Warren Buffet

Comprehensive Annual Financial Report

Produced by: Controller's Office Audience: Accountants, auditors

Complexity: Very High

Size: 235 pages, ~25 pages on the Retirement System

Notes:

This report describes all the finances for the City.

SFERS Annual Report

Produced by: SFERS

Audience: Employees, retirees, public

Complexity: Medium/High

Size: 79 pages

Notes:

Its Financial, Investment, Statistical, and Deferred Compensation Plan Sections are clear, and much of the Actuarial Section is as well, but the "Actuarial Analysis of Financial Experience", "Schedule of Funding Progress", and "Actuarial Solvency Test" tables have no description of the tables, the data they contain, or why the data ends with the previous Fiscal Year.

SFERS Financial Statements

Produced by: SFERS

Audited by: MGO Certified Public Accountants

Audience: Accountants, auditors

Complexity: High Size: 52 pages

SFERS Actuarial Valuation Report

Produced by: Cheiron, the SFERS' Actuary Audience: SFERS, actuaries, auditors

Complexity: Extremely High

Size: 94 pages

Notes:

This report is for funding purposes, i.e., to determine the City's annual contribution. It contains many tables, most of which are clear and understandable, but there are many that have no description of the tables or the data they contain.

SFERS GASB 67/68 Report

Produced by: Cheiron, the SFERS' Actuary Audience: SFERS, actuaries, auditors

Complexity: Very High

Size: 35 pages

Notes:

This report is for financial reporting purposes. It is required by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 67, "Financial Reporting for Retirement Systems", and Statement No. 68, "Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions."

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding F1: That there are multiple causes for the City's \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System, including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic assumptions (\$1.1 billion)³¹. However, the principal underlying cause is the estimated \$3.5 billion³² in retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008.

Recommendation R1.1: That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public.

Recommendation R1.2: That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations.

Finding F2: 1) That the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related propositions (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening the fiscal status of the City.

Recommendation R2.1: That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The details of the committee are:

- 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee
- 2. Purpose
 - a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System's unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, and present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018. All options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.
 - **b.** Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement System.

- c. As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement System encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.
- d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by the Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) all propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to voters in the Voter Information Pamphlet.
- e. In furtherance of its purpose, the committee may engage in any of the following activities:
 - i. Inquire into the actions of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, financial statements, actuarial reports, or other materials related to the Retirement System.
 - ii. Holding public meetings to review the effect on San Francisco residents of actions taken by the Retirement System.

3. Public Meetings

- a. The Board of Supervisors shall provide the committee with any necessary technical assistance and shall provide administrative assistance in furtherance of its purpose and sufficient resources to publicize the conclusions of the committee.
- b. All committee proceedings shall be subject to the California Public Records Act (Section 6254, et seq., of the Government Code of the State of California) and the City's Sunshine Ordinance (Chapter 67 of this Code). The committee shall issue regular reports on the results of its activities. A report shall be issued at least once a year. Minutes of the proceedings of the committee and all documents received and reports issued shall be a matter of public record and be made available on the Board's website.

4. Membership

- a. Two-thirds of the members will be Public members and one-third will be Representative members.
- b. Public members.
 - i. Public members must be voters.
 - ii. Public members cannot be members of the Retirement System.
 - iii. Each Supervisor will appoint a single Public member.
 - iv. The Mayor will appoint all other Public members.
 - v. Public members can only be removed for cause.
 - vi. Public members shall be experienced in life insurance, actuarial science, employee pension planning, investment portfolio management, labor negotiations, accounting, mathematics, statistics, economics, or finance.
 - vii. Public members will receive no compensation.
 - viii. Four-year term, staggered so that one-fourth of the Public members' terms expire each year.

- ix. No more than two consecutive terms.
- c. Representative members
 - i. Mayor's Office representative.
 - ii. Board of Supervisors' representative.
 - iii. Controller's Office representative.
 - iv. Human Resources Department representative.
 - v. Safety Unions' representative.
 - vi. Miscellaneous Unions' representative.
- 5. Committee Costs
 - a. The Board of Supervisors will decide how best to fund the Committee.

Recommendation R2.2: That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board.

FINDING F3: That the Voter Information Pamphlets for retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not provide voters with complete estimates of the propositions' costs, who would pay those costs, how those costs were financed, and what the interest rates were.

RECOMMENDATION R3.1: That the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections ensure that future Voter Information Pamphlets for Retirement System-related propositions provide voters with complete financial details.

RECOMMENDATION R3.2: That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it.

FINDING F4: The Controller and the Retirement System provide extensive reports about the Retirement System, but they are too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand. The data in the Retirement System reports is not available to the Retirement System or the public in a dataset, making research and analysis more difficult.

RECOMMENDATION R4.1: That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and make that dataset available to the public.

RECOMMENDATION R4.2: That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office develop and produce an annual Retirement System Report that clearly explains the current and projected status of the Retirement System and its effect on the City's budget.

REQUEST FOR RESPONSES

FINDING F1

That there are multiple causes for the City's \$5.81 billion debt to its Retirement System, including investment losses (\$1.4 billion), a court ruling on Supplemental Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) in the 2011 Proposition C (\$1.3 billion), and changes in demographic assumptions (\$1.1 billion). However, the principal underlying cause is the estimated \$3.5 billion in retroactive retirement benefit increases implemented by voter-approved propositions between 1996 and 2008.

RECOMMENDATION R1.1

That the Mayor and Board of Supervisors fully disclose the financial details of any future retirement benefit increases or decreases to the public.

RECOMMENDATION R1.2

That by the end of 2018, the Retirement Board produce an annual report for the public showing each component of the debt owed by the City to the Retirement System, including the full history of each component and descriptions of all calculations.

RESPONDERS

Mayor Board of Supervisors Retirement Board

FINDING F2

1) That the City's Retirement System diligently protects the retirement-related interests of the City's employees and retirees; 2) that the Retirement Board has a majority of members who are also members of the Retirement System (they receive, or will receive, pensions); 3) that when it came to retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008, the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Retirement Board, and Controller did not fulfill their responsibility to watch out for the interests of the City and its residents; and 4) that despite previous Retirement System-related propositions (2010 Proposition D and 2011 Proposition C) that reduced future pension liabilities, the Retirement System remains seriously underfunded, threatening the fiscal status of the City.

RECOMMENDATION R2.1

That the Board of Supervisors establish a permanent Retirement System Oversight Committee to develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System that is fair to both employees and taxpayers, and present it to the voters in a proposition by 2018. All options for reducing pension liabilities must be considered, including a hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan. The details of the committee are:

- 1. Name: Retirement System Oversight Committee
- 2. Purpose
 - a. Develop a comprehensive, long-term solution for the Retirement System's unfunded liabilities that is fair to both employees, retirees, and taxpayers, and present it to voters in a proposition by the end of 2018. All options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined

RESPONDERS

Mayor Board of Supervisors Retirement Board Controller Contribution plan.

- b. Inform and educate the public concerning the finances of the Retirement System.
- c. As needed, develop solutions to future problems the Retirement System encounters and, if necessary, present them to voters in a proposition. All options should be on the table, including a Hybrid Defined Benefit / Defined Contribution plan.
- d. The Committee shall provide oversight to ensure that: (1) actions taken by the Retirement System are in the best interest of the residents of San Francisco; (2) all propositions that modify the Retirement System are adequately described to voters in the Voter Information Pamphlet.
- e. In furtherance of its purpose, the committee may engage in any of the following activities:
 - i. Inquire into the actions of the Retirement System by reviewing reports, analyses, financial statements, actuarial reports, or other materials related to the Retirement System.
 - ii. Holding public meetings to review the effect on San Francisco residents of actions taken by the Retirement System.

3. Public Meetings

- a. The Board of Supervisors shall provide the committee with any necessary technical assistance and shall provide administrative assistance in furtherance of its purpose and sufficient resources to publicize the conclusions of the committee.
- b. All committee proceedings shall be subject to the California Public Records Act (Section 6254, et seq., of the Government Code of the State of California) and the City's Sunshine Ordinance (Chapter 67 of this Code). The committee shall issue regular reports on the results of its activities. A report shall be issued at least once a year. Minutes of the proceedings of the committee and all documents received and reports issued shall be a matter of public record and be made available on the Board's website.

4. Membership

- a. Two-thirds of the members will be Public members and onethird will be Representative members.
- b. Public members.
 - i. Public members must be voters.
 - ii. Public members cannot be members of the Retirement System.
 - iii. Each Supervisor will appoint a single Public member.
 - iv. The Mayor will appoint all other Public members.
 - v. Public members can only be removed for cause.

- vi. Public members shall be experienced in life insurance, actuarial science, employee pension planning, investment portfolio management, labor negotiations, accounting, mathematics, statistics, economics, or finance.
- vii. Public members will receive no compensation.
- viii. Four-year term, staggered so that one-fourth of the Public members' terms expire each year.
- ix. No more than two consecutive terms.
- c. Representative members
 - i. Mayor's Office representative.
 - ii. Board of Supervisors' representative.
 - iii. Controller's Office representative.
 - iv. Human Resources Department representative.
 - v. Safety Unions' representative.
 - vi. Miscellaneous Unions' representative.
- 5. Committee Costs
 - a. The Board of Supervisors will decide how best to fund the Committee.

RECOMMENDATION R2.2

That by the end of 2018, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors submit a Charter amendment proposition to the voters to add three additional public members who are not Retirement System members to the Retirement Board.

FINDING F3

That the Voter Information Pamphlets for retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions between 1996 and 2008 did not provide voters with complete estimates of the propositions' costs, who would pay those costs, how those costs were financed, and what the interest rates were.

RECOMMENDATION R3.1

That the Elections Commission and the Department of Elections ensure that future Voter Information Pamphlets for Retirement System-related propositions provide voters with complete financial details.

RECOMMENDATION R3.2

That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office provide SF residents, employees, and retirees with a description of the City's Retirement System that enables them to make informed decisions about it.

RESPONDERS

Elections
Commission
Department of
Elections
Controller

FINDING F4

The Controller and the Retirement System provide extensive reports about the Retirement System, but they are too complex for the average citizen, employee, or retiree to understand. The data in the Retirement System reports is not available to the Retirement System or the public in a dataset, making research and analysis more difficult.

RECOMMENDATION R4.1

That by the end of 2018, the Retirement System develop and maintain a dataset based on the data in its actuarial and financial reports of the last 20 years, and make that dataset available to the public.

RECOMMENDATION R4.2

That by the end of 2018, the Controller's Office develop and produce an annual Retirement System Report that clearly explains the current and projected status of the Retirement System and its effect on the City's budget.

RESPONDERS

Retirement Board Controller

Appendix A: Sources

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

San Francisco Charter (http://www.amlegal.com/codes/client/san-francisco_ca/)

Article XII: Employee Retirement and Health Service Systems

Appendix A: Employment Provisions

San Francisco Employees' Retirement System

Website Home Page: http://mysfers.org

Agendas & Minutes: http://mysfers.org/about-sfers/agendas-minutes/

Publications - Annual Reports: http://mysfers.org/resources/publications/annual-reports/

Publications - Actuarial Valuation Reports:

http://mysfers.org/resources/publications/sfers-actuarial-valuations/

Publications - Audited Financial Statements:

http://mysfers.org/resources/publications/sfers-audited-financial-statements/

Office of the Controller

Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR):

http://openbook.sfgov.org/webreports/search.aspx?searchString=&year=1986&year2=2017&type=CAFR&index=0&index2=4&index3=0

City Budgets & Reports:

http://openbook.sfgov.org/webreports/search.aspx?searchString=&year=1986&year2=2017&type=CityBudgets &index=0&index2=3&index3=0

SF OpenBook: http://openbook.sfgov.org/

Proposed Five-Year Financial Plan, FY 2017-18 – 2021-22, 12/16/2016: http://sfcontroller.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Budget/Five%20Year%20Financial%20Plan%20FY17-18%20through%20FY21-22%20%28Proposed%29%20FINAL.pdf

The City's Five Year Financial Plan Update, 3/23/2017: http://sfcontroller.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Budget/FY17-18%20Five%20Year%20Plan%20Update%20FINAL%203.23.pdf

San Francisco Civil Grand Jury

2008-09 Pensions Beyond Our Ability to Pay: http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2008-2009.html 2009-10 Pension Tsunami: The Billion Dollar Bubble: http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2009-2010.html

OTHER RESOURCES

California Actuarial Advisory Panel (CAAP): http://www.sco.ca.gov/caap.html

Calpensions: https://calpensions.com/

Hoover Institution, Hidden Debt, Hidden Deficits: 2017 Edition, How Pension Promises Are Consuming State and Local Budgets: http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/rauh_hiddendebt2017_final_webreadypdf1.pdf

Joint AAA (American Academy of Actuaries)/SOA (Society of Actuaries) Task Force on Financial Economics and the Actuarial Model, Pension Actuary's Guide to Financial Economics, 2006: https://www.soa.org/Files/Sections/actuary-journal-final.pdf

League of California Cities — Pension Information Center: http://www.cacities.org/Policy-Advocacy/Hot-Issues/Pension-Information-Center

Little Hoover Commission — Public Pensions for Retirement Security: http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/204/report204.html

Los Angeles Times – The Pension Gap: http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-pension-crisis-davis-deal/

Pension Finance Institute, Financial Economics Principles Applied to Public Pension Plans: www.pensionfinance.org/papers/PubPrin.pdf

Rockefeller Institute of Government – Government Finance – Pension Reform: http://www.rockinst.org/government finance/pension.aspx

Appendix B: Retirement System Propositions

These are the retroactive retirement benefit increase propositions placed on the ballot by the Board of Supervisors between 1996 and 2008. The dollar amounts are the City Controller estimates from the Voter Information Pamphlet for each proposition. The actual costs for the propositions are not reported by the Retirement Board or by the Controller's Office.

| Year-Mon | Ltr | Title | \$/Year | Total | \$/Year |
|-----------|-----|--|------------|---------------|------------|
| | | • | 20 Years | 20 Years | after 20 |
| 1996 Nov | С | Retired Employee Benefits | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| 1996 Nov | D | Firefighters Retirement Benefits | 3,500,000 | 70,000,000 | 1,750,000 |
| 1998 Nov | A | Police Retirement Benefits | 3,900,000 | 78,000,000 | 2,300,000 |
| 1998 Nov | C | Paramedic Retirement Benefits | 485,000 | 9,700,000 | |
| 2000 Nov | C | City Worker Retirement Benefits (Misc) | 34,000,000 | 680,000,000 | 17,000,000 |
| 2002 Mar | В | Cost of Living Benefits | 19,100,000 | 382,000,000 | 7,400,000 |
| 2002 Nov | H | Police & Firefighter Retirement Benefits | 28,000,000 | 560,000,000 | 8,200,000 |
| 2003 Nov | F | Targeted Early Retirement | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| | l | (Misc 3+3, 1 of 3) | | | |
| 2003 Nov | F | Targeted Early Retirement | n/a | n/a | п/а |
| · | | (Misc 3+3, 2 of 3) | | | |
| 2003 Nov | F | Targeted Early Retirement | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| | | (Misc 3+3, 3 of 3) | | | |
| 2004 Nov | E | Police and Fire Survivor Benefits | 1,000,000 | 20,000,000 | |
| 2008 June | В | New Misc Ret Bfts and Compound COLA | 84,000,000 | 1,680,000,000 | 27,000,000 |
| | | Totals: | | 3,479,700,000 | 63,650,000 |

| Year-Mon | Ltr | Title | Voter Information Pamphlet |
|-----------|-----|--|--|
| 1996 Nov | С | Retired Employee Benefits | https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November5 1996short.pdf |
| 1996 Nov | . D | Firefighters Retirement Benefits | https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November5 1996short.pdf |
| 1998 Nov | A | Police Retirement Benefits | https://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November3 1998 short.pdf |
| 1998 Nov | С | Paramedic Retirement Benefits | https://sfpl.org/pdf/main/qic/elections/November3 1998 short.pdf |
| 2000 Nov | С | City Worker Retirement Benefits (Misc) | https://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November7 2000 .pdf |
| 2002 Mar | В | Cost of Living Benefits | https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/March5 200 2.pdf |
| 2002 Nov | Н | Police & Firefighter Retirement Benefits | http://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November5 2002. pdf |
| 2003 Nov | F | Targeted Early Retirement | https://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November4 2003 .pdf |
| 2004 Nov | E | Police and Fire Survivor Benefits | http://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November2 2004.pdf |
| 2008 June | В | New Misc Ret Bfts and Compound COLA | https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/June3 2008.pdf |

ENDNOTES

bin/cognosisapi.dll?b_action=cognosViewer&ui.action=run&ui.object=/content/folder%5B%40name%3D%27Reports%27% 5D/report%5B%40name%3D%27Budget%27%5D&ui.name=20Budget&run.outputFormat=&run.prompt=false

¹ San Francisco Charter, Article XII: Employee Retirement and Health Service Systems, and Appendix A: Employment Provisions, http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca

² 2000 Proposition C, Voter Information Pamphlet: https://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November 7 2000.pdf

³ 2002 Proposition H, Voter Information Pamphlet: http://sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/November5 2002.pdf

⁴ SFERS Audited Financial Statements 2006, page 8. "In order to maintain the fiscal soundness of the Plan, employer contributions were required from the City and County during the year ended June 30, 2005. This was the first year since the year ended June 30, 1997 in which employer contributions were required.

⁵ June 2008 Proposition B, Voter Information Pamphlet: https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/June3 2008.pdf

⁶ SF CGJ 2008-2009 Report: Pensions, Beyond Our Ability to Pay: http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2008 2009/Pensions Beyond.pdf

⁷ Office of the Controller, Status of the Recommendations by the Civil Grand Jury 2008-09, 2010 Department Responses, page 11: http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2008 2009/ControllersAudit 2008-2009 Report.pdf

⁸ SF CGJ 2009-2010 Report: Pension Tsunami, The Billion Dollar Bubble: http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2009 2010/Pension Tsunami.pdf

⁹ Office of the Controller, Status of the Recommendations by the Civil Grand Jury 2008-09, 2010 Department Responses, page 15: http://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2009 2010/Controllers Audit 2009-2010 Reports.pdf

¹⁰ 2010 Proposition D, Voter Information Pamphlet: https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/June8 2010.pdf

^{11 2011} Proposition C, Voter Information Pamphlet: https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/november8 2011.pdf

¹² Protect Our Benefits, http://www.protectourbenefits.org/

¹³ Allen v. City of Long Beach (1955) 45 Cal.2d 128, 131

¹⁴ Little Hoover Commission, Public Pensions for Retirement Security, page v, http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/204/report204.html

¹⁵ GASB 67/68 is the Government Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 67, "Financial Reporting for Retirement Systems", and Statement No. 68, "Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions."

¹⁶ Budget, Salaries and Benefits data is from SF OpenBook: http://openbook.sfgov.org/openbooks/cgi-

¹⁷ The cumulative rate of inflation between FY 2007 and FY 2016 is 15.8%, according to the US Inflation Calculator (www.usinflationcalculator.com). The 2007 amount is multiplied by 1.158 to adjust it to its 2016 equivalent, and then the percentage increase is calculated.

- ¹⁸ The City's Five Year Financial Plan Update, 3/23/2017, page 2: http://sfcontroller.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Budget/FY17-18%20Five%20Year%20Plan%20Update%20FINAL%203.23.pdf
- ¹⁹ Employee and Retiree counts are from the 2007-2016 SFERS Actuarial Valuation Reports. http://mysfers.org/resources/publications/sfers-actuarial-valuations/
- ²⁰ City and Employee Contributions, and Investment Returns are from the 2007-2016 SFERS Actuarial Valuation Reports. http://mvsfers.org/resources/publications/sfers-actuarial-valuations/
- ²¹ The cumulative rate of inflation between FY 2007 and FY 2016 is 15.8%, according to the US Inflation Calculator (<u>www.usinflationcalculator.com</u>). The 2007 amount is multiplied by 1.158 to adjust it to its 2016 equivalent, and then the percentage increase is calculated.
- ²² Liability, Assets, and Unfunded amounts are from the 2007-2016 SFERS Actuarial Valuation Reports. http://mvsfers.org/resources/publications/sfers-actuarial-valuations/
- ²³ The cumulative rate of inflation between FY 2007 and FY 2016 is 15.8%, according to the US Inflation Calculator (<u>www.usinflationcalculator.com</u>). The 2007 amount is multiplied by 1.158 to adjust it to its 2016 equivalent, and then the percentage increase is calculated.
- ²⁴ Actuarial Liability is the difference between the present value of all future system benefits and the present value of total future normal costs. This is also referred to by some actuaries as the "accrued liability" or "actuarial accrued liability." Unfunded Actuarial Liability represents the difference between Actuarial Liability and valuation assets. This value is sometimes referred to as "unfunded actuarial accrued liability."
- ²⁵ The Salary Increase Rate is a combination of the Wage Inflation and Merit Increase percentages; these are Actuarial Assumptions. All Actuarial Assumptions are reviewed and set by the Retirement Board each year.
- ²⁶ Little Hoover Commission Public Pensions for Retirement Security: http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/204/report204.html
- ²⁷ http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Twelve Point Pension Reform 10.27.11.pdf
- ²⁸ June 2008 Proposition B, Voter Information Pamphlet: https://sfpl4.sfpl.org/pdf/main/gic/elections/June3 2008.pdf
- ²⁹ SFERS letter from the Executive Director and Acting Actuary to the Clerk of the Board, 2/11/2008, Re: File No. 071663, with attached letter from Towers Perrin, "Estimated Costs of Potential Changes to SFERS Plan Provisions." File name: "20080211_ActuarialAnalysis.pdf." Could not find it online. Request it from the Retirement Board's Secretary.
- ³⁰ The Outstanding Balance, Cumulative Interest, and Cumulative Principal are from the 2007-2016 SFERS Actuarial Valuation Reports. http://mysfers.org/resources/publications/sfers-actuarial-valuations/
- 31 SFERS FY 2016 GASB 67/68 Report, page 2.
- ³² See Appendix B: Retirement System Propositions.

Prepared L Illen Lee Zhou Contact: ellenzhou8 Pyahoo.com SEIU 1021 Bargaining Team Member, Retirement Committee Wednesday, October 18th, 2017

Dear SEIU1021 members, thank you for trusting me to lead our Retirement Committee. I have read several articles written by a retired San Francisco public employee that appear in the Westside Observer. Many of his articles are on our Deferred Comp plan, which is also known as a 457 (b) Plan. The San Francisco Employees Retirement System (SFERS) selects and monitors the company that manages our plan. Currently Prudential Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company (PRIAC) acts as our record keeper. Please take your time to study these problems. I found several facts alarming about our 457 (b) deferred compensation plan:

- 1. SFERS has never audited our plan, so they really do not know whether Prudential (PRIAC) ensured our investments actually were purchased. If Prudential is just the record keeper, it is unclear who or where our assets are actually held.
- 2. Every year SFERS prepares an annual report that includes the values of our deferred comp plan. Earlier this year, a retired employee made a public records request to get a copy of the deferred comp statements from each mutual fund component. It was learned that SFERS does not even receive mutual fund account statements to backup the numbers SFERS reports in the annual report. http://mysfers.org/wp-content/uploads/SFERS_AnnualReport_FY16_web.pdf
 3. Our plan allows Prudential to buy investments other than the investments you instruct them to invest in. Prudential is allowed to buy options, futures, and other derivatives that you may not want them to invest in,
- 4. When our account was transferred from ING to Great West in 2009, our Stable Value fund was deficient over \$100 million dollars. Great West paid off this deficit by not giving city employees their full interest until the \$100 million loan was paid off,
- 5. Prudential is charging us a fee based on how many assets we have. If Prudential is charging us a fee based on the alternative investments that Prudential has made with our money, then they are overcharging us,
- 6. Our fellow San Francisco employees have almost three billion dollars with Prudential. Our \$3 billion account is not segregated from other cities and corporations accounts. Our account is commingled in a pool. Unlike other pooled investments like mutual funds, with our Prudential account, every city has a separate contract and agreement with Prudential. SFERS does not get to review the other cities' contracts, so SFERS is blind to allowances or restrictions the other cities might have given to Prudential. In theory, another city could allow Prudential to invest in salt and that salt now becomes partially ours because our investments are not segregated from the other cities in the Prudential pooled fund,
- 7. Banks provide FDIC Insurance and mutual fund investors are protected by SIPC insurance. Because our shares are not held at the mutual fund companies, we do not receive the \$500,000 SIPC Insurance protection.
- **8.Prudential** does not even assign you an account number. This makes it easier for identity thieves to access your account
- 9. 401k Plan investments are monitored by the Department of Labor. Our deferred comp plan is not protected by the Department of Labor and the ERISA law that the Department of Labor enforces.

I found our retired coworkers articles to be complex but frightening. You can go to this link and then scan down to his articles on Deferred Comp. How can we advocate to protect our money? http://www.westsideobserver.com/news/barberini.html#oct17

Prepared by Ellen Lee Zhou Contact: ellenzhou888@yahoo.com Behavioral Health Clinician, Department. Public Health SEIU 1021 Bargaining Team Member, Retirement Committee

Submitted 0/17/2018

Reguested for BD statements. Retirement Board hot address.

Carroll, John (BOS)

~rom:

claire zvanski <czvanski@hotmail.com>

∌nt:

Wednesday, January 17, 2018 3:42 AM

lo:

Kim, Jane (BOS); Peskin, Aaron (BOS); Breed, London (BOS)

Cc:

Carroll, John (BOS)

Subject:

GAO item #3 Grand Jury report

Categories:

2018.01.17 - GAO, 170662

Dear Supervisors:

The Retired Employees of the City and County of San Francisco (RECCSF) has been representing ALL retirees from the City, the Unified School District, the Community College District and the Superior Court since the 1950s. We find that the latest Civil Grand Jury Report on the SF Retirement System (SFERS) is scheduled for review at your committee this morning.

The RECCSF urges you to reject the findings of the Civil Grand Jury. The SFERS was among the top 5% in the nation for returns during the 2016-17 year and is now among the top 2 pension plans in the nation in the 2017-18 year. The fund is one of the most stable and best funded public pension plans in the nation. Clearly, the Grand Jury report does not accurately reflect the investment returns and stability of the fund.

Unlike a number of other local public pension plans, the SFERS has not changed it's rate of return nor has it seen a need to do so since it is easily reaching its rate of return. That also means that contribution rates from both employers and employees remain stable and will not be increasing.

We follow the performance of the SFERS very carefully and were dismayed by the clearly skewed report of the Civil Grand Jury. RECCSF rejects the findings and recommendations of the report. The Civil Grand Jury port does not accurately reflect the condition, performance and stability of the SFERS and should be jected by you.

Thank you very much for your consideration of our position and recommendation, Claire Zvanski
President, RECCSF



Introduction Form

By a Member of the Board of Supervisors or the Mayor

| I hereby submit the following item for introduction (select only one): | or meeting date |
|---|---|
| 1. For reference to Committee. (An Ordinance, Resolution, Motion, or Charter Amendme | nt) |
| 2. Request for next printed agenda Without Reference to Committee. | , |
| □ 3. Request for hearing on a subject matter at Committee. | • |
| 4. Request for letter beginning "Supervisor" | inquires" |
| 5. City Attorney request. | ~J |
| 6. Call File No. from Committee. | |
| 7. Budget Analyst request (attach written motion). | |
| 8. Substitute Legislation File No. | |
| 9. Reactivate File No. | |
| ☐ 10. Question(s) submitted for Mayoral Appearance before the BOS on | |
| Please check the appropriate boxes. The proposed legislation should be forwarded to the following Small Business Commission | ission n |
| ponsor(s): | ~ v~ |
| Clerk of the Board | |
| Subject: | |
| Hearing - Civil Grand Jury Report - The San Francisco Retirement System - Increasing Understan Voter Oversight | ding and Adding |
| The text is listed below or attached: | · |
| Hearing on the recently-published 2016-2017 Civil Grand Jury report, entitled "The San Francisco System - Increasing Understanding and Adding Voter Oversight." | Retirement |
| Signature of Sponsoring Supervisor: | |
| For Clork's Ligo Only: | - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |

Time stamp